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Introduction: Hegel and the foundations of post-structuralism

Continental post-structuralism has problematized the foundations

of philosophical and political thought. Perhaps dazzled by the impact

of this theoretical rupture, diverse American authors have embraced

this movement as the inauguration of a post-Philosophical culture

where philosophical claims and political judgements admit no

justification and rest on no foundation. This problematic, however,

settles too easily into a new opposition that obscures the real

possibilities afforded by contemporary Continental theory. At the

hands of both its supporters and its detractors, post-structuralism

has been incorporated into a series of Anglo-American debates --

between modernists and postmodernists, between communitarians and

liberals -- in such a way as to misdirect and blunt its force. If we

look closely at the historical development of post-structuralist

thought, however, at the complex social and theoretical pressures it

encountered and the tools it constructed to face them, we can

recapture some of its critical and constructive powers. Post-

structuralism, I argue, is not oriented simply toward the negation of

theoretical foundations, but rather toward the exploration of new

grounds for philosophical and political inquiry; correspondingly, it

is involved not simply in the rejection of the tradition of political

philosophy but more importantly in the articulation and affirmation of

alternative lineages.

The roots of post-structuralism and its unifying basis lie in a

general opposition not to the philosophical tradition tout court but

specifically to the Hegelian tradition. For the generation of

Continental thinkers that came to maturity in the 60s, Hegel was the

figure of order and authority that served as the focus of antagonism.

Deleuze speaks for his cohort: "Ce que je d‚testais avant tout,

c'‚tait l'h‚g‚lianisme et la dialectique." [Lettre … Michel Cressole

110] In order to appreciate this antagonism, however, we must realize

that, in the domain of Continental theory, Hegel was ubiquitous. As

the result of influential interpretations by theorists as diverse as

KojŠve, Gramsci, Sartre and Bobbio, Hegel had come to dominate the

theoretical horizon, as the ineluctable centerpiece of philosophical

speculation and political theory. In 1968, it appeared to Francois

Chƒtelet that every philosopher had to begin with Hegel. "[Hegel]

d‚termine un horizon, une langue, un code au sein duquels nous sommes

encore, aujourd'hui. Hegel, de ce fait, est notre Platon: celui qui

d‚limite --id‚ologiquement ou scientifiquement, positivement ou

negativement--les possibilities th‚oriques de la th‚orie." [2] Any

account of Continental post-structuralism must take this framework of

generalized Hegelianism as its point of departure.

The first problem of post-structuralism, then, is how to evade an

Hegelian foundation. In order to appreciate the extent of this

problem, however, we have to recognize the serious restrictions facing

such a project in this social and historical context. Chƒtelet

argues, in curiously dialectical fashion, that the only viable project

to counter Hegelianism is to make Hegel the negative foundation of

philosophy. Those who neglect the initial step of addressing and

actively rejecting Hegel, he claims, those who attempt simply to turn

their backs on Hegel, run the risk of ending up, finally, as mere

repetitions of the Hegelian problematic. "Nombreuses, certes, sont

les conceptions philosophiques actuelles que ignorant l'h‚g‚lianisme

.... Elles sont dans la fausse signification des commencements

absolus et de plus, se privent d'un bon point d'appui. Mieux vaut--

comme Marx et comme Nietzsche--commencer par Hegel, puisqu'il est une

fin." [4] Hegelianism was such a powerful vortex that in attempting

to ignore it one would inevitably be sucked in by its power. Only

anti-Hegelianism provided the negative point of support necessary for

a post-Hegelian project. Furthermore, Chƒtelet specifies that, at

least within the context of Continental theory, there were two avenues

available for pursuing this project: a Nietzschean philosophical

critique of Hegel and a Marxist political critique.

These two avenues available for an anti-Hegelian project offer a

first explanation for our focus in this study on the works of Gilles

Deleuze and Antonio Negri. In his early work, Deleuze pursues a

philosophical critique of the dialectic principally through his

interpretations of Bergson and Nietzsche. Negri's work complements

this project on a political plane by reading Marx and Lenin to develop

an adequate political critique of Hegelianism. In these works Deleuze

and Negri do not engage Hegelianism in order to salvage its worthwhile

elements; they do not propose their critiques as the extraction of

"the rational kernel from the mystical shell." They strive instead

toward a total critique and rejection of Hegelianism so as to attain a

real autonomy, a theoretical separation from the entire Hegelian

problematic. Nonetheless, we find that, perhaps since they are so

firmly embedded in their cultural contexts, this attempted

deracination from the Hegelian terrain is not immediately successful.

They not only pose their projects in terms of the typical Hegelian

problems -- the determination of being, the unity of the One and the

Multiple, the dialectical development of historical forces -- they

also do so in the traditional language of Hegelianism. Paradoxically,

Deleuze and Negri appear very Hegelian in their efforts to establish

Hegel as a negative foundation for their thought.

If Hegelianism is the first problem of post-structuralism, then,

anti-Hegelianism quickly presents itself as the second. In many

respects, Hegelianism is the most difficult of adversaries because it

possesses an extraordinary capacity to recuperate opposition. Many

Anglo-American authors, seeking to discount the rupture of Continental

post-structuralism, have rightly emphasized this dilemma. Judith

Butler presents the challenge for anti-Hegelians in very clear terms:

"references to a 'break' with Hegel are almost always impossible, if

only because Hegel has made the very notion of 'breaking with' into

the central tenet of his dialectic." [184] It may seem, then, from

this perspective, that to be anti-Hegelian, through a dialectical

twist, becomes a position more Hegelian than ever: in effect, one

might claim that the effort to be an "other" to Hegel can always be

folded into an "other" within Hegel. Several recent studies argue

that the work of contemporary anti-Hegelians consists merely in

unconscious repetitions of Hegelian dramas without the power of the

Hegelian subject and the rigor and clarity of Hegelian logic. (1)

The problem of recuperation that faces the anti-Hegelian

foundation of post-structuralism offers a second and more important

explanation for our selection of Deleuze and Negri in this study.

While numerous authors have made important contributions to our

critique of Hegel, Deleuze and Negri have gone the farthest in working

out of the problems of anti-Hegelianism and constructing an

alternative terrain for thought -- no longer post-Hegelian but simply

free from the problem of Hegel. There are two central elements of

this passage that Deleuze and Negri develop in different registers and

on different planes of thought: an absolute conception of negation and

a constitutive theory of practice. Even when Deleuze is engaged on

the highest planes of philosophical speculation and Negri embroiled in

local polemics of political strategy these two elements link their

thought as complementary essays in a common project. The radical

negation razes the theoretical horizon and marks an irrecuperable

rupture with the Hegelian problematic; mental and corporeal practices,

patterns of behavior, the powers of the immanent horizon, provide the

material point of support for the constitution of a new horizon.

These two themes, negation and practice, comprise the "foundations"

(2) of the new terrain that post-structuralism has to offer for

philosophical and political thought, a terrain for contemporary

research.

The concept of negation lies at the center of dialectical thought

and seems to pose the most serious challenge for any theory that

claims to be anti- or post-Hegelian. "Nondialectical difference,"

Judith Butler writes, "despite its various forms, is the labor of the

negative which has lost its 'magic'...." [184] The nondialectical

concept of negation that we find in Deleuze's total critique and in

Negri's theory of insurrection certainly contains none of the magical

effect of the dialectic. The dialectical negation is always directed

toward the miracle of resurrection: it is a negation "which supersedes

in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and

consequently survives its own supersession." [Phenomenology of Spirit

188] Nondialectical negation is more simple and more absolute. With

no faith in the beyond, in the eventual resurrection, negation becomes

an extreme moment of nihilism: in Hegelian terms, it means the death

of the other. Hegel considers this pure death, "the absolute Lord,"

merely an abstract conception of negation; in the contemporary world,

however, the absolute character of negation has become dreadfully

concrete and the magical resurrection implicit in the dialectical

negation appears merely as superstition. On the one hand, authors

like Deleuze and Negri propose this nondialectical concept of negation

not in the promotion of nihilism, but merely as the recognition of an

element of our world. We can situate this theoretical position in

relation to the recently-developed field of "nuclear criticism," but

not in the sense that nuclear weapons pose the threat of negation, not

in the sense that they pose the universal fear of death: this is

merely the "standing negation" of an Hegelian framework, preserving

the given order. The negation of the bomb is nondialectical in its

actuality, not in the planning rooms of Washington but in the streets

of Hiroshima, as an agent of total destruction. There is nothing

positive in the nondialectical negation, no magical resurrection: it

is pure. On the other hand, with an eye toward the philosophical

tradition, we can locate this radical conception of negation in the

methodological proposals of certain Scholastic authors such as Roger

Bacon. The pure negation is the first moment of a pre-critical

conception of critique: pars destruens, pars construens. The

important characteristic is the purity and autonomy of the two

critical moments. Negation clears the terrain for creation; it is a

bi-partite sequence that precludes any third, synthetic moment. Thus

we can identify solid grounds for this radical, nondialectical

negation: it is as new as the destructive force of contemporary

warfare and as old as the pre-critical skepticism of the Scholastics.

The radicality of negation forces Deleuze and Negri to engage

questions of the lowest order, questions of the nature of being.

Deleuze's total critique and Negri's theory of insurrection involve a

destruction so absolute that it becomes necessary to question what

makes reality possible. From the outset, however, we should

distinguish this from a Heideggerian return to ontology, most

importantly because Deleuze and Negri will only accept "superficial"

responses to the question "what makes being possible?" In other

words, they limit us to a strictly immanent and materialist

ontological discourse that refuses any deep or hidden foundation of

being. There is nothing veiled or negative about being; it is fully

expressed in the world. Being, in this sense, is superficial,

positive and full. (3) There are numerous contributions to this

project of a materialist ontology throughout the history of philosophy

-- Spinoza, Marx, Nietzsche, Lucretius, etc. -- and we will refer to

them in our discussion to provide stable points of support. We will

focus, however, on Deleuze's and Negri's constitutive conception of

practice as a foundation of ontology. The radical negation of the

nondialectical pars destruens emphasizes that no pre-constituted order

is available to define the organization of being. Practice provides

the terms for a material pars construens: practice is what makes the

constitution of being possible. The investigation of the nature of

power allows both Deleuze and Negri to bring substance to the

materialist discourse and to raise the theory of practice to the level

of ontology. The "foundation" of being, then, resides both on a

corporeal and on a mental plane, in the complex dynamics of behavior,

in the superficial interactions of bodies. This is not an

Althusserian "pratique th‚orique," but rather a more practical

conception of practice, autonomous of any "tendance th‚oriciste," a

"pratique pratique" that is oriented principally toward the

ontological rather than the epistemological realm. Here we have the

full paradox of a materialist ontology: existence precedes the essence

that founds it; or rather, beings (Seiendes) are constitutive of the

Being (Sein) that makes them possible. The only nature available to

ontological discourse is an absolutely artificial conception of nature

-- further removed than a second nature, an n-th nature. This

approach to ontology is as new as the infinitely plastic universe of

cyberpunk science fiction and as old as the tradition of materialist

philosophy. What will be important throughout our discussion is that

the traditionally fundamental terms -- necessity, nature, being, etc.

-- though shaken from their transcendental fixity, still play a

fundamental role because they acquire a certain consistency and

substance in our world. Being, now historicized and materialized, is

delimited by the outer bounds of the contemporary imagination.

I elaborate these conceptions of negation and practice in

Deleuze's and Negri's work by reading the evolutions of their thought,

that is, by following the progression of critical questions that guide

their investigations during successive periods. One one level the two

sequences are parallel: the first stage involves an engaged critique

of Hegelianism; the second develops a nondialectical conception of

negation; and the third proceeds to articulate the ontologically

constitutive nature of practice. On another plane, however, Deleuze's

and Negri's arguments move in opposite directions, outlining

complementary trajectories. Deleuze begins with a philosophical

critique, on the highest plane of ontological speculation, and works

progressively toward more social and political domains of discussion;

Negri, on the other hand, begins with a political critique of the

dialectic, grounded in practical and strategic questions of

organization, and gradually recognizes the need to pose the issues at

stake on higher planes of ontological generality. Finally, the two

halves of the study are also incongruent in tone and register.

Deleuze's work requires rigorous philosophical exegesis and meticulous

attention to the logical development of arguments. Negri's writings

demand a different rigor, a careful historical analysis, because his

arguments are so closely tied to the social and political context of

his work. Therefore, whereas Deleuze treats the issues involved

principally on a speculative plane, Negri demonstrates their power and

limitations, the possibilities they afford and the problems they

raise, on a practical and political plane.

The evolution of Deleuze's thought unfolds as he directs his

attention sequentially to a series of authors in the philosophical

canon and poses them each a specific question. His work on Bergson

offers a critique of negative ontology and proposes in its stead an

absolutely positive movement of being that rests on an efficient and

internal notion of causality. To the negative movement of

determination, he opposes the positive movement of differentiation; to

the dialectical unity of the One and the Multiple, he opposes the

irreducible multiplicity of becoming. The question of the

organization or constitution of the world, however, of the being of

becoming, pushes Deleuze to pose these ontological issues in ethical

terms. Nietzsche allows him to transpose the results of ontological

speculation to an ethical horizon, to the field of forces, of sense

and value, where the positive movement of being becomes the

affirmation of being. The thematic of power in Nietzsche provides the

theoretical passage that links Bergsonian ontology to an ethics of

active expression. Spinoza covers this same passage and extends it to

practice: just as Nietzsche posed the affirmation of speculation,

Spinoza poses the affirmation of practice, or joy, at the center of

ontology. Deleuze argues that Spinoza's is an ontological conception

of practice; Spinoza conceives practice, that is, as constitutive of

being. In the pre-critical world of Spinoza's practical philosophy,

Deleuze's thought finally discovers a real autonomy from the Hegelian

problematic.

In certain respects, Negri's work takes up this inquiry where

Deleuze leaves off, extending the theory of social practice toward a

political conception of constitution. Negri sets out from a juridical

and economic critique of the dialectical nature of capital, of its

capacity to subsume the innovative thrust of productive social forces

and recuperate the workers' opposition within the unified order of its

own development. His theorizing moves entirely within the volatile

dynamic of the Italian social struggles, consolidating and formulating

the strengths and limitations of their practices on a theoretical

plane. Negri interprets these social movements not only as a

practical critique of the role of the State in the determination of

social organization, but also as the positive proposition of an

alternative constitution of society. The theory of insurrection is

followed by "the logic of separation," an autonomous logic of a new

social organization. Just as Deleuze seeks an autonomous foundation

for philosophy outside of the Hegelian problematic, Negri strives to

identify the existing elements of a democratic constitution of

society, independent of the recuperative powers of capital and the

State. The practices of the new social movements pose alternative

systems of organization and valorization, and thus indicate the path

to the constitution of a new social being. Through the dynamic of

political organization, Negri argues, we can intervene in the social

process of ontological constitution. The innovative powers of social

practices push the popular imagination beyond its previous limits,

creating an ontological excess and thereby constituting a new figure

in the constellation of being.

Throughout our study we will encounter unresolved problems and

propositions that are powerfully suggestive but not clearly and

rigorously delimited. We do not look to Deleuze and Negri here,

however, simply to find the solutions to contemporary theoretical

problems. More importantly, we inquire into their thought in order to

investigate the proposals of a new problematic for research after the

post-structuralist rupture, to test our footing on a terrain where new

foundations of philosophical and political thought are possible.

Notes

1 - In addition to Judith Butler's Subjects of Desire, see Stephen

Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics, Gillian

Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism and John Grumley, History and Totality:

Radical Historicism from Hegel to Foucault.

2 - By "foundations" I refer both to the philosophical traditions

that offer solid and extensive grounding and to the theoretical and

practical elements that make post-structuralist thought possible.

3 - Another important difference from the Heideggerian ontological

problematic is Deleuze's and Negri's refusal of an "intellectualist"

account of being. In Heidegger's terms, Being is what makes the

comprehension of beings possible. Deleuze and Negri deny the

fundamental role of "comprehension" here. We will deal with this

question at length in terms of the interpretation of the attributes in

Spinoza's ontology.