Will White NATO's Peacekeeping Mandate Any analysis of the Cold War would be vastly incomplete without mention of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A group of Western nations has operated within this collective defense framework since 1949. The NATO bloc formed the "side" of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The defense plans of the most powerful capitalist countries in the world were made with regard to this treaty. In addition, NATO marked the final end of the isolationism of the United States, giving it a lasting and formal commitment to the protection of a large portion of Europe. It is relevant to wonder what other roles, besides forming the bulwark of Western defense, this powerful organization played during the Cold War. This topic is especially relevant today, as questions arise regarding the future of NATO and its continuing existence in the post-Cold War climate. One of the most prominent of these questions regards the organization's mandate for United Nations style peacekeeping operations. NATO forces were very successful in Bosnia performing one of these campaigns in 1995. Indeed, as early as 1992 it could be reported that, "NATO nations approved a new peacekeeping role for the alliance...saying that they could join former Warsaw Pact enemies and other European states in such missions if asked to act by the United Nations."1 This is interesting with regard to NATO's history, as the organization has not always been so enthusiastic about peacekeeping. NATO's mandate for peacekeeping was viewed differently at different points of the Cold War. Before the Cyprus crises of 1964 several nations, most notably the United States, had been lobbying for NATO to adopt a peacekeeping role. After the mid-1960's, however, the call for NATO peacekeeping was conspicuously absent from Western politics. Thus the conflict between the NATO states Greece and Turkey over the Eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus presents a major turning point in the alliance's history. An analysis of any NATO mandate would naturally begin with the North Atlantic Treaty itself. Fortunately, this document is short and very easy to follow. In fact, Theodore Achilles, one of the principal United States negotiators for the treaty, recalls that, "He [John D. Hickerson: Director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs] maintained that the treaty should be written in such simple language that 'even a milkman in Omaha can understand it.'"2 The NATO treaty's fourteen articles can be broken down into several thematic parts: the preamble and articles 1-2, the collective defense arrangements of articles 3-5, the "geography" definition of article 6, and the international obligation and housekeeping articles 7-14.3 The part that lends itself most to a peacekeeping mandate is the opening. There is clearly not much of a basis for peacekeeping-style operations in the main "thrust" of the treaty, articles 3-5. These articles contain the core NATO clauses concerning mutual military and economic assistance as well as the collective defense clause. The preamble and opening clauses, however, are much more vague and leave room for a peacekeeping NATO. Contained in this section are several phrases that could be interpreted as providing a basis for peacekeeping. One prominent sentence from the preamble reads, "They [the NATO nations] are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security."4 This rather general statement alone would seem to provide an excellent basis for NATO peacekeeping missions. This is not necessarily the case in practice, as Theodore Achilles remarked that during the negotiations, "little importance was attached to a preamble - 'mere pious platitudes'..."5 However, the fact remains that NATO has no problem using its founding treaty to justify international peacekeeping operations. There are several situations that demonstrate NATO's pre-Cyprus peacekeeping inclinations. The Korean War in particular stands out as an example. Suddenly finding itself in its first major international armed conflict, the principle peacekeeping organization of the world, the United Nations, appeared to want NATO's help. The major manifestation of this call for help by the UN was the "Uniting for Peace Resolution." This was a proposal sponsored by the United States to let the General Assembly mobilize peacekeeping forces; it allowed for a means to bypass a Soviet veto in the Security Council.6 This was primarily a way to let NATO forces operate under the aegis of the United Nations. Along similar lines, The Economist reported in 1951 that on American initiative a proposal was put forward stating, "a unified UN command such as has been formed in Korea should be entrusted not to one nation but to a group of nations which already possessed a joint command."7 It should be noted that at the time the only "joint command" in existence belonged to NATO. It would seem that a joint NATO operation under UN auspices in Korea was inevitable. Yet it never occurred. There are several plausible explanations, including want of will or military ability and general lack of concern over Asian affairs. Yet there is one powerful reason behind NATO's reluctance to become involved in Korea, and that involves geographical limits. Article 6 of the NATO treaty specifically defines a geographical sphere of military operations for NATO that does not include anything outside the member states and the North Atlantic region. Theodore Achilles, however, does mention that the founding fathers of the treaty did not mean the geography defined in Article 6 to be strictly binding in the event of an extraterritorial danger to security.8 Nevertheless, with the exceptions of the United States and Britain, the NATO powers have been extremely reluctant to commit military resources beyond the Atlantic area, both before and especially after the aforementioned Cyprus dilemma. There is one more pre-Cyprus justification for NATO peacekeeping, and it leads directly into the Mediterranean crisis. In 1956, a NATO committee referred to as the "Three Wise Men" prepared a report that was to serve as the foundation for intervention in Cyprus. This report basically stated that NATO countries needed to settle peacefully any inter-NATO problem; NATO should be the first organization to handle such crises; and member nations should report any events or situations that could threaten the stability of the organization.9 This report had a large influence on the Paul-Henri Spaak, the activist NATO Secretary-General from 1957 to 1961. He later asserted that, "So far as I personally was concerned, the adoption of the report of the Three Wise Men was to have momentous results."10 In reference to the new, increased political activity of the alliance, Spaak also significantly remarked, "No longer were these consultations to be confined within the geographical limits set out in the Washington Treaty, but they were to range freely throughout the world."11 By 1957, NATO had the history and justification to attempt peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the 1964 Cyprus crisis proved, until very recently, to be the end of NATO's peacekeeping urges. Cyprus has had, to say the least, a very troubled history in the years after World War II. Cyprus, a former British colony, possesses a large Greek majority and a Turkish minority. Unlike other British colonies that clamored for independence, the Greek majority led by the Orthodox religious leader Archbishop Makarios demanded Enosis, or union with Greece. The Turkish population of the island strongly objected. The Greek and Turkish governments each supported their own ethnic groups, and thus put two NATO powers in direct conflict. The situation was compounded by the presence on Cyprus of British military installations deemed essential to the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean region against Soviet aggression. Thus NATO had two very good incentives for intervention. In 1958, then Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak realized the danger this situation posed to the Alliance and used the basis of the "Three Wise Men" report to intervene diplomatically in the situation by beginning negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and Britain.12 This intervention was unsuccessful, but it led to further negotiations that granted independence and ruled out Enosis. These negotiations proved to be temporarily successful at averting disaster. This NATO action in the late 1950's proved that the organization could be a suitable forum for member nations to resolve disputes. Philip Windsor, looking back on NATO's Cyprus history, puts it this way, "There are strict limits to the general policy planning that can be accomplished by NATO; but on particular points of emergent conflict, the Secretary-General and his staff could achieve much by timely and preventative diplomacy."13 Ultimately, despite these efforts, it was the later Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 that proved the end of NATO peacekeeping efforts. In December 1963, open violence erupted on Cyprus between the Greeks and Turks. The cause was the new constitution, which neither ethnic group particularly liked. The violence continued for months, despite the presence of British troops. The Turkish government threatened periodically to militarily intervene, and the Greek government was secretly providing arms to the Greek Cypriots. 14 This was the background for the first real NATO armed forces peacekeeping proposal of the Cold War. The actual plan was a British idea, proposed and supported by the United States. It consisted of nothing more than an invitation for all NATO nations to contribute military men and materiel to a peacekeeping operation on the island to stop the armed violence. The basic reason for American support is summed up nicely, "The United States offer of a peacekeeping force for Cyprus was based on fear of a Greco-Turkish war that could collapse the south eastern flank of NATO and topple the Western defense strategy in Europe."15 In fact, Britain and the United States were the only nations to seriously contemplate this plan; all other European NATO powers considered it out of their area of concern.16 Even before Cyprus, in 1960, Paul-Henri-Spaak, in his resignation letter from Secretary-General of NATO, mentioned: Countries such as Canada, Norway, and Denmark feel that they cannot go beyond their splendid effort in 1949. At all events, they refuse to undertake any fresh military commitments and are even reluctant to associate themselves closely with the policies of their allies in areas beyond the geographical limits set by the Treaty of Washington. While they are prepared to take part in a search for a common stance on European problems such as those of Berlin and Germany, they are disinclined to do so in regard to issues arising in other parts of the world.17 Although this statement betrays some of the diplomatic frustration Spaak was feeling at the time, it nevertheless conveys a dominant attitude in NATO regarding expansion beyond the traditional North Atlantic area. This underlined the continuing validity of NATO's geographical limitations. The deathblow to the plan occurred when the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, rejected it. As Philip Windsor put it, "But the heart of the problem was that NATO could only intervene at the invitation of the Archbishop, and it was obvious from the beginning that he would never consent. There could never be any question of accepting on Cypriot territory the armed presence of NATO forces."18 To intervene without his approval, NATO would have faced insurmountable charges of imperialism from the United Nations. Nevertheless, there could be no question of the urgent need for NATO intervention. The United Nations was involved in the crisis, but with very limited effect. President Makarios did allow a UN peacekeeping force on the island, but in effect its only accomplishment was to prevent Turkey from landing troops. The United Nations was fairly impotent on Cyprus. An account of the situation written later in 1964 sums up the UN effect: But the tragedy of the situation was the evident weakness of the UN in Cyprus, its inability to keep the peace except on an ad hoc and patched up basis, its inability to stop the landing of Greek arms (which began in earnest in March), its impotence to protect the Turkish minority from the continuous and remorseless pressure of the Greek Cypriot irregulars...all this made it more urgent for NATO to revive the dialogue between its two conflicting members.19 Yet NATO did not revive this dialogue. There were no more diplomatic initiatives such as the one Paul-Henri Spaak lead in 1958. After the British intervention plan was killed, NATO did little more than provide a table where Greece and Turkey could talk at each other. The situation was left to the United Nations, which could not handle it. Many attempts were made to mediate by diplomacy and armed peacekeeping; none were successful. United Nations troops remained in Cyprus breaking up Greek-Turkish violence into the 1990's.20 NATO did nothing after 1964, even though the need for resolution for this inter-member conflict remained. Martin Smith commented, "When, for example, the simmering disputes over Cyprus erupted for a third time, in 1974, no Western government was prepared even to consider the possibility of involving NATO in the organization of a fresh peacekeeping mission."21 If, with the Spaak precedent and background of the Three Wise Men report, NATO could not control a dispute between two of its own nations over an island technically within its geographical boundary, how could it expect to involve itself in a Third World peacekeeping operation? In a report to the Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly in 1968, C. L. Patijn made the recommendation, "NATO as an organization cannot operate outside the NATO-area."22 Even as early as November 1964 the attitude was voiced, "...the Cyprus crisis has reinforced the truth of a platitude. NATO is a defensive alliance. Peacekeeping is the function of the UN."23 With a model this bad, it is no wonder NATO abstained from peacekeeping until the end of the Soviet superpower. After 1964, it appeared that NATO's geographical constraints tied with its necessary preoccupation with the Soviet bloc effectively prohibited peacekeeping initiatives. This has changed very dramatically since the end of Soviet power, and a look at just what has changed since Cyprus proves very informative. In 1992, NATO nations approved a new peacekeeping role for the alliance. The most obvious cause for this turnaround is the fall of the Soviet Union. The European NATO nations need no longer fear a communist superpower at their eastern border. Doug Bandow even went so far as to say, "the USSR's collapse eliminated the justification for NATO, anchor of the Cold War collective defense system."24 Bandow argues that the thrust behind this new peacekeeping NATO comes from former pro-NATO officials seeking justification for the alliance's continued existence. A counter argument is that since future peacekeeping is inevitable, NATO is far better suited to this military role than the United Nations. Recent NATO action in Bosnia seems to support this claim. Even Bandow admits, "Because NATO commands actual troops, it would probably win any competition with the U.N."25 This does not, however, resolve NATO's number one impediment to peacekeeping since Cyprus, the geographic constraint. NATO's geographic limits were a prime factor for Cyprus, and they remain so today. It is unclear whether the basic European Atlantic-central view has changed appreciably, but there are signs that it has. For instance: ...in March 1992, the [NATO] council considered a possible military role for NATO in Azerbaijan, a region roughly 1,700 miles from Western Europe. While NATO officials rejected any immediate intervention, they indicated they were pleased with the idea of backing up the alliance's peacekeeping efforts with force.26 Given NATO's very early flirtations with peacekeeping and the end of its major mission, it is probable that if the alliance is to survive, it will need to overcome the geographic constraint. In any event, it would prove most beneficial for NATO policy-makers to study the history of Cyprus in their continuing deliberations for NATO peacekeeping. Only by analyzing and overcoming the problems of Cyprus can future NATO peacekeeping be successful. 1 Nicholas Doughty, 17 December 1992, "NATO Takes New Peacekeeping Role as Agent of U.N." Reuters North American Wire. 2 Theodore Achilles, 1985, "The Omaha Milkman: The role of the United States in the Negotiations," in Andre de Staercke (ed.), NATO's Anxious Birth (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 35. 3 "The North Atlantic Treaty," From the NATO Web-archive. [Internet, WWW], ADDRESS: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm 4 "The North Atlantic Treaty." 5 Achilles, p. 39. 6 Joseph Johnson, 1951, "Strengthening Collective Security," in Clyde Eagleton and Richard Swift (ed.), Annual Review of United Nations Affairs (New York: New York University Press), pp. 239-240. 7 "NATO as a United Nations Instrument?", The Economist, 11 August 1951, p. 329. 8 Achilles, p. 37. 9 Philip Windsor, NATO and the Cyprus Crisis, Adelphi Paper, no. 14, London: IISS, 1964. 10 Paul-Henri Spaak, 1972, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966, translated by Henry Fox, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company), p. 259. 11 Spaak, p. 258. 12 Martin A. Smith, spring, 1995, "At Arm's Length: NATO and the UN in the Cold War Era," International Peacekeeping Vol. 2 (1), p.67. 13 Windsor, p. 16. 14 Windsor, p. 17. 15 Halil Ibrahim Salih, 1968, Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord (New York: Theo. Gaus' Sons), pp. 113-114. 16 Windsor, p. 13. 17 Spaak, p. 348. 18 Windsor, p. 7. 19 Windsor, p. 14 20 Goeff Simons, 1994, The United Nations: A Chronology of Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 133-134. 21 Smith, p. 70. 22 C. L. Patijn, 1968, "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 6 (4), p. 517. 23 Windsor, p. 16. 24 Doug Bandow, 22 December 1992, "Avoiding War; U.S. Security Policy and International Security," Foreign Policy No. 89, p. 156. 25 Bandow 26 Bandow Bibliography Achilles, Theodore. 1985. "The Omaha Milkman: The role of the United States in the Negotiations," in Andre de Staercke. Ed. NATO's Anxious Birth. New York: St. Martin's Press. Bandow, Doug. 22 December 1992. "Avoiding War; U.S. Security Policy and International Security." Foreign Policy No. 89, p. 156. Crawshaw, Nancy. 1978. The Cyprus Revolt. London: William Clowes & Sons. Doughty, Nicholas. 17 December 1992. "NATO Takes New Peacekeeping Role as Agent of U.N." Reuters North American Wire. Johnson, Joseph. 1951. "Strengthening Collective Security." in Clyde Eagleton and Richard Swift. Ed. Annual Review of United Nations Affairs. New York: New York University Press. "NATO as a United Nations Instrument?" The Economist. 11 August 1951. p. 329. "The North Atlantic Treaty." From the NATO Web-archive. [Internet, WWW]. ADDRESS: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm Patijn, C. L. 1968. "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance." The Atlantic Community Quarterly. Vol. 6 (4), pp. 512-519. Salih, Halil Ibrahim. 1968. Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord. New York: Theo. Gaus' Sons. Simons, Geoff. 1994. The United Nations: A Chronology of Conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press. Smith, Joseph. Ed. 1990. The Origins of NATO. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. Smith, Martin A. 1995. "At Arm's Length: NATO and the UN in the Cold War Era." International Peacekeeping Vol. 2 (1), pp. 56-73. Spaak, Paul-Henri. 1972. The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966. translated by Henry Fox. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Windsor, Philip. 1964. NATO and the Cyprus Crisis. Adelphi Paper. No. 14. London: IISS.