Social science approaches networks in at least three ways: as flows, as trust, and as claims on resources. All three of these images work for the "mosque network" in Pahlavi Iran. Yet the mosque network has been highly overrated in studies of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Contemporaneous documents and recollections by revolutionaries indicate that most mosques were under the control of non-revolutionary religious scholars who were hesitant to allow their institution to get involved in anti-shah activism. As a result, the network had to be created/ coopted for revolutionary purposes. What can we learn from this about Muslim networks? I propose that 1) networks don't just "exist" on their own, but have to be built; 2) networks may have different purposes that are not easily transferable to other goals; and 3) networks should not be "reified", but rather that the process of reification should itself be an object of study.

1. Conceptions of networks in social science:
    - flows along paths of least resistance (Castells, Abu Lughod "footsteps in snow" image)
    - trust that reduces the transaction costs of collective action (socialcapital literature)
    - claims on others' time, energy, resources (social movement literature)
2. All three images work for the "mosque network" in Pahlavi Iran.
    - flows: time-honored system of communications and travel among mosques
    - trust: expectations of other mosque leaders' behaviors
    - claims: authority to collect tithes (All three aspects operated transnationally, not just inside Iran.)
3. Yet the "mosque network" has been highly overrated in studies of the Iranian Revolution
    - most senior religious scholars were opposed to the revolution
    - the radicals were barred from protesting in most mosques and seminaries
    - the radicals hated the moderates for this
4. The "mosque network" had to be created/coopted for revolutionary purposes.
    - radicals called on moderates to support them
    - radicals exposed themselves to repression to radicalize the moderates
    - radicals threatened the moderates in various ways
    - radicals built a counter-network
5. The common image of the Iranian "mosque network" was a result of the revolutionary mobilization, not a cause of it.
6. What can we learn from this about Muslim networks?
    - that networks don't just "exist" on their own; they have to be built
    - that networks may have different purposes that are not easily transferable to other goals
    - that networks should not be "reified", but rather that the process of reification should itself be an object of study.