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S E C T. VII.

Of know-
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probabi-
lity.

*Of the nature of the idea or
belief.*

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THE idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole. We conceive many things, which we do not believe. In order then to discover more fully the nature of belief, or the qualities of those ideas we assent to, let us weigh the following considerations.

'Tis evident, that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions, concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities. 'Tis also evident, that the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we wou'd conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceiv'd by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate

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rate and distinguish from them. But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that the conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those, which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes. But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the *manner*, in which we conceive it.

SUPPOSE a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, *that Cæsar dy'd in his bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold*; 'tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms. My imagination is endow'd with the same powers as his; nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I cannot conceive; or conjoin any, which I cannot

PART cannot conjoin. I therefore ask, Wherein
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 lity. disbelieving any proposition? The answer is
 easy with regard to propositions, that are
 prov'd by intuition or demonstration. In
 that case, the person, who assents, not only
 conceives the ideas according to the propo-
 sition, but is necessarily determin'd to con-
 ceive them in that particular manner, either
 immediately or by the interposition of other
 ideas. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible;
 nor is it possible for the imagination to con-
 ceive any thing contrary to a demonstration.
 But as in reasonings from causation, and
 concerning matters of fact, this absolute ne-
 cessity cannot take place, and the imagina-
 tion is free to conceive both sides of the
 question, I still ask, *Wherein consists the
 difference betwixt incredulity and belief?*
 since in both cases the conception of the
 idea is equally possible and requisite.

'T W I L L not be a satisfactory answer to
 say, that a person, who does not assent to
 a proposition you advance; after having
 conceiv'd the object in the same manner
 with you; immediately conceives it in a
 different manner, and has different ideas of
 it. This answer is unsatisfactory; not be-
 cause it contains any falshood, but because

it

it discovers not all the truth. 'Tis confest, SECT.
 that in all cases, wherein we dissent from VII.
 any person, we conceive both sides of the Of the na-
 question; but as we can believe only one, ture of the
 it evidently follows, that the belief must idea or
 make some difference betwixt that concep- belief.
 tion to which we assent, and that from
 which we dissent. We may mingle, and
 unite, and separate, and confound, and vary
 our ideas in a hundred different ways; but
 'till there appears some principle, which fixes
 one of these different situations, we have in
 reality no opinion: And this principle, as
 it plainly makes no addition to our prece-
 dent ideas, can only change the *manner* of
 our conceiving them.

ALL the perceptions of the mind are of
 two kinds, *viz.* impressions and ideas, which
 differ from each other only in their dif-
 ferent degrees of force and vivacity. Our
 ideas are copy'd from our impressions, and
 represent them in all their parts. When
 you wou'd any way vary the idea of a par-
 ticular object, you can only encrease or di-
 minish its force and vivacity. If you make
 any other change on it, it represents a dif-
 ferent object or impression. The case is the
 same as in colours. A particular shade of
 any colour may acquire a new degree of
 liveliness

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liveliness or brightness without any other variation. But when you produce any other variation, 'tis no longer the same shade or colour. So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION*.

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* We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of establish'd maxim, and is universally received by all logicians. This error consists in the vulgar division of the acts of the understanding, into *conception*, *judgment* and *reasoning*, and in the definitions we give of them. Conception is defin'd to be the simple survey of one or more ideas: Judgment to be the separating or uniting of different ideas: Reasoning to be the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other. But these distinctions and definitions are faulty in very considerable articles. For *first*, 'tis far from being true, that in every judgment, which we form, we unite two different ideas; since in that proposition, *God is*, or indeed any other, which regards existence, the idea of existence is no distinct idea, which we unite with that of the object, and which is capable of forming a compound idea by the union. *Secondly*, As we can thus form a proposition, which contains only one idea, so we may exert our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause immediately from

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HERE are the heads of those arguments, which lead us to this conclusion. When we infer the existence of an object from that of others, some object must always be present either to the memory or senses, in order to be the foundation of our reasoning; since the mind cannot run up with its inferences *in infinitum*. Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determin'd by reason, but by custom or a principle of association. But belief is some-

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its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect the two extremes. What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects. Whether we consider a single object, or several; whether we dwell on these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conception, and are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive. This act of the mind has never yet been explain'd by any philosopher; and therefore I am at liberty to propose my hypothesis concerning it; which is, that 'tis only a strong and steady conception of any idea, and such as approaches in some measure to an immediate impression.

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what more than a simple idea. 'Tis a particular manner of forming an idea: And as the same idea can only be vary'd by a variation of its degrees of force and vivacity; it follows upon the whole, that belief is a lively idea produc'd by a relation to a present impression, according to the foregoing definition.

THIS definition will also be found to be entirely conformable to every one's feeling and experience. Nothing is more evident, than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more strong, firm and vivid, than the loose reveries of a castle-builder. If one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another as a true history; they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author. His words produce the same ideas in both; tho' his testimony has not the same influence on them. The latter has a more lively conception of all the incidents. He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons: represents to himself their actions, and characters, and friendships, and enmities: He even goes so far as to form a notion of their features, and air, and person. While the

the former, who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more faint and languid conception of all these particulars ; and except on account of the style and ingenuity of the composition, can receive little entertainment from it.

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Of the causes of belief.

HAVING thus explain'd the nature of belief, and shewn that it consists in a lively idea related to a present impression ; let us now proceed to examine from what principles it is deriv'd, and what bestows the vivacity on the idea.

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I wou'd willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, *that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.* All the operations of the mind depend in a great measure on its disposition, when it performs them ; and according as the spirits are more or less elevated, and the attention more or less fix'd, the action will always have more or less vigour and vivacity.

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vacuity. When therefore any object is presented, which elevates and enlivens the thought, every action, to which the mind applies itself, will be more strong and vivid, as long as that disposition continues. Now 'tis evident the continuance of the disposition depends entirely on the objects, about which the mind is employ'd; and that any new object naturally gives a new direction to the spirits, and changes the disposition; as on the contrary, when the mind fixes constantly on the same object, or passes easily and insensibly along related objects, the disposition has a much longer duration. Hence it happens, that when the mind is once enliven'd by a present impression, it proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related objects, by a natural transition of the disposition from the one to the other. The change of the objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of the related idea with all the force and vivacity it acquir'd from the present impression.

IF in considering the nature of relation, and that facility of transition, which is essential to it, we can satisfy ourselves concerning the reality of this phænomenon, 'tis well: But I must confess I place my chief confidence

fidence in experience to prove so material a SECT.
 principle. We may, therefore, observe, as VIII.
 the first experiment to our present purpose, Of the
 that upon the appearance of the picture of causes of
 an absent friend, our idea of him is evi- belief.
 dently inliven'd by the *resemblance*, and that
 every passion, which that idea occasions,
 whether of joy or sorrow, acquires new
 force and vigour. In producing this effect
 there concur both a relation and a present
 impression. Where the picture bears him
 no resemblance, or at least was not intend-
 ed for him, it never so much as conveys
 our thought to him: And where it is ab-
 sent, as well as the person; tho' the mind
 may pass from the thought of the one to
 that of the other; it feels its idea to be ra-
 ther weaken'd than inliven'd by that transi-
 tion. We take a pleasure in viewing the
 picture of a friend, when 'tis set before us;
 but when 'tis remov'd, rather choose to
 consider him directly, than by reflexion in
 an image, which is equally distant and ob-
 scure.

THE ceremonies of the *Roman Catholic*
 religion may be consider'd as experiments
 of the same nature. The devotees of that
 strange superstition usually plead in excuse
 of the mummeries, with which they are

PART III. *Of knowledge and probability.* upbraided, that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in inlivening their devotion, and quickening their fervour, which otherwise wou'd decay away, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types, than 'tis possible for us to do, merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other ; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas, to which they are related, and which they resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in inlivening the idea is very common ; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur, we are abundantly supply'd with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle.

WE may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind, in considering the effects of *contiguity*, as well as of *resemblance*. 'Tis certain, that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and that upon our approach to any object ; tho' it does not discover

discover itself to our senses ; it operates upon the mind with an influence that imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous ; but 'tis only the actual presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant ; tho' even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends and family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter case, both the objects of the mind are ideas ; notwithstanding there is an easy transition betwixt them ; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate impression. *See Appendix*

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No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are fond of the relicts of saints and holy men, for the same reason that they seek after types and images, in order to invigorate their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives, which they desire to imitate. Now 'tis evident, one of the best relicts a

PART devotee cou'd procure, wou'd be the handy-
 III. work of a faint; and if his cloaths and fur-
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 Of know- niture are ever to be consider'd in this light,  
 ledge and 'tis because they were once at his disposal,  
 probability. and were mov'd and affected by him; in  
 which respect they are to be consider'd as  
 imperfect effects, and as connected with him  
 by a shorter chain of consequences than any  
 of those, from which we learn the reality  
 of his existence. This phænomenon clearly  
 proves, that a present impressiion with a  
 relation of causation may enliven any  
 idea, and consequently produce belief or  
 assent, according to the precedent definition  
 of it.

BUT why need we seek for other ar-  
 guments to prove, that a present impressiion  
 with a relation or transitiion of the fancy  
 may inliven any idea, when this very  
 instance of our reasonings from cause and  
 effect will alone suffice to that purpose?  
 'Tis certain we must have an idea of every  
 matter of fact, which we believe. 'Tis  
 certain, that this idea arises only from a re-  
 lation to a present impressiion. 'Tis certain,  
 that the belief super-adds nothing to the  
 idea, but only changes our manner of con-  
 ceiving it, and renders it more strong and  
 lively. The present conclusion concerning  
 the

the influence of relation is the immediate consequence of all these steps; and every step appears to me sure and infallible. There enters nothing into this operation of the mind but a present impression, a lively idea, and a relation or association in the fancy betwixt the impression and idea; so that there can be no suspicion of mistake.

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IN order to put this whole affair in a fuller light, let us consider it as a question in natural philosophy, which we must determine by experience and observation. I suppose there is an object presented, from which I draw a certain conclusion, and form to myself ideas, which I am said to believe or assent to. Here 'tis evident, that however that object, which is present to my senses, and that other, whose existence I infer by reasoning, may be thought to influence each other by their particular powers or qualities; yet as the phænomenon of belief, which we at present examine, is merely internal, these powers and qualities, being entirely unknown, can have no hand in producing it. 'Tis the present impression, which is to be consider'd as the true and real cause of the idea, and of the belief which attends it. We must therefore endeavour to discover by experiments the par-

PART ticular qualities, by which 'tis enabled to  
 III. produce so extraordinary an effect.

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FIRST then I observe, that the present impression has not this effect by its own proper power and efficacy, and when consider'd alone, as a single perception, limited to the present moment. I find, that an impression, from which, on its first appearance, I can draw no conclusion, may afterwards become the foundation of belief, when I have had experience of its usual consequences. We must in every case have observ'd the same impression in past instances, and have found it to be constantly conjoin'd with some other impression. This is confirm'd by such a multitude of experiments, that it admits not of the smallest doubt.

FROM a second observation I conclude, that the belief, which attends the present impression, and is produc'd by a number of past impressions and conjunctions; that this belief, I say, arises immediately, without any new operation of the reason or imagination. Of this I can be certain, because I never am conscious of any such operation, and find nothing in the subject, on which it can be founded. Now as we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion,

clusion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impressi<sup>o</sup>n, is deriv'd solely from that origin. When we are accus<sup>t</sup>om'd to see two impressi<sup>o</sup>ns conjoin'd together, the appearance or idea of the one immediately carries us to the idea of the other.

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BEING fully satisfi'd on this head, I make a third set of experiments, in order to know, whether any thing be requisite, beside the customary transiti<sup>o</sup>n, towards the production of this phænomenon of belief. I therefore change the first impressi<sup>o</sup>n into an idea; and observe, that tho' the customary transiti<sup>o</sup>n to the correlative idea still remains, yet there is in reality no belief nor persuasi<sup>o</sup>n. A present impressi<sup>o</sup>n, then, is absolutely requisite to this whole operation; and when after this I compare an impressi<sup>o</sup>n with an idea, and find that their only difference consists in their different degrees of force and vivacity, I conclude upon the whole, that belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impressi<sup>o</sup>n.

THUS all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensati<sup>o</sup>n. 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy.

PART III. When I am convinc'd of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another.

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'T W I L L here be worth our observation, that the past experience, on which all our judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some measure be unknown to us. A person, who stops short in his journey upon meeting a river in his way, foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these consequences is convey'd to him by past experience, which informs him of such certain conjunctions of causes and effects. But can we think, that on this occasion he reflects on any past experience, and calls to remembrance instances, that he has seen or heard of, in order to discover the effects of

water

water on animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method, in which he proceeds in his reasoning. The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of water, and the idea of suffocating with that of sinking, that the mind makes the transition without the assistance of the memory. The custom operates before we have time for reflection. The objects seem so inseparable, that we interpose not a moment's delay in passing from the one to the other. But as this transition proceeds from experience, and not from any primary connexion betwixt the ideas, we must necessarily acknowledge, that experience may produce a belief and a judgment of causes and effects by a secret operation, and without being once thought of. This removes all pretext, if there yet remains any, for asserting that the mind is convinc'd by reasoning of that principle, *that instances of which we have no experience, must necessarily resemble those, of which we have.* For we here find, that the understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past experience, without reflecting on it; much more without forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon that principle.

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PART IN general we may observe, that in all  
 III. the most establish'd and uniform conjunc-  
 tions of causes and effects, such as those of  
 gravity, impulse, solidity, &c. the mind  
 never carries its view expressly to consider  
 any past experience: Tho' in other affoci-  
 ations of objects, which are more rare and  
 unusual, it may assist the custom and tran-  
 sition of ideas by this reflection. Nay we  
 find in some cases, that the reflection pro-  
 duces the belief without the custom; or  
 more properly speaking, that the reflection  
 produces the custom in an *oblique* and *ar-*  
*tificial* manner. I explain myself. 'Tis  
 certain, that not only in philosophy, but  
 even in common life, we may attain the  
 knowledge of a particular cause merely by  
 one experiment, provided it be made with  
 judgment, and after a careful removal of  
 all foreign and superfluous circumstances.  
 Now as after one experiment of this kind,  
 the mind, upon the appearance either of the  
 cause or the effect, can draw an inference  
 concerning the existence of its correlative;  
 and as a habit can never be acquir'd merely  
 by one instance; it may be thought, that  
 belief cannot in this case be esteem'd the  
 effect of custom. But this difficulty will  
 vanish, if we consider, that tho' we are  
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here suppos'd to have had only one experiment of a particular effect, yet we have many millions to convince us of this principle; *that like objects, plac'd in like circumstances, will always produce like effects*; and as this principle has establish'd itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply'd. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment; but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either *expressly* or *tacitly*, either *directly* or *indirectly*.

I MUST not conclude this subject without observing, that 'tis very difficult to talk of the operations of the mind with perfect propriety and exactness; because common language has seldom made any very nice distinctions among them, but has generally call'd by the same term all such as nearly resemble each other. And as this is a source almost inevitable of obscurity and confusion in the author; so it may frequently give rise to doubts and objections in the reader, which otherwise he wou'd never have dream'd of,

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PART of. Thus my general position, that an opinion or belief is *nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv'd from a present impression related to it*, may be liable to the following objection, by reason of a little ambiguity in those words *strong and lively*. It may be said, that not only an impression may give rise to reasoning, but that an idea may also have the same influence; especially upon my principle, *that all our ideas are deriv'd from correspondent impressions*. For suppose I form at present an idea, of which I have forgot the correspondent impression, I am able to conclude from this idea, that such an impression did once exist; and as this conclusion is attended with belief, it may be ask'd, from whence are the qualities of force and vivacity deriv'd, which constitute this belief? And to this I answer very readily, *from the present idea*. For as this idea is not here consider'd, as the representation of any absent object, but as a real perception in the mind, of which we are intimately conscious, it must be able to bestow on whatever is related to it the same quality, call it *firmness, or solidity, or force, or vivacity*, with which the mind reflects upon it, and is assur'd of its present existence. The idea here supplies the place of an

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an impression, and is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose.

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UPON the same principles we need not be surpriz'd to hear of the remembrance of an idea; that is, of the idea of an idea, and of its force and vivacity superior to the loose conceptions of the imagination. In thinking of our past thoughts we not only delineate out the objects, of which we were thinking, but also conceive the action of the mind in the meditation, that certain *je-ne-scai-quoi*, of which 'tis impossible to give any definition or description, but which every one sufficiently understands. When the memory offers an idea of this, and represents it as past, 'tis easily conceiv'd how that idea may have more vigour and firmness, than when we think of a past thought, of which we have no remembrance.

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AFTER this any one will understand how we may form the idea of an impression and of an idea, and how we may believe the existence of an impression and of an idea.

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## S E C T. IX.

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**H**OWEVER convincing the foregoing arguments may appear, we must not rest contented with them, but must turn the subject on every side, in order to find some new points of view, from which we may illustrate and confirm such extraordinary, and such fundamental principles. A scrupulous hesitation to receive any new hypothesis is so laudable a disposition in philosophers, and so necessary to the examination of truth, that it deserves to be comply'd with, and requires that every argument be produc'd, which may tend to their satisfaction, and every objection remov'd, which may stop them in their reasoning.

I HAVE often observ'd, that, beside cause and effect, the two relations of resemblance and contiguity, are to be consider'd as associating principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another. I have also observ'd, that when of two objects connected

ted together by any of these relations, one is immediately present to the memory or senses, not only the mind is convey'd to its co-relative by means of the associating principle; but likewise conceives it with an additional force and vigour, by the united operation of that principle, and of the present impression. All this I have observ'd, in order to confirm by analogy, my explication of our judgments concerning cause and effect. But this very argument may, perhaps, be turn'd against me, and instead of a confirmation of my hypothesis, may become an objection to it. For it may be said, that if all the parts of that hypothesis be true, *viz. that* these three species of relation are deriv'd from the same principles; *that* their effects in inforcing and inlivening our ideas are the same; and *that* belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea; it shou'd follow, that that action of the mind may not only be deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance. But as we find by experience, that belief arises only from causation, and that we can draw no inference from one object to another, except they be connected by this relation, we may conclude, that there

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PART there is some error in that reasoning, which  
 III. leads us into such difficulties.

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THIS is the objection; let us now consider its solution. 'Tis evident, that whatever is present to the memory, striking upon the mind with a vivacity, which resembles an immediate impression, must become of considerable moment in all the operations of the mind, and must easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination. Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system, join'd to the present impressions, we are pleas'd to call a *reality*. But the mind stops not here. For finding, that with this system of perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas; and as it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determin'd to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by which it is determin'd, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of *realities*. The first of these systems is the  
 object

object of the memory and senses; the second of the judgment.

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'TIS this latter principle, which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please. I form an idea of ROME, which I neither see nor remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and books of travellers and historians. This idea of *Rome* I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object, which I call the globe. I join to it the conception of a particular government, and religion, and manners. I look backward and consider its first foundation; its several revolutions, successes, and misfortunes. All this, and every thing else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; tho' by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination.

*Of the effects of other relations and other habits.*

As to the influence of contiguity and resemblance, we may observe, that if the

PART contiguous and resembling object be com-  
 III. prehended in this system of realities, there  
 is no doubt but these two relations will  
 assist that of cause and effect, and in-  
 fix the related idea with more force in the  
 imagination. This I shall enlarge upon  
 presently. Mean while I shall carry my ob-  
 servation a step farther, and assert, that even  
 where the related object is but feign'd, the  
 relation will serve to enliven the idea, and  
 encrease its influence. A poet, no doubt,  
 will be the better able to form a strong de-  
 scription of the *Elysian* fields, that he  
 prompts his imagination by the view of a  
 beautiful meadow or garden; as at another  
 time he may by his fancy place himself in  
 the midst of these fabulous regions, that by  
 the feign'd contiguity he may enliven his  
 imagination.

BUT tho' I cannot altogether exclude  
 the relations of resemblance and contiguity  
 from operating on the fancy in this manner,  
 'tis observable that, when single, their in-  
 fluence is very feeble and uncertain. As  
 the relation of cause and effect is requisite  
 to persuade us of any real existence, so is this  
 persuasion requisite to give force to these o-  
 ther relations. For where upon the appear-  
 ance of an impression we not only feign  
 another

another object, but likewise arbitrarily, and of our mere good-will and pleasure give it a particular relation to the impression, this can have but a small effect upon the mind; nor is there any reason, why, upon the return of the same impression, we shou'd be determin'd to place the same object in the same relation to it. There is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same, without any difference or variation. And indeed such a fiction is founded on so little reason, that nothing but pure *caprice* can determine the mind to form it; and that principle being fluctuating and uncertain, 'tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. The mind foresees and anticipates the change; and even from the very first instant feels the looseness of its actions, and the weak hold it has of its objects. And as this imperfection is very sensible in every single instance, it still encreases by experience and observation, when we compare the several instances we may remember, and form a *general rule* against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which

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*Of the effects of other relations and other habits.*

PART arise in the imagination from a feign'd re-  
 III. semblance and contiguity.

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 Of know-
 ledge and
 probabi-
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THE relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages. The objects it presents are fixt and unalterable. The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination, as something solid and real, certain and invariable. The thought is always determin'd to pass from the impression to the idea, and from that particular impression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation.

BUT not content with removing this objection, I shall endeavour to extract from it a proof of the present doctrine. Contiguity and resemblance have an effect much inferior to causation; but still have some effect, and augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception. If this can be prov'd in several new instances, beside what we have already observ'd, 'twill be allow'd no inconsiderable argument, that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression.

TO begin with contiguity; it has been remark'd among the *Mahometans* as well as *Christians*, that those *pilgrims*, who have
 seen

seen MECCA or the HOLY LAND are ever SECT.
after more faithful and zealous believers, IX.

than those who have not had that advantage. *Of the ef-*

A man, whose memory presents him with *fects of o-*
a lively image of the *Red-Sea, and the De-* *ther rela-*
sert, and Jerusalem, and Galilee, can never *tions and*
doubt of any miraculous events, which are *other ha-*
related either by *Moses or the Evangelists.* *bits.*

The lively idea of the places passes by an easy transition to the facts, which are suppos'd to have been related to them by contiguity, and encreases the belief by encreasing the vivacity of the conception. The remembrance of these fields and rivers has the same influence on the vulgar as a new argument; and from the same causes.

WE may form a like observation concerning *resemblance.* We have remark'd, that the conclusion, which we draw from a present object to its absent cause or effect, is never founded on any qualities, which we observe in that object, consider'd in itself; or, in other words, that 'tis impossible to determine, otherwise than by experience, what will result from any phænomenon, or what has preceded it. But tho' this be so evident in itself, that it seem'd not to require any proof; yet some philosophers have imagin'd that there is an appa-

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Of knowledge and probability.
 rent cause for the communication of motion, and that a reasonable man might immediately infer the motion of one body from the impulse of another, without having recourse to any past observation. That this opinion is false will admit of an easy proof. For if such an inference may be drawn merely from the ideas of body, of motion, and of impulse, it must amount to a demonstration, and must imply the absolute impossibility of any contrary supposition. Every effect, then, beside the communication of motion, implies a formal contradiction; and 'tis impossible not only that it can exist, but also that it can be conceiv'd. But we may soon satisfy ourselves of the contrary, by forming a clear and consistent idea of one body's moving upon another, and of its rest immediately upon the contact; or of its returning back in the same line, in which it came; or of its annihilation; or circular or elliptical motion: and in short, of an infinite number of other changes, which we may suppose it to undergo. These suppositions are all consistent and natural; and the reason, why we imagine the communication of motion to be more consistent and natural not only than these suppositions, but also than any other natural effect, is founded on
 the

the relation of *resemblance* betwixt the cause and effect, which is here united to experience, and binds the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseparable. Resemblance, then, has the same or a parallel influence with experience; and as the only immediate effect of experience is to associate our ideas together, it follows, that all belief arises from the association of ideas, according to my hypothesis.

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'TIS universally allow'd by the writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points, and that a man on the top of a mountain has no larger an image presented to his senses, than when he is coop'd up in the narrowest court or chamber. 'Tis only by experience that he infers the greatness of the object from some peculiar qualities of the image; and this inference of the judgment he confounds with sensation, as is common on other occasions. Now 'tis evident, that the inference of the judgment is here much more lively than what is usual in our common reasonings, and that a man has a more vivid conception of the vast extent of the ocean from the image he receives by the eye, when he stands on the top of the high promontory, than mere-

PART ly from hearing the roaring of the waters.

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ledge and
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lity.

He feels a more sensible pleasure from its magnificence; which is a proof of a more lively idea: And he confounds his judgment with sensation; which is another proof of it. But as the inference is equally certain and immediate in both cases, this superior vivacity of our conception in one case can proceed from nothing but this, that in drawing an inference from the sight, beside the customary conjunction, there is also a resemblance betwixt the image and the object we infer; which strengthens the relation, and conveys the vivacity of the impression to the related idea with an easier and more natural movement.

No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others; and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the influence of resemblance. When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony, our faith arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to causes; nor is there any thing but our *experience* of the governing principles of human nature, which can give us any assurance of the veracity of men.

men. But tho' experience be the true stan-
 dard of this, as well as of all other judg-
 ments, we seldom regulate ourselves entire-
 ly by it; but have a remarkable propensity
 to believe whatever is reported, even con-
 cerning apparitions, enchantments, and pro-
 digies, however contrary to daily experience
 and observation. The words or discourses
 of others have an intimate connexion with
 certain ideas in their mind; and these ideas
 have also a connexion with the facts or ob-
 jects, which they represent. This latter
 connexion is generally much over-rated, and
 commands our assent beyond what experi-
 ence will justify; which can proceed from
 nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the
 ideas and the facts. Other effects only point
 out their causes in an oblique manner; but
 the testimony of men does it directly, and
 is to be consider'd as an image as well as
 an effect. No wonder, therefore, we are
 so rash in drawing our inferences from it,
 and are less guided by experience in our
 judgments concerning it, than in those up-
 on any other subject.

As resemblance, when conjoin'd with
 causation, fortifies our reasonings; so the
 want of it in any very great degree is
 able almost entirely to destroy them. Of
 this

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fects of o-
ther rela-
tions and
other ha-
bits.*

PART III. this there is a remarkable instance in the universal carelessness and stupidity of men with regard to a future state, where they show as obstinate an incredulity, as they do a blind credulity on other occasions. There is not indeed a more ample matter of wonder to the studious, and of regret to the pious man, than to observe the negligence of the bulk of mankind concerning their approaching condition; and 'tis with reason, that many eminent theologians have not scrupled to affirm, that tho' the vulgar have no formal principles of infidelity, yet they are really infidels in their hearts, and have nothing like what we can call a belief of the eternal duration of their souls. For let us consider on the one hand what divines have display'd with such eloquence concerning the importance of eternity; and at the same time reflect, that tho' in matters of rhetoric we ought to lay our account with some exaggeration, we must in this case allow, that the strongest figures are infinitely inferior to the subject: And after this let us view on the other hand the prodigious security of men in this particular: I ask, if these people really believe what is inculcated on them, and what they pretend to affirm; and the answer is obviously

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ously in the negative. As belief is an act of the mind arising from custom, 'tis not strange the want of resemblance shou'd overthrow what custom has establish'd, and diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter principle encreases it. A future state is so far remov'd from our comprehension, and we have so obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we can invent, however strong in themselves, and however much assisted by education, are never able with slow imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future condition, deriv'd from its want of resemblance to the present life, than to that deriv'd from its remoteness. For I observe, that men are every where concern'd about what may happen after their death, provided it regard this world; and that there are few to whom their name, their family, their friends, and their country are in any period of time entirely indifferent.

AND indeed the want of resemblance in this case so entirely destroys belief, that except those few, who upon cool reflection on
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effects of
other rela-
tions and
other ha-
bits.*

PART the importance of the subject, have taken
 III. care by repeated meditation to imprint in
 Of know- their minds the arguments for a future state,
 ledge and there scarce are any, who believe the im-
 probabi- mortality of the soul with a true and estab-
 lish'd judgment; such as is deriv'd from the
 testimony of travellers and historians. This
 appears very conspicuously wherever men
 have occasion to compare the pleasures and
 pains, the rewards and punishments of this
 life with those of a future; even tho' the
 case does not concern themselves, and there
 is no violent passion to disturb their judg-
 ment. The *Roman Catholicks* are certainly
 the most zealous of any sect in the christian
 world; and yet you'll find few among the
 more sensible people of that communion,
 who do not blame the *Gunpowder-treason*,
 and the massacre of *St. Bartholomew*, as cruel
 and barbarous, tho' projected or executed
 against those very people, whom without
 any scruple they condemn to eternal and
 infinite punishments. All we can say in ex-
 cuse for this inconsistency is, that they really
 do not believe what they affirm concerning
 a future state; nor is there any better proof
 of it than the very inconsistency.

WE may add to this a remark; that in
 matters of religion men take a pleasure in
 being

being terrify'd, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and 'tis only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure. In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being soften'd by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention.

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THE present hypothesis will receive additional confirmation, if we examine the effects of other kinds of custom, as well as of other relations. To understand this we must consider, that custom, to which I attribute all belief and reasoning, may operate upon the mind in invigorating an idea after two several ways. For supposing that in all past experience we have found two objects to have been always conjoin'd together, 'tis evident, that upon the appearance of one of these objects in an impression, we must from custom make an easy transition to the idea of that object, which usually attends it; and by means of the present impression and easy transition

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ledge and
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lity.*

transition must conceive that idea in a stronger and more lively manner, than we do any loose floating image of the fancy. But let us next suppose, that a mere idea alone, without any of this curious and almost artificial preparation, shou'd frequently make its appearance in the mind, this idea must by degrees acquire a facility and force; and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and unusual idea. This is the only particular, in which these two kinds of custom agree; and if it appear, that their effects on the judgment are similar and proportionable, we may certainly conclude, that the foregoing explication of that faculty is satisfactory. But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects of EDUCATION ?

ALL those opinions and notions of things, to which we have been accustom'd from our infancy, take such deep root, that 'tis impossible for us, by all the powers of reason and experience, to eradicate them; and this habit not only approaches in its influence, but even on many occasions prevails over that which arises from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects. Here we must not be contented with saying, that
the

the vividness of the idea produces the belief: S E C T. IX.
 We must maintain that they are individu-
 ally the same. The frequent repetition of
 any idea infixes it in the imagination; but
 cou'd never possibly of itself produce belief,
 if that act of the mind was, by the original
 constitution of our natures, annex'd only to
 a reasoning and comparifon of ideas. Cuf-
 tom may lead us into some false compa-
 rifon of ideas. This is the utmost effect we
 can conceive of it. But 'tis certain it cou'd
 never fupply the place of that comparifon,
 nor produce any act of the mind, which
 naturally belong'd to that principle.

A P E R S O N, that has loft a leg or an
 arm by amputation, endeavours for a long
 time afterwards to ferve himfelf with them.
 After the death of any one, 'tis a common
 remark of the whole family, but efpecially
 of the fervants, that they can fcarce believe
 him to be dead, but ftik' imagine him to
 be in his chamber or in any other place,
 where they were accuftom'd to find him.
 I have often heard in converfation, after
 talking of a perfon, that is any way cele-
 brated, that one, who has no acquaintance
 with him, will fay, *I have never feen fuch-a-
 one, but almoft fancy I have ; fo often have I
 heard*

PART *heard talk of him.* All these are parallel instances.

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Of knowledge and probability.

IF we consider this argument from *education* in a proper light, 'twill appear very convincing; and the more so, that 'tis founded on one of the most common phænomena, that is any where to be met with. I am persuaded, that upon examination we shall find more than one half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to education, and that the principles, which are thus implicitly embrac'd, overballance those, which are owing either to abstract reasoning or experience. As liars, by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to remember them; so the judgment, or rather the imagination, by the like means, may have ideas so strongly imprinted on it, and conceive them in so full a light, that they may operate upon the mind in the same manner with those, which the senses, memory or reason present to us. But as education is an artificial and not a natural cause, and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves in different times and places, it is never upon that account recogniz'd by philosophers; tho' in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition

as

as our reasonings from causes and effects*.

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Of the influence of belief.

BUT tho' education be disclaim'd by S E C T.
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philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, it prevails nevertheless in the world, and is the cause why all systems are apt to be rejected at first as new and unusual. This perhaps will be the fate of what I have here advanc'd concerning *belief*, and tho' the proofs I have produc'd appear to me perfectly conclusive, I expect not to make many profelytes to my opinion. Men will scarce ever be persuaded, that effects of such consequence can flow from principles, which are seemingly so inconsiderable, and that the far greatest part of our reasonings with all our actions and passions,

* IN general we may observe, that as our assent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas, it resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination. By this expression it appears that the word, imagination, is commonly us'd in two different senses; and tho' nothing be more contrary to true philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings I have often been oblig'd to fall into it. When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings. When I oppose it to neither, 'tis indifferent whether it be taken in the larger or more limited sense, or at least the context will sufficiently explain the meaning.

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*Of know-
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probabi-
lity.*

can be deriv'd from nothing but custom and habit. To obviate this objection, I shall here anticipate a little what wou'd more properly fall under our consideration afterwards, when we come to treat of the passions and the sense of beauty.

THERE is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. But pain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of which the one has effects very different from the other. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling, or only in idea, as at present when I mention them. 'Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far from being equal. Impressions always actuate the soul, and that in the highest degree; but 'tis not every idea which has the same effect. Nature has proceeded with caution in this case, and seems to have carefully avoided the inconveniences of two extremes. Did impressions alone influence the will, we should every moment of our lives be subject to the greatest calamities; because, tho' we foresaw their approach, we should not be provided by nature with any principle of action, which might impel us to avoid them. On the other hand, did every idea influence our actions,

our condition would not be much mended. S E C T. X.
 For such is the unsteadiness and activity of thought; that the images of every thing, especially of goods and evils, are always wandering in the mind; and were it mov'd by every idle conception of this kind, it would never enjoy a moment's peace and tranquillity.

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NATURE has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow'd on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. Tho' an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. For as the different degrees of force make all the original difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence be the source of all the differences in the effects of these perceptions, and their removal, in whole

PART or in part, the cause of every new resemblance
 III. they acquire. Wherever we can make an idea
 Of know- approach the impressions in force and vivacity,
 ledge and it will likewise imitate them in its influence
 probabi- on the mind; and *vice versa*, where it imi-
 lity. tates them in that influence, as in the pre-
 sent case, this must proceed from its ap-
 proaching them in force and vivacity. Be-
 lief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imi-
 tate the effects of the impressions, must make
 it resemble them in these qualities, and is
 nothing but *a more vivid and intense concep-
 tion of any idea*. This, then, may both serve
 as an additional argument for the present sys-
 tem, and may give us a notion after what
 manner our reasonings from causation are able
 to operate on the will and passions.

As belief is almost absolutely requisite to
 the exciting our passions, so the passions in
 their turn are very favourable to belief; and
 not only such facts as convey agreeable emo-
 tions, but very often such as give pain,
 do upon that account become more readily
 the objects of faith and opinion. A coward,
 whose fears are easily awaken'd, readily as-
 sents to every account of danger he meets
 with; as a person of a sorrowful and melan-
 choly disposition is very credulous of every
 thing, that nourishes his prevailing passion.

When

When any affecting object is presented, it S E C T. gives the alarm, and excites immediately a X. degree of its proper passion; especially in Of the influence of persons who are naturally inclined to that belief. passion. This emotion passes by an easy transition to the imagination; and diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting object, makes us form that idea with greater force and vivacity, and consequently assent to it, according to the precedent system. Admiration and surprize have the same effect as the other passions; and accordingly we may observe, that among the vulgar, quacks and projectors meet with a more easy faith upon account of their magnificent pretensions, than if they kept themselves within the bounds of moderation. The first astonishment, which naturally attends their miraculous relations, spreads itself over the whole soul, and so vivifies and enlivens the idea, that it resembles the inferences we draw from experience. This is a mystery, with which we may be already a little acquainted, and which we shall have farther occasion to be let into in the progress of this treatise.

AFTER this account of the influence of belief on the passions, we shall find less difficulty in explaining its effects on the imagination, however extraordinary they

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ty.*

may appear. 'Tis certain we cannot take pleasure in any discourse, where our judgment gives no assent to those images which are presented to our fancy. The conversation of those, who have acquir'd a habit of lying, tho' in affairs of no moment, never gives any satisfaction; and that because those ideas they present to us, not being attended with belief, make no impression upon the mind. Poets themselves, tho' liars by profession, always endeavour to give an air of truth to their fictions; and where that is totally neglected, their performances, however ingenious, will never be able to afford much pleasure. In short, we may observe, that even when ideas have no manner of influence on the will and passions, truth and reality are still requisite, in order to make them entertaining to the imagination.

BUT if we compare together all the phenomena that occur on this head, we shall find, that truth, however necessary it may seem in all works of genius, has no other effect than to procure an easy reception for the ideas, and to make the mind acquiesce in them with satisfaction, or at least without reluctance. But as this is an effect, which may easily be supposed to flow from that solid-
lidity

lidity and force, which, according to my system, attend those ideas that are establish'd by reasonings from causation ; it follows, that all the influence of belief upon the fancy may be explained from that system. Accordingly we may observe, that wherever that influence arises from any other principles beside truth or reality, they supply its place, and give an equal entertainment to the imagination. Poets have form'd what they call a poetical system of things, which tho' it be believ'd neither by themselves nor readers, is commonly esteem'd a sufficient foundation for any fiction. We have been so much accustom'd to the names of MARS, JUPITER, VENUS, that in the same manner as education infixes any opinion, the constant repetition of these ideas makes them enter into the mind with facility, and prevail upon the fancy, without influencing the judgment. In like manner tragedians always borrow their fable, or at least the names of their principal actors, from some known passage in history ; and that not in order to deceive the spectators ; for they will frankly confess, that truth is not in any circumstance inviolably observed ; but in order to procure a more easy reception into the imagination for those extraordinary events, which they represent. But this is a precau-

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PART III. tion; which is not required of comic poets, whose personages and incidents, being of a more familiar kind, enter easily into the conception, and are received without any such formality, even tho' at first sight they be known to be fictitious, and the pure offspring of the fancy.

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THIS mixture of truth and falshood in the fables of tragic poets not only serves our present purpose, by shewing, that the imagination can be satisfy'd without any absolute belief or assurance; but may in another view be regarded as a very strong confirmation of this system. 'Tis evident, that poets make use of this artifice of borrowing the names of their persons, and the chief events of their poems, from history, in order to procure a more easy reception for the whole, and cause it to make a deeper impression on the fancy and affections. The several incidents of the piece acquire a kind of relation by being united into one poem or representation; and if any of these incidents be an object of belief, it bestows a force and vivacity on the others, which are related to it. The vividness of the first conception diffuses itself along the relations, and is convey'd, as by so many pipes or canals, to every idea that has any communication with the primary one. This, indeed,

indeed, can never amount to a perfect assurance; and that because the union among the ideas is, in a manner, accidental: But still it approaches so near, in its influence, as may convince us, that they are deriv'd from the same origin. Belief must please the imagination by means of the force and vivacity which attends it; since every idea, which has force and vivacity, is found to be agreeable to that faculty.

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To confirm this we may observe, that the assistance is mutual betwixt the judgment and fancy, as well as betwixt the judgment and passion; and that belief not only gives vigour to the imagination, but that a vigorous and strong imagination is of all talents the most proper to procure belief and authority. 'Tis difficult for us to withhold our assent from what is painted out to us in all the colours of eloquence; and the vivacity produc'd by the fancy is in many cases greater than that which arises from custom and experience. We are hurried away by the lively imagination of our author or companion; and even he himself is often a victim to his own fire and genius.

NOR will it be amiss to remark, that as a lively imagination very often degenerates into madness or folly, and bears it a great resem-

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ledge and
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lity.

resemblance in its operations; so they influence the judgment after the same manner, and produce belief from the very same principles. When the imagination, from any extraordinary ferment of the blood and spirits, acquires such a vivacity as disorders all its powers and faculties, there is no means of distinguishing betwixt truth and falsehood; but every loose fiction or idea, having the same influence as the impressions of the memory, or the conclusions of the judgment, is receiv'd on the same footing, and operates with equal force on the passions. A present impression and a customary transition are now no longer necessary to inliven our ideas. Every chimera of the brain is as vivid and intense as any of those inferences, which we formerly dignify'd with the name of conclusions concerning matters of fact, and sometimes as the present impressions of the senses. *See Appendix to Page 290.*

WE may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; only with this difference, that the least reflection dissipates the illusions of poetry, and places the objects in their proper light. 'Tis however certain, that in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm, a poet has a counterfeit belief, and even a kind of vision of his objects: And if there be any shadow

shadow of argument to support this belief; S E C T. X.
 nothing contributes more to his full conviction than a blaze of poetical figures and images, which have their effect upon the poet himself, as well as upon his readers. *Of the influence of belief.*

S E C T. XI.

Of the probability of chances.

BUT in order to bestow on this system S E C T. XI.
 its full force and evidence, we must carry our eye from it a moment to consider its consequences, and explain from the same principles some other species of reasoning, which are deriv'd from the same origin.

THOSE philosophers, who have divided human reason into *knowledge and probability*, and have defin'd the first to be *that evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas*, are oblig'd to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But tho' every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases; and accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse, I have follow'd this method of expression; 'tis however certain, that in common discourse we readily affirm,
 that