

**Words, Words, Words:  
A Two-Level Analysis of Language Reform as a State-Building Strategy**

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**Abstract:**

In this paper we argue that language reform policy will fall along a continuum from less to more diversity depending on levels of internal stability and external threat and on governmental structure. By taking both domestic and international-level factors into consideration, we illustrate that variation in state-building strategies is a function of both levels. This approach challenges the idea that nationalism entails strict cultural homogenization by arguing that differences in threat environments, duration of state consolidation, and governmental institutional structures cause variation in the types of linguistic reforms enacted. We test our hypotheses with case studies of France, Romania, Italy, Turkey, and Switzerland, using contemporaneous historiographic work as well as more recent scholarly analysis. The cases of France, Romania, Italy, and Switzerland are more closely linked temporally, as the height of their national unification movements and attention to language policy occurs during the mid- to late-19th century. Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey extend our study into the 20th century, allowing us to demonstrate our hypotheses' durability across time, while studying both Romania and Turkey indicates theoretical relevance outside of Western Europe.

Paper prepared for presentation at the  
International Studies Association 49<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting  
San Francisco, CA  
29 March 2008

Panel SD18:  
Diverse Approaches to Understanding Statehood:  
Borders, Size, Sovereignty, and Identity

*\*\*Working Paper – do not cite without authors' permission \*\**

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## ***1. Introduction: Puzzle and Cases***

The 19<sup>th</sup> century saw increased attention towards national language policies in both Western and Eastern Europe. As the 1800s also brought about the rise of nationalism, one might expect states to try to homogenize language as one manifestation of cultural and political nationalistic sentiment, and thus this new focus may not seem surprising at first. However, the variation among the types of language reform policies enacted is puzzling, as strict linguistic homogeneity was *not* sought by all states. Two possible sources of this variation are (1) the international threat environment and external political influences and (2) the domestic political and institutional environment.<sup>1</sup> We argue that language reform policy will fall along a continuum from less to more diversity depending on levels of internal stability and external threat and on domestic governmental structure. By taking both domestic and international-level factors into consideration, we illustrate that variation in state-building strategies is a function of both levels. Thus, we argue that differences in threat environments, duration of state consolidation, and governmental institutional structures cause variation in the types of linguistic reforms enacted. We derive hypotheses from this theory and test them on five case studies: France, Romania, Italy, Switzerland, and Turkey, and find confirmation of our hypotheses and support for our theory.

### **1.1 Theory and Hypotheses**

In specifying the variation in linguistic reform policies as a function of both international and domestic-level factors, we borrow from the logic of two-level games, as initially developed

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<sup>1</sup> While it is certainly arguable that key individuals or groups of individuals were uniquely important in developing the language policies in each of the cases in question, a study focused on this level of analysis would comprise an entirely different paper. We here seek to identify the state-level and international-level structural and environmental factors that provided the general impetus for and circumstances favoring the diverse types of variation (although we do identify individuals who played significant roles in the cases).

by Robert Putnam.<sup>2</sup> Our approach differs in that we do not consider the situation as a bargaining game, but rather as sets of pressures and incentives deriving from both levels that state leaders experience simultaneously, and which affect the particular form of language policy enacted. The independent variables we consider as most important for our “model” are found in our hypotheses, while the key dependent variables encompass the following policy-dimensions: alphabet reform, purification, legalization, enforcement, and status of minority language rights. See the Appendix for Table 1, which lists the independent and dependent variables and their potential values.<sup>3</sup> Using these variables, we can derive testable hypotheses about the interaction effects of both levels.

In hypothesizing how the domestic and international level factors interact, Most and Starr’s opportunity-willingness framework serves as a useful starting point.<sup>4</sup> In this framework, opportunity represents the total set of environmental constraints. Willingness involves the selection of a behavioral option from a set of alternatives. Previously utilized in understanding international conflict behavior, we believe that this framework functions more broadly to shed light on other domains of state behavior.<sup>5</sup> Applying this logic to linguistic policy-making enables us to link both domestic and international level explanatory mechanisms to willingness and/or opportunity dimensions. Table 2 depicts this linkage more clearly.

First, by focusing on the willingness dimension, we illustrate how specific factors might prompt states to pursue a particular type of linguistic policy over alternative options. Second, by emphasizing the opportunity dimension, we suggest ways in which our explanatory variables influence the context in which decision-making takes place. Third, we recognize that some of

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<sup>2</sup> Putnam 1988.

<sup>3</sup> All figures and tables are in the Appendix.

<sup>4</sup> Most and Starr 1989.

<sup>5</sup> Starr 2000; Starr and Thomas 2002, among others.

our explanatory variables impact both willingness and opportunity and thereby act as motivators and enablers, respectively.

As we noted above, we conceptualize linguistic policy as multidimensional instead of dichotomous. More specifically, by moving beyond an understanding of linguistic unification as a dichotomous yes/no variable, we introduce greater specificity in theorizing about language unification. We believe that one caveat of a dichotomous specification of policy lies in the loss of real variation. Our framework seeks to redress this drawback by differentiating between the variants of language unification programs.

A number of hypotheses arise from these concepts: *(1)a. States facing external threats or conflict situations will be expected to consolidate linguistically. States facing territorial claims from other states are expected to legislate language homogeneity.* This hypothesis is linked both to the understanding that higher levels of national consolidation boost war-making capacity and to the literature on the value of a rally effect and cohesion within the in-group (in this case, the population of the entire state) when confronting an external threat.<sup>6</sup> Linguistic homogenization could be expected to contribute on both fronts, by increasing efficiency of internal production and cooperation through better communication, and by fostering a sense of shared identity and group solidarity defined in opposition to the outside threat.

*(1)b. States not facing external danger will be expected to take a more relaxed approach and permit greater linguistic heterogeneity.* Internal diversity or a greater level of social fragmentation is not necessarily a problem if the state is not in a difficult geopolitical situation or worried about prospective threats. When a large, strong army is needed, linguistic conformity would be necessary to maintain order, and if surrounded by other states with aggressive

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<sup>6</sup> E.g. see Tilly 1990; Reiter and Stam 2002, among others.

intentions, internal fragmentation could cause the state to appear as a weak or easy target. Such external constraints are not present in a peaceful international situation.

*(2)a. Newly consolidated states are expected to enforce linguistic unity.* Consistent with Hypothesis (1)a, a new state's greatest concern must be its own survival such that it will not be overthrown either by other powers or through internal discord. Therefore, reinforcement or creation of national identity through language homogenization is expected.

*(2)b. States that have been consolidated within their territory for longer amounts of time are expected to be more relaxed towards language diversity, as long as they are not currently facing external threat.* This behavior is expected because a state that has remained consolidated for a certain length of time may be more confident in its stability as a national entity relative to the other states in the international system, and less worried about potential internal fragmentation both because of the population's shared territorial history and because domestic institutions are also expected to become more stable over time.

Hypothesis (2)a, above, suggests a direct link between state durability and linguistic heterogeneity. From the willingness standpoint, states that have been consolidated for longer periods of time face fewer incentives to enforce linguistic uniformity, especially given the costs of opting for homogenization. From an opportunity perspective, however, durable states possess the resources necessary to implement and enforce language unification.<sup>7</sup> Taken together, these dimensions indicate that the effects of territorial durability on linguistic policy might be nonlinear or interactive. One such interaction possibility is suggested by the following hypothesis:

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<sup>7</sup> Laitin 2004. Laitin argues that weak states might grant language recognition rights to stave off rebellion; in that sense liberal language policies are correlated with weak state capacity.

*(2)ab. (durability-threat [interaction]): Given an external threat, states that have been territorially consolidated for long amounts of time are expected to pursue linguistic unification.*

We derive this interactive effect from two disparate sources of literature. First, scholarship on territoriality suggests that historical rootedness strengthens public attachments to the state's territories. Although this observation has been examined from the perspective of the role of historical territorial claims in conflict initiation, it is possible to argue that states fight for survival in more than one possible way.<sup>8</sup> While initiating conflict to defend historical attachments might be one way, adopting domestic policies that strengthen social cohesion might be another. Furthermore, to the extent that territory serves as an identity marker and lies at the heart of nationhood and social cohesion, territorial challenges might prompt state leaders to emphasize other salient identity-markers.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, while external threats affect states' willingness to pursue certain policies, durability affords the resources necessary to pursue these policies.

The notion of language as an identity marker brings us to the second strand of scholarship on which we build. Despite the fact that various theories of nationalism differ on the function of language in nation-building, the need for communicative interaction emerges as a common theme.<sup>10</sup> On one end of the spectrum, ethno-linguistic nationalists regard language as a mythical and mystical unifier. On the other end of the spectrum, modernists emphasize the role of language in state development. In particular, language policy functions as a form of state rationalization, whereby standardization contributes to the efficient and orderly functioning of

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<sup>8</sup> On the role of language in nation-building see Weber 1968; for language as communicative device see Newman 2006; Murphy 1990.

<sup>9</sup> Johnston et al. 1988; cited in Murphy 1990.

<sup>10</sup> Laitin 1989.

the administration.<sup>11</sup> Occupying a space in between the two views, perennialists contend that language serves as a tool of belonging and solidarity. Common to these views is that language might function effectively as a unifier. Language is integral in that sense for “imagining the nation.”<sup>12</sup>

Building on this logic, it is plausible to suggest that external threats prompt leaders to look to language to preserve solidarity. Given territorial challenges, states that have been consolidated for longer periods of time are more likely to opt for unification for two reasons. First, from an opportunity perspective, durability affords states with the necessary resources to pursue unification. Second, because territory forms a central aspect of the ‘nation’ for the publics of enduring states, when faced with challenges, leaders must look to other salient identity markers to maintain social cohesiveness.

*(2)c. Notwithstanding (2)b, established states with strong central governments are expected to pursue greater linguistic conformity. A domestic structure with a strong central government depends specifically on the coherence of the entire country. Internal divisions along linguistic lines, or the existence of enclaves of distinct language groups, are highly undesirable for such states because they would reduce the efficiency of public communications and operations (efficiency is a goal sought via centralization), and could even lead to fragmentation along linguistic boundaries, thus undermining the central government’s control.*<sup>13</sup>

*(2)d. Established states with strong regional governments, or power distributed within a federalized system, are expected to permit greater linguistic heterogeneity. Because intra-state regional boundaries are often determined based on the locations of ethnic and linguistic groups,*

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<sup>11</sup> Weber 1968

<sup>12</sup> Anderson 1983.

<sup>13</sup> In societies with numerous cross-cutting cleavages, the dimension of language is also much easier to change via legislation and enforcement than other dimensions such as religion, ethnicity, or local land attachments.

it is expected that states with more regional autonomy relative to the central government will also permit more linguistic diversity. This is consistent with Rokkan's conceptualization of federalism as a strategy of striking a balance between central and peripheral interests.<sup>14</sup> By institutionalizing conflict resolution, federal structures provide a solution to the threat of irredentism in multicultural contexts, while the regional distribution of power enables comparable levels of stakeholding across the country without requiring linguistic uniformity to function.

*(2)e. Centralized states whose governments are supported by a narrow base of elites will be less likely to promote language homogenization policies than those whose governments rely on mass support.* If a government requires mass support for its success and legitimacy, there must be cohesiveness as well as facility of communication both among the populace and between the citizens and the government. In contrast, this type of unity is not so vital if the governing decisions are made solely by a small class of elites that is not accountable to the public.

This paper attempts to solve the puzzle of national language policy variation by testing the above hypotheses on five cases: France, Romania, Italy, Switzerland, and Turkey. These cases form a continuum ranging from greatest to least diversity, as shown in Figure 1.<sup>15</sup> The French government consolidated and institutionalized Parisian French with the express intention of causing local languages to disappear. Before unification, the Romanian provinces already shared a common majority language, and in 1860 the newly unified country changed its nationally recognized script from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Italy established standardized public education and rendered teaching of standard Italian obligatory in 1859/1861, but did not legislate against continued (spoken) use of local dialects. Switzerland is our

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<sup>14</sup> Flora et al. 1999.

<sup>15</sup> "Diversity" is reflected in the types of language unification policies or practices exercised.

disproving case, as it codified its linguistic and political divides in distinct regions (the canton system). Turkey, coming out of World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire systematically purged Ottoman vocabulary in schools, government, and common usage, replacing it with a reversion to Old Turkish and the addition of European loan-words and neologisms.

As Hobsbawn reminds us, the nineteenth century witnessed an unprecedented increase in nationalist activity. As a political force in Europe, the wave of nationalism stirred up competition among different conceptions of nationhood and identity. Not only did nationalism serve as a major catalyst for self-assertion, but also prompted states to adopt specific policy changes. Scholars of nationalism postulate that these changes reflected functional requirements of modernization and industrialization.<sup>16</sup> Centralization of education, the spread of mass communication, standardization of citizenship rights, and linguistic standardization constituted a package of modernizing reforms. At the same time, the wave of nationalism was marked by attempts to put the “nation on display” and an increased salience of symbolic markers and shared social codes that accentuated the grandeur of the state.<sup>17</sup>

Both as a symbolic marker and as a tool of modernization, language policy gained in importance during and following the spread of nationalism in Europe. In that sense, the pursuit of language unification by many states during this period might be construed as a process of policy contagion. More specifically, the process can be defined as “uncoordinated interdependence” in which governments made their decisions independently but factored in the

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<sup>16</sup> Gellner 1983 cited in Zimmer 2003; Hobsbawn 1991; Weber 1968.

<sup>17</sup> Zimmer 2004; Anderson 1991. Examples for such attempts include creation of national exhibitions, museums, festivals.

choices of other governments.<sup>18</sup> Our research puzzle is motivated by the desire to tease out the conditions under which policy convergence did or did not occur.

This understanding of language unification is distinct from previous scholarship on language policy in two related ways. First, language unification has heretofore been modeled as a contest between domestic actors.<sup>19</sup> Second and relatedly, to the extent that international-level factors have assumed a role, domestic factors have been proximate causes. Laitin's models are illustrative in this regard: although the colonial experience is a third-image factor, it is the domestic vested interests who have invested in the colonially inherited language that emerge as proximate causes in explaining the failure of language unification. By adopting a "second-image reversed" perspective, we direct attention to those external causes that acted in tandem with domestic mediators to influence language policy.<sup>20</sup>

## 1.2 Case Selection and Methodology

The cases here examined were selected for several reasons. First, we are able to read and translate the original-language sources necessary to complete this work. Second, four of the five countries legislated changes in their official state language policies during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, offering the opportunity to look for evidence of policy contagion or "uncoordinated interdependence."<sup>21</sup> Third, there are a number of secondary sources and contemporaneous historiographic works available for each of these countries for the time period specified, providing us with variation in historical monographs which can help prevent selection bias.<sup>22</sup> Finally, five cases is a reasonable number of case studies in a project of this length. The across-

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<sup>18</sup> Elkins and Simmons 2005. A number of micro-mechanisms fall under this type of policy contagion: mimicry, learning, imitation, emulation, and bandwagoning.

<sup>19</sup> Laitin 1989; 1993

<sup>20</sup> Gourevitch 1978.

<sup>21</sup> See Elkins and Simmons 2005.

<sup>22</sup> See Lustick 1996, especially pp. 615-16.

case focused comparison case study method was selected over a quantitative approach at this time because the goal of this study is to uncover the causal mechanisms leading to divergent aspects of a similar outcome; i.e. change in language policy occurred in all five cases, indicating a uniformly felt systemic force (nationalism) but the varying character of the different policies requires explanation. Detailed case studies, using process-tracing, will permit evaluation of the hypothesized underlying causal mechanisms and the independent variables that cause them to operate.<sup>23</sup> At this time, investigation into the causal processes at work would not be possible in a large-N quantitative analysis, which would risk overlooking variables unknown prior to process-tracing. As we discuss in the Conclusion, we hope to continue this line of research with a quantitative analysis that builds on the findings of this study.

## ***2. Case Studies***

### **2.1 France**

On the heels of the success of the French Revolution and the establishment of the Republic, the new French government began implementing restrictive (conformist) language policies starting in the 1790s. As language scholar Ronald Wardhaugh points out, “In October 1793 it was decreed that only French could be used as the language of instruction in schools. In December of the same year the use of German was forbidden in Alsace,” while the law of July 20, 1794 forbade any public act from being written in any language besides French.<sup>24</sup> The reason for this stringency was that at the time of the Revolution, half of the inhabitants of France could not speak French fluently. This posed a problem for the leaders of the nascent Republic, as it was unclear how many people could live out the ideal of ‘citizen of the Republic’ if they

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<sup>23</sup> See Lustick 1996; Bennett and Elman 2006; Collier, Brady, and Seawright, 2004; George and Bennett 2004; Gerring 2007; Van Evera 1997; King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, among others..

<sup>24</sup> Wardhaugh 1987, pp. 102-103.

could not understand each other within the entire span of the territory. That is, “To the extent they did not yet know the language they were not yet ‘Frenchmen’. The revolutionaries were not prepared to accept this consequence: the population of France were to be turned into Frenchmen and the French language was to be the principal means to effect the necessary change.”<sup>25</sup>

In this precarious time following the revolution, the dedication of the Committee of Public Safety to spread Parisian French and the vehemence of its attitude towards other languages is well-expressed by the following quote from Barrère:

Federalism and superstition speak South Breton; emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian; and fanaticism speaks Basque. We break these instruments of damage and error ... As for us, we owe to our fellow citizens, we owe to the strengthening of the Republic, to make spoken over all its territory the language in which the Declaration of the Rights of Man is written.<sup>26</sup>

To understand the import of establishing a shared language and concomitant identity of “Frenchness,” we must consider the substance of Barrère’s fears. He warns of “federalism,” “emigration,” “hatred of the republic,” and the “counter-revolution.” All of these indicate a concern about a weakened central government, fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines, and ultimately the destruction of the revolutionary enterprise. Notable also are the subjects of his appeal: “our fellow citizens” and “the strengthening of the republic” – that is, he invokes the idea of a community with a shared identity (French citizens), and the territorial locus or basis for that community identity (the Republic). Lachuer comments, “The major impact of the revolutionary period resides in effect on the national language itself that would serve as the ideological base for the different successive regimes throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>27</sup> Wardhaugh concurs, pointing

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in *ibid.* (Trans. A. Díaz.)

<sup>27</sup> Lachuer 1998, p. 47. (Trans. A. Díaz.)

out that “[e]very other language in France was inferior to French. It was therefore the responsibility of the schools to teach French and to teach in French.”<sup>28</sup>

However, despite the strict legislation of the 1790s, enforcement remained a recurring problem for more than the next forty years. As late as 1861, official statistics indicated that French was not spoken at all in 8,381 of France’s 37,510 communes, and according to the Ministry of Public Education, nearly half a million out of the four million school-age children in the country could not speak any French.<sup>29</sup>

Why did the policies of the 1790s fail to take hold? An early problem that was not easily resolved was one of logistics and enforcement capacity. Despite the 1795 law establishing a plan of standardized education in the *écoles centrales*, neither the municipal nor the central governments had sufficient funding to support this scheme. Along with the lack of funding, the microlevel organization of the schools also often failed to meet the law’s standards (sometimes in such an egregious fashion as to allow the pupils to select the subjects they wished to study, without regard for the official curriculum), but there was no accountability.<sup>30</sup> After establishing the First Empire, Napoleon enforced standardized education, first by creating the Ministry of Education in 1808 and then legislating the standardized secondary educational degree, the baccalaureate, in 1809. Whereas the goal of the First Republic had been to develop the identity of the people as Frenchmen and citizens, Napoleon sought an educated, prosperous, and satisfied middle class as a form of political and economic support.<sup>31</sup> With the ascendance of the Bourbon monarchy, however, many of the education reforms were rolled back and suffrage further restricted.

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<sup>28</sup> Wardhaugh 1987, p. 103.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>30</sup> Williams 1956, p. 370.

<sup>31</sup> Kagan et al, 1979.

The July Revolution of 1830 (led by Adolphe Thiers, among others) contributed to the downfall of the Bourbon monarchy, and opened the door for Orleanist rule. This period produced some liberalization, including electoral reform and expanded franchise, but the regime still carefully limited the number of people who could vote based on economic status. In the province of Brittany, the year 1831 saw the implementation of a bilingual education program in French and Breton. Although this might seem to be a tolerant or pluralistic approach to language acquisition, the program's purpose was to fully replace Breton with French.<sup>32</sup> With the overthrow of the Orleanist government in the Revolution of 1848, the Second Republic aimed to reopen access to services and voice for a majority of the population; however, this fell short when Napoleon III established the Second Empire via coup d'état in 1851. The Second Empire has been called "the most obvious, highly developed representation of France's growing dilemma: overcentralization of her national state," which, after the significant turmoil of the preceding years, had for the most part contributed to domestic stability.<sup>33</sup> An 1867 law provided for the creation of girls' schools in every commune in Brittany with more than 500 inhabitants, in order to train the girls to speak French so that their children would not grow up speaking Breton.<sup>34</sup> Despite the laws, the clergy proved a strong institutional obstacle to the diffusion of Parisian French in Brittany.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, the suppression of German in Alsace during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was also very strict, in an attempt to clearly identify the people as French citizens and affirm the province as part of France.<sup>36</sup> However, because France suffered a crushing defeat at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, and the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine

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<sup>32</sup> Lachuer 1998, pp. 49, 51, 52-53; see also Wardhaugh 1987, p. 108.

<sup>33</sup> Greenberg 1969, p. 309.

<sup>34</sup> Lachuer 1998, p. 54.

<sup>35</sup> Lachuer 1998, p. 54.

<sup>36</sup> Wardhaugh 1987, p. 111.

were ceded to Prussian control, we cannot know how that province would have been subjected to the reforms of the 1880s had it remained within the French sovereign state.

With the advent of the Third Republic after Napoleon III's capture in 1870, the new government (headed by Adolphe Thiers) tightened the institutions of centralization developed under the Second Empire. As a reaction to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia (and the high level of domestic dissatisfaction with the National Assembly's capitulation), this drive for unity can be understood as an attempt to recover the domestic stability that had existed during the Second Empire. Popular disapproval of the Thiers government was only exacerbated by the strict policies it enforced, finally culminating in the tumultuous episode of the Paris Commune. Within ten years of the fall of the Commune, the government of the Third Republic at last overcame most of the prior obstacles to carrying out language homogenization laws, despite some continued domestic opposition.<sup>37</sup>

One issue discussed at this time was how closely the new policies should emulate the 1970s legislation. Laws passed in 1881 and 1882 rendered primary education obligatory, free, and secular, while laws passed in 1886 required that instruction occur in French as well as “[encourage] the promotion of French language and culture.”<sup>38</sup> These fulfilled the dual purpose of giving all schoolchildren a standard French education, as well as significantly limiting the influence of the clergy over local education practices. Improved means of communication, due to new roads and railways, further assisted realization of these goals; this allowed the French state to continue its process of consolidation more efficiently and consistently. The strict enforcement of the legislation of the 1880s recalled the original “linguistic Terror” of the 1790s, but this time enforcement did not abate.

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<sup>37</sup>Mainly by clergy; see Williams 1953.

<sup>38</sup> Wardhaugh 1987, p. 103; Lachuer 1998, p. 75.

The logistical difficulty of conducting French-only education, when none of the students in many of the provinces understood any French, had hindered the implementation of the laws of the 1790s. However, the serious French loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia, the ideological drive for centralization, and the technological advances in communication methods combined to provide sufficient means and motivation for further legislation and consistent enforcement in the 1880s.

## 2.2 Romania

The emphasis on the Romanian language as a locus of cultural and political national identity had already taken root by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century through the efforts of a literary vanguard known as Școala Ardeleană, or the Transylvanian School. At this time, all the Romanian-speaking provinces were divided under the control of Austria (Bucovina), Hungary (Transylvania), the Ottoman Empire (Wallachia and Moldova<sup>39</sup>), and after 1812, Russia (Bessarabia). The members of the Transylvanian School were a generation of young writers and intellectuals who had lived and received their education in Western Europe (particularly in Paris and Vienna) before returning to the Romanian provinces. Barbara Jelavich comments, “In Paris they came under the influence of the ideas of romantic nationalism, including revolutionary concepts of national liberation.”<sup>40</sup> They viewed the relationship between their language and their nation as interdependent, and by cultivating and uniting the Romanian popular language, aimed for political self-determination.<sup>41</sup> While their newfound Enlightenment ideals inspired a desire

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<sup>39</sup> Also known as Moldavia.

<sup>40</sup> Jelavich 1984, p. 41.

<sup>41</sup> See, among others: Bahner 1972, p. 5 and Grecu 1973, p. 29: “They [the language and nation] are confounded in the process of the fight for liberation, because the fight for language cultivation implies concomitantly the fight for national affirmation, just as the fight for national liberation signifies the fight for the defense and development of the language.” (Trans. A. Díaz.)

to unify their language, the Transylvanian School's emphasis on *cultivation* of the language resulted in a narrow concentration on developing a literary language. These scholars also debated the question of whether or not it was possible to have a unified Romanian language that clearly evidenced its Latin roots, as long as it was written in the Cyrillic alphabet.<sup>42</sup> Their research and advocacy paved the way for the eventual substitution of a Latin alphabet some years later.

When the growing political aspirations of Romanian national unity were stalled by the failed revolution attempt of 1826, the next generation chose to create “a society that was apparently literary and secretly political.”<sup>43</sup> Continuing the project begun by the Transylvanian School, this generation of young intellectuals continued to focus on cultivating the syntax and vocabulary of their language through the 1830s, in the context of a broader Romanian artistic, literary, historiographic, and journalistic movement.<sup>44</sup> The sentiment at this time in favor of language cultivation is well-expressed by a writer from the province of Banat: “A national culture without a cultured language is without possibility. We aspire with everyone towards the language's cultivation, because this is as significant and great a question as the question of our political life.”<sup>45</sup> The strands of this cultural and political drive for unification culminated in the revolutions of the summer of 1848. The widespread support for unification is particularly striking, for while it was organized and spearheaded by the Western-educated young intellectuals, they were backed by peasants and clergy throughout the lands, who sought to do away with the long-standing institutions of feudalism and occupying rule by other countries.<sup>46</sup> These revolutions were cut short by defeat at the hands of Ottoman and Russian troops, leaving

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<sup>42</sup> See Greu 1973, p. 80.

<sup>43</sup> Pascu 1977, p. 34.

<sup>44</sup> See Pascu 1977 and Hitchens 1996, pp. 192-193.

<sup>45</sup> Simeon Manguica, quoted in Babeu 1984, p. 95. (Trans. A. Díaz.)

<sup>46</sup> See Jelavich 1984, pp. 39, 41; Pascu 1971, p. 38; and Florescu 1982, pp. 165-66.

the provinces under the control of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Hungary, and Austria. However, popular desire for national unity, based on an understanding of shared language, religion, and history, remained strong.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1856 ended Russia's hold on the region of Bessarabia, including the Danube Delta area, and restored it to the Romanian principality of Moldavia. In 1857/1858, the members of the Paris Peace Conference<sup>47</sup> allowed the formation of *divans ad hoc* – provisional governments – in Wallachia and Moldavia, and agreed that they would be self-administrating and free from external interference, although the Ottoman Empire would still hold official suzerainty over them.<sup>48</sup> They were directed to each elect a prince; however, in 1859 the two provinces circumvented the requirements by electing the same man as prince in both provinces, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, thereby achieving political unification.<sup>49</sup>

In the wake of this unification, the Romanian government officially replaced the Cyrillic alphabet with a Latin alphabet in 1860, as a means of asserting at once the linguistic homogeneity of the Romanian-speaking peoples and differentiating their language from the surrounding Slavic tongues by reclaiming their Latin heritage.<sup>50</sup> In this way, Romanian leaders emphasized their unique national cultural and literary heritage while demonstrating their affinity towards Western Europe. Notable, however, was the exception permitted to churches. The Romanian Orthodox Church had conducted its services in Old Church Slavonic since the Middle Ages, and the law permitted the continued use of that language, concomitant with its Cyrillic expression.

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<sup>47</sup> France, England, Germany, Sardinia-Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Russia.

<sup>48</sup> Wallachia, consisting of Oltenia and Muntenia, is also referred to as “the Romanian Land” (“Țara Românească”). Hungary still controlled the province of Transylvania at this time. See Jelavich 1984, pp. 70-88.

<sup>49</sup> Jelavich 1984, pp. 96-97; Bârlea 1977, pp. 105-107; Pascu 1971, p. 43; Hitchens 1996, pp. 284-285, 294; Van Meurs 1994, p. 50, among others.

<sup>50</sup> Bârlea 1977, p. 157; Van Meurs 1994, p. 127.

In 1864, by arranging a referendum, Cuza seized full governing control of the two principalities, thus gaining the power to create legislation. Particularly significant was the Law of Public Instruction. This act made primary education free, compulsory, and secular; at this same time, Cuza advocated for universal suffrage, but it was never legislated.<sup>51</sup> The effect of the education law was expected to increase the sense of national unity among all the inhabitants of the united provinces (both male and female) through consistent and standardized instruction in the national language and orthography, within the context of the Romanian literary and historiographic traditions of the preceding century. However, while the Education Minister in 1866, C. A. Rossetti, pressed for clear publicization and promotion of the law, arguing that “there should not remain a single commune without a school and not a single boy or child who lacks sainted book-learning,” the next Education Minister disagreed, asserting that “education is obligatory only on paper.”<sup>52</sup>

After Cuza’s overthrow in 1866 and the subsequent accession of Prince Carol, the debate continued. The ongoing politico-ideological clashes in the government resulted in fluctuating decisions about how the laws ought to be enforced, while the scholarly community became divided on how best to express the spoken language in the new Latinate orthography, and how vocabulary should also reflect the change. At this time, the two main sides to the debate were those who followed the Transylvanian School (in particular, Petru Maior), and the Junimea or Youth movement from Timișoara. Some adherents of the former school sought to reify a Romanian national identity via language purification – systematic purging of terms considered to be of exclusively Slavic, Hungarian, or Turkic origin, along with the addition of neologisms

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<sup>51</sup> Cuza and his minister Kogălniceanu advocated universal suffrage because Cuza relied on the backing of the peasants, although he effectively governed with dictatorial power. See Jelavich 1984, pp. 145-146 and Knight, 1920, pp.3-5.

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in Drace-Francis 2006, p. 148.

derived from contemporary French and Italian. In contrast, the position of the second movement emphasized common usage as its rubric, arguing that time had made those words Romanian, regardless of their etymology. Common usage ultimately favored the latter view.<sup>53</sup>

When Romania declared itself independent in 1877, it ceased paying tribute to the Ottoman Empire and joined with the Russians to fight a Romanian War of Independence as part of the Russo-Turkish-Romanian War. As a result of the Russian and Romanian success, the Great Powers recognized Romania's independence in the Treaty of Berlin, although it had to cede control of three provinces in southern Bessarabia back to Russia, receiving Dobrogea in exchange. However, as Wright points out, the chief political goal for Romania had long been not merely independence, but unification of all the Romanian peoples in the surrounding area. Although all of Bessarabia was not to be reunited with Romanian Moldova again until after the First World War, this intense focus on national cultural identity and desire for broader unification revealed itself in a reemphasis on language policy and the continuing lively spirit of debates over spelling and vocabulary.

The debates came to a close (at least in terms of official legislation) with the Spelling Reform of 1904, which dropped some additional letters from the alphabet. In 1919, the exemption for churches was rescinded. After this point, the official orthographic style remained constant until 1949 when some alterations were made to the script while under Soviet Russian control.<sup>54</sup>

### **2.3 Italy:**

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<sup>53</sup> Wright 2000.

<sup>54</sup> Bârlea 1977. This process is sometimes referred to as the "russification" of the language.

During the first half of the 1800s, Italy saw the work of novelist Alessandro Manzoni, who made it his aim to reform the Tuscan dialect. While the purified language had been recognized as a “literary language” since Dante’s time (largely due to the fact that several notable writers besides Dante wrote in the Florentine dialect, including Petrarch and Boccaccio), Manzoni sought to make it less elite-centric and more suited to everyday usage.<sup>55</sup> The particular puzzle of the Italian case, which Ernst Pulgram points out, is that Italy had created dictionaries of this literary language as early as 1612, yet failed to propagate a standardized language among the general public until nearly 250 years later. Pulgram argues that “the reason for the sluggishness of Tuscan toward becoming a national language lies of course in the absence of political national unity, which both France and Spain enjoyed much earlier.”<sup>56</sup> The consequence of this lack of diffusion of the literary language was that the majority of the population continued speaking their local dialects, while the literary language remained the exclusive purview of the literary elite. Pasquini writes in 1869 that the problem with the old literary language is that it did not have much relevance to the common parlance of the Italian people.<sup>57</sup> This began to change with the rise in popularity of the novel as a more “democratic” form of literature, which also enriched the standard language with common speech forms.<sup>58</sup> As a consequence of the disjuncture between the literary language and the speech of the people, the movement away from this elite, esoteric language was led by writers influenced by other European literary movements, who chose to write in their local dialects; this only exacerbated the problem of incommensurability across dialects, however.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Pulgram 1958, pp. 64-65.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>57</sup> Pasquini 1869, p. 421.

<sup>58</sup> Vivaldi 1894, *Vol. III*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>59</sup> Pulgram 1958; Pasquini 1869.

Thus, as in Romania, this literary-based language movement both preceded and was concurrent with the country's political stirrings. The year 1848 was particularly significant across Europe, heralding a "democratic tendency [...], a desire to shake off tyranny, and, in Italy, a will to political liberation and unification, [that] not only favored and bolstered the establishment of a national language accessible to all classes, but indeed rendered necessary the new readable and pliable Manzonian prose in the place of the old Dantesco *volgare illustre*."<sup>60</sup> Certainly a literary language alone could not suffice as a popular tongue, but a standardized popular tongue was needed to support unification, and the Manzonian development of Florentine Tuscan (which included elements from other dialects as well), seemed a clear choice. As late-19<sup>th</sup> century scholar Vincenzo Vivaldi wrote, "[t]he Florentine language and the Tuscan language are the nerve, the spirit, the substance of our language[.]"<sup>61</sup>

Although the revolutions of 1848 included some failed attempts to unify the Italian states, by the end of 1849 rulership of most of the provinces had returned to the pre-revolution status quo, with Austria controlling northern Italy and guaranteeing stability in much of central Italy. While there was not much change from this status quo over the next ten years, in 1859 the northern Italians, with French support, successfully expelled the Austrians from Lombardy and Piedmont, although Austria retained control over Venice. Despite an agreement between France's Napoleon III and the Austrians to again restore the status quo in the governments of the central Italian states, troops from Piedmont prevented this from happening, and by the end of the year the Papal Legations, Modena, Tuscany, and Parma had unified. Following fighting among the remaining Italian states over the next two years, all the provinces (except Venice and Rome)

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<sup>60</sup> Pulgram 1958, p. 65. It is also important to note the international character of these various movements. Just as the Romanian revolutions of 1848 were inspired by French liberal thought, so Italy's drive for unification was in some ways an emulation of Romania. In fact, some of the Romanian revolutionary leaders lent assistance to the Italian unification movement (see Jelavich 1984, pp. 124-125).

<sup>61</sup> Vivaldi 1894, p. 27. (Trans. A. Díaz.)

were finally unified in 1861 under Victor Emmanuel (then king of Piedmont). From 1860 onwards, the idea that a unified nation could only survive with the support of a unified language became increasingly important.<sup>62</sup>

After unification, the debate among the literati over the normative question of the merits of standardized Italian continued raging. The “anti-manzonian” scholars took issue with the Manzonian project to create a “written language that conforms to the spoken [language], language [that is] erudite and common, simple and cultivated”; some argued that Manzoni gave too little credit to the role of writers in creating language.<sup>63</sup> Conversely, others felt that it was the everyday linguistic interactions of *all* the Italian people, “remaking and reconstituting” a vibrant national language that was needed for national unity.<sup>64</sup> Meanwhile, a standardized public educational system had been created by the Casati Law in Piedmont/Lombardy in 1859 and extended to the rest of the newly unified Italian state in 1861. Among the provisions of the law were to make primary education compulsory, and oblige teaching of several core subjects, including the Italian language, reading, and writing. Despite a few reforms over the ensuing years (including the 1877 change of religious instruction from obligatory to optional), the structure of the Italian educational system remained substantially unchanged until 1923.<sup>65</sup>

As Arturo Tosi points out, “Language changes within Italian society were later to endorse Manzoni’s view that it is the everyday language that provides good models for literature, and not vice versa. But Ascoli’s prediction was also to be confirmed, in that Florentine [...] could not be promoted to the status of national language only through by operations of formal education and

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<sup>62</sup> Vivaldi 1894, *Vol. III*, p. 43.

<sup>63</sup> Writer and historian Cesare Cantù (1865), quoted in Vitale 1978, p. 452. (Trans. A. Díaz.)

<sup>64</sup> Luigi Settembrini (1868), quoted in Vitale 1978, p. 454. (Trans. A. Díaz.)

<sup>65</sup> Brinkmann and Hörner 2007, pp. 394ff.

status planning.”<sup>66</sup> Post-unification, the new government was highly centralized and enforced cultural homogeneity through strict control over public education, required military service, and obligatory use of standard Italian.<sup>67</sup> At the same time, however, the spoken use of regional dialects was not forbidden (due in no small part to the obvious impossibility of effective government monitoring and enforcement of standard language use in everyday – that is, non-official – situations). In fact, facility of comprehension between the dialects and standard Italian was encouraged through the production of dictionaries. This project was carried out primarily by writers and literary people. “With Italy’s unification arose a need – and a competitive program – to produce dialect-language dictionaries, for the purpose of bringing the young Italian nation with its dialect division together through the use of *one* language.”<sup>68</sup> Thus, this two-fold approach to linguistic-cultural unity – strict legal enforcement and development of inter-dialect dictionaries – served to supplement and preserve the new political unity.

## 2.4 Turkey

The origins of the Turkish language reform may be traced back to the series of socioeconomic and cultural reforms in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman era. Although the Tanzimat reforms did not result in institutionalized policy change, the principles of purification and simplification of language proved essential for the elites of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, the Kemalist notion that relative decline might be redressed through a societal reform program also found its seeds in the Tanzimat era.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Tosi 2001, p. 3. He continues by saying, “Instead, the linguistic difference we find in Italian society today are evidence of the heritage of many centuries of political division and cultural diversity, which could not be erased by the official recognition of Florentine as Italy’s national language.”

<sup>67</sup> See Peri 2000, p. 254 and Tosi 2001, pp. 4-7.

<sup>68</sup> Haller 1999, p. 66.

<sup>69</sup> The Tanzimat era begins with the Imperial Decree in 1839 and ends in 1876 with the First Constitutional Era (Birinci Meşrutiyet).

The Ottoman state's response to perceptions of military, economic, and cultural decline culminated in a series of reforms known as the Tanzimat, or the Reordering. As a result, the Gülhane decree of 1839, led by Reşid Paşa, Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire, reflected the desire first, to redress internal and external decline by modernizing and second, to concomitantly reestablish the power of the Sultanate.<sup>70</sup> Although reorganization of state institutions necessitated unraveling the existing economic structure, the elites of the era, led by the Grand Vezir Ali Paşa, believed that the only way that the Ottoman Empire was to be treated as an equal partner in the European system was through Westernization and secularization of the administrative and legal system.<sup>71</sup> These efforts paved the way to the Constitutional reform (Kanun-i-Esasi); held to be the Magna Carta of the Turks, it reflected the desire to mimic Western style reforms and concomitantly to gain the approval of European powers.<sup>72</sup>

It was primarily in the Constitutional Era, however, that the Turkish part of Ottoman, then a composite of Persian, Arabic, and Turkish became a cornerstone of Turkish nationalism.<sup>73</sup> Promulgated by the Young Turks, who later formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the second half of the nineteenth century saw an accelerated tendency of linguistic purification and simplification. The Constitutional elite saw the Turkish vernacular as a reservoir. Aided by the spread of print media, Turkish elites sought to disseminate everyday language and by doing so, to simplify legal and administrative language.<sup>74</sup> This period was also

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<sup>70</sup> Inalcık et al. 1997.

<sup>71</sup> Secularization here remained limited in scope in contrast to the Kemalist era. One of the ways in which Tanzimat constituted secularization was through the creation of a three tiered school system that was distinct from the Medrese-school system which had been based on an Islamic curricula.

<sup>72</sup> Ahmad 2000. The Kanun-I Esasi initiated the Constitutional period, which is divided into two stages: First Constitutional Era (1876-1878), which was suspended by Abdulhamit after the defeat in the Russo-Ottoman War, and The Second Constitutional Era (1908-1922).

<sup>73</sup> Lewis 1999.

<sup>74</sup> See Anderson 1991 on the role of print media in the rise of nationalism.

characterized by early attempts to modify the script. Consensus on one of these proposals, however, was not to emerge before the formation of the Republic.<sup>75</sup>

The pre-Republic Era had been characterized by a series of cultural reforms undertaken by the Ottoman intelligentsia. The elevation of Turkish took place in a nationalist milieu. The wave of nationalism was itself a response to the decline of the Empire as well as to the competing nationalist movements of Ottoman minorities that had led to the independence of Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria from the Empire. This era provides a striking example of “linguistic engineering,” a state-led campaign carried out for nationalist reasons.<sup>76</sup>

The Turkish language reform<sup>77</sup> encompassed two related phases: the first culminated in the alphabet reform, enacted in 1928 and the second encompassed a series of related policy changes and might be said to begin with the foundation of the Turkish Language Institute (Türk Dil Kurumu) in 1932.<sup>78</sup> Linguistic engineering incorporated several interrelated dimensions: purity, secularism, populism, statism, progressiveness.<sup>79</sup> These tenets guided both phases of language policy changes in the early Republic. Additionally, these tenets manifested in specific types of policy changes: alphabet reform followed by legalization of Turkish, rationalization/standardization of the language, and institutional innovations designed to facilitate dissemination of Turkish as an official language.

Motivated by the twin pillars of progress – modernization and secularism – the Kemalist elites adopted the Latin alphabet by passing a legislative act in 1928. The intellectual debate leading up to the alphabet reform in 1928 demonstrates that the reform itself was an “act of

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<sup>75</sup> Ülkütaşır, cited in Çolak 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Lewis 1999, p. 6.

<sup>77</sup> Türk Dil Devrimi, as Lewis notes translates literally to “Turkish Language Revolution.” The choice of ‘revolution’ to officially define changes in policy, however, is indicative of the reformers, and particularly Atatürk’s desire for changes to be rapid and comprehensive.

<sup>78</sup> Initially the Türk Dil Cemiyeti, or the Turkish Language Society. See Şavkay 2002 and Çolak 2004.

<sup>79</sup> Interestingly, four of these tenets, secularism, populism, statism, and progressiveness were among the seven principles of the founding party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP).

forgetting.”<sup>80</sup> A recurring theme in reformers’ speeches leading up to the Alphabet Reform, the need for a uniquely Turkic alphabet reflected the Kemalists’ desires to cut ties with the “ancien regime.”<sup>81</sup> In fact, shortly after the Alphabet Reform, the *London Times* commended the Turkish effort to transcend centuries of backwardness and isolation and to “draw closer than ever to the West.”<sup>82</sup> This sentiment echoed the distinct but related goals of the Kemalists’ agenda: domestically, to increase literacy, and internationally, to “achieve the ranks of Western civilization.”<sup>83</sup>

An analogous theme was the incongruence between natural Turkish sounds and the Arabic alphabet. According to the elite, this incongruence and the consequent difficulties it posed to the layman were to blame for low literacy rates, backwardness, and mass ignorance. The populist underpinnings of the Kemalist program are evident in the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s address to the Turkish media at Dolmabahçe in 1928. He summed up the *raison d’être* of the alphabet reform: “To save the public from ignorance.”<sup>84</sup> The dislike of the Arabic script was also intricately linked to Anti-Arab sentiment. Although clearly linked to secularization, the sentiment is more closely attributable to the “recent past.” In this sense, the recent past had created a mass-elite convergence in emphasizing the detrimental role Arabs played in Turkey’s defeat in World War I.<sup>85</sup>

That the alphabet reform was to be a precursor to the broader changes in linguistic policy was evident in Atatürk’s parliamentary address shortly after the adoption of the new alphabet.<sup>86</sup>

In fact, the alphabet reform had constituted a transition period and by weakening opposition from

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<sup>80</sup> Çolak 2004, p. 73.

<sup>81</sup> Lewis 1999; Çolak 2004.

<sup>82</sup> *The London Times* 1928, quoted in Şimşir 1992, p. 255.

<sup>83</sup> One of the most oft-cited quotes from Atatürk; also quoted in .

<sup>84</sup> Afet Hanim et al. 1930. *Türk Tahrihinin Ana Hatları*, cited in Şavkay 2002, p. 41.

<sup>85</sup> Şavkay 2002; Zurcher 1997.

<sup>86</sup> Çolak 2004, p. 43. Underlining the significant role of the Turkish Parliament in linguistic reform, Atatürk stated that the new letters were to “set the stage for the rise and progress of the nation.” (Trans. N. Avdan.)

conservative and religious parties set the stage for more comprehensive reforms. The period after the formation of the Turkish Language Institute was marked by two complementary efforts: purification and standardization. The impetus behind this was to carve out what was uniquely Turkish, as a strategy of cutting ties with the Ottoman era, while simultaneously weeding out the Persian and Arabic elements from the language. This latter desire, in turn was partially attributable to the fact that in the eyes of the Kemalist elite, Turkish nationalism stood in opposition to Persian and Arab nationalisms.

Second, it also reflected an attempt at reputation-building in the international arena. Stressing the salience of a uniquely Turkish language, Atatürk declared “Only after establishing a profound and robust cultural frame will the Turkish nation’s capacity and integrity be recognized among other nations. Consequently, it is noteworthy to recognize the significance of these historic reforms in reestablishing the Turkish nation’s uniqueness.”<sup>87</sup> The quest for a unique national language culminated in the Sun Language Theory. Advocated by an eclectic group of state elites, academics, and literary figures, the Sun Language Theory maintained that Turkic languages preceded all other languages. This claim enabled the Kemalists to reincorporate foreign words – provided they were “Western” – into technical vocabulary.<sup>88</sup>

Shortly after the formation of the Turkish Language Institute, the Kemalist elites set up “people’s houses.”<sup>89</sup> In tandem with the national education program undertaken personally by Atatürk to disseminate the new letters as quickly as possible, these institutional innovations sought to popularize linguistic reforms.<sup>90</sup> In fact, although Turkish linguistic engineering is held

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<sup>87</sup> Korkmaz 1992. (Trans. N. Avdan.)

<sup>88</sup> See Lewis 1999 on a detailed account of these debates. While some historians argue that it was an attempt on the part of Kemalists to justify incorporation of Western words into Turkish dictionaries, others maintain that it was a middle-path in terms of purification.

<sup>89</sup> “Halk evleri.”

<sup>90</sup> Webster 1939.

to be a state-led top down process, the success of these measures was evident in the popular “Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign.”<sup>91</sup> If one facet of purification entailed the search for “öz Türkçe” (originally Turkish) words, another facet was the enforcement of Turkish as the official language. The campaign sought to eradicate the visibility and audibility of non-Turkish languages. Thus, by forming a domestic fire-alarm system, a social network composed of intellectuals and students reinforced the legalization of language unification.

## 2.5 Switzerland:

The antiquity of the Swiss state, the oldest democracy of Europe, created an important legacy for state-builders in later centuries. It was the long and relatively enduring nature of territorial consolidation that figured prominently in the construction of a nation.<sup>92</sup> The Old Confederation dates back to the military alliance of three cantons, Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden in 1291. From a state-building perspective, this alliance did not develop central institutions; however, it is possible to trace Swiss shared history back to this era.<sup>93</sup> From a linguistic-policy perspective, the short-lived Helvetic Republic marked the birth of Swiss multilingual society and linguistic equality. With the incorporation of eight French speaking cantons, for the first time in this era, German, French, and Italian stood on an equal footing. The Helvetic Republic was dissolved through the Napoleonic Mediation Act of 1803. By restoring power to cantons, the Act struck a balance between the newly emerging principles of direct democracy and the older decentralized nature of the Old Confederation in the pre-Helvetic Era.

The problem of language came to the fore in three periods of Swiss history. First, in the post-1848 period, as the only remaining liberal republican regime in continental Europe,

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<sup>91</sup> Aslan 2007.

<sup>92</sup> De Rougemont 1965.

<sup>93</sup> Zimmer 2004.

Switzerland posed a threat to the absolutist monarchies of Europe.<sup>94</sup> Second, in the interwar period, nationalism emerged partially as a response to the external threat of irredentism and partially to the challenge of the liberal left. The domestic contest gave way to a nationalist synthesis based on preserving what was uniquely Swiss. Third, the interwar period saw the emergence of linguistic pluralism as a crucial aspect of Swiss nationalism.<sup>95</sup>

The former two periods were characterized by a domestic contest between competing visions of nationalism.<sup>96</sup> In contrast to cultural explanations of linguistic pluralism in Switzerland which downplay the role of nationalism in Swiss nation-building, a ‘competing nationalisms’ perspective views the process as a domestic contest to define “the nation.”<sup>97</sup> Importantly, both periods in Swiss history were significant for language-policy in that in both eras, perceptions of external threat spurred discussions of what constituted the nation. It was in this milieu that language-policy was first problematized by Swiss elites.<sup>98</sup>

The attempt by the Allied Powers to restore the old regime of aristocracy and decentralization in 1815 constituted a turning point in Swiss linguistic history. However, with the Congress of Vienna, three more French speaking cantons were added to the Confederation’s territories. Following the addition of Geneva, Neuchatel, and Valais, Switzerland acquired its current territorial boundaries, which were to remain unchanged until 1979.<sup>99</sup>

The post 1848 environment proved turbulent for Switzerland in that as the only surviving liberal regime in continental Europe, Switzerland posed a definite threat to its neighbors. As a result, the period is marked by several foreign policy crises.<sup>100</sup> Prussia threatened intervention

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<sup>94</sup> Zimmer 2004.

<sup>95</sup> McRae 1983.

<sup>96</sup> Stojanovic 2003.

<sup>97</sup> Zimmer 2003. See Kymlicka 1995 for cultural explanations of multilingualism.

<sup>98</sup> Mayer 1951.

<sup>99</sup> Jura was incorporated into Switzerland in 1979, see Zimmer 2003; 2004.

<sup>100</sup> McRae 1983.

and demanded changes in Switzerland's asylum policy; Austria imposed a blockade on Ticino in 1852, and France annexed Savoy in 1860. Domestically, the crises resulted in a growing divide between Radicals and Catholics. However, the struggles were defined not along linguistic lines; rather, cleavages formed around religious and ideological lines. Furthermore, elites pointed to history to justify the multiculturalist and voluntaristic vision of Switzerland.<sup>101</sup> In fact, the conclusion that emerged in this era is echoed in the words of Renan. Emphasizing the origins of Switzerland as a voluntary alliance of distinct cultures, Renan questioned the direct link between language and nation: "The Spanish-speaking American and the Spaniard speak the same language but do not form one nation. In contrast, the Swiss people, though composed of different parties and a total of four languages form one nation. In man there is a quality superior to that of language: it is voluntarism. The Swiss form one nation of their own volition, despite the variety of languages."<sup>102</sup>

In terms of linguistic divides, the period leading up to World War I is striking because for the first time, Switzerland witnessed inter-conflict between different language groups. In particular, influenced by Pan-German sentiment, the allemanic speaking Swiss rallied around German and sought expanded language rights. This resulted in the parallel reactionary mobilization of language-rights advocates in French and Italian Switzerland. Though the post-1890 era was marked by a growing potential for language conflict, a number of intellectuals and elites responded to the threat of domestic fragmentation by reemphasizing the importance of Swiss diversity and the exceptionalism of Swiss values. Specifically, Swiss neutrality went hand in hand with the acceptance of diversity. With the termination of World War I and the growing salience of economic and class divisions, linguistic cleavages receded into the background.

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<sup>101</sup> Stojanovic 2003.

<sup>102</sup> Renan, 1996[1882], p. 16. (Trans. N. Avdan.)

Importantly, the demographic dominance of German did not emerge as a pretext for German linguistic dominance.<sup>103</sup>

The interwar period constitutes the third crucial period for understanding why and how language unification was not deemed necessary for Swiss nationalism.<sup>104</sup> Faced with the threat of Nazism, Swiss elites asserted the sense of Swiss exceptionalism. In other words, Switzerland responded to external threat by developing a mechanism of survival: stressing exceptionalism and embracing psychological self-sufficiency were integral to remaining wedded to cultural diversity. The unique element was defined as an acceptance of diversity and a capacity to transcend national differences. In fact, the acceptance of Romansch as a fourth language is a testament to the significance of multiculturalism in conceptualizing Swiss nationhood.<sup>105</sup> Furthermore, decentralization and direct democracy not only prevented the rise of Fascism by isolating these movements, but also went hand in hand with the acceptance of pluralism.

The territorial principle proved instrumental in guaranteeing linguistic autonomy in Switzerland.<sup>106</sup> Although it might be said that the territorial compromise owes its origins to the 1848 Constitution, the constitution failed to put an end to linguistic tensions. In fact, the addition of the canton of Jura in 1979 to Switzerland illustrates that multiculturalism does not deterministically entail linguistic diversity. Triggered by old hostilities and an election of a French-speaking official in Bern, linguistic tensions resurfaced and resulted in separatist claims. However, the incorporation of Bern into Jura constituted an innovative solution to linguistic tensions and was lauded as a solution to modern conflict.

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<sup>103</sup> Mayer 1951.

<sup>104</sup> McRae 1983.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Schmid 2001.

In sum, the Swiss did not mimic other polities experiencing linguistic tensions; instead they chose to accentuate their uniqueness.<sup>107</sup> We believe that the “Swiss enigma” may be explained at two levels: at the domestic level, decentralization in the form of cantonal autonomy and federalism acted as enabling factors in the emergence of the territorial compromise. At the international level, enduring territorial attachment and absence of direct military threats meant that language divisions did not constitute threats to social cohesion.

### **3. Discussion**

#### **3.1: Hypotheses (1)a. and (1)b.**

*(1)a. States facing recent external threats or conflict situations will be expected to consolidate linguistically. States facing territorial claims from other states are expected to legislate language homogeneity.*

*(1)b. States not facing external danger will be expected to take a more relaxed approach and permit greater linguistic heterogeneity.<sup>108</sup>*

France, Romania, and Italy all fulfill the prediction of Hypothesis (1)a. France began strongly enforcing its laws as well as passing new ones in the wake of its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Romania was at the crossroads of competing empires, all of which held sway over parts of the area and also claimed other Romanian-speaking territories, while orthographic change came quickly after the *fait accompli* of unifying Wallachia and Moldova right under the nose, so to speak, of Ottoman rule. Therefore, its move to change the orthography and reform the language makes sense in the geopolitical context. In Italy, the literati began the process of reforming and standardizing the language in the hopes that cultural-linguistic unity would

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> A selection problem with this study was the absence of states that had not recently undergone a revolution or international conflict. See the Conclusion for further discussion of how this could be remedied in future research.

precipitate and support political unification, pulling all the Italian territories away from foreign powers. When the Italian national state finally achieved unification through a series of battles, the newly consolidated territories still keenly felt the absence of Venice and the other regions occupied by Austria, which again supports Hypothesis (1)a.

Dating back to the Tanzimat, in the Turkish case cultural reform can be seen as the elite's reaction to perception of relative decline. In particular, the literature on the Tanzimat offers clear references to military defeat as the precursor to a series of reforms that started in the military/technical domain and extended to the cultural.<sup>109</sup> After the formation of the Republic, Kemalist elites saw language reform as a “direct continuation of the national war of independence.”<sup>110</sup>

Kemalists viewed the pre-Republican history as one of chaos in which territorial loss was tied to loss of identity. Additionally, the framing of decline as “civilizational loss” provided justification for the Kemalists' quest for a unique and pure Turkish, devoid of elements of the ‘ancien régime,’ the main culprit of decline.<sup>111</sup> From that perspective the reforms emerged as a remedial package: by setting up goal posts, the elites hoped to mobilize the populace.

Furthermore, decline was directly tied to the two fundamental tenets of linguistic reform: Westernization and secularization. Entering “the ranks of the civilized nations,” quoting Atatürk, was proposed as the only means to recoup cultural losses.

One might say that the definitive feature of Swiss state-building is the absence of external threats. In that sense, a multicultural community follows unproblematically from a stable polity, thus supporting Hypothesis (1)b.<sup>112</sup> However, this is a simplistic view of Swiss history.<sup>113</sup> In

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<sup>109</sup> Zurcher 1997.

<sup>110</sup> From the words of Hasan Ali, the first Minister of Education; cited in Şavkay 2002, p. 67.

<sup>111</sup> Şavkay 2002.

<sup>112</sup> Kymlicka 1995.

fact both in the period leading up to the First World War and in the interwar period, Switzerland's three language groups forged a sense of community partially in response to the German threat.<sup>114</sup> Motivated by the need for ideological self-defense, these groups rallied around the Swiss version of nationalism, a significant pillar of which was linguistic pluralism. In other words, in line with the expectations of the literature on state-building, external threats did prompt a nationalist response, yet nationalism was not dictated by language centralization.<sup>115</sup> We must look to other factors, then, in explaining why a multiculturalist version of nationalism was embraced by Swiss elites.

### **3.2: Hypotheses (2)a. and (2)b.**

*(2)a. States that have been consolidated within their territory for longer amounts of time are expected to be more relaxed towards language diversity, as long as they are not currently facing external threat.*

*(2)b. Newly consolidated states are expected to enforce linguistic unity.*

France's legislation of the 1790s follows Hypothesis (2)b's expected pattern of attempted linguistic homogenization by a newly consolidated state. However, the combination of enforcing preexisting laws and passing new ones in the 1880s – almost a century after the Revolution's success – seems to contradict Hypothesis (2)a. Nevertheless, the decisive defeat France had just suffered in the Franco-Prussian War, which included the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, meant that France was no longer secure in its territory by the 1880s. Therefore, this outcome is also consistent with Hypothesis (2)a.

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<sup>113</sup> McRae 1983; Zimmer 2003.

<sup>114</sup> McRae 1983.

<sup>115</sup> Tilly 1992.

In some ways, Italy appears to contradict Hypothesis (2)b. On the one hand, as a newly unified state, it legislated one national language, as was expected. However, by permitting the continued use of the regional dialects, and not even mentioning them through legislation, it could have undermined the durability of unification because linguistic fragmentation could have increased, resisting the use of standard Italian. Looking beyond the timeframe of this study shows that continued use of regional dialects over time has resulted in variation in how the standard language is used in the different regions; however, this does not seem to have had fragmentary political effects.

Romania also confirms Hypothesis (2)b, by legislating the script change within a year after first achieving unification. In some ways, the Romanian and Italian situations appear to be ordered differently from that of France. Whereas in France, the intellectuals and politicians led the movement towards linguistic consolidation as a response to the dialect fragmentation that they saw as a possible threat to the newly unified state, both the Romanian and the Italian language reform movements actually provided impetus for unification (and purposefully so).

### **3.3: Hypothesis (2)ab (interaction effect)**

*(2)ab (durability-threat [interaction]): Given an external threat, states that have been territorially consolidated for long amounts of time are expected to pursue linguistic unification.*

Common to both the Ottoman and the Republican eras were perceptions of relative decline as an impetus for cultural reform. If the factors in state antiquity concept are taken into account, Turkey emerges as a territorially consolidated state, where World War I represents a brief interruption of continuity.<sup>116</sup> Based on this we would expect the state elites to be more relaxed in terms of language policy. However, as we emphasized before, loss, particularly

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<sup>116</sup> See Burkett et al. 1999 on state antiquity.

territorial loss, weighed heavily on reformers' minds. In the pre-Republic era, the Ottoman Empire lost those territories it had had suzerainty over. Furthermore, the independence of these nations provided an impetus for the rise of nationalism. The nationalist program, in turn, might be interpreted as a backlash on the part of the Young Turks against the challenge of secessionism. The status of the Turkish language became politicized in particular because the new elites perceived Turkish to be 'colonized' by foreign elements, similarly to the way the Empire was penetrated by foreign claims. Importantly, the existence of an enduring state structure provided the new intelligentsia with the institutional resources necessary to pursue intellectual debate and reform.

Turning to the Republican era, the Kemalist elites were able to build on the concepts promulgated by the Young Turks. Second, as a newly independent state, the Turkish Republic faced incentives to pursue strategies of state-building. That language unification emerged as one of those strategies is attributable both to fledgling status of the Republic and to the memories of humiliation suffered with the Treaty of Sevres. In fact, the public was "buoyed up by being the only people on the losing side of World War I to have redressed their territorial losses."<sup>117</sup> In the hands of Kemalist reformers, linguistic uniformity became a cornerstone of the project.

Much like the Turkish case, the reinvigorated language homogenization practices of 1880s France were inspired by the territorial loss of Alsace and Lorraine. Furthermore, after almost seventy years of rule by empire and monarchy, the Third Republic sought to reawaken the ideals of the original revolutionaries; thus, the strict enforcement of the legislation of the 1880s was a type of emulation of the "linguistic Terror" of the 1790s.

As we note in the theory section, state durability may act as an enabling factor in pursuing a relaxed language policy. Cultural explanations of Swiss nation-building link

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<sup>117</sup> Lewis 1999, p. 41.

linguistic pluralism to the infeasibility of a unitarist vision of solidarity.<sup>118</sup> However, this account is inadequate in explaining why geography emerged as the salient identity marker in the concept of Swiss nationhood. We argue that the long history of territorial consolidation gave Swiss state-builders the opportunity to politicize territorial attachments. In that sense, through a “nationalization of nature,” Swiss elites pointed to the territory as a binding force.<sup>119</sup>

Although the importance of language was recognized in debates on nation-building, a single state language never gained predominance as an identity marker.<sup>120</sup> Swiss elites were able to emphasize the Swiss landscape in “imagining a shared community.”<sup>121</sup> As Kaufmann further notes, the mountainous nature of Swiss terrain, particularly in border zones, contributed to the shared vision of Swiss territories as a “haven.”<sup>122</sup> In line with our hypothesis on the interaction effect between state durability and external threats, the fact that the Swiss government had maintained stable territorial control over its territories enabled territorial attachments to figure as a focal point in nation-building.

### **3.4: Hypotheses (2)c. and (2)d.**

*(2)c. Notwithstanding (2)a., established states with strong central governments are expected to legislate greater linguistic conformity.*

*(2)d. Established states with strong regional governments, or power distributed within a federalized system, are expected to permit greater linguistic heterogeneity.*

The propositions of Hypotheses (2)c and (2)d, when considered for the majority of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, explain France’s behavior which appeared to contradict Hypothesis (2)a. The

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<sup>118</sup> Kauffman and Zimmer 1998.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Kaufmann and Zimmer 1998; Zimmer 2004; Wiegandt 1977

<sup>121</sup> Anderson 1991.

<sup>122</sup> This is related to the concept of difficult terrain contributing to defense dominance.

political instability that dominated through much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century resulted from a fluctuation in governance. From Republic to Empire to monarchy and so on, each of these had differing ideological bases for their policies, and the structuring of their governments also correlates with policy implementation. By the 1880s, France was recovering from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, and had shifted toward a stronger central government that sought to reclaim the ideals of the Revolution in response to its territorial loss and diminished status in the international sphere.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, while as a state that had been consolidated for quite some time, it could have been expected to relax its language homogenization practices, its status as a state with a strong central government makes its renewed approach to language policy understandable and predictable.

The importance of a strong central government is evident in the motives for the Tanzimat reforms. Primarily, both the Tanzimat, and ironically the following constitutional reforms, came as a response to the unraveling of central control by the Sultanate. Some authors contend that the tenet of statism itself is an outcome of Ottoman paternalism.<sup>124</sup> In other words, the Kemalist elites inherited the strong state tradition of the Ottoman era. The belief that the state and its elites must educate and lead the public gave way to the corollary belief in elite-led top-down reform.

Despite external threats by the Great Powers in the nineteenth century and of irredentist nationalism in the interwar era, Switzerland embraced diversity and enshrined the norms of diversity, pluralism, and voluntaristic nationalism in the Constitution.<sup>125</sup> This is further exemplified by the inclusion of the Romansch language, through a constitutional amendment, as

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<sup>123</sup> Perhaps the drive for centralization was because of the disaster for the central government that was posed by the Paris Commune ten years earlier.

<sup>124</sup> See Lewis 1999; Heyd 1954.

<sup>125</sup> McRae 1983; Zimmer 2004.

a fourth national language at the end of the interwar era. In other words, federalism provided an institutional mechanism to address diversity and to preempt political instability. Instead of viewing federalism as an outcome of linguistic diversity, we argue that federalism acted as an enabling explanatory factor in allowing state builders to adopt multilingual policies.<sup>126</sup>

The above notion highlights the role of political culture as a key factor in embracing linguistic diversity. Beyond the role of culture, however, the institutionalization of norms of compromise in Switzerland's federal system paved the way for linguistic pluralism. In fact, long before the legalization of multilingual policies, the Swiss Confederation had developed effective mechanisms of conflict moderation and compromise. With the advent of democracy, norms of compromise became institutionalized and enshrined in the federal system, in accordance with Hypothesis 2d.

### **3.5: Hypothesis (2)e.**

*(2)e. States whose governments depend on a base of elites will be less likely to promote language homogenization policies than those whose governments rely on mass support.*

This hypothesis is immediately confirmed in France's laws of the 1790s, as the revolutionaries knew that their basis in the support of the masses depended on cohesiveness among the population, principally a shared sense of "Frenchness." In contrast, the intermediate regimes had no desire to promote more unifying forces, since governance was restricted to a very small category of stakeholders. Italy, like France, needed to foster a sense of being Italian, as

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<sup>126</sup> Mc Rae 1983; Stein 1968; Watts 1970 cited in McRae. These authors prescribe federalism as a remedy to cultural conflict.

opposed to Tuscan, Lombard, Neapolitan, or Roman, in order to achieve and maintain unification, despite the slow spread of enfranchisement.<sup>127</sup>

The revolutionary movement in Romania, which set the groundwork for the eventual 1860 legislation, was led by a relatively small group of intellectuals; however, it boasted mass support ranging from peasants to clergy throughout the Romanian-speaking provinces. While France and Italy's goals were to establish a shared sense of national identity through cultivating a shared language, the movement in Romania simply had to appeal to the pre-existing mutual linguistic identity.

The Romanian case shows also how the type of regime supported by leaders' ideological leanings can function in a similar manner to an actual regime. Although the actual governing functions of the Romanian government were centrally controlled, whether or not an Education Minister believed that the mass public ought to have a voice or a stake in the progress of the nation had clear material repercussions in terms of how the laws were enforced. The liberal Minister, Rossetti, was a firm advocate for consistent, centrally well-funded, standardized education – that is, strictly enforcing the laws on obligatory public education. In contrast, his conservative successor did not consider the awareness or participation of the mass public as having much relevance for the country, and thus had no interest in enforcing the legislation.

As sociolinguist Sue Wright comments in discussing the low percentage of citizens who spoke the standard language fluently in the newly constituted French and Italian states, “[These figures] do nothing to suggest that language is unimportant in French and Italian nationalism. Far from being insignificant, it is the very language diversity of France and Italy that explains

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<sup>127</sup> See Pulgram 1958, p. 60.

400 years of official French insistence on the correct use of the language being taught properly in schools throughout France, and the promotion of Italian in Italy after unification.”<sup>128</sup>

There is no doubt that the Turkish language reform was an elite-led and top-down process. At first sight then, that language unification was led by a single-party state seems to contradict this hypothesis. Nevertheless, it was undertaken by the state establishment on behalf of the populace, as evinced by the principle of statism advocated by the People’s Republican Party. In that respect, there was a paradoxical merging of statist and populist principles. Perhaps more importantly, Atatürk and his circle of elites recognized that a single-party state was necessary for the smooth enactment of reforms. Both because Atatürk favored a speedy process of change, and because he anticipated opposition from conservative and Islamic factions and consequently feared fragmentation along these lines, he opted for a top-down process. The single-party system was “a logical consequence of the failure of the first parliaments (Tanzimat I and II) to get beyond the debate of concerted action and the lethargy of the masses.”<sup>129</sup> Leaders and the led were accustomed for state responsibility for all action and legislation reflected this understanding.

As the oldest democracy of Europe, Switzerland’s political system relied on mass support. In fact, cantonal predilection towards direct democracy had played a key role in state-building.<sup>130</sup> It was the preference towards direct democracy that aided the creation of a federal compromise.<sup>131</sup> Far from being a trivial aspect of state-building, language was significant in facilitating the workings of direct democracy.<sup>132</sup> The logistical problem of facilitating

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<sup>128</sup> Wright 1998, p. 30.

<sup>129</sup> Webster 1939.

<sup>130</sup> McRae 1983.

<sup>131</sup> Stajavonic 1999.

<sup>132</sup> Torrenté 1957.

communication between the citizenry resulted in the adoption of the “territorial principle,” a constitutional principle that recognizes the legal equality of the distinct language groups.<sup>133</sup>

#### ***4. Conclusion: Findings and Implication for Future Research***

This has been both a theory-building and theory-testing study. Based on the five cases examined, our hypotheses regarding the conditions under which a state will pursue language homogenization policies are confirmed. Avenues for future research could include creating a data set by expanding across regions and across time, including countries that did not change or institute national language policies, as well as those that did not experience significant territorial conflict.

Extant large-N studies on language focus on the relationship between economic development and language diversity.<sup>134</sup> Reflecting this focus, these compilations have included various measures of linguistic diversity in countries. Our proposed project would differ from existing studies first and foremost in recognizing that while observed diversity might result from state policies, linguistic diversity would be a poor proxy for linguistic pluralism as a *state policy*. Second, as we stressed throughout the paper, language unification is a multifaceted concept. Our proposed coding partially reflects the subtle distinctions that scholars of language draw between types of policies.<sup>135</sup> That said, our focus would be on the political aspects of these distinctions: for instance, although the distinction between overt/covert policies is a linguistic construct, from a political perspective a more salient distinction is between legalization and enforcement.

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<sup>134</sup> Banks and Taylor’s Cross-Polity Survey and Russett et al’s World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators are primary examples of this; cited in McRae 1983.

<sup>135</sup> Schliffman, cited in Schmid 2001.

Our approach would also build on Laitin's recent work on language rights. Based on the Minorities at Risk project, this work has concentrated on the linkage between domestic-level factors such as state strength, regime type and language rights.<sup>136</sup> As we emphasized, our paper is guided by the logic of outside-in effects. In that respect, our data would include measures that capture state durability, territorial consolidation, and external threats. Whereas scholars of international conflict have developed measures for the study of the latter, our conceptualization of territorial consolidation requires data heretofore largely unexplored by international relations scholarship.<sup>137</sup> Burkett and Putterman's state antiquity index proves useful in this regard: by capturing the extent of territory directly under governmental control, it captures our concept of territorial consolidation.<sup>138</sup> The central theme of this project would be to trace generalizable linkages between state durability, external threat, and language policy.

The goals of this research will be twofold: (1) The results of this preliminary study will be tested for durability, and (2) we will be able to address the broader questions concerning the ultimate source of this type of policy change. This will finally allow us to extrapolate to make predictions about other types of policy change. Although we use historical cases, this work is currently relevant because language policy is a major focus of countries working towards prospective EU membership. They are all constrained by the same accession requirements, but the factors we discuss here could determine how they enact those requirements.

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
<sup>136</sup> Laitin 2004.

<sup>137</sup> Correlates of War measures, developed by Singer 1963 and Brecher and Wilkenfield's International Crisis Behavior project would especially be useful in this regard.

<sup>138</sup> Burkett and Putterman 1999; Puttermann 2000; 2007.

## Appendix

Figure 1 – Linguistic Diversity Continuum

**Dimensions of language unification:**

Our operationalizations of five key concepts are from the perspective of language unification. This reflects our goal to create a composite ordinal index of language unification where each dimension would be ranked from high to low and contribute to the overall score.

**Purification:** This indicator captures attempts to define a unique single language as well as attempts to purge the language from foreign influence.

**Legalization:** This indicator taps legal changes enacted by the state, such as legislative acts and/or constitutional reform, that declare a single language as official policy.

**Alphabet Reform:** A dummy indicator that looks at whether a new alphabet was adopted with the goal of enhancing the unique status of the official language.

**Enforcement:** Captures state-led and popular channels of enforcing compliance with legal statutes; includes whether means of penalizing noncompliance were implemented.

**Status of Minority Languages:** Captures covert and overt means of ‘diglossification’: whether minority languages stood on an equal footing with the official language. Measures capture media, dissemination, and education rights granted to minority languages.

Table 1 – Independent and Dependent Variables

Independent Variables		Dependent Variables	
Variable Name	Potential Coded Value	Variable Name	Potential Coded Value
external threats or territorial demands	high/med/low/none	alphabet reform	yes/no
duration of state consolidation	high/med/low/none	purification	high/med/low/none
strength of central government	high/med/low	legalization	high/med/low/none
dependence of government on mass public support	high/med/low	enforcement	high/med/low/none
		status of minority language rights	high/med/low/none

Table 2 – Explanatory Factors According to Opportunity-Willingness Framework

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dimension of Effect
(1)a & b	external threat	willingness
(2)a & b	territorial consolidation/ durability	both
(2)c	centralization	opportunity
(2)d	federalism	opportunity
(2)e	elite/mass support	willingness
(2)b	durability	both

Table 3 – Cases and Respective Codings

Cases	Independent Variable Name	Coding	Dimensions of Language Unification	Policies Enacted	Coding
Turkey	external threats or territorial demands	high	purification	foreign words purged Sun language theory	high
	duration of state consolidation	med	legalization	Turkish declared official language	high
	strength of central government	high	alphabet reform	1928 reform precedes other language policies	yes
	dependence of government on mass public support	med	enforcement	enforcement through public campaigns	high/med

			status of minority rights	education and media rights exclusive till recent changes	low
<b>France</b>	external threats or territorial demands	high	purification	none	none
	duration of state consolidation	low/high	legalization	declaration of Parisian French as official French language; standardized public education; French required for official purposes	high
	strength of central government	high	alphabet reform	none	no
	dependence of government on mass public support	high/low	enforcement	“linguistic Terror” imposed French-only programs, but lax in practice until 1880s	high/low
			status of minority rights	regional dialects suppressed through various requirements and subverted through bilingual and French-only education programs	low
<b>Romania</b>	external threats or territorial demands	high	purification	some words of Slavic and Turkic origin removed from “official” language; added neologisms from French and Italian	med
	duration of state consolidation	low	legalization	official switch from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet; standardized public education; exemption for churches	high/med
	strength of central government	high	alphabet reform	1861 switch from Cyrillic to Latin script precedes other policies	yes
	dependence of government on mass public support	med	enforcement	all official documents must use Latin script; church	med

				proceedings exempt until 1919; education not consistent over time	
			status of minority rights	Hungarian, Slavic, and German-speakers must use Romanian in official settings	med/low
<b>Italy</b>	external threats or territorial demands	high/low	purification	“cultivation” of Florentine Tuscan incorporates commonly-used words from other dialects	med
	duration of state consolidation	low/none	legalization	Florentine Tuscan declared official language; standardized public education	high/med
	strength of central government	high/med	alphabet reform	none	no
	dependence of government on mass public support	med	enforcement	obligatory education, military service, official use of standard Italian	high/med
			status of minority rights	standard Italian required for official use; private use of regional dialects permitted; cross-dialect dictionaries	med
<b>Switzerland</b>	external threats or territorial demands	med/low	purification	none	low
	duration of state consolidation	high	legalization	three languages declared official	low
	strength of central government	low	alphabet reform	none	no
	dependence of government on mass public support	high	enforcement	enforcement of territorial principle	none
			status of minority rights	all national languages of equal status	high (equal)

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