



rise to a contest between a Hayekian “liberal project for an integrated Europe” and a Monnetist blueprint for a fundamentally undemocratic European superstate. The remainder of part I offers an interpretive overview of the various proposals for the institutionalization of interstate, transgovernmental, and supranational cooperation among the West European countries, from the Marshall Plan-induced Organization for European Economic Co-operation and the European Payments Union to the Hallstein-led first Commission of the European Economic Community, and the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. In a laudable move, Gillingham then, in part II, examines rather than skips the “eurosclerosis” of the 1970s. He depicts it as a period of Schumpeterian creative destruction—albeit here primarily destruction of normative commitments to Keynesianism and of excess governmental capacity for neomercantilism. Institutional innovations like the European Council, the monetary snake and European Monetary System (EMS), as well as the consolidation of the European Court of Justice’s doctrines of supremacy and direct effect for European law are treated in only a few pages each. Yet, Gillingham suggests that this forgotten decade of European integration might in fact have been “the most decisive decade in [its] history” (p. 144), from which Margaret Thatcher emerges as the new heroine of pro-market negative integration, sparking the momentum toward the Single European Act of 1985 (SEA) and beyond.

From this perspective, with a nod to historical institutionalism, Gillingham then discusses in part III the reforms of the 1980s, both the domestic reforms in response to the crisis of the welfare state in Europe and beyond (he briefly lauds New Zealand’s radical liberalization) and the reforms of European regional institutions. The liberalizing SEA is, by Gillingham’s account, the shining example of negative integration, but the Monnetist legacy comes back to haunt the European Union in the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty (covered in part IV of the book) in the form of acrimonious summits, treaty revisions that offer no lasting solutions, and political scandals. Economic reforms at the national level, recounted in some detail for six EU member states, illustrate the continuing diversity in national political economies—a diversity that has been increased further by the enlargement of 2004. In light of the lack of a European *demos* (or just closely aligned economic interests?), attempts to proceed with positive integration have been doomed to failure, Gillingham suggests, and have little chance of success in the foreseeable future. Even the European Monetary Union—more rigid and less market-conforming than the EMS—fails at least in providing any economic benefit, although liberalization continues in other issue areas. Gillingham closes on an optimistic note because he sees market forces as ultimately ensuring that Europe will choose classical economic liberalism. For this reason, as well as because of an unspecific “security rationale,” he stops just short of recommending British withdrawal from the EU (p. 501).

This history of ideas is lucidly written, and despite bold assertions and consciously provocative arguments, Gillingham provides a sometimes nuanced analysis. For instance, he faults the European Coal and Steel Community for failing to operate “as intended or, for that matter, even satisfactorily” (p. 22) and for making little if any contribution to the stated goal of ensuring peace in Europe (p. 23), but he also praises

the political genius of this institution insofar as it gave security assurances to France and guaranteed it coal supplies—at some economic expense to West German industry (p. 23) but with the overwhelming political-economic benefits for for the West Germans of halting the disassembly of their industrial base (p. 24) and setting in motion Franco-German reconciliation. Combining his prior analysis of primary sources for the early period with insights drawn from secondary sources, Gillingham also shows a familiarity with a vast range of the literature in sociology, economics, and especially political science, which is a real interdisciplinary achievement.

One wonders, however, whether Gillingham's ideological prejudices do not lead to systematic bias. His dismissive assessment of positive integration tends to precede rather than follow from any analysis. This makes it hard to assess his overarching argument based on his account of European integration. The corresponding rhetoric, while entertaining, risks getting in the way of understanding the phenomena at hand, such as when he calls the European Commission a "bureaucratic monster" (p. 62)—an administration barely one-fortieth the size of the U.S. federal bureaucracy and smaller than that of many European cities (see Andrew Moravcsik, "In Defense of the 'Democratic Deficit,'" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, November 2002, p. 608).

From a methodological point of view, one might also take issue with Gillingham's vast unexplored assumptions and sweeping claims based on implicit models (see Tim Büthe, "Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 481–494); or wonder about the circularity of using theory to "confirm" interpretations of the historical record that are informed by that same theory (p. 120). Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, and Alexander Rüstow, the founders of the *Ordo-liberalism* to which Gillingham frequently refers fondly, would surely not recognize their school of economic thought as depicted here. Gillingham's version completely omits their critique of classical liberalism. Readers may also question whether the pure liberal market and the stark alternative of the repressive "superstate" are really the only alternatives. As the EU's "new approach" to regulatory harmonization suggests, joint public-private governance may under some conditions enable public benefit from private expertise and do so quite efficiently.

Gillingham sees his history of ideas and their institutionalization in part as a corrective to what he considers the "reign[ing]" political science theory of European integration, namely, Ernst Haas's functionalism of 1958 (p. 28). Maybe this explains the preponderance of intergovernmentalist works among Gillingham's references. Yet, his account actually, if inadvertently, seems to support a sophisticated *neofunctionalist* approach, which starts from selective integration of national economies creating demands for further integration (due to the *economic* logic of the market; pp. 94, 296) but recognizes explicitly that further integration will be "supplied" only if those who expect to benefit from it can build *political* coalitions stronger than the coalitions of those who expect to lose (see Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).