Diana Morlang

        My future research agenda reflects my long-term interests in Central European politics, policy-making, party politics and institutions. The projects summarized below explore puzzles I found interesting during my dissertation work, but could not encompass in my current project. My immediate research interests include the effects of liberal policy making on party reputation and party programs, and the effects of electoral institutions on party system dynamics. Each of these projects will begin with my region of expertise, Central Europe, but I will also test the generality of the findings through cross-national comparison. I hope to begin on these projects following the completion of my dissertation

        My dissertation looks at what conditions enable government leaders to forgo short-term electoral benefits, and instead choose economic policies with long-term payoffs. In my main case, Hungary, a left-wing party was held responsible for liberal economic policy. I argue that party leaders view increased credibility and a stronger reputation for commitment to economic reform as long-term investments in the party’s competitiveness. Although party leaders expect these benefits, it is still too early to observe the long-term effects of party reputation for future electoral strategy. In my next project, I will question how much the effects expected by party leaders materialize. Does party reputation actually change after a party implements economic reform? Does party program substantively reflect the shift toward liberal economic policies? Does a party’s credibility reflect its reform agenda, or does it signal inconsistency and uncertainty to voters? Do voters consistently associate reformers with reform, do they update their view of the party's pre-reform identity with a reputation for reform, or do voters fall back on the party's earlier ideological identity when assessing its ability to govern in the future? I invert the puzzle of party reputation, and look at how a party program changes when the party becomes identified with economic liberalization. To examine the impact of economic liberalization programs on their proponents, I will explore public perception of parties (using World Value and Eurobarometer surveys), party programs and intra-party competition. This project, initially designed for Hungary and Central Europe, lends itself to cross-national comparisons among populist and leftist parties responsible for economic liberalization in Latin America.

        In a separate project, I plan to return to the influence of electoral laws on party system development. In writing my chapter on the electoral system in Hungary, I became interested in its unusual, and sometimes perverse, effects on party competition. For example, the style of national-level seat distribution precludes pre-election compromise or coordination among parties, while majoritarian run-offs in district races encourage cooperation among candidates. These conflicting incentives lead to a collective action problem; small parties must compete with each other, decreasing their ability to win seats. In Hungary, this dilemma leads to fragmentation of the center and right parties. By comparing the Hungarian electoral system with others in Central and Eastern Europe, I hope to develop general arguments about the ways in which incentives determine outcomes. I will show how electoral rules can create pressure for parties to compete for the central position in the party system or polarize party competition. This project will also begin with the cases most familiar to me, like Hungary and Central Europe, and then expand to cross-national comparisons.