

# **WEB APPENDIX FOR “RESTRAINT OR PROPELLANT? DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIAN FATALITIES IN INTERSTATE WARS”**

Alexander B. Downes  
Department of Political Science  
326 Perkins Library, Box 90204  
Duke University  
downes@duke.edu

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In “Restraint or Propellant?” I describe several results that I was not able to present in the article owing to space constraints. This appendix contains additional tables with those results, as well as a list of variables, instructions for replicating my results, and a table that includes the sources of my data on civilian casualties. The data needed to replicate the results in the article and this appendix is also available in a separate file.

## **REPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR TABLES IN THE ARTICLE**

*Table 1. Logit Estimates for Determinants of Mass Killing in Interstate Wars, 1816-2003*

- Dependent Variable: masskill
- Independent Variables: democ7adj, civdif, attrition, annex, cappercent, logenemypop, deterrence, victimcv, post45 (for model 2, add dem7post45)
- Calculate Huber-White standard errors clustered on war number: robust cluster (abnum)

*Table 2. Determinants of Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003*

- ZINB Analysis (Models 3-4)
  - Dependent Variable: ckallmed
  - Independent Variables: democ7adj, civdif, attrition, annex, cappercent, logenemypop, deterrence, hadcivskilled, post45 (for model 4, add dem7attrition)
  - Inflation Variables: same as above
  - Robust cluster (abnum)
  - Observations from 1900-2003 (if yrstart>=1900)
  - Percent change is calculated as described in the note to Table 1
- Ordinal Logit Analysis (Models 5-6)
  - Dependent Variable: ckallmedcat1
  - Independent Variables: democ7adj, civdif, attrition, annex, cappercent, logenemypop, deterrence, hadcivskilled, post45 (for model 6, add dem7attrition)
  - Robust cluster (abnum)
  - Observations from 1900-2003 (if yrstart>=1900)
- OLS Analysis (Models 7-8)
  - Dependent Variable: log10ckallmedp1
  - Independent Variables: democ7adj, civdif, attrition, annex, cappercent, logenemypop, deterrence, hadcivskilled, post45 (for model 8, add dem7attrition)
  - Robust cluster (abnum)
  - Observations from 1900-2003 (if yrstart>=1900)

## ADDITIONAL TABLES

Table 1. List and Description of Variables in Article and Appendix

This table provides a list and brief description of all of the variables that appear in the dataset that is posted online at <http://jcr.sagepub.com>.

<b>Table 1</b>	
<b>List and Description of Variables in Article and Appendix</b>	
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>
abnum	War number
statenum	COW state number
stateabb	Abbreviated state name
warname	Name of war
yrstart	Year war started
yrend	Year war ended
masskill	State killed 50,000 or more civilians
mkcap	Same, capable states only
ckalllow	Civilians killed per state, low estimate
ckallmed	Civilians killed per state, medium estimate
ckallhigh	Civilians killed per state, high estimate
ckcaplow	Civilians killed per capable state, low estimate
ckcapmed	Civilians killed per capable state, medium estimate
ckcaphigh	Civilians killed per capable state, high estimate
ckallmedintent	Civilians killed in campaign of civilian victimization
ckalllowcat1	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed, low estimate
ckallmedcat1	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed, medium estimate
ckallhighcat1	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed, high estimate
ckalllowcat2	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed, low estimate
ckallmedcat2	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed, medium estimate
ckallhighcat2	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed, high estimate
ckallmedcat1intent	Ordinal indicator of civilians killed during campaign of civilian victimization, medium estimate
log10ckalllowp1	Log of low estimate of civilian fatalities
log10ckallmedp1	Log of medium estimate of civilian fatalities
log10ckallhighp1	Log of high estimate of civilian fatalities
log10ckallmedintentp1	Log of civilian fatalities inflicted during campaign of civilian victimization
log10ckcapmedp1	Log of medium estimate of civilian fatalities, capable states
democ7	Polity score of +7 or greater
liberal	Coded as a liberal state by Doyle 1997
oligarchy	Polity score between -6 and +6
regimepos	Polity index, 0-20
regimesquare	Regimepos squared
insular	Insular state, protected by water from great powers
civdif	States in war from different civilizations as coded by Huntington 1996
difccode	States in war from different regions as coded by COW
attrition	War of attrition
logbatdead	Log of state's battle deaths
logdur	Log of war duration in days
waexpand	War aim is unconditional surrender, regime change, or expanded during the war
annex	War aim is to annex territory
cappercent	Percentage of total material capabilities controlled by each state in war
logenemypop	Log of enemy state's population
deterrence	State and its opponent have capability to kill civilians
victimcv	State's civilians targeted by adversary
hadcivskilled	State had some positive number of civilians killed
post45	War occurred after 1945
post70	War occurred after 1970
initabd	War initiator
dem7initabd	Democ7*initabd
dem7attrition	Democ7*attrition
libattrition	Liberal*attrition
dem7post45	Democ7*post45
nazi	Nazi Germany
germany	Germany
usadummy	United States

Table 2. Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Article and Web Appendix

<b>Table 2</b>					
<b>Summary Statistics</b>					
<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Dev.</b>
masskill	317	0	1	0.06	0.23
mkcap	178	0	1	0.10	0.30
ckallow	196	0	6,074,000	56,106.1	454,206.2
ckallmed	196	0	10,000,000	92,420.26	768,471.8
ckallhigh	196	0	14,000,000	136,727.6	1,099,625
ckallmedintent	194	0	10,000,000	92,884.91	772,435.5
ckcaplow	139	0	6,074,000	79,113.63	538,221.3
ckcapmed	139	0	10,000,000	130,319.2	910,767
ckcaphigh	139	0	14,000,000	192,795.8	1,302,970
ckallowcat1	196	0	6	0.96	1.32
ckallmedcat1	196	0	6	1.06	1.41
ckallhighcat1	196	0	6	1.13	1.48
ckallmedcat1intent	194	0	6	0.79	1.42
ckallowcat2	196	0	6	0.89	1.34
ckallmedcat2	196	0	6	1.01	1.49
ckallhighcat2	196	0	6	1.07	1.55
log10ckcapmedp1	139	0	7	2.25	2.00
log10ckallowp1	196	0	6.78	1.49	1.86
log10ckallmedp1	196	0	7	1.60	1.97
log10ckallhighp1	196	0	7.15	1.67	2.03
log10ckallmedintentsp1	194	0	7	1.11	1.94
democ7adj	317	0	1	0.22	0.41
liberal	323	0	1	0.25	0.43
oligarchy	323	0	1	0.36	0.48
regimepos	312	0	20	8.29	7.08
regimesquare	312	0	400	118.73	148.46
insular	323	0	1	0.13	0.34
civdif	323	0	1	0.57	0.50
difccode	323	0	1	0.32	0.47
attrition	321	0	1	0.24	0.43
logbatdead	313	0	6.88	3.46	1.27
logdur	323	0	3.57	2.19	0.74
waexpand	323	0	1	0.19	0.39
annex	321	0	1	0.11	0.32
cappercent	319	0.0000658	0.9991645	0.31	0.32
logenemypop	319	2.70	6.02	4.36	0.73
deterrence	323	0	1	0.33	0.47
victimcv	310	0	1	0.14	0.34
hadcivskilled	256	0	1	0.32	0.47
post45	323	0	1	0.34	0.47
post70	323	0	1	0.19	0.39
initabd	323	0	1	0.34	0.47
dem7initabd	317	0	1	0.08	0.26
dem7attrition	315	0	1	0.05	0.21
libattrition	321	0	1	0.06	0.24
nazi	323	0	1	0.02	0.15
germany	323	0	1	0.05	0.21
usadummy	323	0	1	0.04	0.19

Table 3. Liberal Democracy (Doyle Coding), Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

This table replicates models 1-8 from the article with an alternative measure of democracy more oriented towards liberal/democratic norms: Michael Doyle's list of liberal states (Doyle 1997, 261-64). As can be seen from comparing the results for this version of the variable with table 1 from the article, they produce very similar results.

Table 3 Liberal Democracy (Doyle Coding), Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003												
	Mass Killing Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB				Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS			
	1	2	Percent Change	3a NB	3b Logit	4a NB	4b Logit	Marginal Effect	5	6	7	8
Democracy (Doyle)	2.12*** (0.71)	2.30*** (0.82)	449	0.46 (0.39)	-1.07* (0.55)	-0.53 (0.45)	-0.80 (0.61)	108	0.81* (0.48)	0.26 (0.51)	0.49** (0.25)	0.18 (0.24)
Cultural Difference	-1.97 (1.20)	-1.89 (1.24)	-	-1.01** (0.54)	-0.52 (0.51)	-0.83* (0.48)	-0.59 (0.49)	-	-0.31 (0.46)	-0.29 (0.42)	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.09 (0.18)
War of Attrition	4.05*** (1.28)	4.17*** (1.35)	-	2.50*** (0.51)	-2.81*** (0.51)	1.93*** (0.68)	-2.49*** (0.54)	-	2.63*** (0.45)	2.22*** (0.44)	1.86*** (0.31)	1.52*** (0.27)
Democracy * Attrition	-	-	-	-	-	1.98*** (0.74)	-21.02*** (0.85)	382	-	2.04* (1.19)	-	1.39** (0.67)
Democracy * Post-1945	-	-0.73 (1.89)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Territorial Annexation	4.22*** (1.43)	4.27*** (1.43)	-	2.83*** (0.47)	-24.26*** (0.89)	3.05*** (0.37)	-23.87*** (0.85)	-	3.41*** (0.64)	3.73*** (0.68)	2.52*** (0.30)	2.64*** (0.33)
Relative Capabilities	4.65 (3.24)	4.89 (3.21)	-	1.81** (0.75)	-3.15*** (0.93)	1.75*** (0.60)	-3.12*** (0.87)	-	2.31*** (0.54)	2.32*** (0.55)	1.38*** (0.31)	1.38*** (0.31)
Enemy Population	2.47*** (0.85)	2.52*** (0.87)	-	1.64*** (0.38)	-0.57 (0.47)	1.57*** (0.36)	-0.50 (0.45)	-	0.82** (0.33)	0.74** (0.32)	0.46*** (0.17)	0.41** (0.16)
Deterrence	1.02 (1.00)	1.08 (0.95)	-	-0.10 (0.69)	-1.43** (0.61)	-0.33 (0.59)	-1.29** (0.61)	-	1.09** (0.46)	0.88* (0.47)	0.67*** (0.24)	0.55** (0.23)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.37 (0.93)	-0.46 (0.88)	-	-0.72 (0.58)	-0.43 (0.66)	-0.48 (0.53)	-0.48 (0.66)	-	-0.33 (0.43)	-0.29 (0.42)	-0.18 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.22)
Post-1945	-0.98 (1.55)	-0.68 (1.69)	-	-0.63 (0.61)	-1.23* (0.68)	-0.22 (0.52)	-1.32** (0.63)	-	0.08 (0.48)	0.21 (0.46)	0.15 (0.24)	0.21 (0.23)
Constant	-19.93*** (5.39)	-20.49*** (5.61)	-	0.80 (1.62)	7.05*** (2.58)	1.00 (1.60)	6.70*** (2.46)	-	-	-	-2.10** (0.81)	-1.78** (0.77)
N	300	300	-	191	-	191	-	-	191	191	191	191
Log Likelihood/F	-25.76	-25.69	-	-936.56	-	-932.08	-	-	-175.46	-172.29	32.47***	29.05***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	22.04***	21.65**	-	296.70***	-	550.34***	-	-	115.89***	125.17***	0.63	0.65
Vuong Statistic	-	-	-	7.33***	-	7.57***	-	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 4. Insular States, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

Recall from the article I discuss the difficulties with testing the democracy and insularity arguments against each other. The two variables are fairly well correlated (0.47). Moreover, the insularity argument is logically prior to the democracy argument, since it maintains that a state's political institutions, sensitivity to casualties, and types of military forces are a product of its geographical circumstances. This table shows results when insularity is substituted for democracy. Insularity performs very much like democracy.

Table 4 Insular States, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003												
	Mass Killing Logit			Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB					Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1	2	Percent Change	3a NB	3b Logit	4a NB	4b Logit	Marginal Effect	5	6	7	8
Insular State	2.42*** (0.45)	1.97*** (0.50)	859	0.77* (0.46)	-0.79 (0.52)	-0.37 (0.63)	-0.59 (0.56)	108	1.02** (0.48)	0.27 (0.51)	0.60** (0.27)	0.14 (0.28)
Cultural Difference	-2.21* (1.24)	-2.43* (1.28)	-	-1.00* (0.56)	-0.55 (0.51)	-0.98** (0.49)	-0.56 (0.51)	-	-0.32 (0.46)	-0.28 (0.42)	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.19)
War of Attrition	3.80*** (1.24)	3.80*** (1.32)	-	2.39*** (0.53)	-2.68*** (0.55)	2.03*** (0.55)	-2.50*** (0.61)	-	2.47*** (0.39)	2.10*** (0.46)	1.78*** (0.30)	1.47*** (0.32)
Insular * Attrition	-	-	-	-	-	1.63** (0.66)	-0.91 (0.95)	382	-	2.23* (1.34)	-	1.47** (0.55)
Insular * Post-1945	-	3.71* (1.92)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Territorial Annexation	4.26*** (1.40)	4.45*** (1.38)	-	2.80*** (0.46)	-26.43*** (0.81)	2.80*** (0.45)	-27.92*** (0.79)	-	3.43*** (0.60)	3.54*** (0.59)	2.53*** (0.29)	2.59*** (0.28)
Relative Capabilities	4.09 (3.10)	2.84 (3.21)	-	1.70** (0.74)	-3.10*** (0.90)	1.82*** (0.66)	-3.10*** (0.87)	-	2.37*** (0.53)	2.39*** (0.54)	1.39*** (0.31)	1.41*** (0.31)
Enemy Population	2.04** (0.86)	2.03** (0.96)	-	1.57*** (0.38)	-0.61 (0.47)	1.56*** (0.37)	-0.57 (0.47)	-	0.79** (0.31)	0.66** (0.32)	0.45** (0.17)	0.38** (0.17)
Deterrence	1.29 (1.00)	0.94 (0.97)	-	-0.22 (0.74)	-1.40** (0.59)	-0.08 (0.63)	-1.37** (0.60)	-	1.13** (0.46)	1.07** (0.45)	0.67*** (0.24)	0.64** (0.24)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.41 (0.95)	-0.09 (1.01)	-	-0.53 (0.61)	-0.38 (0.70)	-0.45 (0.62)	-0.40 (0.70)	-	-0.22 (0.44)	-0.18 (0.45)	-0.13 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.24)
Post-1945	-0.69 (1.38)	-1.48 (1.58)	-	-0.60 (0.64)	-1.36** (0.67)	-0.52 (0.58)	-1.38** (0.65)	-	0.21 (0.48)	0.29 (0.46)	0.24 (0.23)	0.28 (0.22)
Constant	-17.52*** (5.20)	-16.72*** (5.28)	-	1.17 (1.68)	7.04*** (2.44)	1.15 (1.65)	6.81*** (2.41)	-	-	-	-2.03** (0.78)	-1.69** (0.77)
N	300	300	-	191	-	191	-	-	191	191	191	191
Log Likelihood/F	-25.65	-24.39	-	-937.48	-	-935.70	-	-	-175.09	-171.92	39.82***	36.03***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	48.54***	48.25***	-	275.78***	-	372.55***	-	-	118.22***	141.70***	0.63	0.65
Vuong Statistic	-	-	-	7.27***	-	7.18***	-	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 5. *Insular States, Democracy, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003*

Table 5 includes both insularity and democracy in the same models. This illustrates the effects of multicollinearity, as each variable has a smaller coefficient when both are included than they had alone.

<b>Table 5</b>					
<b>Insular States, Democracy, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>					
	Mass Killing Logit	Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB	Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit	Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1	2a NB	2b Logit	3	4
Democracy (Polity)	1.75* (0.97)	-0.17 (0.47)	-0.94 (0.69)	0.71 (0.45)	0.36 (0.24)
Insular State	1.37** (0.54)	0.93 (0.58)	-0.25 (0.70)	0.67 (0.47)	0.40 (0.29)
Cultural Difference	-1.98 (1.23)	-1.00* (0.58)	-0.54 (0.50)	-0.37 (0.45)	-0.14 (0.20)
War of Attrition	4.16*** (1.42)	2.36*** (0.52)	-2.80*** (0.55)	2.68*** (0.44)	1.84*** (0.31)
Territorial Annexation	4.36*** (1.32)	2.78*** (0.47)	-26.40*** (0.81)	3.51*** (0.61)	2.54*** (0.30)
Relative Capabilities	3.95 (3.36)	1.71** (0.75)	-3.06*** (0.92)	2.29*** (0.54)	1.37*** (0.31)
Enemy Population	2.17** (0.94)	1.54*** (0.39)	-0.56 (0.49)	0.76** (0.32)	0.43** (0.17)
Deterrence	0.67 (0.98)	-0.18 (0.73)	-1.36** (0.60)	0.98** (0.47)	0.62** (0.24)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.29 (1.07)	-0.49 (0.63)	-0.46 (0.70)	-0.23 (0.43)	-0.12 (0.24)
Post-1945	-0.74 (1.53)	-0.63 (0.63)	-1.26** (0.64)	0.15 (0.47)	0.21 (0.23)
Constant	-18.43*** (5.55)	1.33 (1.70)	6.97*** (2.60)	-	-1.99** (0.80)
N	298	190	-	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-24.20	-936.17	-	-173.58	32.20***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	51.36***	277.06***	-	115.26***	0.64
Vuong Statistic	-	7.57***	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Tables 6-8. Alternative Measures of Attrition

These three tables show results for the other three measures of attrition warfare: battle deaths, war duration, and expansive or expanding war aims. Each of these alternative indicators is positively and significantly associated with the dependent variables.

<b>Table 6</b>							
<b>Battle Deaths, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>							
	Mass Killing Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB		Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit	Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1	Percent Change	2a NB	2b Logit	Marginal Effect	3	4
Democracy (Polity)	5.69** (2.42)	-	0.24 (0.31)	-0.99* (0.52)	-	0.80* (0.46)	0.49* (0.28)
Cultural Difference	-0.59 (0.91)	-	0.09 (0.41)	-0.79 (0.51)	-	0.39 (0.39)	0.02 (0.27)
Battle Deaths	3.73*** (1.06)	1863	1.21*** (0.13)	-0.24 (0.23)	122	0.63*** (0.22)	0.29* (0.14)
Territorial Annexation	7.49*** (2.21)	-	1.14** (0.47)	-26.29*** (0.64)	-	2.52*** (0.63)	2.52*** (0.40)
Relative Capabilities	7.54*** (2.37)	-	1.92*** (0.66)	-2.75*** (0.70)	-	2.42*** (0.50)	1.53*** (0.34)
Enemy Population	4.72*** (1.68)	-	1.12*** (0.34)	-0.28 (0.40)	-	0.56 (0.34)	0.41* (0.21)
Deterrence	0.16 (0.79)	-	0.69 (0.53)	-1.83*** (0.55)	-	1.72*** (0.55)	1.07*** (0.34)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	1.24 (1.36)	-	-1.10* (0.59)	-0.90 (0.58)	-	-0.06 (0.43)	-0.05 (0.32)
Post-1945	0.15 (1.15)	-	-0.75 (0.47)	-0.52 (0.61)	-	-0.12 (0.59)	0.14 (0.38)
Constant	-50.28*** (15.01)	-	0.96 (1.51)	5.78*** (2.15)	-	-	-2.63*** (0.97)
N	291	-	187	-	-	187	187
Log Likelihood/F	-16.69	-	-915.11	-	-	-187.18	22.25***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	45.01***	-	525.18***	-	-	66.47***	0.51
Vuong Statistic	-	-	4.55***	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

**Table 7**  
**War Duration, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003**

	Mass Killing		Civilian Fatalities (Counts)		Marginal Effect	Civilian Fatalities	Civilian Fatalities
	Logit	Percent Change	ZINB	ZINB		(Categories) Ordinal Logit	(Logged) OLS
	1		2a	2b		3	4
			NB	Logit			
Democracy (Polity)	3.21*** (1.18)	-	-0.13 (0.41)	-0.80 (0.57)	-	0.31 (0.41)	0.30 (0.26)
Cultural Difference	-2.23* (1.15)	-	-1.06** (0.44)	-0.75 (0.54)	-	0.08 (0.41)	-0.03 (0.24)
War Duration	4.89*** (1.04)	4156	1.48*** (0.24)	-0.33 (0.34)	149	0.80** (0.32)	0.48*** (0.15)
Territorial Annexation	7.09*** (1.73)	-	1.96*** (0.53)	-30.19*** (0.64)	-	2.77** (0.60)	2.48*** (0.36)
Relative Capabilities	8.08** (3.42)	-	2.18*** (0.69)	-2.99*** (0.79)	-	2.62*** (0.55)	1.78*** (0.36)
Enemy Population	5.43*** (1.63)	-	1.19*** (0.36)	-0.32 (0.41)	-	0.72** (0.36)	0.46** (0.20)
Deterrence	1.20 (1.09)	-	0.32 (0.57)	-1.99*** (0.60)	-	1.89*** (0.56)	1.26*** (0.34)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.05 (1.09)	-	-0.86* (0.57)	-1.00* (0.57)	-	0.05 (0.37)	0.08 (0.35)
Post-1945	1.58 (1.37)	-	-1.16** (0.47)	-0.45 (0.54)	-	-0.34 (0.48)	-0.08 (0.28)
Constant	-47.53*** (12.34)	-	1.17 (1.60)	5.89** (2.42)	-	-	-2.96*** (0.99)
N	300	-	190	-	-	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-19.05	-	-944.09	-	-	-191.49	23.11***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	58.04***	-	353.91***	-	-	63.11***	0.53
Vuong Statistic	-	-	5.41***	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

**Table 8**  
**Expansive War Aims, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003**

	Mass Killing		Civilian Fatalities (Counts)			Civilian Fatalities	Civilian Fatalities
	Logit		ZINB		Marginal	(Categories)	(Logged)
	1	Percent Change	2a NB	2b Logit	Effect	3 Ordinal Logit	4 OLS
Democracy (Polity)	2.18*** (0.62)	-	0.40 (0.52)	-0.79 (0.57)	-	0.63* (0.38)	0.38* (0.22)
Cultural Difference	-1.35 (0.99)	-	-1.12** (0.56)	-0.87 (0.58)	-	0.11 (0.40)	0.02 (0.24)
Expansive War Aims	2.85*** (0.93)	1235	1.13** (0.56)	-2.36*** (0.83)	179	2.38*** (0.53)	1.62*** (0.36)
Territorial Annexation	4.01*** (1.27)	-	2.35*** (0.53)	-25.96*** (0.82)	-	2.80*** (0.67)	2.31*** (0.39)
Relative Capabilities	3.20 (2.20)	-	1.81* (1.00)	-2.55*** (0.77)	-	1.98*** (0.47)	1.20*** (0.29)
Enemy Population	3.00*** (0.95)	-	1.96*** (0.47)	-0.53 (0.43)	-	0.78** (0.32)	0.49*** (0.17)
Deterrence	0.36 (0.97)	-	1.28 (0.91)	-1.45** (0.61)	-	1.25*** (0.47)	0.80*** (0.30)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	1.23 (0.92)	-	-0.90 (0.90)	-1.24** (0.63)	-	0.63 (0.41)	0.28 (0.26)
Post-1945	-1.20 (1.03)	-	-0.57 (0.78)	-0.71 (0.61)	-	-0.44 (0.48)	-0.06 (0.28)
Constant	-20.84*** (4.91)	-	-0.09 (2.38)	6.47*** (2.20)	-	-	-2.12** (0.80)
N	300	-	190	-	-	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-28.27	-	-953.53	-	-	-180.56	34.78***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	44.68***	-	302.38***	-	-	70.89***	0.58
Vuong Statistic	-	-	5.32***	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Tables 9-10. Low and High Estimates of Civilian Fatalities

As noted in the article, I collected low, medium, and high estimates of civilian deaths in as many of the cases as possible. In the article I reported results using the middle estimate, which is also usually the estimate I consider to be most accurate. However, as robustness checks, I re-ran the ZINB, ordinal logit, and OLS analyses substituting the low and high estimates as alternate dependent variables. Table 9 shows the results for the low estimates of civilian fatalities. The findings for desperation, annexation, and cultural differences are basically unchanged from Table 2 of the article. For democracy, the ZINB results are about the same, but the findings are weaker in the other two types of models: democracy and democracy interacted with attrition are insignificant. The results using the high estimates of civilian deaths, reported in Table 10, are highly consistent with the medium estimate results. The coefficients for democracy are generally a bit smaller, but in two out of three cases the interaction term (democracy\*attrition) is larger. Interestingly, annexation is insignificant in model 1a of Table 10, and attrition is insignificant in model 2a (both or which are ZINB analyses). Since these variables are significant in the ordinal logit and OLS analyses in Table 10, the problem may lie with the increased variance of the high estimates of civilian casualties.

<b>Table 9</b>								
<b>Determinants of Civilian Fatalities (Low Estimates) in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>								
	Civilian Fatalities (Counts)				Civilian Fatalities (Categories)		Civilian Fatalities (Logged)	
	ZINB				Ordinal Logit		OLS	
	1a	1b	2a	2b	3	4	5	6
	NB	Logit	NB	Logit				
Democracy (Polity)	0.35 (0.44)	-0.87 (0.56)	-0.98* (0.56)	-0.76 (0.65)	0.54 (0.41)	0.33 (0.48)	0.33 (0.20)	0.13 (0.21)
Cultural Difference	-1.30*** (0.48)	-0.73 (0.46)	-1.01** (0.44)	-0.75* (0.45)	-0.13 (0.41)	-0.14 (0.41)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.17)
War of Attrition	2.27*** (0.56)	-2.64*** (0.43)	1.43** (0.60)	-2.51*** (0.54)	2.39*** (0.41)	2.20*** (0.46)	1.69*** (0.27)	1.46*** (0.26)
Democracy * Attrition	-	-	2.58*** (0.89)	-0.73 (1.35)	-	0.74 (0.98)	-	0.87 (0.59)
Territorial Annexation	2.61*** (0.49)	-24.23*** (0.83)	2.92*** (0.40)	-24.39*** (0.82)	2.90*** (0.62)	2.99*** (0.63)	2.30*** (0.32)	2.39*** (0.34)
Relative Capabilities	1.50* (0.88)	-3.11*** (0.92)	1.71** (0.67)	-3.11*** (0.88)	2.54*** (0.52)	2.54*** (0.52)	1.41*** (0.30)	1.41*** (0.30)
Enemy Population	1.68*** (0.32)	-0.49 (0.46)	1.50*** (0.32)	-0.48 (0.46)	0.70*** (0.30)	0.75** (0.30)	0.43*** (0.16)	0.40** (0.16)
Deterrence	-0.33 (0.82)	-1.28** (0.62)	-0.13 (0.60)	-1.21** (0.61)	0.90** (0.45)	0.84* (0.46)	0.51** (0.22)	0.45** (0.22)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.44 (0.68)	-0.48 (0.69)	-0.08 (0.59)	-0.59 (0.68)	0.01 (0.48)	0.02 (0.48)	-0.01 (0.25)	0.01 (0.25)
Post-1945	-0.71 (0.70)	-1.32** (0.66)	-0.28 (0.62)	-1.35** (0.63)	0.32 (0.43)	0.35 (0.42)	0.26 (0.22)	0.29 (0.21)
Constant	0.95 (1.55)	6.75*** (2.50)	1.22 (1.66)	6.66*** (2.47)	-	-	-2.05*** (0.74)	-1.84** (0.73)
N	190	-	190	-	190	190	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-894.11	-	-890.17	-	-178.15	-177.71	30.53***	26.67***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	306.78***	-	338.14***	-	124.85***	136.86***	0.60	0.61
Vuong Statistic	7.49***	-	7.41***	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See note for Table 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

**Table 10**  
**Determinants of Civilian Fatalities (High Estimates) in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003**

	Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB				Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1a NB	1b Logit	2a NB	2b Logit	3	4	5	6
Democracy (Polity)	-0.33 (0.48)	-0.94 (0.58)	-2.06** (0.96)	-0.67 (0.68)	0.82* (0.43)	0.33 (0.47)	0.44* (0.23)	0.09 (0.24)
Cultural Difference	0.97 (0.95)	-0.47 (0.56)	0.61 (1.16)	-0.62 (0.54)	-0.33 (0.44)	-0.30 (0.41)	-0.08 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.21)
War of Attrition	2.95*** (0.87)	-3.05*** (0.66)	1.59 (1.35)	-2.71*** (0.66)	2.80*** (0.49)	2.40*** (0.48)	1.97*** (0.33)	1.57*** (0.28)
Democracy * Attrition	-	-	3.38** (1.39)	-21.45 (0.98)	-	1.77 (1.15)	-	1.53** (0.68)
Territorial Annexation	0.98 (0.74)	-24.36*** (1.28)	1.89** (0.95)	-24.93*** (1.10)	3.32*** (0.59)	3.60*** (0.63)	2.51*** (0.31)	2.66*** (0.33)
Relative Capabilities	0.30 (1.06)	-4.11** (1.66)	1.07 (1.08)	-3.89*** (1.40)	2.58*** (0.52)	2.57*** (0.52)	1.54*** (0.31)	1.54*** (0.31)
Enemy Population	0.33 (0.55)	-1.02 (0.72)	0.21 (0.60)	-0.90 (0.65)	0.92*** (0.32)	0.84*** (0.31)	0.52*** (0.17)	0.45*** (0.16)
Deterrence	0.59 (0.86)	-1.48** (0.74)	-0.09 (0.79)	-1.34* (0.73)	0.75* (0.45)	0.61 (0.46)	0.56** (0.24)	0.45* (0.24)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed Post-1945	-1.49* (0.83)	-0.12 (0.85)	-0.75 (0.78)	-0.16 (0.83)	-0.44 (0.39)	-0.41 (0.39)	-0.24 (0.23)	-0.21 (0.23)
Constant	-2.87*** (0.67)	-1.89* (1.09)	-2.06*** (0.79)	-1.87** (0.89)	0.31 (0.45)	0.40 (0.43)	0.20 (0.25)	0.25 (0.24)
	8.36*** (2.22)	9.45** (4.14)	8.95*** (2.31)	8.84** (3.66)	-	-	-2.31*** (0.84)	-1.95** (0.79)
N	190	-	190	-	190	190	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-982.97	-	-977.81	-	-182.02	-179.56	33.09***	30.04***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	179.96***	-	343.96***	-	107.90***	110.22***	0.62	0.64
Vuong Statistic	7.12***	-	7.80***	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See note for Table 2 of the article. \* p < .10 \*\* p < .05 \*\*\* p < .01

Table 11. Determinants of Intentional Civilian Fatalities (Medium Estimates) in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

In their article “Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” Ben Valentino, Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco use intentional civilian fatalities as their dependent variable, excluding noncombatants killed in the cross-fire or as collateral damage. To approximate their analysis, in Table 11 I include only those civilian fatalities inflicted during campaigns of civilian victimization, defined as a military strategy that targets civilians intentionally or which wields force indiscriminately such that tens of thousands of civilians are killed (Downes 2006, Downes forthcoming). Other positive values on the dependent variable are re-coded as zero. As one can see, the results remain stable, and if anything are slightly stronger for the democracy argument.

<b>Table 11</b>								
<b>Determinants of Intentional Civilian Fatalities (Medium Estimates) in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>								
	Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB				Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1a NB	1b Logit	2a NB	2b Logit	3	4	5	6
Democracy (Polity)	1.08** (0.55)	-0.82 (0.71)	-0.58 (0.87)	0.26 (0.88)	1.12* (0.60)	-0.10 (0.57)	0.49** (0.19)	-0.06 (0.15)
Cultural Difference	-1.01 (0.94)	0.02 (0.61)	-0.75 (0.63)	0.11 (0.64)	-1.05 (0.68)	-1.06 (0.66)	-0.25 (0.23)	-0.22 (0.19)
War of Attrition	2.66** (1.11)	-3.04*** (0.82)	1.80 (1.36)	-2.09** (0.87)	3.01*** (0.68)	2.21*** (0.62)	1.82*** (0.36)	1.18*** (0.30)
Democracy * Attrition	-	-	2.60* (1.50)	-2.67* (1.37)	-	2.61** (1.23)	-	2.38*** (0.66)
Territorial Annexation	3.08 (0.41)	-5.34*** (1.46)	3.43*** (0.44)	-5.05*** (1.34)	4.24*** (0.59)	4.50*** (0.91)	2.85*** (0.35)	3.09*** (0.37)
Relative Capabilities	2.96*** (0.94)	-3.45** (1.36)	3.00*** (0.78)	-3.46*** (1.35)	3.47*** (1.17)	3.44*** (1.12)	0.67** (0.32)	0.69** (0.30)
Enemy Population	1.56** (0.79)	-0.83* (0.48)	1.46* (0.84)	-0.70 (0.49)	1.32*** (0.44)	1.14*** (0.44)	0.39** (0.16)	0.30** (0.14)
Deterrence	-0.37 (1.05)	-2.14*** (0.52)	-0.06 (0.77)	-1.99*** (0.51)	1.16* (0.61)	0.99 (0.63)	0.39* (0.23)	0.22 (0.18)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.58 (0.62)	-0.02 (0.81)	-0.16 (0.72)	-0.34 (0.91)	-0.24 (0.56)	-0.15 (0.54)	-0.25 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.21)
Post-1945	-0.59 (0.67)	2.15** (0.95)	-0.56 (0.58)	2.02** (0.96)	-1.34 (0.67)	-1.32** (0.66)	-0.43* (0.25)	-0.36 (0.22)
Constant	0.30 (3.68)	8.91*** (2.50)	0.40 (3.84)	7.82*** (2.43)	-	-	-1.60** (0.72)	-1.04* (0.61)
N	188	-	188	-	188	188	188	188
Log Likelihood/F	-603.15	-	-599.52	-	-99.52	-96.08	28.60***	24.75***
LR Chi²/R²	193.67***	-	228.11***	-	64.57***	67.92***	0.65	0.71
Vuong Statistic	3.13***	-	2.69***	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See note for Table 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 12. Evidence of Curvilinearity in the Relationship between Regime Type and Mass Killing/Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

In the article I tested the hypothesis generated from Goemans (2000) that leaders in mixed regimes—who are particularly vulnerable to being ousted from office and punished after losing a war—should be more likely than leaders in other regime types to kill enemy civilians. Civilian victimization in this case would be understood as a kind of “high variance strategy” described by Goemans used by leaders gambling for resurrection. I found that a dummy variable for regimes scoring between -6 and +6 on the Polity index was negative and significant for mass killing, although this finding was not replicated when the dependent variable was civilian casualties. This curious finding led me to wonder if the relationship between regime type and civilian war deaths is not linear. To test for this possibility, I recoded democracy to range between 0 and 20, and then squared that value and inserted it in the model. If the is curvilinear, the sign on democracy should be negative and that on democracy squared positive, indicating a U-shape. The even-numbered models in Table 12 show this to be the case, but only with mass killing are the coefficients significant. Still, it is interesting to speculate why leaders in mixed regimes would kill fewer civilians than their democratic or autocratic counterparts.

<b>Table 12 Evidence of Curvilinearity in the Relationship between Regime Type and Mass Killing/Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>										
	Mass Killing Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB				Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1	2	3a NB	3b Logit	4a NB	4b Logit	5	6	7	8
Mixed Regime	-2.55*** (0.74)	-	0.31 (0.59)	0.72 (0.63)	-	-	-0.66 (0.52)	-	-0.28 (0.25)	-
Democracy (0-20)	-	-0.47** (0.19)	-	-	-0.04 (0.16)	0.22 (0.20)	-	-0.18 (0.12)	-	-0.08 (0.06)
Democracy Squared	-	0.03*** (0.01)	-	-	0.002 (0.007)	-0.01 (0.01)	-	0.011* (0.006)	-	0.005 (0.003)
Cultural Difference	-1.35 (1.26)	-1.72 (1.19)	-1.05 (0.67)	-0.63 (0.52)	-0.99 (0.62)	-0.48 (0.50)	-0.17 (0.46)	-0.30 (0.46)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.21)
War of Attrition	4.25*** (1.35)	4.26*** (1.32)	2.65*** (0.54)	-3.05*** (0.58)	2.59*** (0.53)	-3.05*** (0.59)	2.67*** (0.45)	2.84*** (0.49)	1.91*** (0.32)	1.93*** (0.31)
Territorial Annexation	3.08** (1.38)	3.99*** (1.51)	2.77*** (0.58)	-25.98*** (0.93)	2.68*** (0.47)	-25.85*** (0.91)	3.16*** (0.65)	3.37*** (0.68)	2.39*** (0.31)	2.45*** (0.31)
Relative Capabilities	3.76 (2.70)	3.85 (3.30)	2.04** (0.85)	-2.91*** (0.89)	1.76* (0.90)	-3.04*** (0.93)	2.32*** (0.52)	2.33*** (0.52)	1.36*** (0.31)	1.37*** (0.31)
Enemy Population	2.59*** (0.76)	2.38*** (0.86)	1.71*** (0.42)	-0.60 (0.46)	1.65*** (0.41)	-0.59 (0.45)	0.83** (0.33)	0.82*** (0.31)	0.49*** (0.17)	0.46*** (0.17)
Deterrence	1.19 (1.04)	0.47 (1.00)	-0.06 (0.61)	-1.30** (0.71)	-0.13 (0.72)	-1.33** (0.59)	1.07** (0.49)	0.94** (0.47)	0.67** (0.26)	0.62** (0.24)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed Post-1945	-1.10 (0.96)	-0.22 (0.99)	-0.93 (0.60)	-0.34 (0.65)	-0.81 (0.57)	-0.54 (0.67)	-0.35 (0.44)	-0.23 (0.44)	-0.22 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.24)
Constant	-18.73*** (4.62)	-17.97*** (5.07)	0.54 (1.86)	6.54*** (2.54)	1.02 (2.03)	6.71*** (2.62)	-	-	-1.98** (0.86)	-1.92** (0.85)
N	300	293	191	-	190	-	191	190	191	190
Log Likelihood/F	-25.63	-24.10	-938.52	-	-936.33	-	-176.49	-174.16	35.40***	29.55***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	32.05***	21.74**	335.56***	-	358.83***	-	110.58***	109.79***	0.63	0.63
Vuong Statistic	-	-	7.37***	-	8.21***	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 13. Democratic War Initiators, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

One implication of the democratic institutions argument is that democracies win the wars they fight, and especially the wars they start. Democratic leaders supposedly select only those wars they expect to win quickly and decisively. If this is the case, democratic war initiators should not kill many civilians because they should rarely find themselves in desperate straits. This table tests this hypothesis by generating a variable for democratic war initiators and inserting it into the regressions. The results show that although democracies that are attacked by other states kill larger numbers of civilians, democracies that start wars do not kill significantly fewer noncombatants. The interaction term is consistently insignificant, and twice takes a positive sign, opposite that of the predicted negative relationship.

<b>Table 13</b>					
<b>Democratic War Initiators, Mass Killing, and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>					
	Mass Killing Logit	Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB	Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit	Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1	2a NB	2b Logit	3	4
Democracy (Polity)	3.37*** (1.29)	-0.18 (0.73)	-1.76*** (0.63)	1.35** (0.55)	0.50* (0.26)
War Initiator	-0.11 (1.11)	-1.13 (0.78)	-2.23** (0.93)	0.83 (0.51)	0.39 (0.29)
Democracy * War Initiator	-2.40 (2.15)	0.35 (1.26)	0.40 (1.38)	-0.72 (0.77)	0.30 (0.48)
Cultural Difference	-1.36 (1.10)	-1.00* (0.55)	-0.28 (0.63)	-0.43 (0.45)	-0.17 (0.19)
War of Attrition	4.19*** (1.43)	2.67*** (0.51)	-2.64*** (0.64)	2.64*** (0.48)	1.83*** (0.33)
Territorial Annexation	4.13** (1.63)	2.91*** (0.56)	-27.85*** (0.98)	3.46*** (0.62)	2.52*** (0.31)
Relative Capabilities	4.86 (3.81)	2.64** (1.18)	-1.90* (1.08)	2.08*** (0.66)	1.04*** (0.33)
Enemy Population	2.54*** (0.87)	1.58*** (0.36)	-0.55 (0.65)	0.84** (0.33)	0.46** (0.18)
Deterrence	0.37 (0.91)	-0.06 (0.70)	-1.06 (0.65)	0.87 (0.54)	0.52** (0.26)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	0.15 (0.98)	-1.06 (0.68)	-1.16 (0.80)	-0.18 (0.40)	-0.12 (0.22)
Post-1945	-0.91 (1.79)	-0.55 (0.80)	-1.42*** (0.72)	0.18 (0.49)	0.19 (0.23)
Constant	-20.59*** (5.30)	1.50 (1.86)	7.55** (3.11)	-	-2.08** (0.83)
N	298	190	-	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-23.36	-929.73	-	-172.94	30.44***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	29.47***	443.67***	-	111.83***	0.64
Vuong Statistic	-	5.95***	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 14. Mass Killing and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003, Capable States Only

In my earlier article on civilian victimization (Downes 2006), I reported results only for states deemed to be capable of targeting enemy civilians (as defined therein). This follows the logic of Mahoney and Goertz (2004), who argue that relevant observations for theory-testing are those where the outcome occurred and those where the outcome did not occur but could have occurred. Observations where the outcome was absent but was impossible are irrelevant. The critique of that argument is that it creates a selection bias by excluding countries that could have developed capabilities to target enemy noncombatants but which chose not to. In this article, therefore, I reported results including all war participants regardless of capability. Table 14 reports results excluding non-capable states simply to show that this decision does not make much difference.

<b>Table 14</b>										
<b>Mass Killing and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003, Capable States Only</b>										
	Mass Killing Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB				Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit		Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1	2	3a NB	3b Logit	4a NB	4b Logit	5	6	7	8
Democracy (Polity)	2.31*** (0.84)	2.58** (1.04)	0.28 (0.37)	-1.44** (0.64)	-0.99** (0.46)	-1.18 (0.74)	1.06** (0.48)	0.49 (0.53)	0.78** (0.35)	0.41 (0.39)
Cultural Difference	-1.77 (1.25)	-1.65 (1.31)	-0.98* (0.57)	-0.82 (0.55)	-0.85* (0.45)	-0.83 (0.53)	-0.28 (0.50)	-0.26 (0.44)	0.00 (0.29)	-0.00 (0.27)
War of Attrition	4.19*** (1.41)	4.35*** (1.46)	2.59*** (0.52)	-2.86*** (0.60)	1.63*** (0.56)	-2.62*** (0.64)	2.64*** (0.43)	2.18*** (0.47)	1.95*** (0.30)	1.64*** (0.32)
Democracy * Attrition	-	-	-	-	2.56*** (0.73)	-22.17*** (0.92)	-	1.96* (1.18)	-	1.10 (0.76)
Democracy * Post-1945	-	-1.06 (1.95)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Territorial Annexation	3.77*** (1.43)	3.85*** (1.45)	2.74*** (0.47)	-24.73*** (0.86)	3.14*** (0.33)	-24.95*** (0.83)	3.16*** (0.61)	3.50*** (0.65)	2.38*** (0.34)	2.49*** (0.38)
Relative Capabilities	3.97 (3.51)	4.30 (3.52)	1.78** (0.75)	-1.49* (0.89)	1.93*** (0.56)	-1.55* (0.85)	1.40** (0.59)	1.40** (0.60)	0.91** (0.38)	0.96** (0.39)
Enemy Population	2.23*** (0.85)	2.30*** (0.88)	1.68*** (0.37)	-0.19 (0.48)	1.50*** (0.35)	-0.17 (0.46)	0.63* (0.33)	0.53* (0.32)	0.37* (0.21)	0.34 (0.20)
Deterrence	0.17 (1.02)	0.23 (0.95)	-0.18 (0.72)	-0.79 (0.62)	-0.08 (0.51)	-0.68 (0.60)	0.50 (0.46)	0.34 (0.46)	0.44 (0.30)	0.37 (0.31)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.27 (1.04)	-0.41 (0.99)	-0.82 (0.56)	-0.03 (0.68)	-0.41 (0.53)	-0.05 (0.68)	-0.45 (0.43)	-0.43 (0.42)	-0.32 (0.29)	-0.30 (0.28)
Post-1945	-0.87 (1.59)	-0.42 (1.72)	-0.58 (0.64)	-1.24* (0.69)	-0.22 (0.49)	-1.30** (0.65)	0.19 (0.53)	0.30 (0.52)	0.17 (0.35)	0.21 (0.35)
Constant	-17.97*** (5.34)	-18.77*** (5.69)	0.76 (1.64)	4.15 (2.59)	1.27 (1.58)	4.05* (2.46)	-	-	-1.37 (1.10)	-1.14 (1.07)
N	170	170	136	-	136	-	139	139	136	136
Log Likelihood/F	-24.46	-24.33	-926.73	-	-921.19	-	-164.73	-161.84	16.74***	15.74***
LR Chi²/R²	17.13**	16.92*	325.54***	-	453.64***	-	92.92***	102.24***	0.55	0.56
Vuong Statistic	-	-	6.34***	-	6.54***	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 15. Democracies after 1970 and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

To check for the possibility that democracies since the Vietnam War have become increasingly shy about inflicting civilian casualties, I coded a variable for the post-1970 period and interacted it with democracy. As can be seen from the results below, there is not much support for this argument.

<b>Table 15</b>				
<b>Democracies after 1970 and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>				
	Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB		Civilian Fatalities (Categories) Ordinal Logit	Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS
	1a NB	1b Logit	2	3
Democracy (Polity)	0.63 (0.53)	-1.15 (0.73)	0.84* (0.49)	0.49* (0.26)
Democracy * Post-1970	-0.60 (0.98)	0.20 (1.32)	0.36 (0.83)	0.05 (0.48)
Cultural Difference	-1.02** (0.49)	-0.89* (0.52)	-0.33 (0.47)	-0.07 (0.21)
War of Attrition	2.07*** (0.62)	-2.56*** (0.47)	2.66*** (0.45)	1.86*** (0.30)
Territorial Annexation	2.90*** (0.51)	-26.36*** (0.62)	3.32*** (0.59)	2.42*** (0.30)
Relative Capabilities	2.04*** (0.63)	-2.72*** (0.67)	2.36*** (0.50)	1.35*** (0.30)
Enemy Population	1.80*** (0.36)	-0.32 (0.35)	0.81*** (0.29)	0.43*** (0.15)
Deterrence	-0.12 (0.63)	-1.64*** (0.57)	1.07** (0.45)	0.68*** (0.24)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed	-0.63 (0.48)	-0.46 (0.59)	-0.28 (0.41)	-0.19 (0.23)
Post-1970	-0.71 (0.76)	-0.38 (0.69)	-0.37 (0.56)	-0.04 (0.23)
Constant	0.03 (1.56)	5.49** (1.75)	-	-1.89*** (0.69)
N	190	-	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-938.36	-	-174.34	28.76***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	322.16***	-	130.63***	0.63
Vuong Statistic	7.37***	-	-	-

NOTE: See note for Table 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01 Mass killing is not included in this analysis because there are no instances of a democracy killing over 50,000 noncombatants in war starting after 1970.

Table 16. Alternative Categorization of Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

Table 16 shows the results for a different categorization of civilian fatalities across low, medium, and high estimates of noncombatant deaths. The alternative categorization employed for the dependent variable in this table is as follows: 0, 1-1,000, 1,001-10,000, 10,001-50,000, 50,001-100,000, 100,000-1 million, over 1 million. Results for attrition, annexation, and cultural differences remain largely unaltered; those for democracy are weakened such that neither democracy nor democracy\*attrition is significant in any of the models.

<b>Table 16</b>						
<b>Alternative Categorization of Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003</b>						
<b>Ordinal Logit Models</b>						
	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Low Estimate	Low Estimate	Medium Estimate	Medium Estimate	High Estimate	High Estimate
Democracy (Polity)	0.48 (0.43)	0.45 (0.45)	0.74 (0.48)	0.44 (0.47)	0.69 (0.47)	0.28 (0.45)
Cultural Difference	-0.09 (0.38)	-0.09 (0.38)	-0.26 (0.43)	-0.24 (0.41)	-0.23 (0.45)	-0.21 (0.42)
War of Attrition	2.20*** (0.37)	2.18*** (0.43)	2.70*** (0.46)	2.44*** (0.44)	2.77*** (0.46)	2.42*** (0.44)
Democracy * War of Attrition	-	0.08 (1.07)	-	1.13 (1.48)	-	1.50 (1.36)
Territorial Annexation	2.96*** (0.60)	2.96*** (0.66)	3.18*** (0.59)	3.31*** (0.57)	3.27*** (0.60)	3.46*** (0.59)
Relative Capabilities	2.38*** (0.49)	2.38*** (0.50)	2.29*** (0.51)	2.27*** (0.52)	2.50*** (0.49)	2.48*** (0.50)
Enemy Population	0.76*** (0.28)	0.76** (0.30)	0.87*** (0.31)	0.81*** (0.31)	0.95*** (0.30)	0.87*** (0.29)
Deterrence	0.85* (0.44)	0.84* (0.47)	0.98** (0.45)	0.89* (0.46)	0.91** (0.44)	0.81* (0.45)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed Post-1945	-0.01 (0.42)	-0.01 (0.43)	-0.33 (0.40)	-0.29 (0.42)	-0.46 (0.40)	-0.40 (0.42)
N	190	190	190	190	190	190
Log Likelihood	-177.85	-177.85	-176.14	-175.19	-181.80	-180.03
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	127.47***	131.26***	126.21***	125.49***	113.17***	120.61***

NOTE: \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

Table 17. Determinants of Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003, U.S. in Vietnam Corrected

After completing the analysis for the article, I discovered two errors in my data on civilian fatalities. The first is relatively minor: I misrecorded the high estimate of civilians killed by Germany in the Soviet Union as 14 million when it should be 15 million. Correcting this mistake results in virtually no changes whatsoever in any of the results reported in Table 10 above. The second error concerns the number of civilians killed by the United States in Vietnam. The figure I had calculated—313,936—included 65,000 killed in the bombing of North Vietnam, 26,369 killed in the Phoenix Program, and 222,000 North Vietnamese or Viet Cong combatants who were probably civilians (all sources for these numbers are given in Table 18 below). However, Lewy (1978, 444) estimates that an additional 247,600 South Vietnamese civilians were killed outright or died of their wounds in hospitals as a result of military action from 1965-74. Given the enormous amount of firepower applied by the U.S., I attribute two-thirds of these deaths—165,000—to the U.S. Adding these deaths gives a total of 478,936 civilians killed by U.S. military action. I re-ran the basic analysis with this revised total with results reported below (the ordinal analysis does not need to be re-done because the increase in deaths does not result in a change in category). No major changes occur in the democracy or democracy\*attrition coefficients.

<b>Table 17</b>						
<b>Determinants of Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003, U.S. in Vietnam Corrected</b>						
	Civilian Fatalities (Counts) ZINB				Civilian Fatalities (Logged) OLS	
	1a NB	1b Logit	2a NB	2b Logit	3	4
Democracy (Polity)	0.31 (0.38)	-1.03* (0.56)	-1.06** (0.47)	-0.75 (0.64)	0.50** (0.23)	0.18 (0.23)
Cultural Difference	-0.94 (0.60)	-0.55 (0.50)	-0.83* (0.45)	-0.63 (0.48)	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.18)
War of Attrition	2.66*** (0.55)	-2.81*** (0.51)	1.62*** (0.57)	-2.51*** (0.54)	1.91*** (0.31)	1.53*** (0.26)
Democracy * Attrition	-	-	2.75*** (0.72)	-24.26*** (0.85)	-	1.40** (0.67)
Territorial Annexation	2.72*** (0.47)	-23.77*** (0.83)	3.16*** (0.32)	-27.08*** (0.79)	2.48*** (0.31)	2.62*** (0.33)
Relative Capabilities	1.89** (0.79)	-3.04*** (0.91)	2.01*** (0.57)	-3.03*** (0.85)	1.38*** (0.31)	1.38*** (0.31)
Enemy Population	1.66*** (0.41)	-0.57 (0.47)	1.48*** (0.37)	-0.51 (0.45)	0.47*** (0.17)	0.41** (0.16)
Deterrence	-0.13 (0.74)	-1.36** (0.61)	-0.05 (0.50)	-1.23** (0.61)	0.63** (0.24)	0.53** (0.23)
State's Own Civilians Targeted/Killed Post-1945	-0.87 (0.56)	-0.44 (0.65)	-0.41 (0.53)	-0.47 (0.66)	-0.19 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.22)
Constant	-0.52 (0.66)	-1.23* (0.67)	-0.15 (0.50)	-1.32** (0.62)	0.17 (0.24)	0.22 (0.23)
Constant	0.70 (1.77)	6.97*** (2.55)	1.25 (1.65)	6.66*** (2.41)	-2.13** (0.81)	-1.79** (0.77)
N	190	-	190	-	190	190
Log Likelihood/F	-938.56	-	-931.88	-	31.66***	28.92***
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	323.76***	-	467.47***	-	0.63	0.65
Vuong Statistic	7.59***	-	7.73***	-	-	-

NOTE: See note for Table 2 of the article. \* p <.10 \*\* p <.05 \*\*\* p <.01

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<b>Table 18</b>			
<b>Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars: Estimates And Sources</b>			
WAR	COUNTRY	CIVILIANS KILLED	SOURCE
Mexican-American, 1846-1848	USA	200	Estimate based on Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 279-80.
Spanish-Chilean, 1865-1866	Spain	250	Estimate based on 2,000 casualties among defenders and civilians in Calleo; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 362.
Franco-Prussian, 1870-1871	Prussia	6,251 (Paris)	Alistair Horne, <i>The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870-71</i> (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 221; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 209.
		47,000 (Paris)	B. Uralanis, <i>Wars and Population</i> , trans. Leo Lempert (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 265; Samuel Dumas and K.O. Vedel-Petersen, <i>Losses of Life Caused by War</i> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), 121.
		97 (Paris)	Prussian shelling; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 209.
		336 (Belfort)	Prussian shelling in siege of Belfort; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 210.
		1,700 casualties (Strasburg)	Assume 400 killed; Prussian shelling; M.W. Royse, <i>Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare</i> (New York: Harold Vinal Publishers, 1928), 159, n. 47.
Russo-Turkish, 1877-1878	Russia	262,000 ethnic Bulgarians	Justin McCarthy, <i>The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire</i> (London: Arnold, 2001), 48.
Sino-Japanese, 1894-1895	Japan	2,000	Massacre of Chinese after Japanese capture of Port Arthur. Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 264.
		Several hundred to several thousand	Stewart Lone, <i>Japan's First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894-95</i> (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 156-57.
Crete, 1897	Turkey	0	Massacres occurred before and after the actual war. I estimate that 2,000 Greeks were killed in Turkish massacres in February 1897 and September 1898. A.A. Pallis, ed., <i>The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece</i> (NY: Robert Speller & Sons, 1959), 9, 15-16; Theodore

			George Tatsios, <i>The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism</i> (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), 82; S.B. Chester, <i>Life of Venizelos</i> (NY: George H. Doran Publishers, 1921), 64.
Boxer, 1900	China	32,284	R.J. Rummel, <i>China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 39.
	Western Armies	5,000-25,000 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5,000 Russia</li> <li>• 500 Japan</li> <li>• 1,000 USA</li> <li>• 1,000 UK</li> <li>• 1,000 France</li> </ul>	R.J. Rummel, <i>China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 39. The distribution of killings is my estimate. German troops inflicted significant civilian suffering but are not included by COW as a war participant.
Russo-Chinese, 1900	Russia	3,000-4,000	R.K.I. Quested, "Matey" <i>Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria, 1895-1917</i> (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 1982), 49.
		3,500	George A. Lensen, <i>The Russo-Chinese War</i> (Tallahassee: Diplomatic Press, 1967); Robert B. Edgerton, <i>Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military</i> (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 55.
		7,000	William J. Duiker, <i>Cultures in Collision: The Boxer Rebellion</i> (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 188.
Italo-Turkish, 1911-1912	Italy	400-450	Tripoli massacre; W.K. McClure, <i>Italy in North Africa, an Account of the Tripoli Enterprise</i> (London: Constable, 1913), 84.
		1,000	My estimate based on Tripoli massacre plus the Italians' use of widespread naval bombardment of coastal towns
		4,400	Tripoli massacre; Francis McCullagh, <i>Italy's War for a Desert, Being Some Experiences of a War-Correspondent with the Italians in Tripoli</i> (London: Herbert and Daniel, 1912).
First Balkan, 1912-1913	Greece	210	Total from massacres documented in International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, <i>The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect</i> (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993), 72, 282-283, 281.
		1,000	Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i> , 72, 282-283, 281.
	Bulgaria	1,345	Total from massacres documented in <i>ibid.</i> , 74, 75, 76, 279, 280.
		15,000	Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i> , 74, 75, 76, 279, 280.
	Serbia	453	Total from massacres documented in <i>ibid.</i> , 74, 281.

		11,000	Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i> , 74, 281.
Second Balkan, 1913	Greece	1,180	Total from massacres documented in International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, <i>The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect</i> (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993), 75, 93, 94, 99, 102, 103, 315.
		10,000	Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i> , 75, 93, 94, 99, 102, 103, 315.
	Bulgaria	671	Total from massacres documented in <i>ibid.</i> , 79, 93, 94.
		1,000	Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i> , 79, 93, 94.
	Serbia	9,453	Total from massacres documented in <i>ibid.</i> , 146, 150, 183, 184, 185, 317, 318, 370-372, 374; Richard Hall, <i>The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War</i> (London: Routledge, 2000,) 138.
		15,000	Estimate based on Carnegie Commission, <i>Other Balkan Wars</i> , and Hall, <i>Balkan Wars 1912-1913</i> .
	Turkey	2,648	Total from massacres documented in International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, <i>The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect</i> (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993), 129, 131, 133, 134, 135.
		7,500	Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i> , 129, 131, 133, 134, 135.
Central Powers – Western Allies, 1914-1918	Germany	1,336	British killed by German bombing; George H. Quester, <i>Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Air Power Background of Modern Strategy</i> (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 28, 42.
		1,413	British killed by German bombing; Robert A. Pape, <i>Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 59.
		3,500	French killed in air and artillery strikes; B. Uralnis, <i>Wars and Population</i> , trans. Leo Lempert (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 274.
		6,427	Belgian and French civilians killed during German invasion; John Horne and Alan Kramer, <i>German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial</i> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 74.
		106	Naval bombardment of Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby, December 16, 1914; J.M. Spaight, <i>Air Power and the Cities</i> (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), 78-79.
	Austria	1,000	Bombing of Italian cities; B. Uralnis, <i>Wars and Population</i> , trans. Leo Lempert (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 274.
	Britain, France,	424,000	Blockade (Germany), not counting 209,000 from influenza epidemic in 1918; post-war study, in Avner Offner, <i>The First</i>

	U.S.*		<i>World War: An Agrarian Interpretation</i> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 34.
		763,000	Blockade (Germany), not counting 150,000 influenza deaths in 1918; German government estimate in C. Paul Vincent, <i>The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany 1915-1919</i> (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), 141.
		467,000	Blockade (Austria-Hungary); Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, <i>The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary</i> (New Haven: 1940), 147.
	Britain/France	746	Bombing of German cities; George H. Quester, <i>Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Air Power Background of Modern Strategy</i> (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 44. Divided into 374 each.
		740	Bombing of German cities; Christian Geinitz, “The First Air War Against Noncombatants: Strategic Bombing of German Cities in World War I,” in <i>Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 207.
Central Powers – Russia, 1914-1917	Turkey	75,000	1918 Invasion of Russian Armenia; Robert Fisk, <i>Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon</i> (NY: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002), 60.
		50-100,000	Turkish invasion of the Caucasus, May-September 1918; Christopher J. Walker, <i>Armenia: The Survival of a Nation</i> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 230.
			Additional figures†: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 600,000: Killed in the genocide, 1915; Arnold J. Toynbee, “A Summary of Armenian History Up to and Including 1915,” in <i>The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>, ed. Viscount J. Bryce (London: H.M.S.O., 1916), 651.</li> <li>• 1,000,000: Killed in the genocide, 1915; Christopher J. Walker, <i>Armenia: The Survival of a Nation</i>, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 230; Robert Melson, <i>Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust</i> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 147.</li> </ul>
Central Powers – Serbia, 1914-1916	Austria-Hungary	1,300 1,862 2,448	Low, middle, and high estimates of Serbs killed in massacres from R.J Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 273, lines 151 and 152.
		650,000	Total civilians who died in Serbia, 1914-1918, owing to effects of the war; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 787.
Hungarian War, 1919	Romania	126	Hungarians massacred to facilitate ethnic cleansing; István Mócsy, <i>The Effects of World War I: The Uprooted: Hungarian Refugees and their Impact on Hungary’s</i>

		1,000	<i>Domestic Politics, 1918-1921</i> (New York: Social Science Monographs, 1983), 37. Estimate based on <i>ibid.</i>
Greco-Turkish, 1919-1922	Total	50,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).
	Total	20,000	R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 94, line 297.
	Greece	10,000	In Western Anatolia; R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 97, line 426.
		15,000	R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 97, line 428.
	Turkey	25,000	Douglas Dakin, <i>The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923</i> (London: Benn, 1972,) 236.
		100,000	Marjorie Housepian, <i>The Smyrna Affair</i> (New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1966), 190.  Additional figures†: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 300,000 Anatolian Greeks dead from all causes in expulsion and aftermath; Norman M. Naimark, <i>Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe</i> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 186.</li> </ul>
Franco-Turkish, 1919-1921	Turkey	20,000	Massacred at Marash; Howard M. Sachar, <i>The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924</i> (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 321. R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 95, estimates 2,000, 11,000, 20,000, and 70,000.
		7,600-9,000	Massacred at Hadjin; R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 95, line 343, 344.
		30,000	Total Armenians killed in 1920; R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 95, line 348.
	France	1,000	Estimate, probably low; French bombardment of towns, use of Armenian auxiliaries who massacred Turkish civilians. Justin McCarthy, <i>The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire</i> (London: Arnold, 2001), 139-40.
Sino-Soviet, 1929	Russia	2,000	Russian émigrés massacred in the Barga District; Peter S.H. Tang, <i>Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931</i> (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), 227.
Second Sino-Japanese, 1931-1933	Japan	6,080	Killed at Shanghai, plus 2,000 wounded and 10,040 missing; official Chinese figures in Alvin Coox, <i>Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939</i> , Vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University

		10,000	Press, 1985), 602, n. 19. Estimate based on 6,080 killed at Shanghai, and judging about half of the 10,000 missing also killed.
		16,120	Estimate, assumes that all 10,040 missing were killed.
Italo-Ethiopian, 1935-1936	Italy	225,000	From aerial bombardment and poison gas; Robert A. Pape, <i>Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 335; Angelo Del Boca, <i>The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941</i> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 206.
Third Sino-Japanese, 1937-1945	Japan	1,578,000 3,949,000 6,325,000	Low, medium, and high estimates by R.J Rummel, <i>China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900</i> (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), line 108.
Germany - Poland, 1939	Germany	10,000	In bombing of Warsaw; Nicholas Bethell, <i>The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939</i> (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 140.
		25,000	Warsaw; Andrew Borowiec, <i>Destroy Warsaw! Hitler's Punishment, Stalin's Revenge</i> (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 16.
		40,000	Warsaw; E.R. Hooten, <i>Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe</i> (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), 188.
		16,000	Poles executed by Wehrmacht firing squads. Alexander B. Rossino, <i>Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity</i> (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 86-87. 50,000 total killed by December 1939, 7,000 of whom were Jews ( <i>ibid.</i> , 234).
Russo-Finnish, 1939-1940	Soviet Union	640	Aerial bombardment; Allen F. Chew, <i>The White Death: The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War</i> (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971), 127.
		650	Robert A. Pape, <i>Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 341; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 485.
		700	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991</i> , vol. 2 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992), 790-91.  Additional figures†: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 956: Hermann Knell, <i>To Destroy a City</i> (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2003), 169.</li> </ul>
France, 1940	Germany	1,000	Walter B. Maass, <i>The Netherlands at War: 1940-1945</i> (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), 40; Matthew Cooper, <i>The German Air Force 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure</i> (London: Jane's Publishing, 1981), 114-115; Horst Boog, "The Luftwaffe and Indiscriminate Bombing up to 1942." In <i>The Conduct of the Air war in the Second World War: An International Comparison</i> , ed. Horst Boog (New York: Berg Publishers, 1992), 386-387.



		14,000,000	Figure used in the analysis; 15 million is the correct figure (see discussion in Table 17 above). 7.5 million killed by fighting or repression; 7.5 million killed by Nazi-induced famine or disease. R.J. Rummel, <i>Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917</i> (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 171 (high estimates from lines 24 and 40).
	Romania	400,000	Leo Kuper, <i>Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century</i> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 129. See also Yehuda Bauer, <i>A History of the Holocaust</i> (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), 309, 200 (260,000 Jews, 144,000 others).
	Soviet Union	500,000	Mid-range estimate of Reich and Ethnic Germans killed in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Eastern Europe (266,000) plus the mid-range estimate of the number of “foreigners” (includes Reich Germans, Ethnic Germans from other countries, Hungarians, Japanese, Poles, Romanians, West Ukrainians, and Belorussians) killed in deportations to the USSR (285,000). R.J. Rummel, <i>Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917</i> (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 174-75. See also Gil Elliot, <i>Twentieth Century Book of the Dead</i> (London: Penguin Press, 1972), 84.
Pacific War, 1941-1945	United States	268,157	USSBS figures based on Japanese sources; Michael S. Sherry, <i>The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon</i> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 413, n. 43.
		330,000	Ibid.
		900,000	Ibid.; Robert A. Pape, <i>Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 104.  Additional figures (included in those above): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 80,000- 100,000 in firebombing of Tokyo, March 9-10, 1945; Kenneth P. Werrell, <i>Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II</i> (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 163.</li> <li>• 70,000 in A-bomb at Hiroshima; Kenneth P. Werrell, <i>Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II</i> (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 217. Estimates range from 64,000 to 130,000.</li> <li>• 35,000 in A-bomb at Nagasaki; Kenneth P. Werrell, <i>Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II</i> (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 218. Estimates range from 35,000-45,000 to 60,000-70,000.</li> </ul>
Palestine, 1948-1949	Israel	850	Minimum number of Palestinians killed in the 20+ massacres documented in Benny Morris, <i>The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
		1,130	Maximum number of Palestinians killed in the 20+ massacres

			documented in Benny Morris, <i>The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
	Arabs	2,000	Estimate based on Benny Morris, <i>The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Morris's figures do not include deaths that occurred in bombardments, combat, random shootings, and during flight.
		1,162	Total Israeli civilians killed, Nov. 1947-Jan. 1949. Martin Van Creveld, <i>The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force</i> (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998), 99. I assume that roughly half of these (581) were killed in the interstate war, and assign them to Arab states as follows: 250 Egypt, 150 Syria, 150 Jordan.
	Egypt	42	Bombing of Tel Aviv. Benny Morris, <i>Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999</i> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 235.
Korea, 1950-1953	North Korea (DPRK)	29,000	ROK civilians "liquidated" during 3 months of DPRK occupation; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 726.
		129,000	Massacred in Seoul. Ibid., 724.
	South Korea (ROK)	1,200-2,000	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 724.
		100,000 (min.)	"Hundreds of thousands" from U.S. bombing; Max Hastings, <i>The Korean War</i> (New York: Touchstone, 1987), 268.
		406,000	Total North Korean civilians killed. Andrew C. Nahm, <i>Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea</i> (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1993).
United States	1,000,000	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 734.	
Russo-Hungarian, 1956	Russia	1,000	Estimate
		3,000	Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, <i>International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and their Management, 1945-1995</i> (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997).
		10,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).  Additional figures (included in those above): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 101 in massacre at Magyarovar by AVO (Hungarian Security Police). George Mikes, <i>The Hungarian Revolution</i> (London: A. Deutsch, 1957), 109.</li> <li>• 600 in massacre in Parliament Square by AVO;</li> </ul>

			George Mikes, <i>The Hungarian Revolution</i> (London: A. Deutsch, 1957), 111.
Sinai/Suez, 1956	Total for war, both sides	1,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).
	Israel	550	Palestinians killed by Israel in conquest of Gaza Strip. Benny Morris, <i>Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999</i> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 295.
		275; 111	At Khan Younis and Rafah; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 634.
	France	100	Estimate
		100	Estimate
	Britain	650	At Port Said, 2,100 wounded (this is where the British landed; results of British White Paper by Sir Edwin Herbert, reported in "Egyptian Dead In Port Said Estimated at 650," <i>The Times</i> , December 22, 1956, p. 5)
Sino-Indian, 1962	China	0	Estimate
		1,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).
Vietnam, 1965-1973	Total for war, both sides	587,000	Guenter Lewy, <i>America in Vietnam</i> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 453.
	North Vietnam and Viet Cong	42,194	Total based on sources below
		38,954	South Vietnamese assassinated by VC/NVA; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772-1991</i> (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1995), 216.
		2,810	Massacred in Hue during Tet, and 1,946 missing; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 784.
		252	Montagnards burned to death with flamethrowers by VC in Dak Son, 5 December 1967; <i>ibid.</i>
		78	Killed in Son Tra, 28 June 1968; <i>ibid.</i>
		100	Killed at Phuthan, 14 June 1970; <i>ibid.</i>
	United States	313,936‡	Total used in analysis
		478,936	Revised total based on sources below
		65,000	North Vietnamese killed in U.S. bombing (52,000 in Rolling Thunder, 13,000 in Linebacker); Robert A. Pape, <i>Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 190, 208.

		26,369	Violent deaths owing to Phoenix Program. Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 784; Mark Moyar, <i>Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong</i> (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 236.
		222,000	VC/NVA dead who were probably civilians (one-third of 666,000 communist military deaths); Guenter Lewy, <i>America in Vietnam</i> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 453.
		165,000	Vietnamese civilians killed/died of wounds from Allied firepower. Lewy argues that "because of the lavish use of this firepower the great majority of CWC [civilian war fatalities] were caused by the allied side." A conservative proportion is two-thirds of the total number of estimated deaths (247,600), which yields a figure of roughly 165,000. Guenter Lewy, <i>America in Vietnam</i> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 446 (quote), 444 (number).
		567	Massacred at My Lai, March 16 1968; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772-1991</i> (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1995), 237.
	South Korea	3,000	Massacred by South Korean forces. R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 127 (line 621).
Second Kashmir, 1965	Total for war, both sides	13,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).
	Pakistan	464	Indian civilians killed; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 664.
	India	500	900 in air and ground strikes, split about evenly between the two countries. Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 664.
	India	500	
Six Day, 1967	Israel	249	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 637.
	Jordan	20	Shelling of Jerusalem; Michael Oren, <i>Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East</i> (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), 187.
War of Attrition, 1969-1970	Israel	1,000	5,000 Egyptian military and civilian, 152 Israelis. Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991</i> , vol. 2 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992), 1047.
	Egypt	152	
		248	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical</i>

			<i>Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 639.
Soccer War, 1969	El Salvador	1,000	“As many as 2,000 Honduran soldiers and civilians may have died in the brief conflict.” Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 707. See also Thomas P. Anderson, <i>The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969</i> (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 126.
		3,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).
Bangladesh, 1971	India	305	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 668.
	Pakistan	178	
Yom Kippur, 1973	Israel	100	Syrians killed in bombing of Damascus; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 643.
Turkish-Cypriot, 1974	Cyprus	500	6,500 total Greek Cypriots killed and several hundred Turkish Cypriots. Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 987.
	Turkey	3,250	
Vietnamese-Cambodian, 1975-1979	Total for war, both sides	14,000	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).
	Cambodia	2,000	For 1977 only; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 692.
		30,000	According to Vietnamese government; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 693. See also R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 62 (line 214).
Uganda-Tanzania, 1978-1979	Uganda	2,000	Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 1028; Patrick Brogan, <i>World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945</i> (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 117.
Iran-Iraq, 1980-1988	Iraq	11,000	Dilip Hiro, <i>The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict</i> (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 250.
		12,420	S. Taheri Shemirani, “The War of the Cities,” in <i>The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression</i> , ed. Farhang Rajaei (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 37.
		15,050	Dilip Hiro, <i>The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict</i> (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 135, 182, 183, 200, and Edgar O’Ballance, <i>The Gulf War</i> (London: Brassey’s, 1988), 153, 201.

	Iran	1,000	<p>Additional figures†:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5,000 Kurds at Halabjah. S. Taheri Shemirani, "The War of the Cities," in <i>The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression</i>, ed. Farhang Rajaee (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 33.</li> <li>• 4,000 Kurds at Halabjah. Dilip Hiro, <i>The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict</i> (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 201.</li> <li>• 2,000 Kurds at Halabjah. Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i>, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 652.</li> </ul> <p>From indiscriminate Iranian rocketing/shelling of Iraqi cities. R.J. Rummel, <i>Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900</i> (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 306 (line 1860); Dilip Hiro, <i>The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict</i> (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 183; Edgar O'Ballance, <i>The Gulf War</i> (London: Brassey's, 1988), 170.</p>
Falklands War, 1982	Britain	3 5	<p>Michael Parsons, <i>The Falklands War</i> (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 2000), 80.</p> <p>Patrick Brogan, <i>World Conflicts</i> (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 464.</p>
Israel-Syria (Lebanon), 1982	Israel	3,000-5,000 4,000-5,000 10,000-12,000 15,485	<p>Richard A. Gabriel, <i>Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon</i> (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), 121.</p> <p>Ibid., 165.</p> <p>Ibid., 165.</p> <p>Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i>, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 1074-75.</p> <p>Additional figures†:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 700-800 at Sabra and Shatila, Israeli intelligence estimate. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, <i>Israel's Lebanon War</i>, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon &amp; Schuster, 1984), 282.</li> <li>• 1,200 at Sabra and Shatila, number of death certificates issued. Ibid., 282.</li> <li>• 2,000 at Sabra and Shatila, Palestinian Red Crescent estimate. Ibid., 282.</li> <li>• 460 at Sabra and Shatila, Lebanese government estimate. Benny Morris, <i>Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999</i> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 547.</li> </ul>
Chad-Libya, 1987	Chad/Libya	0	<p>Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i>, 2nd ed.</p>

			(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 1010-11; Patrick Brogan, <i>World Conflicts</i> (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 42.
Second Sino-Vietnamese, 1987	China/Vietnam	0	Ruth Leger Sivard, <i>World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88</i> (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1987).
Iraq-Kuwait, 1990	Iraq	0	Kuwaiti deaths during the period of Iraqi occupation are assigned to the Persian Gulf War (see below)
Persian Gulf War, 1991	United States	3,000	U.S. bombing; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, <i>The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order</i> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 68; Ward Thomas, <i>The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations</i> (Ithaca: Cornell, 2001), 159.
	Iraq	1,014	1,000 during occupation of Kuwait; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, <i>The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order</i> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 68. 13 Israelis and 1 Saudi killed in Scud attacks; Robert A. Pape, <i>Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 357-58.
Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), 1992-1994	Total for war, both sides	13,333	20,000 total deaths, two-thirds of them noncombatants; Micheal Clodfelter, <i>Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000</i> , 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 606.
	Armenia	7,500	25,000 total deaths, "mostly civilians." Patrick Brogan, <i>World Conflicts</i> (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 400; Thomas de Waal, <i>Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War</i> (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 285; Michael P. Croissant, <i>The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications</i> (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 138.
	Azerbaijan	7,500	
Eritrea-Ethiopia, 1998-2000	Eritrea	250	"There have been hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries resulting, for example, from Eritrea's bombing of Mekele and Adigrat in June 1998 and from Ethiopian shelling of border villages in early 1999." Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut, <i>War in the Horn: The Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia</i> (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 52.
	Ethiopia	250	
US-Yugoslavia (Kosovo), 1999	Yugoslavia	10,000	Milton Leitenberg, "Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century," Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #29, 3 <sup>rd</sup> ed. (2006), Table 2.
	United States	500	Serbs and Albanians; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, <i>Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo</i> (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 4.
		488-527	Ward Thomas, <i>The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations</i> (Ithaca: Cornell, 2001), 169.
Kargil, 1999	India & Pakistan	0	None reported in multiple sources consulted; battle theater was in mountains.
US-Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom),	United States	1,300	U.S. bombing; Carl Conetta, "Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War," Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #6, 30 January

2001-2002		3,400	2002, at <a href="http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.pdf">www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.pdf</a> , p. 6. Marc W. Herold, "A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan," March 2002; <a href="http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm">www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm</a> .
US-Iraq, 2003	United States	3,240	Niko Price, "AP, in First Nationwide Tally of Iraqi Civilian War Deaths, Counts at Least 3,240," <i>Associated Press</i> , June 11, 2003.
		3,750	3,200-4,300. Carl Conetta, "The Wages of War: Iraq Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2004 Conflict," Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #8, October 20, 2003, p. 3, at <a href="http://www.comw.org/pda/0310rm8.html">http://www.comw.org/pda/0310rm8.html</a> .
		6,882	Iraq Body Count, <i>A Dossier on Civilian Casualties 2003-2005</i> , <a href="http://www.iraqbodycount.org">http://www.iraqbodycount.org</a> .

\* For the low estimate, all 891,000 blockade deaths (424,000 plus 467,000) were assigned to Britain and the bombing deaths were split evenly between Britain and France. For the medium estimate, the 891,000 blockade deaths were split evenly among Britain, France, and the United States. For the high estimate, 1,230,000 blockade deaths (763,000 + 467,000) were split evenly among Britain, France, and the U.S.

† Deaths not included in the statistical analysis, but included for informational purposes

‡ I accidentally omitted the 165,000 civilians that Lewy estimates were killed by indiscriminate U.S. and South Vietnamese firepower. Incorporating these additional fatalities does not appreciably change the statistical results (see Table 17 in this appendix).