

THE CAUSES OF FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE IN INTERSTATE WARS

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ABSTRACT

What are the causes of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in interstate wars? Why do belligerents in some conflicts but not others decide to overthrow and replace opposing governments? This paper identifies four potential explanations for this variation: ideological tensions, democratic crusading, commitment problems, and strategic territory. Some analysts contend, for example, that high levels of transnational ideological tension or ideological conflicts among particular combatants lead to FIRC. Others argue that democracies are particularly prone to toppling adversarial regimes. A third school of thought maintains that commitment problems caused by the potential for post-war changes in the balance of power between belligerents fuels FIRC. Finally, states caught between enduring rivals may be especially vulnerable to FIRC. The paper tests these hypotheses against evidence from 134 interstate wars that occurred between 1816 and 2003. The evidence shows that periods of ideological tension are prone to FIRC, but ideological differences between belligerents in the same war do not increase the likelihood that governments fall. Changes in the balance of power are not associated with an increased risk of FIRC, but commitment problems generated by unreliable leaders (personalist dictators) do raise the probability that such leaders are overthrown. Buffer states—states caught in between enduring rivals and fighting one of them—are more likely to endure FIRC. Democracies, however, if anything are less likely to inflict FIRC on their adversaries.

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INTRODUCTION

“My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.” With these words, President George W. Bush announced to the nation on March 19, 2003, the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a military campaign that aimed to bring down Iraq’s long-time dictator Saddam Hussein. Three weeks later, Hussein had fled and gone into hiding, U.S. forces occupied Baghdad, and U.S. Marines helped ordinary Iraqis pull down a statue of Saddam on live television: foreign-imposed regime change had come to Iraq. This was not America’s first experience with foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC): a scant sixteen months earlier U.S. airpower and Northern Alliance ground forces had chased Mullah Omar and the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s safe haven in that country.

Foreign-imposed regime change is far from a new phenomenon, however. Although less common than regime change inspired and executed domestically, externally-compelled regime change has still been a regular occurrence in international affairs, stretching back at least to the time of the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece. John Owen has identified nearly two hundred instances of foreign promotion of domestic political institutions dating back to 1555, many (but not all) of which entailed forcible regime change by external actors.¹ Two of the major hegemonic wars of the past two centuries ended in FIRC: the removal of Napoleon in 1814 (and again in 1815 after his escape from captivity) and the toppling of Adolf Hitler and the government of Japan in 1945. The Triple Entente made regime change in Germany one of its principal war aims in 1914, but the Germans (and Austrians) removed their own leaders in the war’s final days thereby obviating the need for external involvement. These are only the most famous cases; FIRC has occurred in many minor wars as well. British expeditionary forces from

¹ Owen 2002.

India, for example, twice toppled Afghani regimes in the nineteenth century. In an experiment that ended disastrously, French troops in 1863 overthrew the government of Benito Juarez in Mexico, installing the ill-fated Maximilian as emperor. Romanian troops ended the brief reign of Bela Kun in Hungary after World War I, while at the same time British, French, and American troops were similarly trying to cut short Bolshevik rule in Russia. The Soviet Union replaced the governments of several Eastern European states in the waning days of World War II, and later re-intervened in Hungary and Czechoslovakia to oust the reformist leaders Imre Nagy and Alexander Dubcek. Finally, neighboring states have taken it upon themselves to overthrow thuggish or genocidal regimes, such as Tanzania in Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, and the United States in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti.

Why do states topple the governments of other states? As a first cut at this question, this paper asks a more specific question: why do states overthrow and replace the governments of enemy states during wartime? Existing explanations for FIRC fall into four categories. First, some analysts argue that FIRC results from a clash of ideologies.² When there is a high level of tension in the international system between two (or more) contending ideologies, such as monarchism versus republicanism or communism versus liberal capitalism, FIRC is more likely to occur. Furthermore, when two contending states are characterized by different ideological views, the loser of the contest is likely to suffer regime change as a consequence of defeat. Second, it has often been observed that liberal democracies tend to turn wars into crusades, Manichean contests of good versus evil. Because autocracies engage in repression domestically, according to liberals, they are also bound to behave aggressively in their external relations. In this logic, the only way to put an end to war is to eliminate authoritarian regimes. When push comes to shove, therefore, democracies seek not only to defeat their autocratic foes but also to

² Owen 2002.

transform them into democracies.³ Third, FIRC is thought to stem from commitment problems generated by likely post-war shifts in the balance of power between former belligerents. A loser that becomes more powerful after its defeat gains incentives to renege on the war-ending agreement and use force to revise its terms. Anticipating this, the winning state in the current war may impose a new, friendly regime on the loser in order to lower the probability that its defeated adversary will start a new war.⁴ Finally, the literature on state death suggests that states may conquer or otherwise seek to influence strategically located states, particularly those that lie between them and a rival power.⁵

Other, more mundane, explanations, however, surely capture some of the variation in FIRC. States that win wars, for example, are much less likely to suffer a change of government at the hands of their opponent, although this has occurred on a handful of occasions.⁶ The more powerful a belligerent is relative to its opponent, the more immune it is likely to be to FIRC as well. The costliness of the conflict might also matter: states that endure high levels of casualties in the war might be more motivated to overthrow the enemy government, or be more vulnerable to regime change by the adversary. Finally, longer wars might be more liable to induce FIRC as belligerents become increasingly frustrated and exasperated by the opponent's resistance.⁷

This question has tremendous real world importance. Although FIRC has been a regular occurrence historically, 9/11 and the ensuing war against terrorism have already prompted the United States to topple two regimes and consider moving against several others, including Iran, Syria, and North Korea. President Bush's enunciation of the Bush Doctrine, which stresses the

³ Doyle 1983b.

⁴ Carrubba, Reiter, and Wolford 2006.

⁵ Fazal 2007.

⁶ Most of these exceptions consist of wars in which one side is losing at an early stage of the conflict but eventually goes on to win, such as the First Afghan War (1839-42) and the Franco-Mexican War (1862-67).

⁷ Werner 1996.

need to act preemptively (or preventively) against potential threats before they emerge because of the dangerous nexus of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, and terrorists may yet lead to further instances of regime change. Moreover, it is important to understand the origins of FIRC because it sometimes entails disastrous consequences. Although instances of FIRC with positive long-term effects exist, such as Germany and Japan in 1945, or Grenada and Panama in the 1980s, more often the effects of FIRC for the target and the intervener are negative. The ousters of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan removed repressive and brutal regimes, but have substituted protracted insurgency, suicide bombings, ineffective governance, and fears about the future. Tanzania's removal of Idi Amin in 1979 helped return the equally murderous Milton Obote to power; Obote may have killed nearly as many Ugandans between 1980 and 1985 as did Amin.⁸ American-sponsored coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile during the Cold War set back the cause of democracy in those countries by decades, helped foster brutal repression, and—in the case of Iran—caused a long-term backlash against the United States that the U.S. government is still dealing with today. Given these often dire consequences of toppling foreign governments, it is important to understand the circumstances under which FIRC is likely to occur.

This paper investigates the causes of foreign-imposed regime change in 134 interstate wars occurring since 1815. Drawing on and extending existing studies, I argue that three mechanisms account for much of the variation in FIRC. First, the literature is correct in identifying ideological differences as a key cause of FIRC. Externally-imposed regime change is more likely when transnational ideological tension is high. Accounting for other factors, however, opponents characterized by different ideologies are not at increased risk of FIRC. Second, commitment problems do figure in decisions for FIRC, but fears about a changing

⁸ Marshall 2005.

balance of power are not the only source of the problem. Personalist dictatorships, systems in which there are few if any constraints on the predilections of individual leaders, give rise to commitment problems because leaders in these governments are especially unlikely to keep their word. Finally, states are more likely to install friendly, pliant regimes in strategic territory where they worry that a rival may act first and seize the area. As argued by Fazal in the context of state death, buffer states are particularly vulnerable to FIRC.⁹ The crusading democracy view finds no support; if anything, democracies are less likely to change their adversary's governments.

The paper proceeds in four sections. First, I define foreign-imposed regime change. Second, I lay out the existing literature on the causes of FIRC, and discuss my amendments to these explanations. The third section describes the data, variables, and methodological procedures used in the empirical analysis. Section four presents the results of several logit regressions. Section five summarizes and discusses the implications of the results.

WHAT IS FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE?

The term “regime change” has multiple meanings. Most generally, it refers to any change of leader, government, or political institutions in a state, whether through regular or irregular means. The upcoming 2008 elections in the United States, for example, will result in a change of regime from the George W. Bush administration—constitutionally-prohibited from seeking a third term—to a new Republican or Democratic administration. As I discuss below, this is a shallow form of regime change, since the governing institutions remain intact; only the elites change. Regime change can also occur through irregular—and sometimes violent—means, such as coups, revolutions, or civil wars. Irregular transitions like these can also be shallow—simply replacing one leader with another in the same institutional framework—or deep, altering the

⁹ Fazal 2007.

entire governmental system of a country. Military coups, for example, sometimes merely substitute one officer for another under the same basic autocratic system. In other cases, peaceful mass movements are able to bring down authoritarian regimes and spark transitions to democracy. The revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 are examples of this type of regime change, as are the toppling of the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia in 2000 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Finally, a radical change in governing institutions sometimes occurs when rebels triumph in civil wars, as in Spain (1939) or China (1949).

What each of these examples shares in common is that the impetus for regime change is located primarily at the domestic level. Military officers, politicians, revolutionaries, rebels, or ordinary people inside the country take matters into their own hands and remove their current leaders either through regular elections or other means. There is a second way that regime change can be brought about, however, and that is from the outside-in, by external forces. I refer to this type as foreign-imposed regime change; it has been defined by W. Michael Reisman as “the forcible replacement by external actors of the elite and/or governance structure of a state so that the successor regime approximates some purported international standard of governance.”¹⁰

Several aspects of this definition should be highlighted. First, for a change of regime to be considered foreign-imposed, external actors must play the dominant role in removing the old leadership and installing new elites (and possibly institutions) via the actual or threatened use of force. It is not enough to observe a leader falling from power during or shortly after a war to conclude that FIRC has occurred. Rather, the state’s opponent in the conflict must be the one doing the removing as well as putting a new leader of its own choosing in power. As Suzanne Werner puts it, there must be evidence that “foreign opponents not only usurped the old regime,

¹⁰ Reisman 2004, 516.

but also chose or effectively determined the *succeeding regime*.”¹¹ This definition rules out instances in which statesmen are removed by their domestic constituents rather than foreign actors after a loss. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, for example, abdicated his throne and fled to the Netherlands two days before Germany accepted an armistice in November 1918. He was forced out not by his Entente enemies, however, but by his own countrymen, who believed the end of the monarchy necessary both to obtain an armistice and to avert a radical revolution at home.¹² Other monarchs, such as Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Emperor Karl of Austria, suffered similar fates at the end of World War I.¹³ The Entente armies obviously played a contributing role to the fall of these leaders, but Entente forces did not actually remove them, nor did the Entente determine who would replace these fallen monarchs or have a hand in installing the new leaders. Similarly, democratic leaders—such as Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman—are sometimes removed while presiding over unsuccessful wars or shortly afterwards, but these are not instances of FIRC since these leaders were ousted by their own constituents through domestic processes rather than by foreign intervention.

Foreign-imposed regime change typically takes one of the following three forms, each involving the use or threat of force by external actors to dispose of current leaders and put others in power. In one scenario, an invading state employs its own military forces to replace the government of another state. The United States, for example, has engaged in this form of regime change frequently in the last quarter century, sending the U.S. military to topple leaders in

¹¹ Werner 1996, 73.

¹² As Goemans puts it, “Domestic political reforms could now credibly perform two functions at the same time. First, these reforms would implement the ‘revolution from above’ that would prevent the larger revolution from below. Second, at the same time these reforms could buy off Wilson and ease the terms Germany could get in the international bargaining over an armistice.” Goemans 2000, 287. Britain had adopted the destruction of Prussian militarism as a war aim in 1914. This objective was eventually dropped when Allied fortunes reached a low ebb following Russia’s departure from the war, but it was revived by President Woodrow Wilson after the tide turned against Germany in autumn 1918. See Goemans 2000, 272, 284-88.

¹³ Ferdinand abdicated and went into exile in October 1918, while Karl was exiled and deposed by the Austrian parliament in early 1919.

Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Soviet Union during and immediately after World War II forcibly installed communist governments in Eastern Europe, and then used the Red Army to remove leaders in Hungary and Czechoslovakia who strayed from the Kremlin's directives. Sometimes, however, an actual invasion with the state's own ground forces is unnecessary to compel regime change; instead, the threat to invade or a limited demonstration of force is enough to do the trick. In Haiti in 1994, for example, a U.S. invasion force was poised off the Haitian coast preparing to come ashore when junta leader Raoul Cedras agreed to step down in favor of previously deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Foreign powers also occasionally seek to bring about regime change by providing substantial economic or military aid to rebels attempting to overthrow the government. The most clear-cut cases of this last mechanism are those in which the rebellion is in large measure a creation of the foreign actor, for example, where the rebels and their leaders are recruited, trained, funded, and armed by the foreign power. The ouster of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz by rebels led by Juan Castillo Armas in 1954 fits this profile.¹⁴ In this category I also include covert actions that are masterminded by external actors, such as the CIA-sponsored overthrow of Mohamed Mossadeq in Iran in 1953. In each of these types of cases, to code a regime change as foreign-imposed, evidence is needed that (1) leaders left power because of the threat or use of force by an external actor, and (2) the outside power effectively determined who the successor would be.

The impetus for foreign-imposed regime change may precede the outbreak of war or may be triggered by intra-war events. In the first version, one state attacks another with the specific intention of overthrowing its government. Some factor that is evident before the war prompts a state's leaders to decide to intervene in another state and replace its leaders. This type probably

¹⁴ The rebel "army" consisted of a few hundred men armed and trained by the United States in neighboring Nicaragua. Although U.S. military forces were not used in the invasion, the United States provided aircraft to the rebel air force, most of which were flown by American pilots hired by the CIA.

accounts for the bulk of FIRC. Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, were cases in which regime change was chosen as the policy before the war began. Similarly, the multilateral intervention to defeat the Roman Republic and re-install the Pope in 1849 was the reason for going to war rather than an intra-war development. The same can be said of Hitler's invasions of Northern and Western Europe and the Balkans in 1940-41. In the second type, however, neither of the belligerents intends to engage in regime change before the war begins, but something about the war itself—either the fact that it occurs or the way it is conducted—persuades one or both participants that it must take action against its adversary's government. As already noted, Germany's decision to launch a continental war in 1914 convinced British policymakers that the militarist party had gained the upper hand in Berlin and thus that peace would not be possible until it had been ousted. Similarly, Idi Amin's brutal invasion of Tanzania in 1978 caused Tanzanian President Nyerere to put an end to Amin's regime for good. In the Ethiopian-Eritrean War (1998-2000), Ethiopia at first simply responded defensively to what it perceived to be Eritrean incursions into Ethiopian territory. As the fighting grew more costly, however, Ethiopian aims escalated: "By September 1998 the strategy of the Ethiopian government was either to topple the government of Issaias Afwerki or to weaken him so badly that he would cease to threaten Ethiopia's northern border."¹⁵

A second important issue in the definition of FIRC concerns the depth of regime change. Although other analysts focus on institutional change, promotion of the intervener's institutions in the target state, or nation-building, I do not consider it necessary that the intervener modify the institutional structure of the target for regime change to occur. Rather, regime change can be as "shallow" as simply replacing one leader with another, or as "deep" as imposing a whole new set of institutions on a country in addition to a new leadership. In some cases, for example,

¹⁵ Negash and Tronvoll 2000, 89.

interveners simply depose one leader and substitute another while leaving the state's political institutions largely untouched. Such was the case in the First and Second Afghan Wars (1839-42, 1878-80), when the British intervened to install leaders friendly to their interests and prevent the growth of Russian influence. Interventions by the United States in Central America in the early twentieth century followed a similar script, with American forces throwing out elites thought to be hostile to U.S. interests and installing more pliant leaders.¹⁶ In many other cases, however, interveners go well beyond substituting one leader for another and seek also to change the target's institutional make-up. Arguably the most famous cases of this type were the American occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II in which the United States successfully transformed its former adversaries into functioning liberal democracies. I adopt a minimalist definition with regard to depth of regime change, requiring only that external actors remove one leader and bring a different one to power.¹⁷

Third, the definition of FIRC adopted here excludes instances of territorial conquest and annexation. When one state is absorbed by another, the regime of the victim is changed as a matter of course, but the motive of the invader is not to change the government or identity of another actor that remains distinct and independent. Rather, the goal is to eliminate the other actor from the state system and incorporate its territory, resources, and people within one's own state. Regime change thus occurs, but it is merely a by-product of conquest, not the intended objective. European colonial powers, for example, conquered and annexed many previously independent states to their empires in the nineteenth century. In South Asia, the British defeated and incorporated the Maratha states of Indore, Nagpur, and Peshwa in 1817-18; Sind in 1843;

¹⁶ The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was also minimalist at the outset, as the Bush administration hoped to retain the bulk of Iraq's institutional structure (minus Saddam and key Baathists) but impose friendly elites from the exile community, such as Ahmed Chalabi.

¹⁷ The ambitiousness of the alterations that external actors seek to bring about in the target government is a potentially interesting variable for the success or failure of FIRC.

Punjab in 1846-49; and Burma in 1886. The French, for their part, conquered Algiers in 1830, Annam in 1884, and Dahomey and Madagascar in 1895.¹⁸

Although each of these cases is an instance of what Fazal refers to as “state death,” which she defines as the “formal loss of control over foreign policy to another state,” I argue that some cases of state death should still be counted as cases of foreign-imposed regime change.¹⁹

Specifically, there are a number of cases in which an invader conquers and defeats an adversary, removes its government, and sets up an alternative regime or military occupation authority, but does not annex the country. In some cases, such as the U.S. occupations of Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24), the occupier issues a clear statement of its intent to leave and return power to native elites.²⁰ I count all regime changes that occur during military occupations where the occupier intends to exert only temporary control over the occupied state as instances of FIRC.

In several other cases, however, it is unclear whether the occupier would have eventually returned sovereignty to the occupied nations or instead sought to annex them. Germany’s occupation of Belgium during World War I falls into this category, as do the Third Reich’s occupations of northwestern Europe (Norway, Denmark, the Benelux countries and France) and Greece and Yugoslavia in World War II. In each case, Germany’s reasons for attacking in the first place did not include annexationist motives. During World War I, Germany’s aims only grew acquisitive after the war started. With regard to Belgium, German leaders hoped to make it a vassal state, not annexed but not completely free either. As Peter Liberman puts it, “Belgium and Poland were to be permitted ‘to enjoy their national life to the full’ with independent

¹⁸ On the status of these entities as independent, recognized states, see Gleditsch and Ward 1999; and Fazal 2007, 243-58.

¹⁹ Fazal 2007, 17.

²⁰ Indeed, Edelstein builds the intent to leave at some future point in time into his definition of occupation. He excludes wartime occupations altogether because the eventual fate of the territory is unclear. Edelstein 2008, 171.

national institutions, subject only to German military and economic control.”²¹ Similarly, Hitler’s aims in the west at the outset of World War II were vague and unfocused. “When the Second World War began,” writes Norman Rich with regard to Norway and Denmark in his study of German war aims, “Hitler had no intention of undertaking a military expedition into Scandinavia. The Scandinavian people were Nordics who at some future date might be cajoled or coerced into some kind of greater Germanic political organization. But for the time being Hitler counted on the Scandinavian states to remain neutral as they had done in the First World War.”²² It was the threat that Britain would intervene first and interdict Germany’s supply of coal from Norway and Sweden that spurred Hitler to action.²³ Similarly, in Western Europe, Liberman notes that “Hitler initially attacked ... less to capture its economic potential than to protect his western flank in preparation for the conquest of the East. His original plans for the West were far more vague than for the East but appear to have involved German economic hegemony rather than annexation (except for Alsace-Lorraine, which was to be restored to the Reich).”²⁴ Even in Greece and Yugoslavia, annexation was not the initial aim: “Hitler had not wanted to get involved in Southeastern Europe.... The Germans expected to dominate the area and to exploit it; but within the foreseeable future they did not plan to occupy or annex it. Until a German peasant should require a plot of Hungarian or Balkan soil for living purposes, these countries and their peoples might continue to exist.”²⁵

One might think of cases such as these as “right-censored”: Germany may eventually have annexed these states to a European empire, but the Third Reich was defeated before it

²¹ Liberman 1996, 72.

²² Rich 1973, 133.

²³ In the event, the Germans did not remove the Danish government, which did not resist the invasion. The Norwegian government, however, which evaded capture and tried to resist, was toppled.

²⁴ Liberman 1996, 38.

²⁵ Rich 1973, 180.

became clear whether or not this would happen. I therefore adopt a slightly less restrictive rule when it comes to the restoration of future sovereignty of occupied states: rather than a clear promise to return sovereignty, I simply require that annexation not be the objective when the intervener attacks and changes the adversary's regime. This rule differentiates cases like the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-36 and the German conquest of Poland in 1939—cases where the aggressors clearly intended to annex the territory of their defeated foes—from the cases where occupiers clearly intend to leave or where the intention is unclear but no immediate moves towards annexation are evident.

THEORIES OF FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE

Literature on the causes of foreign-imposed regime change is relatively sparse, but existing explanations can be grouped roughly into four categories. One set of arguments emphasizes clashes of ideologies: FIRC will be more likely in times of transnational ideological ferment or between states dominated by different ideological perspectives. A second set of theories maintains that democracies are particularly prone to change the regimes of their adversaries. A third argument focuses on commitment problems created by shifting balances of power as the reason for regime change. A victory in a current war is unlikely to provide lasting peace, according to this view, if the defeated adversary is likely to grow stronger in the future. This gives states incentives to inflict a total defeat on such an enemy in this round rather than face the possibility of another war down the road. Lastly, states caught between enduring rivals may be more vulnerable to FIRC.

CLASHES OF IDEOLOGY

One of the most intensive explorations of externally-inspired regime change in the literature is John Owen's work on the foreign imposition of domestic institutions. Owen's work is not only about regime change, however, but rather the promotion of a state's own domestic institutions in another state. As Owen puts it, "Domestic institutional promotion is any effort by state A to create, preserve, or alter the political institutions (as distinguished from the ruler or government) within state B. Although imperial states often promote their institutions in regions they annex or directly rule, I study only those states that retain juridical sovereignty."²⁶ Institutional promotion can obviously entail exchanging one set of institutions for another, but it also involves efforts to assist states with similar institutions to survive against internal or external challenges. Moreover, Owen's conception of institutional promotion extends deeper than simply installing a particular leader or ensuring the survival in office of a particular set of elites. Rather, he is concerned first and foremost with institutions rather than leaders. By contrast, as discussed above I conceive of regime change as any external intervention that at a minimum results in a new leader or at maximum an entirely new set of institutions.

Owen compiles all instances of forcible institutional promotion by external powers since 1555, a total of 198 cases in all. Owen suggests that it is the coincidence of high levels of insecurity in the international system and major clashes of transnational ideologies that produces the highest frequency of forcible institutional promotion. The Thirty Years' War, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, World War II, and the Cold War produced nearly three-quarters of the 198 cases in Owen's dataset. Other patterns, however, suggest that ideological tension is the more important of the two factors, as high ideological tension correlates with moderate levels of institutional imposition in the absence of high insecurity but high insecurity

²⁶ Owen 2002, 377.

without ideological clashes does not.²⁷ Owen argues that powerful states wishing to expand their influence abroad have a vested interest in promoting institutions that will empower like-minded elites in other countries who desire close relations. As Owen writes, “The promotion of domestic institutions, then, can alter the balance of power by extending promoting states’ influence.” But such regime promotion can trigger other states’ security fears, leading them to promote their own institutions, which in turn decreases the security of the original exporter. According to Owen, “The promotion-insecurity and promotion-ideological tension relations are recursive: domestic institutional promotion is both cause and consequence of insecurity and ideological tension.”²⁸

Ideologically-motivated instances of foreign-imposed regime change are often the result of attempts to reverse a recent change of ideology in a neighboring state, or attempts to impose ideological conformity on a defeated adversary. A liberal revolution against King Ferdinand VII in Spain in 1820, for example, prompted French intervention—sanctioned by the Concert of Europe—to restore the monarchy. Similarly, the ouster of the Pope and the declaration of a republic in Rome in 1848 prompted great power intervention the following year to restore the pontiff.²⁹ The Soviet Union was also a frequent intervener in its sphere of influence in the twentieth century to quash any moves by its satellite states in Eastern Europe—such as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—away from communist ideology.³⁰ Ideological clashes were also responsible for several instances of FIRC in Central America in the late nineteenth and

²⁷ Owen 2002, 399.

²⁸ Owen 2002, 400. Owen notes other patterns in the data: all kinds of regimes, not only democracies, have intervened to impose institutions abroad; the same states tend to undertake such interventions repeatedly, and they are usually great powers; it is common for there to be civil strife in the target state; the targets of intervention typically border the intervener and also possess geopolitical, strategic importance; and more often than not states promote their own institutions.

²⁹ Reversal of republican revolutions was also responsible for several examples of FIRC that did not rise to the level of war: Austria-Sicily, 1821; Austria-Modena, 1831; Austria-Parma, 1831; Prussia-Saxony, 1849; Prussia-Baden, 1849; and Austria-Tuscany, 1849. There was only one intervention to overthrow an absolute monarchy and restore constitutional governance: Britain/Spain-Portugal, 1828-34.

³⁰ The Czech case was accomplished without much bloodshed. The Soviets also intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, replacing Hafizullah Amin with Babrak Karmal. They later removed Karmal as well.

early twentieth centuries, where liberal and conservative strongmen sought to overthrow leaders in other states that did not share their ideological predilections and promote those who did.³¹

Three hypotheses can be distilled from Owen's arguments. First, Owen maintains that foreign regime promotion—and hence foreign-imposed regime change—is more frequent during periods when there is a high level of ideological disputation in the international system.

- Hypothesis 1: FIRC is more likely to occur in wars during periods of high transnational ideological tension.

Second, FIRC should also be more likely between pairs of states characterized by competing ideologies.

- Hypothesis 2: A belligerent involved in an interstate war is more likely to endure FIRC if it is characterized by a different ideology than its opponent.

Finally, Owen contends that the combination of ideological competition and security competition is the most conducive atmosphere for FIRC.

- Hypothesis 3: Belligerents are more likely to suffer FIRC when ideological and security competition are intense.

DEMOCRATIC CRUSADING

Imprudent Vehemence. A number of commentators have argued that democracies are prone to turn the wars they fight into crusades that require the elimination of the enemy leadership and the re-making of the enemy state as a democracy. Robert Tucker, for example, argued in the 1960s that although the United States was loathe to go to war in the first place, once it was engaged in a war, objectives that it had previously maintained could only be achieved peacefully suddenly

³¹ Guatemala, for example, toppled the leaders of Honduras and El Salvador in the First Central American War of 1876. Nicaragua removed the Honduran leadership in the Fourth Central American War of 1907.

became fair game. Tucker specifically contended that there were no inherent limits on war in American doctrine, and thus total war objectives like unconditional surrender to eliminate the source of a threat once and for all were consistent with defensive wars. As he noted, “It is not that the American doctrine condones the avowal of any and all purposes in a war waged against aggression, but rather that the purposes it does avow—defense and peace—set no meaningful limitations to the specific objectives that may be pursued in war.”³²

The view that democracies are apt to turn wars into crusades is perhaps most strongly associated with Michael Doyle, who termed it “imprudent vehemence” in his early pair of articles on the liberal peace.³³ Liberalism, Doyle argued, not only leads to peace among liberal democracies, but it also exacerbates antagonisms between democracies and autocracies. The reason is that autocracies are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people rather than representing the true interests of their citizens. Because they use coercion at home, liberals assume autocrats will also use it abroad, which leads to an extreme lack of trust and respect. In relations with powerful authoritarian states, this suspicion leads to missed opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation, overreaction to events in the periphery, and failures to capitalize on conflicts of interest among different autocracies. In relations with weak non-democracies, powerful liberal states are prone to interventionism owing to the power imbalance (opportunity) and the illegitimacy of the autocratic regime (motive).³⁴

When liberal states have gone to war against non-liberal great powers, the imprudent vehemence that characterizes liberal relations with autocracies emerges in the total war objectives that liberal powers often seek from their adversaries. In World War I, for example,

³² Tucker 1960, 74.

³³ Doyle 1983a, 1983b.

³⁴ In practice, Doyle argues that such interventions often end up failing to promote democracy in the target and undermining it at home owing to the exigencies of ruling an empire and maintaining it against other imperial powers.

Britain and France quickly elevated their war aims to demand an end to the rule of Prussian militarism in Germany as a prerequisite for a settlement. Similarly, Britain and the United States decided to demand unconditional surrender from the Axis powers in World War II at a time when Axis expansion was at its highest tide. Nothing in the progress of the war up to that point could have led to the optimism that some argue is required for an expansion of war aims.³⁵ Finally, although the Cold War never turned hot, far from seeking only to limit the expansion of Soviet power, the doctrine of containment aimed over the long term at internally-inspired regime change in the Soviet Union by bringing the contradictions of the Soviet system to the surface.³⁶ Because authoritarian regimes are inherently aggressive, liberal democracies that engage in FIRC seek to replace autocratic governments with democratic systems.

Selectorate Theory. A contrasting perspective on democracy rooted in institutions makes a similar prediction but the logic is very different. The argument runs as follows. Leaders in democracies care first and foremost about getting reelected. Because the voting public is so large, it is impossible to follow the strategy that many authoritarian leaders pursue to keep themselves in power, which is to provide perks to the relatively small group of key players whose support is necessary for autocrats to stay in office. This means that democratic leaders tend to pursue broad policy aims in war, like security or ideological goals, whereas autocrats pursue territorial aims to provide private benefits to a small circle of elites. Achieving policy aims, however, creates a dilemma: “Broad policy aims in war face a commitment problem in that they often require the active participation of the defeated states to secure those aims in the future.”³⁷ If the defeated adversary refuses to go along, it may deny “the victor the fruits of its victory,” which in turn could endanger the incumbent’s survival in office. The solution? Install a

³⁵ Labs 1997.

³⁶ Litwak 2006, 7.

³⁷ Morrow et al. 2006, 32. See also Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2002.

pliant government in the target state that will do your bidding. In short, democracies are more likely to engage in regime change to secure their broad policy objectives.

This argument also has implications for the type of regime that democratic interveners will seek to impose on former foes. The important question for the victorious democratic leader is what regime type will best secure my hold on power at home? Implanting a democratic regime is not necessarily the best choice, since those leaders must respond to their own domestic opinion, which is not always in line with the interests of the intervening state. If a leader imposes democracy on another state, and that state starts following policies that clash with or are detrimental to the intervener's interests, the public in the intervening state is likely to punish the leader who made such an unwise choice. Autocrats, by contrast, are far freer to pursue policies that are not in their own state's national interest because they only have to keep a few people happy to stay in power. Thus, according to this logic, democratic interveners are more likely to install non-democratic regimes.

Critique and Hypotheses. The evidence for the validity of the imprudent vehemence and selectorate arguments is not strong. Neither of the two major studies on FIRC and foreign promotion of domestic institutions find that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to overthrow foreign governments. Owen, for example, shows that states promoted their own institutions abroad well before any modern democracies existed, and that since democratic states were founded in the early nineteenth century, they have not cornered the market on foreign regime promotion. Owen does argue, however, that states tend to promote their own institutions, which is consistent with the liberal argument.³⁸ Werner, moreover, finds that states fighting

³⁸ Owen 2002, 391, 396.

against democracies in interstate wars are actually less likely to have a new regime imposed on them.³⁹

The evidence presented in favor of the selectorate argument has problems as well. First, the proxy variables employed in the principal studies are relatively crude. In their paper on selection institutions and war aims, for example, Morrow and colleagues code the intention “to depose enemy leader[s] in disputes” based on whether the state participated in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) in which both sides used force and at least one of the participants had regime aims. A glance at these cases in the MID dataset suggests a few problems: roughly 18 percent of the cases are composed of North Korea versus South Korea, another 11 percent consist of intervention in the Russian Civil War, and 7 percent comprise the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Furthermore, only 8 percent of the cases occurred before 1900 and 31 percent before World War II, suggesting incomplete data coverage before very recent times. Moreover, many well known cases of actual forcible regime change are missing.⁴⁰

A second problem concerns the results. In the Morrow et al. study, for example, the authors estimate the probability that democracies adopt war aims that involve changing the enemy regime. What they find is that in eleven out of eighteen scenarios, democracies actually have a lower chance than autocratic states of pursuing regime aims. Only against one-party autocracies are democracies systematically more likely to seek the ouster of the opposing government. Against modern mass democracies and military dictatorships or traditional monarchies, by contrast, democracies almost always pursue regime aims with a lower likelihood

³⁹ Werner 1996, 81-82.

⁴⁰ The problem of crude proxy variables also characterizes to a lesser extent the study by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs on the impact of intervention on ensuing levels of democracy. In addition to using data on UN intervention and countries that intervened in civil wars, the paper codes as interveners any state that scored higher than 1 on the MID hostility indicator (excluding initiators), which sets a very low bar for intervention. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006, 637.

than do one-party autocracies and dictatorships/monarchies.⁴¹ The evidentiary foundation for the argument that states with large winning coalitions and selectorates (democracies) are more likely to seek regime change is thus open to question.

The different logics and difficulties with empirical evidence notwithstanding, these different regime type arguments yield a very concrete hypothesis:

- Hypothesis 4: War belligerents fighting against democracies are at a higher risk of suffering FIRC.

Both arguments also imply an interactive effect between regime type and relative power:

- Hypothesis 5: Opponents of democratic states face a higher risk of suffering FIRC as the democracy becomes more powerful.

Where the two perspectives part ways concerns the type of regime that democracies are likely to impose. The imprudent vehemence thesis implies that democracies which engage in regime change should leave new democracies in their wake. If the source of aggression lies in autocratic repression at the domestic level, then the solution is to transform autocracies into democracies.

The selectorate thesis, by contrast, suggests that democracies seek mainly to obtain a regime that will do their bidding, and for this purpose autocracies are more reliable than democracies. I do not test this implication of the two arguments in this paper.

COMMITMENT PROBLEMS

Another class of explanations for foreign-imposed regime change focuses on post-war commitment problems. One such commitment problem has already been touched on: the difficulty that democracies have in getting defeated foes to implement policies that are more in the winner's interest than the loser's. The inability of democratic regimes to commit to such

⁴¹ Morrow et al., 2006, 48-49.

policies in the face of possible domestic disapproval is said to lead democratic victors to impose authoritarian forms of government to ensure compliance.

Shifts in the Future Balance of Power. A more common argument regarding the creation of post-war commitment problems concerns the role of shifting power. The argument is that any promise a losing state makes to abide by a peace agreement after a war loses its force should the balance of power shift in its favor. As the loser's power increases relative to the winner's, so too does its ability to revise the war-ending settlement. Werner, for example, found that changes in the balance of power between former belligerents significantly increased the hazard of war recurrence. Similarly, Werner and Yuen found that post-war shifts in the balance of capabilities were associated with the breakdown of cease-fire agreements in the period after 1945.⁴²

New work on war termination has begun to endogenize this post-war commitment problem and incorporate its effects on the progress of the war. Rationalist literature on war termination argues that because private information (and incentives to misrepresent that information to obtain a better deal in negotiations with the adversary) causes war, the revelation of private information that occurs through fighting battles should cause at least one side to realize it was mistaken and revise its estimate of victory downward and thus lower its war aims. This revision eventually opens up a bargaining space where the two sides' demands overlap and a negotiated settlement becomes possible. This process has become known as the "convergence hypothesis."⁴³ In certain cases, however, convergence fails to occur in the predicted fashion: either the losing side holds out, failing to lower its war aims as defeats pile up on the battlefield, or one belligerent decides at some point that it does not desire a negotiated settlement at all but rather prefers to eliminate or change the nature of the other actor. Analysts have suggested that

⁴² Werner 1999; Werner and Yuen 2005.

⁴³ Reiter 2003.

domestic politics explains the tendency of some losing states to hold out and gamble for resurrection. Goemans, for instance, argues that leaders in mixed regimes are likely to be removed and punished for losing a war and thus have strong incentives to employ risky strategies to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.⁴⁴ Croco has modified Goemans's argument by claiming that only culpable leaders—those in power (or closely associated with them) when the war began—are likely to be punished for losing a war and are thus most likely to hold out for a positive settlement, whereas leaders who come to power later in the conflict are not viewed as responsible for the war's outcome and hence are not punished for it.⁴⁵

Another explanation for war aims that are unresponsive to the progress of the war that has nothing to do with domestic politics concerns commitment problems that arise from changes in relative power after the war is over. The basic argument is simple and flows directly from the findings in the literature discussed above: if it is likely that a defeated belligerent will probably become more powerful after a negotiated settlement, that state will be in a position to use force to revise the agreement in the future. In that case, the winner of the previous contest may find itself embroiled in war again with the same adversary over the same issue. Rather than face this possibility, the state may decide to fight for a complete victory in the current round and then impose a government in the defeated state that will adhere to the terms of settlement.⁴⁶ This phenomenon could help explain cases where belligerents adopt total war objectives early in a conflict regardless of military progress, such as the United States and Britain in World War II, and why winning states would accept the costs of extended occupations and nation-building rather than a negotiated settlement that leaves the adversary's government in power.

⁴⁴ Goemans 2000.

⁴⁵ Croco 2007.

⁴⁶ Carrubba, Reiter, and Wolford 2006.

- Hypothesis 6: States that are perceived as likely to grow in power relative to their adversary after the completion of the current war are more likely to suffer FIRC.

The post-war commitment problem thesis captures an important part of what I believe drives most instances of foreign-imposed regime change in international politics: the preventive motive. Specifically, when one side fears that its opponent is unable to commit to a settlement because it will inevitably grow stronger in the future, it may prolong the war now to achieve total victory so as to eliminate the commitment problem later. It is unclear, however, how common this mechanism is empirically, and how regime change would solve it. In many cases, for example, it is not so much the possible future growth in power of a defeated that is cause for concern, but rather who is at the helm of the state and what their intentions are perceived to be. Furthermore, replacing the leader of a growing state does not prevent the balance of power from changing; only dismantling the state—as the Allies contemplated regarding Germany under the Morgenthau Plan—can do that. Leaders installed today can be deposed tomorrow, leaving the fundamental problem of the state’s power potential unaddressed.

Dangerous Leaders. Another version of this mechanism brings the regime type of the target state back in and might be called regime commitment or leader commitment. This mechanism is similar to the post-war commitment problem identified by Carrubba, Reiter, and Wolford in that it focuses on states’ expectations regarding the likelihood that their current adversary will abide by any future agreement they negotiate. Whereas Carrubba, Reiter, and Wolford argue that the expectation of post-war shifts in the balance of power generate commitment problems, this is only partially correct. At least as often—and perhaps more often—it is not changing capabilities that are responsible for commitment issues, but rather particular leaders. A number of cases exist where the reason for regime change was the refusal of the

enemy leader to end the war on reasonable terms. In the La Plata War (1839-52), for example, Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, in an attempt to re-conquer Uruguay (which used to be a province of Argentina) laid siege to Montevideo for nine years! Rosas was finally forced to raise the siege in 1851 by the combined forces of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil, which defeated and removed him from power the following year. A similar case is the Lopez War (1864-70) fought by Paraguay against its much larger neighbors Brazil and Argentina. Paraguay had a population of about half a million people when the war started, less than one-twentieth the size of its foes' combined populations. Regime change in this case was a function of Paraguayan dictator Francisco Lopez's grandiose ambitions and his refusal to surrender rather than worries about future power transitions.

In other cases, leaders or regimes take actions that convince their adversaries that they are innately aggressive, cannot be trusted, or have unlimited ambitions. This was surely the case with Hitler in World War II, for example. His conquest of almost the entirety of Europe convinced the Allies that there was no making peace with this man (or any Nazi figures, for that matter): he was a megalomaniac and a serial aggressor who could not be trusted to keep his word. Other lesser known cases also fit this description, such as the Tanzanian removal of Idi Amin and Vietnam's overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia. In the case of Amin, the Ugandan dictator sent his troops across the border into Tanzania, where they laid waste to the area, killing thousands of civilians. This brutality, however, convinced the Tanzanian leadership that Amin had to be removed: "As his [Amin's] indisciplined army rampaged through the invaded districts, as it boastfully killed, tortured, raped and looted few people foresaw that the end of Amin's regime was near. But as Tanzania, which had been caught completely unprepared assessed the cost of this barbaric incursion which had left thousands of

Tanzanians dead or missing, President Nyerere reached the conclusion that Amin must be made to pay for the slaughter of his people and the devastation of the country.”⁴⁷ Similarly, Vietnam responded to repeated Cambodian incursions into Vietnamese territory—in which Khmer Rouge forces killed thousands of civilians—by invading and overthrowing Pol Pot’s murderous regime.

- Hypothesis 7: States governed by leaders that are viewed as unlikely to adhere to a peace agreement are more likely to endure FIRC.

STRATEGIC TERRITORY

The final explanation for why states engage in FIRC is to gain control over a piece of strategic territory, or rather to prevent another state from getting it first. Recent work on state death in international politics helps explain this logic. Tanisha Fazal, for example, argues that buffer states—“states caught between two others engaged in an enduring rivalry”—are the types of states most likely to die in international politics. Fazal defines state death as the “formal loss of control over foreign policy to another state” via conquest, military occupation, federation or confederation with other states into a larger unit, or dissolution into two or more smaller units. Buffer states often become enmeshed in a prisoner’s dilemma involving the enduring rivals on either side of them. Buffers can serve a useful function for two rivals, since these territories keep the rival states from directly bordering each other and thus reduce tensions and help avoid quarrels over borders that might occur were the two states to abut each other directly. Yet the placement between two mutually suspicious rivals is detrimental to the health of buffer states. Because the two states mistrust one another, and absorbing the buffer would confer a strategic advantage, each fears that the other will move to take over the buffer. In a classic statement of PD, Fazal writes, “Both rivals know that they would be better off if they could exercise mutual

⁴⁷ Kiwanuka 1979, 190.

restraint with respect to the buffer area. But they both also want to avoid the worst-case outcome of being ‘suckered’; neither rival wants to exercise restraint while its opponent takes over the buffer area.”⁴⁸

Changing the regime of a strategically important state can be a cheap means of blocking an opponent’s expansion and improving one’s own security without necessarily inheriting the headaches of directly ruling the territory. This was clearly Britain’s motivation in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century. Afghanistan and Persia were the two key buffer states separating the expanding Russian and British empires in Asia. After their defeat of the Persians in 1827, the Russians gained a preponderant influence over the Shah. In 1837, with the encouragement of Russia, the Shah besieged Herat, at the time an autonomous principality in what is now western Afghanistan. Showing the Russian hand clearly was the fact that the commander of the besieging army was a Russian officer, and the Russian minister to Persia was with the Shah at his campaign headquarters. The British feared that if Herat fell, Kandahar and Ghazni might be next. “Then Kabul itself would be at Persia’s mercy,” writes John Waller; “and behind the shah, accounting for his brazen confidence, was the czar of Russia.”⁴⁹

In the face of this burgeoning threat on the northwestern frontier of the Indian empire, British governor general Lord Auckland decided that Dost Mohammed, the Afghan ruler in Kabul, had to be replaced with someone more friendly to British interests who would resist Persia’s Russian-inspired incursions. The British government approved of Auckland’s scheme, even after the Persians were defeated at Herat and the siege was raised in September 1838. As Waller puts it, “proponents of the forward policy argued that while Herat had been saved from Persian clutches by British pressure on the shah, the problem of a Russian-dominated Persia still

⁴⁸ Fazal 2007; quotes are from pp. 37 and 40; definition of state death is from 17.

⁴⁹ Waller 1990, 121.

existed; only by controlling Afghanistan could the Russian menace be contained.”⁵⁰ British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston was hesitant to confront Russian expansion in Persia because of Russia’s strong position there. According to Paul Schroeder, however, Palmerston viewed the situation in Afghanistan as more propitious for success: “in mid-1838 he decided finally to break with Persia and adopt Auckland’s plan for intervention in Afghanistan, where he believed Britain’s position was strong and Russia’s weak. The move would not only stop Persia and save Herat, he thought, but also check Russia and strengthen Britain in Central Asia.”⁵¹

In the event, the British-Indian expeditionary force of 21,000 succeeded in ousting Dost Mohammed, replacing him with former Afghan emir Shah Shuja. This first Afghan adventure proved to be disastrous, however, as an entire British column of nearly 4,000 men (and 12,000 camp followers) was annihilated while retreating from Kabul to Jalalabad in early January 1842. It also proved to be only a temporary interregnum in Dost Mohammed’s rule, as he regained the throne in 1843 after the British withdrew for good. At least one old India hand had foreseen that regime change in Afghanistan—although perhaps easy to accomplish initially—would be doomed to failure: “If you send 27,000 men up the Bolan Pass to Candahar (as we hear is intended) and can feed them, I have no doubt you will take Candahar and Caubul [Kabul]; but for maintaining him in a poor, strong and remote country among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless.”⁵²

Territorial expansion and war often trigger the need to control more territory to protect the state or the territory just acquired from attack. Several prime cases of this occurred in Europe during World War II. As discussed above, Hitler had no intention of invading Scandinavia, Western Europe, or the Balkans before the war began. Although many of these states were

⁵⁰ Waller 1990, 128.

⁵¹ Schroeder 1994, 759.

⁵² Mountstuart Elphinstone, quoted in Waller 1990, 128.

technically buffer states lodged between states engaged in rivalries, their position did not become precarious until the rivals actually went to war. Once Britain, France, and Germany were engaged in hostilities, the status of Norway and Denmark assumed major importance. If these countries fell into enemy hands, Hitler feared, the British “would be in a position to close the entrance to the Baltic and dominate the entire German sea coast, including all German naval bases.”⁵³ Equally as serious was the threat to German supplies of iron ore, over 50 percent of which was imported from Norway and Sweden. Although Hitler preferred continued Norwegian neutrality to direct German intervention, and was reluctant to fight in an area where Britain’s naval strength could be brought to bear, the potential dangers of a British move into Norway eventually outweighed the costs and risks of taking action.

Similarly, in the Balkans, Hitler had no immediate plans to move militarily, but his hand was forced by his blundering ally Mussolini’s attack on Greece in October 1940. The problem was that the British were sure to come to the Greeks’ aid. As Rich comments, “Greece might now become a British air base, a direct threat to southern Italy and only five hundred kilometers from the Rumanian oil fields.” Hitler viewed the military situation as “dangerous,” but perceived the economic threat to the oil fields as “positively terrifying.”⁵⁴ The need to crush Greece generated incentives to attack Yugoslavia as well to protect German lines of communication, especially after a coup in Belgrade overthrew the government that had negotiated Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact.

Finally, FIRC is sometimes used to establish a buffer belt of friendly states in the wake of a devastating war. This motivation accounts at least in part for Stalin’s overthrow of governments in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania (as well as his insistence on a

⁵³ Rich 1973, 134.

⁵⁴ Rich 1973, 197.

communist government for a resurrected Poland) in the waning days of World War II. Although these actions are sometimes interpreted as signaling Moscow's revisionist and expansionist motives, the Soviet-imposed regime changes in Eastern Europe are probably better understood as setting up a protectorate to secure Soviet borders against any repetition of the disaster that engulfed the country beginning on June 22, 1941.

- Hypothesis 8: States located between two enduring rivals are at an increased risk of suffering FIRC.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD

DATASET AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE

To investigate the causes of foreign-imposed regime change, I compiled a dataset of interstate wars that occurred between 1816 and 2003. This dataset is different from the typical Correlates of War list. Following the work of Gleditsch and others, I added a substantial number of wars omitted by COW that nevertheless involved two or more recognized independent states.⁵⁵ A list of these additional wars is included as Appendix A. For each of these conflicts, I recorded whether or not one of the belligerents experienced a forcible change of regime at the hands of its opponent(s). To count as a case of FIRC, the victim's adversary had at a minimum to remove the old leader and replace him with a new one, and the target state had to exercise some minimal amount of sovereignty. In practice, this means that cases of territorial annexation are excluded: regime changes occur when one state ingests another, but they are incidental to the real goal,

⁵⁵ Gleditsch 2004.

which is annexation. Targets of FIRC may be occupied by an external power so long as the intervener does not formally annex the target. The list of cases that results is shown in Table 1.⁵⁶

[Table 1 about here]

The cases of foreign-imposed regime change identified by my research differs significantly from the list compiled by Werner, included as Appendix B.⁵⁷ There are at least three factors that account for the differences. First, Werner simply overlooked several cases of FIRC—especially in the nineteenth century—that further research has brought to light. Second, my dataset includes a large number of wars that Werner’s dataset did not, some of which ended in FIRC. These conflicts are of three types: recent conflicts that occurred after Werner’s article was published, such as U.S.-Afghanistan in 2001 and U.S.-Iraq in 2003; a large number that were erroneously coded by COW as extrasystemic wars but are in fact interstate wars, such as the First and Second Afghan Wars; and multiphase, multi-participant wars that I have broken down into their constituent parts or campaigns, such as the two world wars.⁵⁸ Third, Werner’s list of cases includes half a dozen that are actually instances of territorial annexation rather than FIRC, and thus are excluded from my list.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ There were also several cases in which a belligerent clearly enunciated its intention to overthrow its adversary’s government but was unable to do so. Examples include the Triple Entente in World War I (target = Germany), the Allies in World War II (target = Italy), Britain, France, and Israel in the Suez/Sinai War (target = Egypt), Israel in the War of Attrition (target = Egypt), both sides in the Iran-Iraq War, and Ethiopia in the Ethiopian-Eritrean War.

⁵⁷ Werner 1996, 84.

⁵⁸ On the status of many of these wars as interstate wars, see Gleditsch 2004. Others who break up the world wars and a few other conflicts (Vietnam, Persian Gulf) into multiple parts include Reiter and Stam 2002 and Downes 2008. There are also at least two conflicts that were did not appear on any COW list: the War of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836-39), and the brief war between Chad and Libya in 1987.

⁵⁹ Werner also codes Turkey as experiencing a FIRC at the conclusion of World War I, but this is incorrect. Enver Pasha, the Turkish leader during World War I, fled to Berlin when Turkey signed the armistice in October 1918. His successor, Mehmet VI, was overthrown by Turkish nationalists led by Kemal Ataturk, in 1922.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Clash of Ideologies. To capture the clash of ideologies argument, I coded three variables. To gauge the argument that FIRC is more likely when transnational ideological tension is high, I coded a dummy variable to take the value of 1 during periods specified by Owen as being characterized by high levels of tension between different ideologies: 1816-1849, corresponding to the period of republican revolution in Europe, and 1917-1988, which captures the period of conflict among communism, fascism, and liberalism. At the dyadic level, the most direct way to capture the ideological argument is to classify states according to their political ideologies, and then code whether states with different ideologies fought against each other. In the nineteenth century, I argue that the relevant ideological cleavage that differentiated among states was monarchism—the view that governing power should be centralized in a king with few restraints on his ability to make policy—versus liberal republicanism—a system where power is vested in elected officials rather than monarchs and citizens’ rights are protected against executive abuses. I code a state as liberal if it appears on Michael Doyle’s list of liberal states or if a revolution occurred that overthrew a monarchy and is described in the historical literature as liberal or republican.⁶⁰ All monarchies that are not considered liberal are coded as having a monarchic ideology.⁶¹ Included are states such as Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Austria, and Prussia/Germany, but also non-European minor powers like Punjab, Burma, Persia, and Afghanistan.⁶² Following World War I, monarchies largely disappear and I classify states according to the three great ideologies of the twentieth century: liberalism, fascism, and

⁶⁰ Doyle 1997, 261-64.

⁶¹ This provision excludes constitutional monarchies such as Britain, France under Louis Phillippe, Italy before Mussolini, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada.

⁶² One could argue that only the most absolutist monarchies like Russia and the Ottoman Empire should be included in the monarchy category since many other monarchies, such as Prussia, were quasi-constitutional states that functioned much like liberal countries such as Britain, France, and Italy. To test this possibility, I coded a second version of this variable that included only the most despotic monarchies. It produces similar results but with higher significance levels.

communism. I then assigned each belligerent a 1 if both fell into different ideological categories and fought on opposing sides in a war. States that did not have clashing ideologies were coded zero.

I also employed a second indicator to detect ideological differences among belligerents, a variable that assumes different ideologies manifest themselves in institutional structures, particularly in varying levels of constraints on the executive. Werner, for example, argues that the greater the difference in states' authority structures, the more likely they will view each other as threats. "This is so," Werner writes, "because states with different authority arrangements provide examples of alternate ways to determine who is powerful in a society."⁶³ Leaders are likely to want to eliminate these alternative examples to secure their own hold on power. I follow Werner by summing each belligerent's Polity score for regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment. The resulting variable ranges from zero to ten. I then subtract the two sides' scores and take the absolute value of the result. If multiple states fought in a coalition, I weighted each contributor's score by its share of the military personnel in the coalition. The final variable ranges from zero to nine.

Crusading Democracies. To appraise the hypothesis that states fighting against democracies are more likely to experience an externally-imposed change of regime, I coded the level of democracy of each state's opponent as judged by the 21-point index in the Polity 4 dataset. In cases in which multiple states are fighting on the same side, I weight each belligerent's Polity score by its percentage of military personnel in the alliance.

The Commitment Problem. To assess the commitment arguments, I constructed two variables. To detect the possibility of a commitment problem stemming from perceptions of a shifting balance of power in the future, I measured the change in the balance of material

⁶³ Werner 1996, 70.

capabilities between the two belligerents over the ten years prior to the war. If data were not available for ten years, I used the longest period for which data could be obtained. This is an imperfect measure, since it measures objective changes in relative power that occurred before the war rather than policymakers' perceptions that the balance of power will change in the future. To get at perceptions of future shifts in power, in-depth case studies are needed (see, for example, Carrubba, Reiter, and Wolford 2006; Reiter 2007).

Second, it is arguable that certain types of regimes are viewed as inherently unconstrained, reckless, or dangerous. Personalist dictatorships, for example, are dominated by ruthless individuals with few or no constraints on their freedom of action.⁶⁴ When Saddam Hussein decided to invade Iran in 1980 or Kuwait a decade later, no one had the power to defy him owing to his total control over the instruments of coercion. In states like these, anyone who gainsays the leader—or is even suspected of harboring treasonous thoughts—is likely to end up in front of a firing squad or otherwise meet an untimely end. Given the monopoly on power held by personalist dictators, states that end up in wars with these regimes are likely to come to the conclusion that the key to resolving the dispute is to remove the offensive leader and replace him with someone more amenable to their interests or with a whole new governmental apparatus. For the post-1945 period, I used Barbara Geddes's list of personalist dictatorships; for the period from 1816-1945, I relied on her coding guidance but coded the regimes myself.⁶⁵

Strategic Territory. I use two versions of Fazal's buffer state variable to gauge the effect of the fourth major argument for regime change, strategic territory. Fazal coded states as buffers if they were located between any pair of states engaged in an enduring rivalry.⁶⁶ This conception of buffers, however, may be overly broad. Fazal's coding makes sense given that her dependent

⁶⁴ Weeks 2008.

⁶⁵ Geddes 1999.

⁶⁶ See Fazal 2007, 260-68 for her coding of buffer states.

variable is state death in any state-year, not state death or FIRC during war. Fazal's buffer variable codes states as buffers whether or not that status has anything to do with the war. Italy, for example, is coded as a buffer in the Crimean War because it was located between Austria and France, which were engaged in an enduring rivalry at the time. Similarly, Fazal codes Russia as a buffer at the time of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) because it lay between Britain and Japan. Afghanistan, by contrast, is not classified as a buffer during the First Afghan War (1839-42) even though these it was located between Russia and British India, which were competing for influence in the region. Because my inquiry is limited to FIRC during interstate wars, I coded a second, more restrictive, version of the variable, classifying a belligerent as a buffer if and only if it was located between two states locked in an enduring rivalry *and* was fighting one of those two states. Examples of such states include Hanover, Bavaria, and Saxony in the Austro-Prussian War; Afghanistan in the two Afghan Wars; Belgium, Serbia, and Romania in various theaters of World War I; and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and several Eastern European countries in World War II.

Although it is no doubt true that competition with regional rivals may compel belligerents to impose a change of regime on a state in order to control it (or deny control over it to an adversary), it is also true that wars that are primarily territorial disputes are less likely to result in FIRC. Direct control over territory via annexation and indirect control via FIRC are usually viewed as alternatives, and thus wars intended to seize and annex land are probably less likely to include FIRC. Wars of imperial expansion are the limiting case: Britain fought Burma and the Sikhs not to force them to adopt friendlier governments but rather to take some or all of their territory. Many long-running territorial disputes have the same quality: India and Pakistan have fought numerous wars since independence, in none of which has one sought to impose a new

regime on the other. I coded wars as territorial disputes if the MID dataset coded one or more of the belligerents as having territorial aims. For the new wars added to the dataset, many of which were wars of imperial expansion, I coded this variable myself.

Control Variables. As Werner has shown, other variables also affect the likelihood that a war participant experiences a foreign-imposed regime change. One of the most important is whether the state wins or loses the war. Regime change is almost always imposed on the loser by the winner. In the few cases in which this is not the case, the state that suffered FIRC was losing at the time its government was overthrown but eventually recovered to win the war. I use a dichotomous indicator of war outcomes: wins are coded as one, and draws and losses are coded as zero. A second important factor is the relative power of the belligerents. States that are stronger relative to their opponents should be harder to defeat and thus have a lower chance of suffering FIRC. I measure relative power as the percentage of total military personnel controlled by each state involved in the war.⁶⁷ States that suffer fewer battle deaths should also be at lower risk of FIRC since suffering lower numbers of casualties is a good predictor of victory and states that win wars are unlikely to have their governments toppled. Whereas Werner used each state's battle deaths per ten thousand of population, this variable is highly skewed owing to a few influential outliers, particularly Paraguay in the Lopez War, which lost 100,000 men from a population of about 500,000.⁶⁸ To avoid this problem, I simply use the log of state battle deaths.⁶⁹ To determine if heightened security competition influences FIRC, I include a set of

⁶⁷ I use military personnel instead of the widely used composite index of material capabilities because these data are not available for many of the states involved in the wars I added to the traditional COW list, whereas I was usually able to obtain figures for military personnel or army size for the additional cases.

⁶⁸ When Paraguay is included, the per capita battle deaths variable is positive and often significant; when Paraguay is dropped, the significance of the variable collapses and the effect is essentially zero.

⁶⁹ I do not use COW's data on battle deaths, however. These data have been shown to be inflated by their inclusion of deaths of soldiers from disease and sickness, as well as civilian deaths. For the twentieth century, I largely rely on the UCDP Battle Death dataset, version 4.1, available at

dummy variables for different configurations of power in the international system: unipolarity (1990-2003), bipolarity (1945-1989), balanced multipolarity (1816-1902, 1919-1936), and unbalanced multipolarity (1903-1918, 1937-1945). Mearsheimer contends that bipolarity is the most stable system, with balanced multipolarity somewhat more conflict-prone and unbalanced multipolarity the most war-prone of all.⁷⁰ Wohlforth argues that unipolarity is even more stable than bipolarity,⁷¹ but the unipole's preponderance of power may enable it to intervene in the affairs of less powerful states at will. I thus categorized bipolarity as the omitted category and hypothesize that FIRC will be more likely in the other three system structures.

Interactive Effects. Recall that Owen hypothesized that foreign regime promotion would be more prevalent in times of ideological and security competition. To estimate this, I generate a term for security competition coded 1 during periods of unbalanced multipolarity and during the early Cold War through the Cuban Missile Crisis (1903-18, 1937-62). I then multiply this variable by the variable for high ideological tension. Democracies are also supposedly more prone to FIRC as they become more powerful relative to their opponents. I approximate this situation with an interaction term between the opponent's level of democracy and its share of material power in the war.

STATISTICAL RESULTS

Table 2 shows the results of several logit models of foreign-imposed regime change in interstate wars; the dependent variable is whether or not the state endures FIRC at the hands of its

http://www.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm. UCDP in turn relies heavily on Clodfelter 2002, which is my primary source for the nineteenth century. For World War II, I also rely on Ellis 1993.

⁷⁰ Mearsheimer 2001.

⁷¹ Wohlforth 1999.

opponent. Model 1 includes only those variables that Werner included in her analysis.⁷² The findings for many of the variables are consistent with her results. States that win wars, for example, are very unlikely to suffer a foreign-imposed regime change, as are states that are much stronger than their adversaries. Also consistent with her findings is the result that the more battle deaths a state suffers, the more likely it is to be the victim of FIRC. Finally, the greater the difference in authority structures between belligerents, the more likely that foreign-imposed regime change will occur.

[Table 2 about here]

The results in model 1 depart from Werner's findings in two areas. First, Werner found that states that replaced their own leader at some point during the war were less likely to be the target of FIRC, but my data indicate that this is not the case. There are ten cases in my dataset where a state experienced a domestically-inspired change of regime and then also endured an externally-imposed regime change, some of which were not in Werner's universe of cases. These additional cases probably account for the different result.⁷³ Second, Werner found that belligerents fighting against democracies were less likely to experience FIRC. In my analysis, although the coefficient for enemy democracy is negative, it is insignificant. Indeed, a cross-tabulation shows that states facing democracies and non-democracies both have about an 11 percent chance of suffering FIRC.

Model 2 includes the variables from Werner's analysis plus those discussed above as indicators of ideological tension, commitment problems, and strategic territory, as well as controls for territorial disputes and differing structures of the international system. Many of the findings from model 1 are confirmed. Winning the war and being the stronger side continue to

⁷² Werner 1996. I omit enemy battle deaths, which is highly correlated with state battle deaths.

⁷³ Examples include the Second Afghan War (Afghanistan) and the War of the Pacific (Peru).

significantly reduce the chance that a state will suffer FIRC, whereas large differences in authority structures and experiencing higher battles deaths make FIRC more likely. Of the new variables, heightened levels of ideological tension in the international system significantly increase the likelihood that FIRC will occur in war. Ideological differences between belligerents fighting against each other in the same war, however, do not appear to have much effect on FIRC. Regarding commitment problems, the variable for changes in the balance of power between belligerents is insignificant and actually takes the wrong sign: if anything, states that are growing more powerful than their opponents are on average more likely to engage in FIRC. This finding runs contrary to the prediction of the commitment argument that states would be more likely to worry about the future and depose their adversary's government if they were losing power relative to that adversary. The part of the commitment argument having to do with which types of regimes are more reliable, however, is supported: personalist dictatorships are significantly more likely to suffer FIRC. The data for testing the power version of the commitment argument, however, are not ideal because the argument has to do with leaders' fears about *future* changes in the balance of power. Still, the evidence supports the view that the dangers represented by particular leaders may be of greater importance for states deciding on FIRC.

The strategic territory argument also finds only weak support in model 2, as the variable for buffer states takes a positive sign but narrowly misses statistical significance ($p = 0.12$). This is the narrow version of the variable; Fazal's coding of buffer states is also positive but less significant ($p = 0.21$). The bivariate relationship between FIRC and the narrow version of the buffer state variable, however, is very strong—39 percent of all buffer states suffer FIRC, and buffer states are nearly five times more likely than non-buffers to have their governments toppled

in war. The hypothesis about territorial disputes is also confirmed: states involved in conflicts over territory are less likely to endure FIRC at the hands of their opponents. Among other variables, the regime type of the adversary, surprisingly, achieves significance (in the opposite of the hypothesized direction), although this may have something to do with the smaller number of cases in this particular model (about which see below). Finally, relative to bipolarity, FIRC is more likely when the system is unipolar or multipolar; unipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity appear to be the structures most prone to FIRC.

Model 3 replicates model 2 but omits the changing balance of power variable. This variable is plagued by a great deal of missing data, which lead to the loss of fifty cases when it is included in a regression.⁷⁴ As model 3 shows, the N increases from 235 to 285 when power transition is dropped. The larger number of cases does not much change the results: only one variable—balanced multipolarity—is significant in model 3 but not model 2. A couple of variables lose influence, however: battle deaths and enemy democracy each become insignificant. It is probably safe to conclude that FIRC is not the preserve of a single type of government.⁷⁵ The coefficient for differences in executive structures shrinks but remains significant.

The final two columns in Table 2 show the substantive effects of the variables on the likelihood of FIRC. Dichotomous variables are held constant at their modes, and continuous variables are fixed at their means. Binary variables are then changed from zero to one, and the continuous variables are shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Column 4 shows the change in probability that results when the

⁷⁴ The missing data stems mainly from the inclusion of wars involving states that COW wrongly codes as not being independent.

⁷⁵ Nor is it the case that democratic regimes are more likely to be overthrown than others, as the Polity score of the target is also insignificant when included.

variable in question is changed. Although the effects look relatively modest, a better gauge of their magnitude is to compare the change to the predicted probability of FIRC with all variables at their modes and means, which is 0.067. Column 5 shows the percent change in the likelihood of FIRC compared to this value. When the victory variable is shifted from lose to win, for example, the probability of FIRC drops by 85 percent. Moving from a low to a high number of battle deaths results in a 72 percent increase in the chance that a state will suffer FIRC. Two variables with large effects include personalist dictatorships, which are more than four times more likely to endure FIRC, and buffer states, which are almost three times as likely to have their regimes changed. Relative power also exerts a large effect on the probability of FIRC: an increase of two standard deviations in states' military capabilities causes the probability of the state suffering FIRC by 148 percent. The largest effects, however, are associated with the polarity variables: when the system is unipolar, FIRC is eight times more likely, and it is five times more likely during unbalanced multipolarity.

Table 3 examines the interactive effects posited above. One implication of the regime type argument, for example, is that democracies should become increasingly likely to inflict FIRC on adversaries the more powerful they become relative to those rivals. Model 4 in Table 3 substitutes enemy military capabilities for the state's own capabilities, and introduces an interaction term between the enemy's Polity score and its share of material capabilities. The coefficients by themselves don't tell us much; what we need to do is examine the marginal effect of increasing levels of capabilities and $\text{Polity} \times \text{capabilities}$ holding Polity constant at the level of a democracy. Figure 1 shows how the likelihood of FIRC changes as the opponent's share of material capabilities increases when the adversary's level of democracy is held constant at the most democratic (21 on my re-scaled version of the Polity index). As the figure shows, the

probability that the target state endures FIRC hardly changes at all, increasing only about 1 percent across the whole range of capabilities. There is thus no strong evidence that democracies are more likely to impose FIRC as they grow more powerful relative to their adversaries.

[Table 3 and Figure 1 about here]

Model 5 shows the results when an interaction term is included representing wars that occurred during periods of high ideological tension and high security competition. Examination of the marginal effects of this variable on the likelihood of FIRC, shown in Table 4, reveals that FIRC is about 2 percent more likely when there is both intense ideological and security competition in the international system, but this effect is far from standard levels of statistical significance. Owen's conjecture that FIRC is more likely to occur under this combination of circumstances is thus not borne out by the evidence in interstate wars.

[Table 4 about here]

CONCLUSION

This examination of the causes of foreign-imposed regime change shows that FIRC stems from multiple causes. The statistical results demonstrated support for several of the theoretical perspectives outlined in the paper. Periods of transnational ideological tension and the differing government authority structures that result from different ideologies appear to raise the risk of FIRC. Controlling for other factors, however, ideological differences between states in the same war do not increase the likelihood of FIRC. The evidence also lent partial support to commitment arguments. Personalist dictatorships, for example, regimes that are uniquely unable to generate audience costs or commit to agreements, are more likely to experience FIRC. States that are growing weaker relative to their adversaries, however, and thus seem to be good candidates to

impose FIRC as a preventive strategy are actually not more likely to do so. Strategic territory also seems to contribute to FIRC, as buffer states are at elevated risk of experiencing FIRC. Finally, although democracies appear to be less likely to topple the regimes of their opponents in interstate wars, the significance of this result is doubtful. The structure of the international system also affects the likelihood of FIRC, but not in the manner predicted by previous theorizing. Bipolarity seems to be the least prone to FIRC. As anticipated by Owen, unbalanced multipolarity, characterized by intense security competition and major power wars, significantly increases the likelihood of FIRC. Foreign-imposed regime change is also more likely in balanced multipolar systems. Contrary to Owen's predictions, though, FIRC has been very common so far under unipolarity, the type of system characterized by the least amount of security competition. It is probable that the lack of security competition among major powers since 1990 has been counteracted by the increased freedom of action that the unipolar power has to remove regimes it finds objectionable or threatening.

What do these findings portend for the future? One could argue that the likelihood of FIRC in the short-to-medium-term is fairly high. A very dangerous form of power transition—the spread of nuclear weapons—is occurring or may occur in the near future between the United States (and other advanced democracies) and several autocratic states, some of which (Syria, North Korea) are also personalist dictatorships. The prospect of the world's most dangerous weapons in the hands of the world's most dangerous (and unaccountable) men at least in part prompted the Bush administration to fell Saddam Hussein, and may yet prompt FIRC in Iran. Furthermore, an ideological competition is developing between liberal capitalism and radical Islam that could lead to FIRC if states hostile to the United States adopt extreme Islamist views. Moreover, the war on terror prompted by 9/11 has made certain areas of the world into strategic

territory because of the location of al-Qaeda or other anti-American groups. Afghanistan, for example, became a very important place after 9/11 because of the presence of al-Qaeda. Pakistan has now gained a similarly high profile because its border provinces harbor al-Qaeda and other extremist militants. Finally, the extreme power imbalance in the international system places few constraints on the ability of the United States to upend regimes it finds threatening or distasteful.

In addition to further statistical and case study analysis of cases of FIRC in wartime, the logical next step is to extend the investigation to the causes of all instances of FIRC, not only those that occur during interstate wars. I am in the process of gathering data to perform this analysis. Moreover, developing a typology of FIRC helps when it comes to analyzing the effectiveness or consequences of FIRC. If a state undertook FIRC to deny a piece of strategic territory to an adversary, for example, was this goal accomplished, or did the adversary end up gaining influence in the disputed area? If an intervener took action to reverse an unfavorable ideological shift in a target, did the intervention succeed in bringing about ideological conformity and prevent the spread of the opposing ideology?

War	Year	Target(s)	Intervener(s)	Type
Franco-Spanish	1823	Spain	France	Ideological Reversal
Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation	1836-39	Peru/Bolivia	Chile	?
First Afghan	1839-42	Afghanistan	Britain	Strategic Territory
Roman Republic	1849	Papal States	France, Austria	Ideological Reversal
La Plata	1851-52	Argentina	Brazil	Regime Commitment
Franco-Mexican	1862-67	Mexico	France	Empire Creation
Lopez	1864-70	Paraguay	Brazil, Argentina	Regime Commitment
Franco-Prussian†	1870-71	France	Prussia	Accident
First Central American	1876	Honduras	Guatemala	Ideological Reversal?
First Central American	1876	El Salvador	Guatemala	Ideological Reversal?
Second Afghan	1878-80	Afghanistan	Britain	Strategic Territory
War of the Pacific	1879-83	Peru	Chile	Regime Commitment
Anglo-Egyptian	1882	Egypt	Britain	Strategic Territory
Second Central American†	1885	El Salvador	Guatemala	Accident
Fourth Central American	1907	Honduras	Nicaragua	Ideological Reversal
Germany-Belgium	1914	Belgium	Germany	Strategic Territory
World War I, Balkan	1914-18	Serbia	Austria, Germany	Strategic Territory
Hungarian	1919	Hungary	Romania	Ideological Reversal
Germany-Norway	1940	Norway	Germany	Strategic Territory
Battle of France	1940	Netherlands	Germany	Strategic Territory
Battle of France	1940	Belgium	Germany	Strategic Territory
Battle of France	1940	France	Germany	Strategic Territory
World War II, West	1941-45	Germany	Britain, U.S.	Regime Commitment
Germany-Yugoslavia	1941	Yugoslavia	Germany	Strategic Territory
Germany-Greece	1941	Greece	Germany	Strategic Territory
World War II, East	1941-45	Germany	USSR	Regime Commitment
World War II, East	1941-44	Bulgaria	USSR	Ideological Reversal Strategic Territory
World War II, East	1941-45	Hungary	Germany	Strategic Territory
World War II, East	1941-45	Hungary	USSR	Ideological Reversal Strategic Territory
World War II, East	1941-45	Romania	USSR	Ideological Reversal Strategic Territory
World War II, Pacific	1941-45	Japan	U.S.	Regime Commitment
Soviet-Hungarian	1956	Hungary	USSR	Ideological Reversal
Vietnamese-Cambodian	1975-79	Cambodia	Vietnam	Regime Commitment
Ugandan-Tanzanian	1978-79	Uganda	Tanzania	Regime Commitment
U.S.-Afghan	2001	Afghanistan	U.S.	?
U.S.-Iraq	2003	Iraq	U.S.	Regime Commitment

† Leader captured or killed by enemy, but not replaced by enemy, and thus not a fully-fledged case of FIRC. Not included in the statistical analysis.

Sources consulted: Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2008; Fazal 2007; Enterline and Greig 2006; Owen 2002; Werner 1996; Leuridijk 1986; Rich 1973.

	1 Werner's Basic Model	2 Full Model	3 Full Model, Change in Balance of Power Omitted	Change in Probability of FIRC (from Model 3)	Percent Change in Probability of FIRC (from Model 3)
State Wins War	-2.19*** (0.59)	-2.87*** (0.78)	-2.28*** (0.71)	-0.057†	-85
State's Relative Power	-3.13*** (0.76)	-2.19** (1.03)	-2.58*** (0.91)	-0.099†	-148
State's Battle Deaths	0.16* (0.09)	0.19* (0.11)	0.15 (0.10)	0.048	+72
Authority Structure Difference	0.18** (0.08)	0.34** (0.14)	0.19* (0.11)	0.045	+67
Transnational Ideological Tension	-	1.44** (0.73)	1.09** (0.55)	0.039	+58
Ideological Difference	-	0.20 (0.58)	0.72 (0.52)	0.053	+79
Domestic Regime Change	0.10 (0.49)	0.75 (0.81)	0.66 (0.71)	0.046	+69
Enemy Polity Score	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.018	-27
Change in Balance of Power	-	0.01 (0.01)	-	-	-
Personalist Dictatorship	-	1.90** (0.80)	1.87*** (0.65)	0.212†	+316
Buffer State (Narrow)	-	1.14 (0.73)	1.18* (0.68)	0.114	+170
Territorial Dispute	-	-1.74** (0.72)	-1.20** (0.54)	0.110†	-164
Unipolarity	-	3.18** (1.25)	3.07** (1.21)	0.467†	+697
Balanced Multipolarity	-	1.49 (0.99)	1.87* (0.97)	0.051	+76
Unbalanced Multipolarity	-	2.02** (0.91)	1.95** (0.94)	0.273	+407
Constant	-2.15** (0.99)	-5.14*** (1.57)	-4.93*** (1.54)	-	-
N	292	235	285	-	-
Log Psuedo-LL	-81.34	-48.93	-62.88	-	-
Wald Chi ²	46.13***	37.70***	54.38***	-	-

Robust standard errors clustered on each war in parentheses; * = $p < 0.10$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$.


† = Change in probability is statistically significant (95 percent confidence interval does not include zero).

Table 3 Logit Models of Determinants of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change in Interstate Wars, 1816-2003: Interaction Models (DV: State Suffers an Imposed Regime Change)		
	4 Powerful Democracies	5 Ideological and Security Competition
State Wins War	-1.99*** (0.74)	-2.07*** (0.71)
State's Relative Power	-	-2.05** (0.91)
State's Battle Deaths	0.14 (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)
Authority Structure Difference	0.20* (0.11)	0.18* (0.11)
Transnational Ideological Tension	0.98* (0.55)	-0.23 (0.69)
Ideological Difference	0.80 (0.56)	0.70 (0.56)
Domestic Regime Change	0.73 (0.69)	0.43 (0.70)
Enemy Polity Score	0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.04)
Change in Balance of Power	-	-
Personalist Dictatorship	1.91*** (0.63)	1.47** (0.64)
Buffer State (Narrow)	1.20* (0.67)	1.49** (0.69)
Territorial Dispute	-1.30** (0.55)	-1.31** (0.56)
Unipolarity	2.70** (1.18)	-
Balanced Multipolarity	1.40 (0.91)	-
Unbalanced Multipolarity	1.56* (0.85)	-
Security Competition	-	-0.80 (0.93)
Enemy Military Personnel	3.26** (1.48)	-
Enemy Polity * Enemy Military Personnel	-0.11 (0.12)	-
Ideological Tension * Security Competition	-	1.56 (1.19)
Constant	-7.32*** (1.69)	-2.90** (1.16)
N	285	285
Log Psuedo-LL	-62.89	-66.00
Wald Chi ²	63.26***	46.62***

Robust standard errors clustered on each war in parentheses;

* = $p < 0.10$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$.

Table 4 Marginal Effect of Ideological Tension and Security Competition on the Probability of FIRC (from Model 5)			
	Mean	SE	95 Percent C.I.
Probability of FIRC, Low Ideological Tension and Security Competition	0.035	0.029	0.006, 0.115
Percent Change in Probability of FIRC, Ideological Tension and Security Competition Changed from Low to High	0.020	0.031	-0.027, 0.103



Appendix A	
New Interstate Wars Added to COW List	
War	Years
Third Maratha/Pindari	1817-18
Turko-Persian	1821-23
First Anglo-Burma	1823-26
Cisplatine	1825
Russo-Persian	1826-28
Peru-Colombia	1827-29
French-Algerian	1830
Persian-Afghan	1836
War of Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation	1836-39
First Afghan	1839-42
First Opium	1839-42
Bolivia-Peru	1841
Sind War	1843
First French-Moroccan	1844
First Sikh War	1845-46
Second Sikh War	1848-49
Second Anglo-Burma	1852-53
Second Opium War	1856-60
French-Indochina	1858-62
Austro-Italian	1866
Anglo-Abyssinian	1867-68
Second Afghan War	1878-80
First Franco-Madagascan	1883-85
Serbo-Bulgarian	1885-86
First Italo-Ethiopian	1887
Franco-Dahomey	1892
Second Franco-Madagascan	1894-95
Second Italo-Ethiopian	1895-96
Second Anglo-Boer	1899-1902
Second Franco-Moroccan	1907-12
Germany-Belgium	1914
World War I, Western Front	1914-18
World War I, Eastern Front	1914-17
World War I, Italian Front	1915-18
World War I, Balkan Front	1914-16
World War I, Romanian Front	1916
Polish War	1939
World War II, Scandinavia	1940
Germany-Belgium	1940
Germany-Netherlands	1940
Battle of France	1940
World War II, Western Front	1940-45
Italo-Greek	1940-41
German-Greek	1941
German-Yugoslav	1941
World War II, Eastern Front	1941-45
World War II, Pacific Front	1941-45
Soviet-Japanese	1945
Second Vietnamese	1973-75
Chad-Libya	1987
Iraq-Kuwait	1990
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1998-2000
Kosovo War	1999
Kargil War	1999
U.S.-Afghanistan	2001
U.S.-Iraq	2003

Appendix B Cases of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change in Interstate Wars as Compiled by Werner (1996)	
War Participant	Year Participant Entered War
Spain	1823
Papal States*	1860
Two Sicilies*	1860
Paraguay	1864
Honduras	1906
Honduras	1907
Morocco*	1909
Belgium	1914
Turkey†	1914
Ethiopia*	1935
France	1939
Poland*	1939
Germany	1939
Greece	1940
Netherlands	1940
Norway	1940
Belgium	1940
Romania	1941
Yugoslavia	1941
Hungary	1941
Japan	1941
Romania	1944
Hungary	1956
Republic of Vietnam*	1965
Cambodia	1975
Uganda	1978

* Case of territorial annexation

† Not a case of FIRC

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