

# **Catastrophic Success: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Civil War**

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## Abstract

Foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) has been argued to have a pacifying effect on interstate relations: when a victorious power changes the composition of its defeated rival's government, a recurrence of armed conflict between them becomes very rare. Yet the domestic effects within states that experience FIRC may be less benign. This paper investigates the extent to which FIRC might be a form of "catastrophic success," dampening international conflict but exacerbating internal conflict. My analysis differentiates between FIRCs that bring entirely new leaders to power versus those that restore a recently overthrown ruler to office. I argue that the former disrupts state power and foments grievances and resentments, whereas the latter does not. Analyzing a dataset of country-years from 1816 to 2008 that includes one hundred FIRCs, I find that only new leader FIRC significantly increases the risk of civil war in the short-term aftermath. New leader FIRC is also especially damaging to the prospects for domestic peace when it is inflicted in conjunction with defeat in an interstate war, and in poor or ethnically heterogeneous countries.

What are the consequences of intervening abroad to overthrow the leaders of other states, a practice known as foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? Do such interventions result in stable, peaceful societies or devolve into violence and civil war? History fails to provide clear guidance on this question: for every Germany, Japan, Grenada, and Panama, there is an Afghanistan, Uganda, Cambodia, and Iraq. Yet the answer is important, not only for current U.S. policy but because of what it can tell us about broader issues like the sources of order in society and the degree to which governance can successfully be imposed from the outside. The United States has participated in the removal of at least twenty-one leaders in the last two hundred years; two of these—Mullah Omar in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq—were felled in the wake of 9/11 when the Bush administration promulgated a doctrine of preventive removal of regimes that might ally with terrorists and provide them with weapons of mass destruction. Although Bush is no longer in office, the fight against radical Islamists and “rogue” regimes continues, and regime change is still mentioned in the same breath as countries like Iran, Syria, North Korea, and others (e.g., Haass 2010).

Foreign-imposed regime change, of course, is far from a new or rare phenomenon. Countries have long sought to bring down foreign leaders that oppose them or to spread their own form of government abroad. Owen (2002), for example, documented nearly two hundred cases of forcible regime promotion (both attempted and successful) dating back to the mid-sixteenth century. Werner (1996) noted twenty-six cases of FIRC in the context of interstate wars since 1816; a later study of cease-fire duration over the period 1914-2001 identified more than thirty (Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter 2008). Fazal’s study of state death lists thirty-five cases of FIRC (Fazal 2007, 268-69). Drawing on existing resources, but also from much new research, I have identified one hundred instances of FIRC since 1816, defined as the removal of a state’s leader resulting from threats or actions by another state. These cases have occurred in wartime and in peace, against targets as powerful as Germany and France and as meek as El Salvador and the Comoros Islands. States have intervened overtly with their own military forces or covertly by sponsoring disgruntled domestic actors; installed democracy, socialism, and dictatorship; engaged in long-term military occupation and nation-building or simply left new regimes to their own devices.

Despite the frequency with which FIRC has occurred, its prominent role in recent history, and its importance for current policy, we still know relatively little about its consequences. As far as international ramifications are concerned, Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008, 732) have found that peace lasts longer after wars in which the loser experiences FIRC. Indeed, FIRC that also forcibly democratizes a defeated belligerent is a near-sufficient condition for peaceful relations with the intervener. Imposing new governments after war is thus argued to be a force for peace. Other studies have examined the effects of imposed democracies on regional peace, prosperity, and the spread of democracy. Enterline and Greig (2005), for example, find that the “brightness” of these democratic “beacons” matters crucially for the effects they have on their neighbors. States that are transformed into fully consolidated democracies reduce the amount of regional conflict and contribute to economic growth in the region (they have no effect on democratization). Dimmer democratic beacons, however—those that fall short of becoming consolidated democracies—have negative regional effects, increasing other states’ propensity to be involved in war and lowering the likelihood that they democratize or experience economic growth.

Less is known about the domestic effects of foreign-imposed regime change. The lone study that explicitly examines the impact of FIRC within target states finds that it increases the likelihood of civil war in the immediate aftermath but only in conjunction with defeat in an interstate war (Peic and Reiter 2008). Studies on related subjects such as imposed polities, nation-building, and military occupation confirm that success is hard to come by in these endeavors. Enterline and Greig (2008), for example, show that imposed polities (a category that consists mostly of former colonies and a few FIRCs) are highly vulnerable to domestic political challenges, defined to include a broad range of oppositional or violent acts. Edelstein (2008) similarly finds that the majority of military occupations fail to establish stability and often require repeated interventions. And according to Pei and Kasper (2003), only about one-quarter of nation-building endeavors result in successful democratization (see also Dobbins et al., 2003; Brownlee 2007). Other studies have shown that intervention by democracies generally fails to increase—and may even decrease—the level of democracy in target states (Bueno de Mesquita and

Downs 2006; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Easterly, Satyanath, and Berger 2008; but see Peceny 1999; and Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007).

This paper builds on the foregoing literature by further investigating the link between FIRC and the onset of civil violence afterward in the target state. I begin by differentiating between two types of FIRC: *restoration* FIRC reinstalls leaders who were previously in power but were recently overthrown; *new leader* FIRC imposes new and different leaders and/or sets of institutions. I argue that only new leader FIRC increases the likelihood of civil war. First, it weakens the state, lowering the cost of rebellion and making it easier to topple fragile governments. Second, new leader FIRC creates a panoply of grievances that can motivate would-be rebels. Externally-imposed leaders are often viewed as illegitimate puppets, serving the interests of foreign masters rather than those of their own people. Additionally, the foreign meddling and occupation that puts these leaders in power can generate resentment. New leader FIRC also overturns the status hierarchy in a society, relegating former rulers to a subordinate position they may seek to reverse. Foreign-inspired overthrow of corrupt and cruel dictators can also inspire hopes of better days ahead, which—if disappointed—can foster disillusionment with the new regime. Restoration FIRC, by contrast, neither weakens state power nor engenders grievances to the same extent.

Controlling for a battery of variables commonly found in studies of civil war, I find that new leader FIRC significantly increases the likelihood that a state suffers a civil war in the next ten years. Restoration FIRC, on the other hand, exerts a negative effect on civil war onset.

This study goes beyond existing work on FIRC in three important ways. First, my data cover the period from 1816 to 2008, one hundred years more than existing studies of FIRC. My data also include one hundred cases of FIRC, two-and-a-half times more than any previous study (e.g., Peic and Reiter 2008). Empirically, therefore, this paper offers a more complete picture of the consequences of FIRC than has hitherto been available. Second, previous studies have neglected the reality that intervention is not randomly distributed. Countries that experience FIRC may already be unstable and prone to civil war; any finding that FIRC is associated with an increased likelihood of civil strife may thus be the product of selection bias. Methodologically, my study uses matching techniques to create and analyze a set of cases

most similar to those that experienced FIRC to account for this bias. Third, I investigate conditions under which FIRC triggers civil strife. I argue that the type of FIRC matters; I also confirm the finding that the combination of FIRC and defeat in an interstate war exerts a strong effect on civil war onset (Peic and Reiter 2008). Beyond these factors, I show that properties of the target society condition the effect of FIRC. I find that the risk of civil war post-FIRC significantly declines as the target state becomes wealthier or more ethnically homogeneous. Theoretically, therefore, the paper differentiates between types of FIRCs and stipulates further conditions under which they may lead to violence.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I define foreign-imposed regime change and differentiate between restoration and new leader FIRC. Second, I briefly review the literature on civil war and argue that only new leader FIRC should increase the likelihood of civil strife. I also specify the conditions under which this effect is more or less likely to obtain. Third, I outline the research design of the study, operationalizing the variables in the analysis and discussing the dataset and method of estimation. Fourth, I present the empirical results, and show that the effect of FIRC on civil war is not the product of a selection effect whereby states that are chosen for FIRC are those that are already at high risk of civil war. I conclude by discussing the implications of the findings and directions for further research.

## **FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE: DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY**

Foreign-imposed regime change is the removal of the effective political leader of a state at the behest of the government of another state. Interveners typically also empower a new leader and sometimes impose a new set of institutions, but all that is required for a case to qualify as FIRC is if an external actor displaces the political leader of the target state. In the vast majority of FIRCs, leaders are removed by foreign troops, or by foreign troops assisted by domestic rebels. Examples include the Tanzanian overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda and the Vietnamese ouster of Pol Pot in Cambodia. Sometimes—as in the case of Haiti in 1994—the threat of intervention or a show of force is enough to prompt a leader to step down. In a handful of cases, external actors use covert means to overthrow the targeted regime. In such cases, the foreign government must make removing the target regime its official (if not public)

objective, and external actors or aid must play a decisive role in toppling the leader. Examples include the removal of Iran's Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 by the United States. To qualify as a case of FIRC, target states must be independent before intervention and remain (at least nominally) so afterwards. This requirement disqualifies governments imposed in the process of decolonization as well as instances of territorial annexation.<sup>1</sup> FIRCs followed by military occupations are included so long as the occupier does not annex the target.<sup>2</sup>

The existing literature on foreign-imposed regime change does not differentiate among different types of FIRC, but in fact there are two separate varieties. The first consists of what I call restoration FIRC, which occurs when an intervener returns a leader or regime to power that previously governed the country but was removed in a coup, revolution, or by an outside power. The goal of restoration FIRC is not to impose a new leader or political order, but rather to restore the status quo ante. Several restoration FIRCs occurred in Europe between 1820 and 1850, when the conservative powers Austria and Prussia intervened to reverse liberal revolutions and reinstall deposed monarchs in minor states in Italy and Germany. A few restorations occurred at the end of World War II as Nazi puppet regimes were ousted by the Allies in France and Norway, and the Soviets intervened in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) to reverse liberalizing trends and restore communist (and pro-Soviet) orthodoxy.

The second type of foreign-imposed regime change is more ambitious: "new leader" FIRC deposes the state's old ruler and brings a different leader to power. This is the type of FIRC that commonly springs to mind when regime change is discussed as a policy option with regard to countries like Iran, and it is the kind that the United States implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whereas restoration FIRC might be characterized as defensive or reactive since it reverses an already accomplished change of leadership the intervener perceives as threatening or destabilizing, new leader FIRC is inherently offensive or proactive because the goal is to reshape the target's political order (by

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<sup>1</sup> Most "imposed polities" (Enterline and Greig 2005, 2008) and "state deaths" (Fazal 2007) are thus excluded.

<sup>2</sup> The most difficult cases are wartime occupations; I code such cases as FIRC if an intervener removed the target state's government and did not immediately annex the country.

empowering new elites) in a way that suits the intervener's interests. This is true even if the intervener views itself as acting defensively, such as to halt the spread of an antagonistic ideology or an adverse shift in the balance of power. Interveners in some instances also establish new institutions as well as empowering new leaders. The United States, for example, set up democratic structures in West Germany and Japan in the wake of World War II, whereas the Soviet Union established communist systems in its satellites in Eastern Europe in the 1940s.

## **FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE AND CIVIL WAR: THEORY AND CONDITIONS**

The literature on the causes of civil war is divided between arguments that focus on greed or opportunity, on the one hand, and grievance or motivation on the other. It has been argued that FIRC causes civil war by weakening state power and thereby increasing the opportunity for rebellion (Peic and Reiter 2008). By contrast, I argue that only new leader FIRC increases the probability of civil war, and it does so not only by creating opportunities for rebellion but also by generating grievances and resentments among sectors of the population. Restoration FIRC neither disrupts state power nor stimulates resentment to the same degree as new leader FIRC. This section first outlines the opportunity and grievance paradigms before proceeding to a discussion of the mechanisms by which new leader FIRC increases the likelihood of civil war, providing evidence from cases to illustrate the plausibility of each mechanism. It then posits some conditions under which new leader FIRC is more or less likely to lead to violence.

### **Opportunity, Grievance, and Civil War**

Probably the most prominent explanation for civil war onset in the current literature is that civil wars occur where prevailing conditions make them feasible or profitable. According to the economic interpretation of civil war, under normal circumstances the costs associated with violent rebellion put it beyond the means of most groups, even those that harbor grievances against the state. "The defining feature of a civil war," write Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, "is large scale organized violence on the part of a rebel army." Financially, rebels need to be able to raise an enormous amount of money to pay

fighters and purchase equipment. Militarily, rebels confront a government army that is larger, better trained, better equipped, and in control of the national territory. Civil war becomes likely, therefore, only under those rare conditions “in which rebellion is financially and militarily feasible” (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009, 3).

Scholars working in this tradition have identified a number of mechanisms that make civil war feasible. First, some argue that rebellion is more likely when it is financially remunerative, such as when there are plentiful natural resources that can be looted to finance an insurgency or when external sources of funding are available from diasporas or other governments (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 565-69). A second argument maintains that civil war is likely when the costs are particularly low. The two main variants of this argument each contend that rebellion is less costly when the state’s level of economic development is low, but provide different mechanisms for how low income influences insurgency. One school of thought posits that when the state is poor or economic growth is small or negative, the supply of potential fighters is larger and the opportunity cost of joining a rebel army is low since there is little income to forego (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 569). Another interpretation is that states with low per capita income are unable to control their territory and thus it is easier and less dangerous to launch an insurgency. Poor states tend to have weak and corrupt militaries and police forces as well as inadequate infrastructure and communications, making it easier for insurgencies to spring up (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Finally, opportunity theorists argue that geography can lower the cost of rebellion: states with forbidding mountain ranges or dense jungles are more difficult to control and thus provide sanctuary for insurgencies to get started (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009, 10-11).

The other major theory of civil war onset focuses on grievances: civil wars occur where people are sufficiently motivated by anger, fear, hatred, or resentment to run the risk of taking up arms and engaging in violence against the government. Grievance arguments identify a wide variety of particular factors that may trigger rebellion, but real or perceived inequality and discrimination are the common denominators. As Tocqueville put it nearly two hundred years ago, “Almost all of the revolutions which have changed the aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or to destroy social inequality” (quoted

in Muller 1985, 47). Social scientists have followed up on this observation. Gurr (1971), for example, famously argued that the source of rebellion lay in relative deprivation: people become frustrated and are more likely to use violence, he argued, when their actual life circumstances do not correspond to the conditions to which they feel they are rightfully entitled. For Gurr, perceptions of relative deprivation could arise from a multitude of sources, but most authors cite specific types of inequality as giving rise to grievances. Boix (2008), for instance, focuses on economic inequality, arguing that civil violence and revolution are more likely in societies characterized by highly skewed distributions of wealth—which generates the highest level of grievance among the poor—and where most of that wealth is immobile (and hence subject to capture; see also Muller 1985). Other scholars point to unequal relations or discrimination among ethnic groups as causes of violence. The Minorities at Risk project, for example, presents a grievance-based model of ethnopolitical conflict based on “the extent” of a group’s “material, political, and cultural disadvantages,” “the historical loss of political autonomy,” and “the extent to which force has been used to establish and maintain their subordinate status” (Gurr 2000, 73). Groups may seek redress through violence if their mother tongue is not recognized as an official language or when they face disadvantages or discrimination in access to education, civil service jobs, or positions in the military (Horowitz 1985). Finally, Petersen’s (2002) account of the role of resentment in provoking ethnic violence in Eastern Europe highlights the sense of injustice that results from status reversals, especially when the dominant group is demoted in the ethnic hierarchy and a minority group is elevated to power.

### **FIRC and Civil War**

Existing work on the connection between foreign-imposed regime change and civil war argues that FIRC influences the likelihood of civil strife by heightening the opportunity for groups in society to take up arms against the state. As highlighted by Peic and Reiter (2008), external intervention to remove and replace a leader greatly weakens state power, and weak states are more prone to civil wars.

The argument that FIRC begets opportunity, however, only scratches the surface of how FIRC might bring about civil conflict. As noted above, not all FIRCs are alike; indeed, there are two different

types—restoration and new leader—that have different implications for the likelihood of rebellion. Restoration FIRC merely turns back the clock by reinstalling a leader (and sometimes a system of government) that recently governed a country. Restoration FIRC is thus less likely than new leader FIRC to weaken the state to the same extent or generate the intensity of resentment necessary to facilitate civil war. In some cases, for example, restoration FIRC returns a popular leader or political system to power that was ousted by a foreign invasion (e.g., Belgium after World War I or Norway after World War II). Restorations that return leaders ousted by domestic forces, however, are still less disruptive than new leader FIRC. Leaders who have previously held power in a country have their own power base and political networks independent of the support provided by the intervening state. Much of the bureaucracy and institutions of governance of the old regime, including the police and the army, often remain in place. Thus, even though the leader is reinstalled by foreign forces, he is less likely to be viewed as illegitimate or as a puppet of the intervener. Moreover, revolutionary forces responsible for overthrowing the leader are usually no match for the invading state's forces. Most revolutions that have preceded restoration FIRCs were urban phenomena staged by nationalist intellectuals and the nascent bourgeoisie. Such forces tend to be few in number, poorly armed, and ill-disciplined, perhaps able to topple weak monarchies but unable to offer much resistance to the disciplined troops of a great power. Restoration FIRC, in short, rather than tearing down the existing governmental edifice and starting from scratch, has an institutional foundation on which to build. This type of FIRC also faces weak opposition and supplements the target's coercive forces with significant external firepower. It thus generates fewer resentments and does not destroy state power.

New leader FIRC, by contrast, weakens the state more than restoration FIRC and is also a more potent generator of grievances. New leaders brought to power at the point of foreign bayonets face an array of difficulties exerting authority and control. Civil servants and government bureaucrats may abandon their posts, bringing the machinery of government to a halt. Externally-imposed leaders must also ascertain the loyalties of the military and other security services, which may be filled with acolytes of the deposed regime. The new ruler will have to decide who to keep and who to cashier, and also how to

integrate his own armed followers into the existing forces. In the extreme, as in Iraq, the army and police may simply melt away, leaving anarchy on the streets, allowing people to loot government buildings and potential insurgents to arm themselves from government arsenals. The arrival of a military occupation force does little to solve these problems, since foreign troops often lack orders to protect government institutions and provide domestic law enforcement. They also face tremendous identification difficulties both in distinguishing friend from foe and in simply finding their way. When Tanzanian troops arrived in Kampala in pursuit of the remnants of Idi Amin's regime, they lacked maps and had to rely on directions from a confused Ugandan school teacher (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 135-36). In short, new leader FIRC is more debilitating to state power than restoration FIRC, leaving the new ruler with many dilemmas to confront and potential rebels with manifold opportunities to employ violence.

Paraguay in the 1870s—following the country's defeat at the hands of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-70)—exemplifies this mechanism. This conflict devastated Paraguay, which lost roughly half of its pre-war population of less than five hundred thousand; only 28,000 men reportedly survived the war, and the country had essentially no security forces (Phelps 1975, 271). In August 1869, the victorious allies deposed Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano Lopez and installed a triumvirate of Paraguayan exiles to rule the country. Internal intrigue soon winnowed this trio down to one—Cirilo Antonio Rivarola—who lasted just over a year in office. In the decade after the war, Paraguay was plagued by chronic instability, coups and attempted coups, and armed rebellions. Although Brazilian and Argentinian troops remained in the country, the victors were reluctant to get bogged down intervening in internal conflicts, which left Paraguayan factions to compete among themselves. The first revolt occurred in late 1871 after Rivarola's government rigged elections and violated the constitution by dissolving the Senate. Salvador Jovellanos, Rivarola's successor, faced two revolts in his three years in office; his successor, Juan Bautista Gill, put down a revolt in 1875 and was assassinated in 1877 (Lewis 1993; Warren 1978). Much of this chaos can be chalked up to the power vacuum the allies left in the wake of their destruction of the Lopez regime.

New leader FIRC can also generate grievances in the target society in at least four ways. First, the experience of FIRC and military occupation may spark resentment among the target's political elites or population. Foreign intervention in the age of nationalism is a risky proposition because it taints rule by foreigners as illegitimate and may galvanize the target population against the interveners. Leaders installed by foreign intervention—even if they are members of the target society—may also be viewed as illegitimate since they were brought to power with outside help. Extended occupation by foreign troops may also trigger nationalist opposition (Edelstein 2008).

Britain's nineteenth century interventions in Afghanistan exhibit the potential for this type of backlash against an outside power. Although perhaps lacking a sense of nationalism in the modern sense of the term (attachment of a people to a single state), Afghans have always been fiercely independent and distrustful of outsiders. When British armies invaded Afghanistan in 1839 and 1878, driving out old leaders and bringing new ones to power, in both cases the British touched off civil wars that ended with their puppets deposed and British troops quitting the country after suffering grievous defeats. In 1840, according to Heathcote, the ruler imposed by British arms, Shah Shuja, "far from establishing his own authority over his subjects, was everywhere faced with outbreaks of rebellion." Shah Shuja would eventually be murdered in January 1842, but "the widespread nature of the revolt, and the depth of religious and national feeling against them, had convinced the British, even before his death, that the whole policy of trying to exert influence over Afghanistan by means of the alliance with Shah Shuja was now an irretrievable failure" (Heathcote 1980, 47, 68).<sup>3</sup> British forces could take Kabul and install new leaders, but they could not stop the uprisings that followed or maintain their puppets in power.

Second, externally-inspired regime change can foster animosity even without the physical presence of foreign troops. The purpose of most regime changes is to empower a leader that will implement policies that serve the intervener's interests (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). These interests, however, do not always (or even often) line up with how some domestic groups view their nation's interests. In democracies, such a mismatch increases the risk that the leader is removed at the

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<sup>3</sup> Britain's second foray into Afghanistan (1878-81) followed a similar pattern (Heathcote 1980, 103-65).

polls. In nondemocracies, it may prompt the formation of armed resistance to the regime. After the United States helped overthrow the left-leaning Arbenz regime in Guatemala, for example, his successor—Carlos Castillo Armas—sought to reverse the revolution of 1944, which first brought democracy to Guatemala. Castillo Armas imprisoned and tortured thousands, annulled hundreds of labor unions, repealed land reform and returned almost all expropriated land to its previous owners (including large multinational corporations like United Fruit Company), and “granted new concessions and privileges to foreign capital” (Jonas 1991, 41-42). These policies re-impooverished many Guatemalans, deprived them of land, and exacerbated income inequality. Combined with heavy doses of repression (encouraged by the U.S. government) that eliminated moderate opposition, these conditions caused some to see violence as the only path to change in Guatemala.

A third mechanism whereby new leader FIRC can generate grievances is that by definition FIRC creates winners and losers, and the losers—the old regime driven from power by the superior numbers or arms of the intervener—may very well launch an insurgency to try to regain their former position. States targeted for FIRC are frequently small and weak, such as Honduras, Peru, Gabon, and the Central African Republic (CAR). In many cases the military forces of these states cannot stand up to an invasion by a stronger adversary. Gabon (1964) and CAR (1979), for example, had little capability to resist French commandos and paratroopers. Indeed, in the latter case, CAR security forces melted away, donned civilian clothes, and went home (Titley 1997, 131). On a number of occasions, however, regimes easily ousted from the capital fled to remote areas and organized guerrilla resistance to the new regime and its foreign allies. The early core of the insurgency in Iraq, for example, was formed by former Baath Party stalwarts who sought to return Saddam Hussein to power, and after his capture and later execution, to dislodge the Shiite-dominated government (Packer 2005, 298-312). Similarly, when far superior Vietnamese forces toppled Pol Pot’s murderous regime in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge retreated to remote jungle redoubts along the Thai border and waged a decade-long guerrilla war to oust the Vietnamese and the puppet regime they installed (Gottesman 2002). Just as in Petersen’s status reversal

argument, leaders and their followers displaced by FIRC may not acquiesce in their ouster and instead seek to regain power.

Finally, even if the former ruler is thoroughly defeated and the target society—or some important faction thereof—is not opposed to the newly-installed regime, the policies or actions of the new government might breed resistance where none had existed. The overthrow of a repressive or cruel ruler by an external actor raises hopes among the population that better days are ahead: a new, more benevolent leader will come to power, enact reforms, expand the rights of ordinary people, make government more responsive to their needs, and generally change their lives for the better. If the new government—whether it be a foreign occupation or an indigenous leader installed by outsiders—fails to improve the situation, or turns out to be violent, venal, corrupt, or incompetent, elements among the population may become disillusioned to such an extent that they take up arms against the state.

The case of Uganda in 1979 is instructive: most Ugandans rejoiced when a Tanzanian invasion overthrew the dictator Idi Amin, a brutal leader who was responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. But political chaos in Kampala, followed by fraudulent elections and the rise of another repressive regime, soon sparked civil war. Amin's successor, university professor Yusuf Lule, was dismissed for his autocratic behavior and replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, who was in turn ousted in a military coup. None of these governments was capable of maintaining law and order, or of protecting the citizenry from violence, which was often inflicted by the military. In elections marred by fraud in December 1980, former President Milton Obote was returned to power. This was finally too much for Yoweri Museveni, who took to the bush and launched an armed rebellion. In this case, Amin's ouster raised the hopes of Ugandans that their lives would improve, but the subsequent bungling and incompetence of the new regime squandered this goodwill. Obote's theft of the 1980 elections was the final straw, according to Phares Mutibwa: "The 1980 general election was a landmark in Ugandan history. It had been looked forward to as a means of redressing the wrongs of the past, but the way it ended was a major disappointment and, as the result, a major cause for the opposition against the administration that grew from it" (Mutibwa 1990, 143).

To summarize, restoration FIRC is unlikely to be followed by civil war because it does not weaken state power or generate the intensity of resentment necessary to trigger civil strife. New leader FIRC, by contrast, lowers the cost of rebellion by weakening the state, but more importantly it creates resentments that provide people with the motivations necessary to take advantage of this situation: it imposes leaders lacking in legitimacy and which serve the interests of the intervening power rather than the needs of their own citizens; displaces a regime or group that may seek to reclaim its lost position; and creates expectations of better days ahead that can go unfulfilled. In short, new leader FIRC increases the probability of civil war whereas restoration FIRC does not.

- *Hypothesis 1*: New leader FIRC increases the likelihood of civil war; restorationist FIRC does not increase—and may decrease—the likelihood of civil war.

### **Conditional Arguments**

*NLFIRC and Defeat in Interstate War.* Peic and Reiter (2008) argue that FIRC alone is not enough to provoke civil war; only in interaction with defeat in an interstate war does FIRC lead to civil violence. In this scenario, not only is the beaten state militarily and economically exhausted, lying prone at the victors' feet, it then suffers the additional chaos of a change in government. As Peic and Reiter (2008, 7) put it, "FIRC, especially following an interstate war, may wreak havoc on a state's ability to administer its territory, to provide conventional police functions, to collect information on potential insurgents, and to provide goods and services to the population." Interveners may also purge or eliminate the old regime's internal security apparatus and its bureaucratic institutions to neutralize threats to the new rulers. These steps, although perhaps important to secure the new regime, have the unfortunate consequence of undermining the state's ability to detect and combat internal armed opposition. In short, FIRC—in combination with defeat in an interstate war—increases the likelihood of civil war because it saps the target state's ability to govern its territory, which enables armed actors to challenge state authority. I amend their argument by specifying new leader FIRC rather than FIRC in general as the type of intervention likely to be associated with civil war.

- *Hypothesis 2*: New leader FIRC inflicted concurrently with defeat in an interstate war increases the likelihood of civil war.

Although Peic and Reiter focus exclusively on the opportunity mechanism, many of the grievance mechanisms may also explain why FIRC combined with military defeat is associated with an increased risk of civil war. Victors in war that also remove the regime of the vanquished, for example, are likely to engage in military occupation, a key generator of resentment. Regimes ousted during war are just as likely to want to try to regain power as those removed less violently; this is a function of whether the outgoing regime surrenders or is able to flee to a remote area or across a border to continue the struggle. Nor is there reason to assume that new governments installed by war will govern better than those brought to power in other ways. I argue, therefore, that FIRC inflicted at the same time as defeat in an interstate war increases both opportunity and motivation for rebellion.

*NLFIRC and Economic Development.* Structural factors make some countries more susceptible to civil war, and these factors mediate the extent to which new leader FIRC increases the likelihood of violence. Research on civil wars and coups indicates that countries that reach a certain level of wealth are largely immune from internal conflict (Londregan and Poole 1990; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Some reasons for this were explored above: poor states have difficulty controlling their territory, and insurgents have an easier time recruiting when the economy is bad because there are fewer legitimate economic opportunities (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Poverty-stricken states also are unable to provide much in the way of public goods to their citizens, and have fewer resources to distribute to groups in society, both of which may foster grievances. Moreover, wealthy societies tend to be highly urbanized, which reduces their capacity for rebellion and increases their susceptibility to coercion compared to rural societies. Insurgencies need sanctuary to consolidate and survive, areas where they are free from state surveillance and military action; this is rarely available in cities (Kocher 2007). Coercion is also especially effective against urban populations, which keep their money in banks, buy their food in supermarkets, and depend on the state for protection (Lieberman 1996).

States at low levels of development are thus already susceptible to civil war. FIRC—by touching off power struggles and political turnover in the capital—further increases this likelihood.

- *Hypothesis 3:* New leader FIRC increases the likelihood of civil war more in economically underdeveloped states than in highly developed states.

*NLFIRC and Heterogeneity.* Another domestic factor that could influence the likelihood of civil violence post-FIRC is the level of heterogeneity of the population. Intuitively it makes sense that states that experience FIRC would be more likely to suffer violence after regime change if they have diverse populations. Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein provides a good example. Under Saddam, the Sunni Arab segment of the population, accounting for perhaps 20 percent of the total, ruled over the Shiites (60 percent) and the Kurds (20 percent). Although Saddam's regime was not religiously based, the ruling Baath Party was based in Saddam's Tikriti clan, which was Sunni, and thus Sunnis occupied an advantaged position in Iraqi society. After U.S. forces removed Saddam, the Sunnis suffered a severe status reversal, since it rapidly became clear that any future democratic government would be dominated by the Shiite majority. Rather than accept this reversal, many Sunnis joined the insurgency in the hope of forcing the United States to leave, ousting the Shiite government, and regaining power.

By contrast, many of the success stories of FIRC occur in countries with largely homogeneous populations. Germany and Japan are obvious examples, but many FIRCs that occurred in Europe in the nineteenth century—in small Italian and German states such as the Modena, Parma, Saxony, and Baden—also took place in homogeneous countries. When the population is almost entirely composed of people sharing the same ethnicity or religion, there are no cultural sub-groups in the population to suffer a status reversal, and fewer groups who feel they may be disadvantaged under the new regime. Homogeneity is thus an important factor that facilitates the success of FIRC.

- *Hypothesis 4:* New leader FIRC increases the likelihood of civil war more in culturally heterogeneous societies than in homogeneous societies.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the relationship between foreign-imposed regime change and civil war, I compiled a dataset consisting of all state-years between 1816 and 2008. The dependent variable is the onset of a civil war, which I define in the conventional way as an armed conflict occurring inside the boundaries of a recognized state—one party to which is the government—that inflicts a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths over the course of the conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 783). Only a few sources provide data on internal armed conflicts before 1945; the two best-known are the Correlates of War list (v. 3.0, Sarkees 2000) and Gleditsch's (2004) update of that list. Building on these existing datasets, I consulted additional data sources (Clodfelter 2008, Kohn 2006, and Sambanis 2004). This survey revealed additional civil conflicts, which I added if there was evidence that they surpassed the 1,000 battle death threshold.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, existing data collections are not always well-suited to my research question. The Correlates of War data, for example, code France's intervention in Mexico between 1862 and 1867 as an interstate war. French forces defeated the Mexican army and overthrew the government of Benito Juárez in June 1863, installing Austrian Archduke Maximilian as the new emperor of Mexico the following year. Foreign-imposed regime change merely inspired further resistance by the Mexicans, who turned to guerrilla war to topple Maximilian and evict the occupiers. I thus code the interstate war as ending with the overthrow of Juárez and a new civil war beginning the next year. Similarly, the COW data code the Caco Revolt in Haiti during the U.S. occupation in 1918 as an extrasystemic (i.e., colonial or imperial) war, but Haiti was never colonized. I code wars against the governing authority—whether it be the national government or a foreign occupier—as civil wars as long as the country was not formally annexed to the intervener's metropole or colonial empire.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> I also consulted the new list of COW wars (v. 4.0; <http://correlatesofwar.org>). A documented list of civil wars in the author's dataset is available upon request.

<sup>5</sup> Cases of resistance to German occupation during World War II thus count as civil war.

The dependent variable is coded one for any year in which a civil war began and coded zero for all other years. According to my data, 298 civil wars began between 1816 and 2008.<sup>6</sup>

### **Independent Variables**

*FIRC.* Foreign-imposed regime change is the removal of the leader of a sovereign state at the instigation of another state, usually through the threat or use of force. Between 1816 and 2008 there were one hundred instances of FIRC; these cases are listed in Table 1. Because multiple FIRCs occurred in the same year in a few countries—Afghanistan (1879), Peru (1881), Guatemala (1954), and Czechoslovakia (1968)—there are ninety-five FIRCs in the actual dataset, which is coded on an annual basis. To account for the fact that the effects of FIRC continue to be felt over a period of time, states that experienced a FIRC are coded one for that year and for the next ten years as well. This is consistent with the practice of other studies that attempt to measure the effects of intervention (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006).<sup>7</sup> The actual relationship being tested, therefore, is the effect of FIRC on the likelihood of civil war onset for the year FIRC occurs and the next ten years. Owing to some instances in which FIRCs occurred in the same state less than ten years apart, there are a total of 874 FIRC-years in the dataset (5.4 percent of all observations). I differentiate among different types of FIRC on the argument that restoring a previous ruler to power is less likely to generate civil war than installing an entirely new leader, or imposing a new leader and new institutions at the same time. I code two dummy variables: one for restoration FIRC, and a second for new leader FIRC. Twenty-one of the ninety-five FIRCs in the dataset are restorationist (22 percent); new leader FIRCs account for the remaining seventy-four cases (78 percent).

[ Table 1 about here ]

*Economic Development.* One of the best-documented empirical relationships in the study of the causes of civil war is the strong negative relationship between economic development and civil war. The variable typically employed to proxy for development is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The

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<sup>6</sup> This is roughly a 40 percent increase over the COW (v. 3.0) total of 213 intrastate wars through 1997.

<sup>7</sup> Peic and Reiter (2008) use a five year lag. I test for robustness using a five year window below.

drawback of this variable—as with many in the study of armed conflict—is limited temporal coverage: data are generally available only after World War II for most countries. This has not impeded studies of civil war because it is rare to find one that tries to analyze the causes of intrastate conflict before 1945 (a notable exception is Boix 2008). For those who aspire to examine a longer time span, however, it is a problem. Roughly two-thirds of all FIRCs between the years 1816 and 2008 occurred before the end of World War II; obviously I am reluctant to forego these cases.

One proxy for economic development that is available for most states over the entire time period I examine—and which has been utilized by other scholars (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001; Enterline and Greig 2008)—is the sum of the amount of iron and steel produced and the amount of energy consumed by a state in a given year. The advantage of these variables is that they are contained in the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (v. 3.02), which goes back to 1816. For years in which only one or the other of these variables is available, I use the available figure. The resulting number is logged and lagged one year.

I also employ new—but imperfect—data on GDP per capita as further proxies for economic development. Boix’s recent study of inequality and civil war employs two different measures of GDP per capita that cover an extended range of years (Boix 2008, 410). One is taken from the work of Angus Maddison (2003), who provides figures for selected countries well back into the nineteenth century. Boix then assigns these same figures to nearby countries in the same region on the argument that these states might reasonably be expected to have similar levels of economic development. The second indicator adopts another imperfect solution: taking the more readily available GDP data (from the Penn World Tables) after World War II and interpolating them backwards in time, the assumption of course being that growth is linear. Acknowledging these caveats, I nevertheless adopt Boix’s historical GDP data (given in constant 1996 dollars) as secondary proxies for economic development. Each is logged and measured in the year prior to the year of observation.

*Heterogeneity.* The relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and civil war is much debated. Some leading studies find that increasing levels of heterogeneity—typically proxied by the ethno-

linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index—has no effect on civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Boix 2008). Other studies report mixed findings (Sambanis 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2008). Studies of conflict and violence in imposed polities and after FIRC, however, have found a positive relationship between ELF and civil war (Enterline and Greig 2008; Peic and Reiter 2008). Literature in economics has also shown ELF to be negatively related to many indicators of economic growth and good governance (Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine 1997). I thus include ELF as a proxy for ethnic heterogeneity. Data for this variable—which is derived from Soviet atlases, and gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups—is from Roeder (2001) and is available only after 1920.<sup>8</sup>

*Rough Terrain.* States with forbidding geography are harder for governments to police and thus insurgencies have an easier time finding sanctuary and getting started. The most commonly used measure of difficult terrain—which I likewise employ here—is the percentage of a country’s surface area covered by mountains.

*New States.* States that are very young are thought to be vulnerable to civil unrest because new governments are untested and may not have developed sufficient capacity to deter and defeat rebellions. States receive a score of one on this variable in their first two years of existence.

*Population.* A highly robust relationship exists between larger populations and civil war. This is probably for the same reason that low levels of development and high levels of rough terrain are associated with conflict: the increased difficulty that governments experience policing larger numbers of people. I thus include the log of each state’s population, taken from the COW National Material Capabilities dataset.

*Regime Type.* Some studies of civil war onset find that (controlling for other factors) political democracy has little effect on the likelihood that a country suffers an internal armed conflict (Fearon and

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<sup>8</sup> There is much discontent with ELF in the field (Posner 2004; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Siroky 2009). Several scholars have proposed new measures of ethnic identity and ethnic diversity, and some of these new measures have been shown to increase significantly the probability of civil war (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Siroky 2009). I use ELF because it is still the most widely available measure of ethnic heterogeneity.

Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Boix 2008; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). However, others have found that governments in the middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum—variously called anocracies, mixed regimes, or oligarchies—are more likely to experience civil wars (Hegre et al., 2001). The reason is that such regimes inhabit particularly tricky political terrain. Unlike complete autocracies, they cannot engage in all-out repression of political challengers. And unlike democracies, mixed regimes do not offer their internal opposition meaningful participation in the political process via elections or other voice opportunities. Anocracies thus face the worst of both worlds: they are more likely to generate political challenges by their exclusion of the opposition from power, but they cannot use heavy doses of violence to suppress anti-regime protest. I account for this argument by including a dummy variable for anocracy, coded one if a state's government is coded greater than five and less than seventeen on the combined twenty-one point Polity index of political institutions.<sup>9</sup>

*Inequality.* I include a measure of economic inequality, following Boix's (2008) argument that civil war is more likely in countries in which income distribution is severely skewed and wealth is highly immobile. I use his variables for inequality, drawn from a study by Vanhanen (1997), and available from 1850 to 2000: the percentage of cultivated land owned by family farms (four employees or less), the percentage of a country's population that is non-agricultural and lives in urban areas, and the interaction of these two measures.

*Defeat in Interstate War.* Losing an interstate war can spark internal conflict in a variety of ways. Losing such a war obviously entails military defeats, which kill troops and destroy military equipment, in turn reducing the state's capacity to deter and defeat internal threats. Defeat in war can also serve as a signal of regime incompetence, causing domestic political opponents to coordinate on the goal of regime removal (Smith 1998). The regime could also be discredited if defeat entails losing territory, especially if that territory is loaded with symbolic value, like Alsace-Lorraine held for France or Kosovo for Serbia. Finally, leaders may have promised to allocate gains from victory to regime supporters, which defeat

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<sup>9</sup> This corresponds to the range -5 to +5 (inclusive) on the more familiar scale of -10 to +10.

obviously renders impossible, causing these factions to try to overturn the government (Goemans 2000). I thus include a dummy variable coded one if a state loses an interstate war in a given year.

*Civil War in Previous Year.* I include a variable for ongoing civil war lagged one year to account for the effect of the occurrence of civil war in the same country in the previous year.

*Peace Years.* To deal with the well-known issue of temporal dependence in binary time-series cross-sectional data, I include a variable that counts the number of peace years between outbreaks of civil war in each country plus three cubic splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).

*Interactive Effects.* I generate several interaction terms to evaluate Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. First, I multiply new leader FIRC  $t_0 - t_{10}$  by the variable just described for losing an interstate war. If the interaction of the two variables yields a one, I then code the interaction one for the next ten years as well to capture the arguably prolonged effect of both FIRC and defeat in war. In the case of Paraguayan dictator Francisco Lopez, for example, ousted when his country was defeated in 1869, the variable *Losewar* is coded one in 1869, and *NLFIRC* and the interaction term  $NLFIRC \times Losewar$  are coded one for the years 1869 to 1879. Second, I multiply *NLFIRC* by my measures of economic development (the sum of iron and steel production and energy consumption, and GDP per capita) to test the argument that new leader FIRC is more likely to lead to civil war in poorer states. Lastly, *NLFIRC* multiplied by *ELF* gauges the argument that new leader FIRC is more strongly linked to internal conflict in highly heterogeneous societies.

## RESULTS

I begin by examining the bivariate relationship between FIRC and civil war onset. I then present results from a multivariate probit analysis, conduct several robustness tests, and finally perform a matching analysis to deal with possible selection bias.

Table 2 shows the results of cross-tabulations of restoration FIRC and new leader FIRC on civil war onset. As the table demonstrates, restoration FIRC lowers the risk of civil war roughly 75 percent (from 1.9 to 0.4 percent), whereas new leader FIRC more than triples the likelihood of internal armed

conflict (from 1.7 to 6.1 percent).<sup>10</sup> Although the effect of restoration FIRC on civil war is only marginally significant, new leader FIRC is significant above the 99.9 percent level of confidence. These figures provide initial support for Hypothesis 1.

[ Table 2 about here ]

Table 3 displays the results of six multivariate probit models of the determinants of civil war onset. Although civil war onset is a rare event, occurring in less than 2 percent of all state years in the dataset, I report results from a standard probit estimator because rare events logit yields results that are highly similar. Because certain variables—most notably economic inequality and ELF—are available only for a truncated range of dates, which results in a significant diminution in the number of cases, I exclude them from the base model and add them to later models.

[ Table 3 about here ]

Model 1 in Table 3 tests Hypothesis 1 regarding the differential effect of restoration and new leader FIRC. The bivariate analysis above offered initial support for this hypothesis, and the results of model 2 strongly confirm it. Restoration FIRC actually reduces the likelihood of civil war onset 70 percent, although this effect is significant only at the 90 percent level of confidence. New leader FIRC, by contrast, is positive and highly significant, nearly tripling the likelihood of civil war (a gain of 178 percent, holding other variables at their means and modes).<sup>11</sup> Some of the other results of the model are expected—increases in iron/steel production and energy consumption decrease the likelihood of civil war, whereas larger populations are associated with much greater probabilities of civil war—but some are surprising, as mountainous terrain and being a new state are not reliably associated with civil war onset. Mixed regimes are more likely to experience civil conflict than either complete autocracies or democracies, whereas ongoing civil wars in the previous year decrease the likelihood of another civil war

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<sup>10</sup> Indeed, only one civil war began within ten years of a restoration FIRC: the First Carlist War in Spain (1833).

<sup>11</sup> Marginal effects are calculated using *CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). The effect of *NLFIRC* is robust to different indicators of economic development. Results for all robustness checks described in the text will be made available in an online appendix.

occurring (the negative effect of longer spells of peace is insignificant). Finally, losing an interstate war strongly increases the probability of civil violence, nearly quintupling the likelihood that a civil war takes place. These substantive effects are summarized in Figure 1.

[ Figure 1 about here ]

Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 include additional control variables. In model 2, for example, I insert Boix's indicators of economic inequality. Although it is not obvious from the regression output, the results suggest that economic inequality is associated with internal war. Considered jointly, shifting Boix's variables—percentage of land owned by family farms, index of occupational diversification, and their interaction—from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of each significantly decreases the likelihood of civil war 63 percent.<sup>12</sup> The coefficient for new leader FIRC declines in this model from 0.42 to 0.35 but remains significant at better than  $p < 0.001$  and increases the probability of civil war onset 140 percent.<sup>13</sup> In model 3 I include ELF, which drops the number of cases to 8,400. Societies that are more ethnically diverse are at significantly greater risk of civil violence: moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean on the ELF indicator increases the risk of civil war 58 percent. New leader FIRC remains significant ( $p = 0.001$ ), increasing the likelihood of internal violence 160 percent.

### **Conditional Effects**

This sub-section tests Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, which postulated that the effect of FIRC on civil war would depend on defeat in an interstate war, and levels of economic development and ethnic heterogeneity in the target. Model 4 in Table 3, for example, tests Hypothesis 2 that FIRC is more likely to lead to civil war when inflicted concurrently with defeat in an interstate war. As can be seen in model 4, the two base terms of the interaction are positive and significant, but the interaction is negative and insignificant. The regression output for interaction terms, however, can be misleading; what matters is whether the change

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<sup>12</sup> This result becomes insignificant using either version of GDP per capita as a measure of wealth.

<sup>13</sup> The effect of restoration FIRC cannot be estimated because it perfectly predicts the absence of civil war after 1850. It is thus omitted from models 3 (post-1850) and 4 (post-1920).

in the likelihood of civil war caused by these three variables is statistically significant. Table 4 shows the probability of civil war when *NLFIRC*, *Losewar*, and the interaction term are each zero and when they are each one (holding other variables constant at their means and modes). The risk of civil war in states that both lose a war and experience a new leader FIRC is nearly ten times as high as in states that experience neither. This effect is of similar magnitude as the eight-fold increase found by Peic and Reiter (2008). The 95 percent confidence intervals of these two estimates do not overlap, indicating that the change is statistically significant. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 2.<sup>14</sup>

[ Table 4 about here ]

Results for Hypothesis 3—which contends that new leader FIRC increases the likelihood of civil war in poor states more than it does in wealthy states—are displayed in model 5 of Table 3 and Figure 2. The solid line in the figure shows the marginal effect of *NLFIRC* on civil war as iron/steel production and energy consumption increases from its lowest to highest values; dotted lines track the 95 percent confidence interval. The graph demonstrates that as states become wealthier, the effect of *NLFIRC* declines; this effect is significant until states reach between 12 and 13 (163,000 to 442,000) on the logged indicator of wealth, a range that includes almost all targets of new leader FIRC. For states at the lowest levels of wealth, such as nineteenth century Honduras, *NLFIRC* more than triples the probability of civil war from 0.023 to 0.071. By contrast, *NLFIRC* increases the probability of civil strife from only 0.005 to 0.012 in a country like West Germany, which—with a logged wealth score of 12.58 in the 1950s—was the richest country ever to have experienced new leader FIRC. In short, *NLFIRC* exerts a large effect on the likelihood of civil war in the poorest states, but as states grow wealthier the risk of civil strife post-FIRC declines and eventually becomes insignificant. These results support Hypothesis 3.<sup>15</sup>

[ Figure 2 about here ]

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<sup>14</sup> Peic and Reiter (2008), however, found no independent significant effect for FIRC or losing a war, only for their interaction. I find that each variable is significant in addition to their interaction.

<sup>15</sup> Results are similar if GDP per capita is used as the measure of economic development. For the poorest states, *NLFIRC* more than triples the probability of civil war from 0.036 to 0.122. At the highest level of GDP, *NLFIRC* has a barely perceptible impact on the risk of civil war. The effect of *NLFIRC* is significant when income is less than roughly \$2,800; 70 percent of states that experienced new leader FIRC fall below that threshold.

Figure 3 (derived from model 6 in Table 3) provides evidence on Hypothesis 4, which argued that new leader FIRC gives rise to a greater risk of civil war as target states became more ethnically heterogeneous. As the figure demonstrates, this is in fact the case. At low levels of heterogeneity, experiencing a new leader FIRC increases the probability of civil war, but the substantive effect is relatively small and insignificant. In a country with an ELF score of 0.1, such as the Netherlands, *NLFIRC* increases the probability of civil war from 0.017 to 0.030, nearly 80 percent. The size of the effect grows—and becomes statistically significant—as heterogeneity continues to increase. By the time ELF reaches 0.9, as in Uganda, the marginal effect of *NLFIRC* is 268 percent, almost quadrupling the risk of civil war from 0.027 to 0.101. The proposition that civil war is less likely to occur post-FIRC when states are homogeneous and more likely to take place when they are heterogeneous is thus supported.

[ Figure 3 about here ]

### **Robustness**

In this sub-section, I assess the robustness of the finding that new leader FIRC increases the probability of civil conflict. First, some might wonder whether new leader FIRC is as potent a cause of civil war in recent times as it was in the distant past. Restricting the time period to the years after World War II, *NLFIRC* continues to be a significant cause of civil strife ( $b = 0.40$ ,  $p < 0.02$ ). The effect of new leader FIRC on the initiation of civil strife is not limited to a particular time period.<sup>16</sup>

Second, the positive effect of *NLFIRC* on the probability of civil war is not sensitive to alternative time lags. Using a version of the variable coded one in the year of new leader FIRC and for the following five years, the coefficient grows larger (0.53) and remains highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). The substantive effect is also stronger, as *NLFIRC* increases the likelihood of civil war more than three-and-a-half times over the ensuing five years.

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<sup>16</sup> Tests not shown indicate that *NLFIRC* is also significantly correlated with other types of political violence, including the occurrence of guerrilla warfare, revolutions, purges, and coups (Banks 2010).

Third, although several countries—Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), China, Indonesia, and Mexico—experienced at least three FIRC followed by civil wars, no single country is responsible for the result that *NLFIRC* increases the risk of civil strife. Omitting any of the five aforementioned countries from the analysis, *NLFIRC* remains significant at  $p < 0.001$ .

Fourth, there are eleven cases in which civil war began in the same year that new leader FIRC occurred. Some readers might wonder whether endogeneity—civil war leading to FIRC rather than vice-versa—may be driving the results. In no case is it true that civil war *caused* FIRC; there are five cases, however, where FIRC occurred simultaneously with, or in the midst of, an ongoing civil war: Hungary (1919), China (1928), Guatemala (1954), DRC (1960), and Chile (1973).<sup>17</sup> In Hungary, Guatemala, and Chile, civil strife occurred in the process and aftermath of removing the old regime; in DRC, the secession of Katanga was aided and abetted by the same external power (Belgium) responsible for removing Patrice Lumumba (de Witte 2001).<sup>18</sup> Recoding these five cases to zero on civil war onset lowers the coefficient of *NLFIRC* to 0.34 ( $p = 0.001$ ); even recoding all eleven cases does not make *NLFIRC* insignificant ( $b = 0.24$ ,  $p = 0.02$ ). Endogeneity thus does not explain the results.

Finally, some might question the inclusion of cases of covert action—where an external actor brings down a government it opposes by using means short of open warfare—wondering whether outside involvement in these cases was of sufficient magnitude to merit their inclusion as cases of FIRC.<sup>19</sup> My dataset includes five such cases: the ousters of Mossadeq in Iran (1953), Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), Lumumba in DRC (1960), Diem in South Vietnam (1963), and Allende in Chile (1973). Excluding any of these cases individually has little impact on the estimated effect of new leader FIRC; dropping them all reduces the coefficient only from 0.42 to 0.36 ( $p < 0.001$ ).<sup>20</sup> In sum, the effect of FIRC on civil conflict

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<sup>17</sup> In the remaining six cases— Afghanistan (1879), Korea (1907), Mexico (1914), Yugoslavia (1941), Greece (1941), and Cambodia (1979)—FIRC preceded the onset of civil war.

<sup>18</sup> In the Chinese case I have been unable to determine the sequence of events.

<sup>19</sup> Historians often disagree regarding the extent of foreign responsibility for these coups. For diverging perspectives on U.S. involvement in Allende's overthrow in Chile, compare Kornbluh (2003) and Gustafson (2007).

<sup>20</sup> Excluding the other set of ambiguous cases—Germany's wartime FIRCs mentioned above—also has little effect on the results.

appears robust to different time periods, a shorter lag structure, potential endogeneity, and the exclusion of influential countries and questionable cases.

### **Responding to Concerns about Selection Bias**

One final issue remains to be addressed. Some readers might be concerned that my analysis of the effect of FIRC on the likelihood of civil war suffers from selection bias. The intuition here is that states are not selected for FIRC randomly, and may be systematically different from states that do not experience FIRC. Consider the following example: chronic instability, such as frequent civil conflict, could very well attract intervention by outside powers eager to staunch refugee flows or relieve other humanitarian disasters. States that experience intervention could therefore already be at a heightened risk of civil war, which could possibly account for the positive effect of FIRC on civil war onset found above because states are intervening in places where civil war is already likely.

To probe for this possibility I used matching software to obtain a set of control cases that most resemble cases that experienced FIRC (the “treatment” cases) on factors thought to be associated with civil war. The goal of matching is to approximate the experimental ideal by creating a dataset that minimizes the observable differences between treatment and control cases in an effort to isolate the effects of the treatment on the outcome and reduce model dependence (Ho et al., 2007). As long as this adjustment is performed solely on values of the independent variables and without reference to the dependent variable, no bias is introduced. To this end, matching discards control cases that most deviate from the treatment cases, and pairs treatment and control cases so as to minimize the differences between the two sets on all the variables in the model. If matching can create a dataset of cases that is extremely similar except that one group experienced FIRC and the other did not, and yet the positive effect of *NLFIRC* persists, we will have taken major strides to showing that the results from Table 3 are not the result of selection bias.

Matching was performed using the *MatchIt* program.<sup>21</sup> The treatment variable was FIRC, and the cases were matched along the following pre-treatment covariates: economic development, population, percentage mountainous, new state, mixed regime, defeat in interstate war, civil war in the previous year, peace years, and ethnic heterogeneity.<sup>22</sup> Before undertaking matching, I dropped all non-FIRC observations from states that experienced FIRC at some point in their history, retaining only the year(s) in which they actually suffered FIRC. The reason for using matching in the first place is because of the suspicion that targets of FIRC might be systematically different from other states. Including observations from states that experienced FIRC as control cases is thus undesirable because it could re-introduce the bias that matching is meant to eliminate.

Several different matching procedures produced large improvements in balance between treatment and control cases; I chose the results of genetic matching because this method greatly improved overall balance without worsening balance on any of the covariates. Table 5 shows that matching produced a set of control cases that on average is very similar to cases that experienced FIRC. Before matching, the distance statistic (also known as the propensity score, defined as the probability that an observation receives the treatment given its values on the covariates) for treated and control cases differed by 0.125; matching reduced this discrepancy to 0.005, an improvement of nearly 96 percent. Matching improved the balance on seven of the ten covariates at least 90 percent, and improved balance on every variable more than 70 percent. The table also provides several tests of whether significant differences remain between treated and control groups after matching (Lyll 2010, 8). Standardized bias, for example, divides the difference in means between the two groups by the standard deviation of the treated group; the results indicate that none of the variables differ by more than 6.4 percent of a standard deviation. Results

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<sup>21</sup> Because matching cannot be performed on datasets with missing data, it was first necessary to impute missing values for some of the variables. I used the *ice* command in *Stata* 10 to perform this procedure.

<sup>22</sup> I used FIRC at  $t_0$  rather than FIRC,  $t_0 - t_{10}$ , to avoid the possibility of post-treatment bias, which would occur if FIRC had a downstream effect on any of the covariates, such as economic development or regime type. After matching produced a control case for each FIRC case, I added the ensuing ten years for both the FIRC and control cases to the dataset. The results shown below are virtually identical if new leader FIRC at  $t_0$  is used as the treatment.

for Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treated and control groups have the same distribution on each variable.

[ Table 5 about here ]

Because matching is not exact, it is still necessary to perform parametric analysis on the matched dataset rather than a difference of means test (although the coefficients on the matched variables should be disregarded; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008, 104, n. 18). Table 6 shows the coefficient, standard error, and substantive effect of *NLFIRC* from a probit model including all of the control variables in model 1 plus ELF. The coefficient for *NLFIRC* is positive and significant at  $p = 0.001$ , which confirms that new leader FIRC continues to increase the risk of civil war even among those cases most similar to those that experience FIRC.<sup>23</sup> Substantively, *NLFIRC* nearly triples the likelihood of civil war onset. These results provide confidence that the effect of *NLFIRC* on civil war should not be attributed to a selection effect.

[ Table 6 about here ]

## CONCLUSION

In this paper I investigated whether foreign-imposed regime change, thought to have beneficial effects on the likelihood of peace between former belligerents, might have a potential downside by heightening the risk of civil war in the country targeted for FIRC. Analyzing a dataset that included one hundred FIRCs over nearly two centuries in a wide variety of countries, and controlling for important determinants of civil war, I found that only new leader FIRC significantly increased the likelihood that a civil war occurred in the target country over the next five or ten years. Restoration FIRC, by contrast, decreased the risk of civil war. The effect of new leader FIRC survived several robustness tests as well as a matching analysis that used a set of control cases that on average was highly similar to cases that actually experienced FIRC. I also discovered an interesting set of conditional findings. When conjoined with defeat in an interstate war, for example, *NLFIRC* is especially damaging to the prospects for domestic

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<sup>23</sup> Although not shown, restoration FIRC is negative and marginally significant ( $p < 0.10$ ).

peace in the defeated state (Peic and Reiter 2008). Moreover, the probability of civil war is significantly higher post-NLFIRC in poorer or ethnically heterogeneous states than in wealthy or homogeneous states.

Many questions remain regarding the effects and effectiveness of FIRC that should form the subject of future research. What, for example, is the durability in office of imposed leaders? Do they serve out their full terms in office, or are their tenures cut short by coups and revolutions? The frequency with which new leader FIRC is followed by civil war suggests that imposed leaders may face an enhanced likelihood of violent removal. A second question concerns the consequences of FIRC for democratization. Does FIRC advance or set back the cause of democracy in targets? Are FIRC carried out by democracies more likely to bring about liberalization? Third, what are the economic consequences of FIRC? Does the political chaos that often follows FIRC spill over into the economic realm as well? Finally, it might be worth revisiting the finding that FIRC increases the duration of interstate peace with data covering the whole period since 1816. Given the close connection between civil and international wars, the high frequency of the former after new leader FIRC might be expected to trigger more of the latter.

The results in this paper highlight a fascinating contradiction for U.S. policy. Foreign-imposed regime change is likely to be most successful in relatively wealthy, homogeneous countries, the types of states where FIRC is either not needed (because they are U.S. allies) or extremely costly to execute. It required four years and millions of Allied lives to subjugate Germany and Japan to the point where new governments could be imposed on them, for example. On the other hand, FIRC is likely to spur resistance and civil war in those countries where the United States and other advanced democracies are most likely to undertake such intervention; the situation is made even bleaker if war is needed to overthrow the existing regime. Iran, for example, is relatively well off with a GDP per capita of around \$13,000 with a fairly urbanized population (68 percent), but it scores high (0.75) on the ELF index, with a population of 51 percent Persians, 24 percent Azeris, and quite a few groups below the 10 percent threshold. Even a FIRC that is accepted by the (largely urban) political opposition could still spark rebellion by one or more disaffected minority groups. Pakistan, by contrast, has a GDP per capita of only \$2,600 with a largely rural population (36 percent urbanization) and is also well above the mean on ELF (0.54). This is not to

say that the United States or any other country is planning FIRC in either of these countries—particularly in nuclear-armed Pakistan. It is not wholly out of the realm of possibility, however, and these countries may be the most hopeful scenarios. Myanmar, for example, boasts a GDP per capita of \$1,200, 33 percent urbanization, and an ELF score of 0.42. Many countries in Africa would be worse: consider the Democratic Republic of Congo’s \$300 GDP per capita and ELF score of 0.90. Thus, those places where FIRC may be most likely to occur in the near future are also the same places where FIRC is mostly likely to lead to domestic chaos and violence. Although FIRC may reduce the likelihood of interstate war recurrence, these scenarios, and my results more generally, suggest that overthrowing other governments (and bringing new leaders to power rather than restoring previous rulers) is a policy instrument with limited utility because of its potential to ignite civil wars. These conflicts may in turn result in the imposed regime’s ouster or draw interveners into costly occupations.

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**TABLE 1. Cases of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, 1816-2008**

TARGET	INTERVENER	YEAR	LEADER REMOVED	FIRC TYPE
Two Sicilies	Austria	1821	Revolutionaries	R
Spain	France	1823	Provisional Regency	R
Modena	Austria	1831	Pellegrino Nobili	R
Parma	Austria	1831	Conte Filippo Linati	R
Portugal	Quadruple Alliance	1834	Miguel I	R
Afghanistan	UK	1839	Dost Mohammed	NL
Tuscany	Austria	1849	Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi	R
Saxony	Prussia	1849	Gustav Friedrich Held	R
Baden	Prussia	1849	Lorenz Peter Brentano	R
Roman Republic	France/Austria/Sicily/Spain	1849	Triumvirate	R
Argentina	Brazil	1852	Juan Manuel de Rosas	NL
Honduras	Guatemala	1855	Trinidad Cabañas	NL
Tuscany	Piedmont/France	1859	Leopoldo II	NL
Parma	Piedmont/France	1859	Roberto I	NL
Modena	Piedmont/France	1859	Francesco V	NL
Mexico	France	1863	Benito Juarez	NL
Honduras	Guatemala/Nicaragua	1863	José Francisco Montes	NL
El Salvador	Guatemala	1863	Gerardo Barrios	NL
Paraguay	Brazil	1869	Francisco Solano Lopez	NL
France	Prussia	1870	Napoleon III	NL
El Salvador	Honduras	1871	Francisco Dueñas	NL
Honduras	El Salvador/Guatemala	1872	José Maria Medina	NL
Honduras	El Salvador/Guatemala	1874	Celeo Arias	NL
El Salvador	Guatemala	1876	Andres del Valle	NL
Honduras	Guatemala	1876	Ponciano Leiva	NL
Afghanistan	UK	1879	Sher Ali	NL
Afghanistan	UK	1879	Yakub Khan	NL
Peru	Chile	1881	Nicolas Pierola	NL
Peru	Chile	1881	Francisco Garcia Calderon	NL
Peru	Chile	1882	Lizardo Montero	NL
Honduras	Nicaragua	1894	Domingo Vasquez	NL
Honduras	Nicaragua	1907	Manuel Bonilla	NL
Korea	Japan	1907	Yi Hyong	NL
Nicaragua	U.S.	1909	José Santos Zelaya	NL
Nicaragua	U.S.	1910	José Madriz	NL
Honduras	U.S.	1911	Miguel Davila	NL
Dominican Republic	U.S.	1912	Eladio Victoria	NL
Mexico	U.S.	1914	Victoriano Huerta	NL
Belgium	Germany	1914	Charles, Baron de Broqueville	NL
Dominican Republic	U.S.	1914	José Bordas Valdez	NL
Haiti	U.S.	1915	Revolutionary Comm. of Safety	NL
Serbia	Austria	1915	King Alexander	NL
Albania	Italy	1916	Esat Pashe Toptani	NL
Dominican Republic	U.S.	1916	Francisco Henriquez	NL
Montenegro	Austria	1916	Nikola I	NL
Greece	UK/France	1917	King Constantine I	NL
Belgium	France/UK/U.S.	1918	Von Faulkenhausen	R
Hungary	Romania	1919	Bela Kun	NL
Mongolia	USSR	1925	Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino	NL
China	Japan	1928	Chang Tso-lin	NL

TARGET	INTERVENER	YEAR	LEADER REMOVED	FIRC TYPE
Ethiopia	Italy	1936	Haile Selassie	NL
China	Japan	1937	Chiang Kai-shek	NL
Albania	Italy	1939	King Zog	NL
Norway	Germany	1940	Johan Nygaardsvold	NL
Luxembourg	Germany	1940	Pierre Dupong	NL
Netherlands	Germany	1940	Dirk Jan De Geer	NL
Belgium	Germany	1940	Hubert Pierlot	NL
Ethiopia	UK	1941	King of Italy	R
Yugoslavia	Germany	1941	King Peter II	NL
Greece	Germany	1941	Emmanouil Tsouderos	NL
Iran	UK/USSR	1941	Reza Khan	NL
Iraq	UK	1941	Rashid Ali	R
Denmark	Germany	1943	Erik Scavenius	NL
France	U.S./UK	1944	Pierre Laval	R
Bulgaria	USSR	1944	Kyril, Prince of Preslav	NL
Hungary	Germany	1944	Miklós Horthy	NL
Romania*	USSR	1944	Ion Antonescu	NL
Hungary	USSR	1945	Ferenc Szalasi	NL
Norway	U.S./UK	1945	Vidkun Quisling	R
Czechoslovakia	USSR	1945	Emil Hacha	NL
Germany	U.S./UK/USSR	1945	Admiral Karl Doenitz	NL
Japan	U.S.	1945	Suzuki Kantaro	NL
Romania	USSR	1947	King Michael	NL
Indonesia	Netherlands	1948	Sukarno	NL
Iran	U.S.	1953	Mohammed Mossadeq	R
Guatemala	U.S.	1954	Jacobo Arbenz	NL
Guatemala	U.S.	1954	Carlos Enrique Diaz	NL
Guatemala	U.S.	1954	Elfegio Monzon	NL
Hungary	USSR	1956	Imre Nagy	R
Congo	Belgium	1960	Patrice Lumumba	NL
Republic of Vietnam	U.S.	1963	Ngo Dinh Diem	NL
Gabon	France	1964	Jean-Hilaire Aubaume	R
Czechoslovakia	USSR	1968	Alexander Dubček	R
Czechoslovakia	USSR	1968	Ludvik Svoboda	R
Chile*	U.S.	1973	Salvador Allende	NL
Cambodia	Vietnam	1979	Pol Pot	NL
Uganda	Tanzania	1979	Idi Amin	NL
Central African Republic	France	1979	Jean-Bedel Bokassa	NL
Afghanistan	USSR	1979	Hafizullah Amin	NL
Grenada	U.S.	1983	Hudson Austin	NL
Mongolia	USSR	1984	Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal	NL
Afghanistan	USSR	1986	Babrak Karmal	NL
Panama	U.S.	1989	Manuel Noriega	NL
Haiti	U.S.	1994	Raul Cedras	R
Comoros	France	1995	Bob Denard	R
Zaire/Congo	Rwanda/Uganda	1997	Joseph Mobutu	NL
Sierra Leone	ECOWAS	1998	Jonny Koroma	R
Afghanistan	U.S.	2001	Mullah Omar	NL
Iraq	U.S.	2003	Saddam Hussein	NL

NOTE: Cases denoted with an asterisk are unclear as to the extent of the foreign power's responsibility for regime change. NL indicates new leader FIRC; R indicates restoration FIRC.

SOURCES: Leurdijk (1986); Werner (1996); Owen (2002); Fazal (2007); Enterline and Greig (2008); Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009); and many case-specific sources.

**TABLE 2. Cross-Tabulation of Civil War Onset and FIRC Types, 1816-2008**

		RESTORATION FIRC			NEW LEADER FIRC		
		Yes	No	Total	Yes	No	Total
CIVIL WAR ONSET	Yes	1 (0.4%)	297 (1.9%)	298 (1.9%)	39 (6.1%)	259 (1.7%)	298 (1.9%)
	No	229 (99.6%)	15,583 (98.1%)	15,812 (98.2%)	605 (93.9%)	15,207 (98.3%)	15,812 (98.2%)
Total		230 (100.0%)	15,880 (100.1%)	16,110 (100.0%)	644 (100.0%)	15,466 (100.0%)	16,110 (100.0%)

Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> = 2.5732; Pr = 0.109

Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> = 65.3664; Pr = 0.000

**TABLE 3. Probit Estimates of Civil War Onset, 1816-2008**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Economic Development	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Population	0.20*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.02)
Mountainous Terrain	0.01 (0.18)	0.05 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.18)	0.01 (0.18)	0.05 (0.16)
New State	0.26 (0.17)	0.42* (0.19)	0.30 (0.19)	0.26 (0.17)	0.27 (0.17)	0.31 (0.19)
Mixed Regime	0.30*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.36*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.36*** (0.07)
Lose Interstate War	0.68*** (0.16)	0.72*** (0.19)	0.92*** (0.21)	0.70*** (0.16)	0.68*** (0.16)	0.94*** (0.21)
Percentage of Family Farms	-	0.001 (0.003)	-	-	-	-
Index of Occupational Diversification	-	-0.010 (0.006)	-	-	-	-
Family Farms × Occupational Diversity	-	-0.010 (0.006)	-	-	-	-
Ethnic Heterogeneity (ELF)	-	-	0.31** (0.11)	-	-	0.25* (0.11)
Restoration FIRC, t <sub>0</sub> - t <sub>10</sub>	-0.56† (0.33)	-	-	-0.55† (0.33)	-0.56† (0.33)	-
New Leader FIRC, t <sub>0</sub> - t <sub>10</sub>	0.42*** (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.38** (0.11)	0.50*** (0.13)	0.51*** (0.17)	0.17 (0.19)
New Leader FIRC × Lose Interstate War	-	-	-	-0.16 (0.18)	-	-
New Leader FIRC × Development (COW)	-	-	-	-	-0.02 (0.02)	-
New Leader FIRC × Ethnic Heterogeneity	-	-	-	-	-	0.49 (0.38)
Civil War (t-1)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.29** (0.11)	-0.39** (0.13)	-0.36*** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.40** (0.13)
Peace Years	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Cubic Spline 1	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Cubic Spline 2	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Cubic Spline 3	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-3.36*** (0.24)	-2.97*** (0.29)	-3.34*** (0.25)	-3.34*** (0.24)	-3.37*** (0.24)	-3.33*** (0.25)
N	12,640	10,424	8,400	12,640	12,640	8,400
Log Pseudo-LL	-1204.61	-982.27	-754.75	-1204.22	-1204.41	-753.81
Wald Chi <sup>2</sup>	244.38***	202.76***	168.25***	258.61***	241.68***	174.95***

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered on country code in parentheses.

† p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001.

**TABLE 4. The Effect of the Interaction of New Leader FIRC and Losing an Interstate War on the Probability of Civil War Onset**

	Probability of Civil War	Standard Error	95 Percent Confidence Interval
Variables set to 0	0.0120	0.0015	0.0093, 0.0149
Variables set to 1	0.1145	0.0355	0.0580, 0.1946

NOTE: Other variables in the model are set to their mean values (continuous variables) or their modes (dichotomous variables).

**TABLE 5. Summary of Balance between Treatment and Control Cases after Matching**

Variable	Mean Treated	Mean Control pre-Matching	Mean Control post-Matching	Mean Difference post-Matching	Percent Improvement	Std. Bias	K-S Test	Rank Sum Test
Distance	0.133	0.008	0.138	-0.005	98.74	0.027	0.418	0.238
Econ. Development	5.453	6.164	5.416	0.037	94.79	0.023	0.999	0.940
Population	8.259	8.534	8.339	-0.080	70.90	0.048	0.400	0.948
New State	0.042	0.028	0.042	0.000	100.00	0.000	1.000	0.499
Mountainous	0.457	0.412	0.456	0.001	98.06	0.008	0.275	0.770
Mixed Regime	0.558	0.322	0.526	0.032	86.60	0.064	1.000	0.539
Lose Interstate War	0.358	0.007	0.358	0.000	100.00	0.000	0.997	0.393
ELF	0.471	0.504	0.474	-0.003	91.85	0.023	0.825	0.671
Civil War (t-1)	0.179	0.090	0.179	0.000	100.00	0.000	1.000	0.829
Peace Years	31.726	34.148	31.105	0.621	74.36	0.021	1.000	0.956


NOTE: 95 matched pairs; genetic matching with replacement. Standardized bias expresses the difference in means between treated and control groups as a percentage of the standard deviation of the treated group. Values > 0.25 suggest matching was not effective. For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p-values are shown; p < 0.05 indicates that treated and control distributions are not equivalent.

**TABLE 6. Probit Estimate of New Leader FIRC on Civil War Onset after Matching**

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Substantive Effect
New Leader FIRC, t0 – t10	0.43**	0.13	+178%

NOTE: N = 1,533. Control variables from model 1 (plus ELF) are included but estimates are omitted. Robust standard errors are clustered on country code; \*\* p < 0.01.


**FIGURE 1. Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Probability of Civil War Onset**



NOTE: Effects for all variables except the following are estimated from model 1 in Table 3 using *CLARIFY* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003): economic inequality is from model 2; ELF is from model 3. Continuous variables are shifted from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean, with the exception of peace years, which is shifted from 1 to 70 (double its mean value); categorical variables are shifted from 0 to 1.

†  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$

**FIGURE 2. Marginal Effect of New Leader FIRC on Probability of Civil War Onset as Economic Development (COW) Increases**



**FIGURE 3. Marginal Effect of New Leader FIRC on Probability of Civil War Onset as Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Increases**

