

MODERN INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Why do individuals and groups take up arms to wage guerrilla insurgencies? How are insurgent groups organized, and what strategies and tactics do they use? What determines how insurgent groups treat civilian populations? How can states best defeat insurgencies? Is violence—including the killing of civilians—an effective tool of counterinsurgency (COIN), or are softer “hearts and minds” strategies more likely to yield results? These are some of the questions addressed by the papers in this collection.

As has been repeatedly pointed out, the majority of armed conflicts since the end of World War II have occurred within states rather than between states, a trend that has grown ever more pronounced with the passing of time.¹ Of the 29 armed conflicts ongoing in 2003, for example, only two were interstate conflicts. In 2001 and 2002, there was only one ongoing interstate conflict.² The bulk of these internal conflicts consist of guerrilla wars, and thus understanding why they occur, how they are conducted, and the determinants of insurgent and counterinsurgent success and failure is increasingly important.

Civil wars also tend to last much longer than the average interstate war, generate sizable numbers of refugees and internally displaced people, reduce the economic well-being and civil and political freedoms of the countries in which they occur, and increase mortality rates not only during the war, but for many years after conflicts are over.³

The consequences of civil war for noncombatants are particularly devastating. Although interstate wars in the twentieth century killed the largest absolute number of noncombatants, a higher percentage of those killed in internal conflicts are civilians owing to the intimate connection between insurgents and the population.⁴ This tendency has worsened in the decades since World War II: by the 1990s, the percentage of total deaths in civil wars comprised of noncombatants exceeded 90 per cent.⁵ Civil wars also contribute to state failure, which has been shown to be a necessary condition for genocide.⁶ The economic, political, social, and human costs of civil wars are thus considerable.

The twin issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency have also climbed to the top of the policy agenda owing to the US predicament in Iraq, where the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 touched off a protracted insurgency based in the country's Sunni population. The insurgency was aided and abetted by the failure of the Bush administration to foresee the potentially chaotic consequences of removing Hussein and its reluctance to provide a larger number of troops for the invasion. The inability of American forces to crush the insurgency has sparked a lively debate on COIN policy in the U.S. military and in academia,⁷ but violence in Iraq has continued to surge as insurgency blends with sectarian massacres and reprisals.

More generally, given the massive US superiority at the conventional level of war, it is increasingly likely that America's opponents will avoid confronting US forces openly. Instead, learning from Saddam Hussein's mistakes in 1991 and 2003, potential foes will wage irregular warfare, hoping to capitalize on America's supposed sensitivity to casualties and impatience with protracted campaigns.

Clearly, understanding how insurgencies arise, the nature, goals, and strategies of insurgent organizations, and the relative efficacy of various state responses to insurgency is of

critical importance. This collection makes contributions to each of these areas, drawing on a variety of perspectives, cases, and methodologies. Although the arguments and conclusions of the papers are general, many use evidence from African cases, such as conflicts in Darfur, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and South Africa.

UNDERSTANDING INSURGENCY

The papers can be roughly grouped into two categories, those dealing primarily with insurgent organizations and insurgencies and those concerned with countering or defeating insurgencies. The first two papers examine what determines how guerrillas treat civilian populations, and the nature, goals, and strategies of one particularly nasty insurgent group, the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. The first paper in this group, for example, "Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups" by William Reno, examines why some rebel groups behave in a predatory fashion vis-à-vis local civilian populations, whereas others are more protective of civilians. Although the brutal behavior of some armed groups—such as Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—is legendary, all rebel factions are not equally cruel, whereas some commit atrocities in certain areas but not in others. What explains this variation?

Reno argues that the answer lies in the nature of patron-client relations in weak or collapsing states, especially in Africa, but also in peripheral areas of the former Soviet Union. In these tenuous states, elites in power in the capital often form alliances with the leaders of armed youth militias to solidify their grip on power and to counterbalance coup-prone militaries or other challengers. In exchange for their support, regime clients are allowed to join in and profit from all manner of technically illegal economic practices. These illicit enterprises, such as exploiting natural resources like diamonds, give these local strongmen independent sources of

income that they are able to privatize and continue to exploit should they later turn against their former patron.

Reno hypothesizes that groups like these, which are deeply involved in patronage politics with the capital, are likely to prey on their local communities if the regime fragments because their patronage relationship with the center “released leaders of armed young men and local political bosses from having to rely upon home communities to obtain resources or to organize fighters.” By contrast, where local leaders are relatively uninvolved in this capital-based patronage network, armed groups are much less violent toward—and more protective of—their local population. In order to benefit from illegal activities without the approval of leaders at the center, these groups must develop good relations with community leaders “who could recruit and discipline vigilante groups to help protect illicit activities from favoured members of the president’s political network.”⁸ These groups, since they rely heavily on the local community, tend not to abuse local civilians. When such groups move out of their home area, however, they can behave in a more predatory fashion.

Reno finds support for these conjectures in the behavior of armed groups in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Somalia. In Sierra Leone, for example, the RUF—which killed the most children per adult killed and accounted for the majority of human rights violations against women and girls—recruited largely from outsiders in the diamond mining communities who had been part of the government’s patronage network. Lacking extensive loyalties to the communities where they operated, and sponsored by an alternative patron in Liberia’s Charles Taylor, the RUF had no need to treat local civilians with restraint. The Civil Defense Forces, by contrast, were composed to a large degree of locally-based militias, such as the Kamajors, which had organized early in the conflict to defend their communities. These armed groups consisted of local men and were

controlled by village or town chiefs who had not been highly involved in the regime's patronage network. These groups behaved in much less predatory fashion as long as they operated in their home areas, but exhibited more brutality when they moved into other regions.

The second of the papers on insurgency, "The Myth of Madness: Cold Rationality and 'Resource' Plunder by the Lord's Resistance Army" by James Bevan, looks directly at the organization, goals, strategy, and tactics of one particularly infamous African rebel group—the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). As Bevan puts it, "the LRA has been characterized variously as a brutal cult and a 'mad' terrorist organization."⁹ The group—led by Joseph Kony and currently said to number between 500 and 1,000 fighters, most of whom are children—has been at war for twenty years but lacks any clear political objectives and targets civilians almost exclusively. Bevan points out that the LRA sits uncomfortably with current classifications of insurgent actors since it is not obviously motivated either by greed or grievance: it does not seek to control territory or secede from Uganda, to overthrow or alter the Ugandan government, or to capture resources or extract economic rents.¹⁰ Rather, the group seems to be driven solely by Kony's need to assert his power and the degree of threat he represents to the government, which he does by attacking the civilian population.

Although the LRA resists easy classification, Bevan maintains that viewing the organization through the lens of the recent literature on resource wars helps illuminate this otherwise puzzling insurgency. Bevan argues that the origins of the LRA lie in real grievances stemming from the defeat of the northern-dominated Ugandan National Liberation Army in 1986 by Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army. The nature of the rebellion quickly changed as popular support dwindled, however, causing the LRA to turn to abduction to fill its ranks. This shift had the effect of removing individual-level motivations—either greed or grievance—from

consideration and making Kony's will the primary factor motivating the insurgency. The change to forced recruitment, Bevan argues, also transformed the LRA into a rent-seeking organization, with the "profit conceived in terms of the political capital that Joseph Kony derives from the war" rather than in economic terms.¹¹

The LRA—in contradiction to individual-level theories of rebel recruitment—is held together almost entirely by coercion and the fear of punishment, rather than attachment to a cause or hope for material gain.¹² Rather than individuals joining the group to satisfy a grievance or capitalize on the opportunity for personal enrichment via looting, all of the LRA's fighters are seized forcibly from the local population. Kony then uses two tools to prevent defection.

First, the young recruits are made complicit in atrocities in their home communities, which "lowers the opportunity cost of membership in the group" by increasing the barriers to leaving.¹³

Second, recruits are heavily indoctrinated in the power of the spirits to punish them if they attempt to flee. The resulting fear prevents massive defections and allows the LRA to operate in highly decentralized fashion, often in groups of only 10 to 15 fighters. Despite the inauguration of peace talks in summer 2006 between the LRA and the Ugandan government,¹⁴ Bevan maintains that Kony has little incentive to terminate the insurgency since he has no political ambitions (nor would there be any role for him in Ugandan politics) and there is no peacetime substitute for the prestige and attention he enjoys as leader of such a notorious organization. Moreover, because it is not reliant on popular support, the insurgency is largely self-sustaining: as long as the LRA has access to the population, it can reproduce itself indefinitely.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT?

The second group of four papers shifts focus to governments and the strategies available to them to defeat guerrilla insurgencies. The first paper, for example, Patrick Johnston's "Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War: Evidence from Darfur," explores the effects of the increasing pressure from international actors for negotiated settlements in civil wars on strategies employed by governments to appear to comply with this pressure but in reality make minimal concessions. Until the end of the Cold War, very few civil wars terminated in negotiated settlements; most resulted in decisive victories for the government (more common) or the rebels (less common).¹⁵ Since 1989, however, a dramatic reversal has occurred: of the civil wars that have ended, about 70 percent terminated in negotiated agreements, most of which incorporated some form of power-sharing among the former belligerents.

Although many scholars hail this trend as a triumph of norms of negotiation and peaceful conflict resolution, Johnston observes that the shift toward negotiated settlements to civil wars also entails some perverse effects. Principal among these is the tendency for governments fighting multiple insurgent groups to use negotiations as a way to split the rebel factions and weaken those which remain in opposition. Much of the previous literature on spoilers in civil conflict treats them as greedy, opportunistic, or irreconcilably opposed to peace, but Johnston argues that some spoilers are actually created by governments. States in today's world that are beset by civil conflict face conflicting pressures: the international community favors negotiations and power sharing, but governments also want to make as few concessions as possible to rebels. Using negotiations to create spoilers provides one way out of this dilemma: the government can co-opt certain groups into signing a superficial peace accord and then tar those who refuse to agree as intransigent dead-enders. The trick is to offer just enough in the way of concessions to

peel away opportunistic or moderate rebel factions. In exchange for perks and material rewards, these groups can be enlisted to provide intelligence or additional combat power against their former comrades.

The government derives two major benefits from this strategy. First, co-opting some of the rebel factions into the regime's camp weakens those that remain and renders them less of a military threat, perhaps inducing them to cut a deal or allowing the government to defeat them on the battlefield. Second, the divide and rule strategy breaks down the unity of the opposition and often leads to fighting among rebel factions. Not only does distrust become rampant between groups, but each rebel commander has to wonder whether his subordinates will remain loyal or reap the spoils of defecting to the government side. These dynamics tend to increase the power of government forces relative to the insurgents while at the same time making the regime look good in the eyes of the international community for being forthcoming in negotiations.

Simultaneously, "such peace agreements between governments and signatory factions inadvertently serve to legitimate attacks against non-signatory factions, who appear as uncooperative and hostile to the peace process."¹⁶ This argument helps explain why civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to recur than those in which one side decisively defeats the other. When states follow the divide and rule strategy described above, the settlement—rather than reflecting a real bargain and resolution of differences—is merely a means used by the government to continue the war against non-signatory groups. In Johnston's words, such "negotiated settlements are designed to fail."¹⁷

Johnston demonstrates this strategy at work in the case of Darfur. First, Johnston argues that the government of Sudan helped create the National Movement for Reform and Development (NRMD), a faction that splintered from one of the two original rebel groups in

Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), shortly before negotiations were about to begin in 2004. NMRD quickly reached a settlement with the government, leading some to suspect that it was largely a creation of Khartoum and Chadian leader Idriss Deby. Second, the government was able to exploit divisions within the second major rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and co-opt the Zaghawa faction of that organization led by Minni Minawi to sign the Darfur Peace Accord in April 2006. Minawi was given a high post in the Sudanese government and his forces subsequently began to assist the army in COIN operations against the remaining rebel groups.¹⁸ The Sudanese government has replicated this strategy with other insurgent factions, whose leaders are invariably rewarded with government posts and return to fight their former allies flush with new weapons and vehicles. Rather than bring the conflict to a conclusion, therefore, negotiated settlements in Darfur have simply prolonged the conflict while giving Khartoum political cover against international pressure.

The next paper, “Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency” by Michael Findley and Joseph Young, addresses the central question of counterinsurgents everywhere: what is the proper military strategy to defeat a guerrilla insurgency? The major distinction in most contemporary literature on COIN is between “attrition” strategies—which attempt to defeat guerrillas by the application of brute force to kill as many as possible—and “hearts and minds” strategies—which seek to quell insurgencies through lenient policies and provision of benefits that reduce the attractiveness of the insurgency relative to the government. These strategies are ideal types often associated with two famous conflicts after World War II.

Attrition is best exemplified by the approach taken by the US Army in the first several years of the Vietnam War. The idea was to kill enemy combatants—in this case, members of the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)—faster than the enemy could replace

them. Eventually, a “crossover point” would be reached whereby the manpower available to the enemy would dwindle and he would be forced to yield. To reach this crossover point, Army operations in Vietnam concentrated on “search and destroy” missions, sending large units to scour the jungle with the aim of engaging and defeating large enemy units in battle. Vietnamese civilians were encouraged to relocate to strategic hamlets in government-controlled territory to facilitate the creation of free-fire zones where anyone encountered could be assumed to be an enemy. These operations tended to come up empty as VC and NVA units quickly learned to avoid fighting pitched battles against the better-armed Americans, who could call on plentiful air and artillery support. This firepower-intensive approach to COIN, however, inflicted vast destruction on the Vietnamese countryside and killed large numbers of noncombatants, thereby alienating the populace and providing a steady flow of recruits to the insurgents.¹⁹

In Malaya, by contrast, the British adopted a different approach. Rather than pursue the guerrillas of the Malayan Races Liberation Army through the jungle and employ massive amounts of firepower, the British instead sought to isolate the rebels from their support base in Malaya’s ethnic Chinese population. Given that this population was relatively small and did not strongly favor the rebels’ cause to begin with, the British were able to relocate these people to protected villages and provide them with homes and services, which reduced their incentives to support the insurgency even further. Cut off from its source of supply and recruits, the rebellion eventually weakened and died out.

Although these two cases appear to support the hearts and minds over the attrition approach to COIN, a sample of two is not a firm basis on which to make generalizations or policy decisions. In “Fighting Fire with Fire,” therefore, Findley and Young seek to test the relative effectiveness of these two strategies to learn which one provides the more useful means

for combating guerrillas. The tool they use to do so is a novel one: agent-based modeling. Findley and Young focus on two crucial variables: the strategy of the counterinsurgents and the level of commitment of the population to the insurgency. At the beginning of each run of the model, the number of insurgents and counterinsurgents is set, the latter's strategy (attrition or hearts and minds) is chosen, and the population's initial level of commitment to the insurgency is also set.

The results clearly support the hearts and minds approach over the attrition approach. As Findley and Young put it, "When the population has a low-level of commitment [to the insurgents] and counterinsurgents pursue a strategy of increasing benefits, the number of insurgents decreases over time and eventually converges towards zero."²⁰ When the government uses a strategy that imposes costs on a population with a similar level of commitment, however, the number of insurgents increases. Raising the population's attachment to the rebels to a moderate level does not change this result: following a hearts and minds strategy decreases the number of guerrillas, whereas an attrition strategy causes the number to go up. Only when the commitment of the population to the insurgents is high does a benefits-based approach fail to reduce the number of guerrillas, but even in this scenario the resulting increase in insurgents is much less than that produced when an attrition strategy is used.

Findley and Young conclude from these experiments that strategies that provide benefits to the population are more likely to produce results than those which impose costs. A brief case study of Iraq suggests that the U.S. military's use of a cost-centered approach against the Sunni insurgency (which is supported by a civilian population with a high level of commitment), exemplified by the two battles for Fallujah in 2004, led to increased support for the insurgency

and bred more militants. Findley and Young argue for a more benefits-oriented approach to both Sunni and Shia insurgent groups.

The fifth paper in the collection—Kelly Greenhill and Paul Staniland’s “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency Campaign”—takes the form of a series of cautionary notes against current trends in the scholarship and practice of COIN. One of the most pernicious problems, according to Greenhill and Staniland, is the tendency to over-analogize from a handful of prominent cases, particularly the British experience in Malaya and America’s in Vietnam. Malaya—as described above—is often held up as an example of the superiority of the hearts and minds approach without acknowledging that “All of the factors one can imagine mattering pointed in favour of British success.”²¹ Scholars and practitioners thus tend to take a “one size fits all” approach, analogizing from a small number of cases and assuming that what worked there will work in other situations as well.

Another problem, according to Greenhill and Staniland, is that the literature is dominated by false dichotomies, such as attrition vs. hearts and minds or firepower vs. population security. In reality, however, any population is likely to be heterogeneous in its level of attachment to the rebels, requiring a judicious combination of carrots and sticks rather than sole reliance on one or the other. Clearly force will be needed to destroy guerrilla fighters and committed activists, but force must be combined with incentives that make supporting the government attractive to fence-sitters. Real COIN policies, therefore, combine elements of costs and benefits; posing the two as opposites simply confuses the issue.

Greenhill and Staniland also caution against an over-reliance on numerical indicators of progress, such as the number of people being killed or whether the number of insurgent attacks is increasing or decreasing. It is tempting to focus on quantifiable measures when fighting a

formless enemy in an unconventional war, but just because a metric can be quantified does not mean that the information gained is a useful measure of progress, and choosing the wrong one can lead counterinsurgents down a blind alley. Certain statistics can also generate perverse incentives, as the body count obsession did in Vietnam.

In addition, Greenhill and Staniland argue that counterinsurgents should not underestimate the usefulness of their local allies, who can often provide valuable information; should pay attention to how their past and present actions affect the attitudes of the civilian population, and be careful not to alienate the people with excessive force; and take care not to prioritize tactics over strategy and political factors, including making political concessions to satisfy grievances in society.

This last point is particularly instructive. Too often COIN is described solely as a military problem with a military solution. If only the counterinsurgents can formulate the proper military strategy (attrition, search and destroy, hearts and minds, oil spot, etc.) victory will follow. But this is a flawed understanding of how to defeat insurgency. Most (if not all) insurgencies have political objectives that must be addressed before the rebellion can be quelled. Greenhill and Staniland point out that even in the best case scenario for COIN military success—Malaya—the insurgency took years to stamp out and the British had to make substantial political concessions, including the promise of independence for the country.

Equally important is the competence and legitimacy of the central government. Brute force is usually not a good substitute for a government that is widely viewed as serving the interests of its constituents. Despite tentative indicators of military progress in Iraq, for example, the government in Baghdad continues to be unable to reach compromises over critical political issues.²² Similarly, in South Vietnam the American COIN effort was significantly hampered by

the political instability and deep unpopularity of the various regimes in Saigon. Much like current strategy in Iraq, the US tried to create conditions for political progress in South Vietnam by escalating militarily, bombing North Vietnam and sending large numbers of American troops to fight in the South. Military escalation, however, had little effect on the political situation in Saigon, just as it has not led to progress in Baghdad. Thus it may be the case that military progress is more likely to follow from political progress rather than the other way around.

The final paper—“Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy” by Alexander Downes, scrutinizes the efficacy of violence against civilians in the context of COIN. Instead of comparing violent approaches that impose costs on civilians to less-violent strategies that provide benefits as Findley and Young do, Downes compares different types of strategies that target civilians. As Gil Merom points out in his recent book *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, a common and sometimes quite effective COIN choice historically has been to wage a campaign of unremitting brutality against the civilian population from which insurgents draw their support.²³ That this tradition lives on is documented by the frequency with which states have committed mass killing in the course of “draining the sea,” killing or removing civilians so as to expose the insurgents hiding in their midst.²⁴

The conventional wisdom with regard to the use of violence against noncombatants in the context of insurgency, however, first enunciated by Sir Robert Thompson in the 1960s and more recently in the work of Stathis Kalyvas, is that violence is most effective when selective. That is, if one is going to employ violence against noncombatants, it is best to use it against people known to be supporting the enemy. That way, violence not only reduces the adversary’s military capability, it also sends a clear deterrent message to observers: working with the enemy invites

deadly retribution. Wielding force in an indiscriminate fashion, however, may kill some enemy supporters, but it is likely to create at least as many as it eliminates (if not more) because of the anger and hatred it engenders in survivors.²⁵ Moreover, collaborating with an actor that uses violence indiscriminately does not guarantee one's security; by definition, indiscriminate violence kills opponents and supporters alike. Joining the rebels in such circumstances will probably increase one's odds of survival.

Several exceptions to this general trend exist, however, cases in which indiscriminate violence by an incumbent was able to defeat a popular insurgency. As Downes shows, for example, the British Army was able to suppress the Boer insurgency in South Africa at the turn of the last century by systematically devastating the landscape and interning the civilian population, strategies that resulted in nearly 50,000 deaths. Downes examines this case in detail in order to derive hypotheses regarding the circumstances under which indiscriminate violence may be effective in defeating insurgencies. He concludes that such violence is likely to be effective the smaller the population upon which the guerrillas rely for support, and the smaller the geographic area in which the guerrillas can operate.

CONCLUSION

The study of ethnic conflict, civil war, insurgency, and counterinsurgency have steadily ascended the scholarly and policy agenda since the end of the Cold War, even more so since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 highlighted the close connections between civil war, insurgency, state failure, and terrorism. Insurgents and those who fight them have always to some extent utilized terror as a tactic or strategy to win the allegiances of local civilians and thereby defeat their opponents; the targeting of civilians in civil war is certainly not new. What 9/11 made clear

was that failed states wracked by warfare could also provide a home for destructive international terrorist movements—like al-Qaeda—bent on mass casualty attacks in third countries. This realization—combined with the fact that insurgencies are easily the most common form of armed conflict today, and the immense social, economic, and human costs associated with these conflicts—has given further impetus to the study of insurgency.

No collection of a half dozen papers can adequately address the myriad questions in this important and fascinating area of study. The papers in this collection, however, offer insights into several important aspects of insurgency.

First, the manner in which insurgents treat the local civilian population is influenced not just by ethnic affiliation or the logic of deterring defection, but by pre-existing networks of graft and corruption in society. Those groups which benefited from the center's network of illicit economic activity tend to treat local civilians worse than those which had to forge ties to local communities to benefit from the illegal economy.

Second, insurgent organizations can exist and remain viable even lacking political objectives, held together by the will of one man and the fear he inspires in others. The importance of Joseph Kony to the LRA highlights the role of charismatic individuals in fueling insurgencies, and suggests a potential COIN strategy not considered by contributors to this volume: targeting leaders. The death of rebel commanders—most notably Jonas Savimbi in Angola—has cleared the way for an end to certain conflicts. This strategy is by no means a silver bullet, however, as indicated by the failure of Israeli killings of Hamas leaders to weaken that organization.

Third, the increasing prevalence of negotiated settlements in civil wars may actually lead to longer conflicts and the recurrence of wars thought to be over. This is because unscrupulous

governments can use negotiated settlements to peel away moderate or opportunistic rebel factions while continuing the fight against the weakened remaining groups, all while appearing to cooperate with the international community and demonizing non-signatory rebels as spoilers.

On the counterinsurgent side, many debates remain. For example, our contributors clearly disagree on the efficacy of hearts and minds vs. attrition strategies. Findley and Young argue that hearts and minds is always a better strategy than attrition, whereas Greenhill and Staniland offer a more nuanced assessment, arguing that one size does not fit all in COIN: strategies need to be judiciously combined and adapted to local circumstances.

Another source of debate concerns the consequences of killing noncombatants. Findley and Young as well as Greenhill and Staniland contend that killing civilians is generally undesirable and counterproductive, but Downes maintains that targeted violence can be successful, and even wholesale violence works under particular circumstances. These debates raise the possibility that there are multiple paths to success in COIN: (1) winning hearts and minds and providing benefits to the population; (2) a mixed strategy of providing benefits and inflicting selective costs; (3) targeted violence against insurgents and civilian insurgent supporters; and (4) indiscriminate violence to interdict civilian support for rebels. The challenge then becomes determining which strategy or mix of strategies will be most effective in which situation, and how to prevail in a situation that calls for a certain type of violence that counterinsurgent forces find morally repugnant. Identifying those situations—and trying to avoid them, or formulating alternative strategies to prevail—would then become very important for democratic societies, which many now argue are morally constrained from inflicting massive violence on civilians.²⁶

NOTES

¹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.

² Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallenstein, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2003," *Journal of Peace Research* 41/5 (2004) p.626.

³ Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003) pp.13-32.

⁴ William Eckhardt, "Civilian Deaths in Wartime," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20/1 (1989) p.92.

⁵ Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1987 and 1996) p.28 and p.17, respectively.

⁶ Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97/1 (2003) pp.57-73.

⁷ For a sample of this debate, see "What to do in Iraq: A Roundtable," *Foreign Affairs* 85/4 (2006) pp.150-169.

⁸ Reno, "Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups," p.16, p.12.

⁹ Bevan, "Myth of Madness," p.2.

¹⁰ On this dichotomy, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004) pp.563-95.

¹¹ Bevan, "Myth of Madness," p.14.

¹² See, for example, Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Armed Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007).

¹³ Bevan, "Myth of Madness," p.17.

¹⁴ Tristan McConnell, "Fresh Hope for Peace in Northern Uganda?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 June 2006, p. 7.

¹⁵ See, for example, Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," *American Political Science Review* 89/3 (1995) p.684.

¹⁶ Johnston, "Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War," p.8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.27.

¹⁸ Minawi, however, has become increasingly marginalized as his forces have suffered defeats at the hands of the National Redemption Front, as the joint rebel command is now known.

¹⁹ For a description, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986) pp.131-214.

²⁰ Findley and Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire?" p.19.

²¹ Greenhill and Staniland, "Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency," p.3.

²² On military progress in Iraq, see General David H. Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," 10-11 September 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf>. On the continuing political difficulties in that country, see James Glanz, "Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing," *New York Times*, 13 September 2007.

²³ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge UP, 2003). See also Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004).

²⁴ Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," *International Organization* 58/2 (2004) pp.375-407.

²⁵ Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), and Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge UP, 2006).

²⁶ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*. For a similar conclusion but with an argument based in the organizational culture of the military, see Colin H. Kahl, "In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq," *International Security* 32/1 (2007) pp.7-46. For a more skeptical view on democratic restraint, see Alexander B. Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War," *International Security* 30/4 (2006) pp.152-95, and Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Cornell UP, forthcoming).