

Let's Get a Second Opinion:
International Institutions and American Public Support for War

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Abstract

Much of the recent scholarship regarding the United Nations's importance in regard to the use by states of military force has focused on the coordinating and signaling role that the UN plays among the leaders of those states (Voeten 2001, 2005). We focus in this paper on another matter which to date has been under-explored, namely, on whether and why international institutions might matter to *mass publics*. Numerous studies have documented the American public's preference for multilateralism during times of war. Less progress has been made, however, in explaining why and how such international support matters to the public. Americans may want allies and international authorization because their possession increases the chances of pre-war coercive diplomatic success and, if war is necessary, increase the prospects for success on the battlefield at lower cost. Alternatively or additionally, Americans may prefer military multilateralism as a way of obtaining a "second opinion" on the wisdom and the intentions of their leaders in taking them down a path that may end in war. We test these different mechanisms regarding the impact of multilateral international organizations on public support for the use of military force with a particular focus on whether they provide a "second opinion" on the wisdom of a military mission for Americans who may not trust the judgment of their commander-in-chief. Our data indicate that international institutions can provide a constraint against the use of force through their power to influence popular support for military conflict.

Introduction

Much of the recent scholarship regarding the United Nations's importance in regard to the use by states of military force has focused on the coordinating and signaling role that the UN plays among the leaders of those states (Voeten 2001, 2005). We focus in this paper on another matter which to date has been under-explored, namely, on whether and why international institutions might matter to *mass publics*. Numerous studies have documented the American public's preference for multilateralism during times of war. Less progress has been made, however, in explaining why and how such international support matters to the public.

Americans may want allies and international authorization to strengthen pre-war coercive diplomacy and, if war is necessary, to increase the prospects for success on the battlefield (and/or reduce the costs of fighting). Alternatively, Americans may prefer military multilateralism as a way of obtaining a "second opinion" on the wisdom and the intentions of their leaders in taking them down a path that may end in war. We test these different mechanisms regarding the impact of multilateral international organizations (IOs) on public support for the use of military force, with a particular focus on whether IOs provide a "second opinion" on the wisdom of a military mission.

Our analysis proceeds in five stages. We begin by reviewing the mounting evidence that the American public prefers to fight alongside allies and with international authorization. Second, we discuss two distinct mechanisms that might lead to the influence of IOs on public attitudes toward the use of force: external risks and internal risks. Third, we review some aggregate public opinion data that speak to these causal mechanisms. Fourth, we present individual-level data regarding the sources of a preference for approval of international institutions. And finally, we present experimental evidence regarding public support for a

hypothetical American intervention in East Timor. We find substantial evidence at both the aggregate and individual levels that the American public relies on the cues from IOs such as the UN and NATO to provide them with a “second opinion” on whether they should accept their president’s statements regarding the wisdom and legitimacy of using military force. Arguments about how international organizations influence public perceptions of the likely costs and prospects for success of a military mission, on the other hand, receive less support.

The American Public’s Preference for Multilateralism in War

Large majorities of Americans have a general preference for multilateralism, and Americans desire international legal sanctioning and the support of allies when employing military force overseas.¹ Scholarship on American public opinion has long since rejected the view that the public is reflexively isolationist. Kull and Destler (1999), for example, contend that - contrary to the perception of American politicians - the public at that time (Chris—what time is being referred to here??) was not isolationist, but preferred international involvement in the context of multilateral institutions. Similarly, Chapman and Reiter (2004) found that the support of the UN Security Council had a significant impact on the size of the “rally 'round the flag” effect that American presidents receive when they use military force.

Preference for the approval of international institutions continued even after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. When asked in early 2002 how the United States should respond to international crises if it “does not have the support of its allies,” 61% of

¹ On the US public preferences for multilateralism in general, see Steven Kull & I.M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Steven Kull, “International Cooperation,” March 28, 2000, available at <http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Globalization/4.html>; I.M. Destler, “The Reasonable Public and the Polarized Policy Process,” in Anthony Lake and David A. Ochmanek (eds), *The Real and the Ideal: Essays on International Relations in Honor of Richard H. Ullman* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 75-90, and available at <http://www.americans-world.org/PDF/Destler.pdf>; and the section, “Using Military Force Through the UN,” maintained by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/un/un4.cfm.

respondents said that the United States “should not act alone,” and 31% agreed that it “should act alone.”² A poll from summer 2002 asked respondents about using force “to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq” showed a strong preference for military multilateralism—only 20% agreed that “The US should invade Iraq even if we have to go it alone.” In contrast, a strong majority of 65% agreed that “The US should only invade Iraq with UN approval and support of its allies.”³

After the Iraq war commenced without UN approval, the US public continued to express a preference for UN Security Council authorizations for the use of force (despite a substantial “rally ‘round the flag” effect). While polls showed presidential approval at more than 70% in late March 2003, a much smaller majority (54%) supported the President’s decision to go to war even without UN authorization.⁴ One in five (21%) stated that they supported the President even though they disagreed with his decision to invade without UN approval, and nearly a quarter (23%) outright disapproved of his decision.⁵

Moreover, Americans believed it was important to make the effort to obtain UN approval. For example, an April 2003 survey found that an overwhelming 88% of respondents agreed that seeking UN authorization “was the right thing to do.”⁶ Moreover, in

² The remaining 8% of the respondents were not sure or declined to reply. See Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States (hereafter cited as Chicago-GMF), “Worldviews 2002: American Public Opinion & Foreign Policy,” October 2002, available on the web at <http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>, p. 27, Figure 3.9; and Chicago-GMF, *Worldviews 2002: U.S. General Population Topline Report*, October 2002, available at <http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>, p.128. The Chicago Council-GMF survey polled more than 3000 members of the American public, but not all individuals were asked the same questions. There were 1095 respondents to this question.

³ Thirteen percent of the sample was opposed to war under all circumstances, and 2% gave no response. See Chicago-GMF, *Worldviews 2002*, 27, Figure 3-10; and Chicago-GMF, *US General Population Topline Report*, 102; there were 721 respondents to this question.

⁴ Program on International Public Attitudes, “PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll: Americans on the Iraq War and the Future of the United Nations,” March 31, 2003, at <http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/mar03/IraqUNfut%20Mar03%20rpt.pdf>, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.* 4.

the same poll, while 35% of respondents agreed that the United States, in the future, “should feel more free to use force without UN authorization,” 61% disagreed with this proposition.⁷

The American public’s preference for UN authorization for military force has been echoed in their views toward NATO. In a poll in the summer of 2002, Americans expressed growing support for the Alliance. More than half of respondents (56%) said NATO “is still essential to our country’s security,” while less than a third (30%) thought that NATO “is no longer essential.”⁸ Further, the survey found that US public support for NATO was perhaps the highest it has been in the last three decades. Specifically, 65% of respondents agreed that the United States should keep its commitment to NATO constant--the highest percentage that agreed with this view since the the NATO commitment question had first been posed in 1974. Similarly, 11% of respondents thought the US should increase its commitment to NATO, again the highest recorded percentage expressing this view between 1974 and 2002.⁹ In sum, Americans at the onset of the new millennium were becoming more not less supportive of America’s participation in NATO.

Explaining the Public’s Preference for International Authorization for War

The American public prefers that military action come with the help of allies and the endorsement of international organizations. But why should Americans who know little about the operation of such institutions place such importance on multilateralism? There are at least two categories of benefits to be gained from the support of international organizations. The first benefit is improving the ability of the US to deal with an adversary

⁶PIPA/KN, Program on International Public Attitudes and Knowledge Networks, “*Americans on America's Role in the World after the Iraq War*,” available at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/AmRole_World/USRole_Apr03/USRole_Apr03_rpt.pdf, p. 7.

⁷Ibid..

⁸ Chicago-GMF, *Worldviews 2002*, 28.

and sharing the costs more widely. The second benefit is giving the public an outside (or second) opinion about the wisdom and merits of international policy choices.

Multilateralism and External Risk Management: Efficacy, Risk Sharing, and Burden Sharing

The support of allies and the attainment of international authorization can help in dealing with an adversary through the threat or use of force in several ways. First, allies and international authorization for war may enhance the credibility of threats prior to hostilities. If an adversary sees that the United States has numerous partners and international authorization for war, that adversary may be more readily persuaded to settle the dispute without force ever needing to be applied.¹⁰ If bargaining fails and war ensues, allies can provide help during and after the war, thus letting Americans share the costs of the endeavor. Recent scholarship indicates that countries that have allies (and especially democratic allies) are much more likely to win the wars in which they participate than countries that fight without allies.¹¹ Once victory is achieved, allies and partners are likely to have an interest in providing economic resources and political support for reconstruction or stabilization efforts. Many of the material costs from the Gulf War of 1990-1991, for example, were borne by allied members of the UN coalition. On the other hand, the United States has had to bear a much greater proportion of the costs of reconstruction in the wake of its 2003 invasion of Iraq.

⁹ Ibid., p. 28, and *Worldviews 2002: U.S. General Population Topline Report*, October 2002, available at <http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>, p. 122.

¹⁰ See Voeten (2001). An alternative argument holds that the willingness of the United States to threaten force without allies or authorization will be viewed as a signal of American resolve. According to this view, demonstrating the willingness to fight despite the domestic costs of using force without multilateral support would enhance American bargaining power during a militarized crisis.

¹¹ Ajin Choi, *Cooperation for Victory: Democracy, International Partnerships, and State War Performance, 1816-1992* (Durham: Duke University, 2001); for a summary of her analysis, see Ajin Choi, "The Power of Democratic Cooperation," *International Security* 28 (Summer 2003), 142-53.

Institutions and Internal Risk Management: the Second Opinion Function

While the benefits of allies are (mostly) well known to policymakers and scholars, the public may be looking for relatively simple heuristics to tell them whether using military force is the “right thing to do” in a particular instance. Members of the American public face a serious problem of asymmetric information when a president argues that it is necessary to undertake military operations abroad. In making the case for war, the president can claim top secret information that demonstrates that the use of force is both just and necessary. Yet Americans rarely have the opportunity or resources to verify arguments made by the administration on behalf of the possible use of force.

Despite this lack of information, numerous studies of public opinion still indicate that the public is reasonably capable of expressing policy preferences and making voting choices that are consistent with their “interests” construed in a material sense (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). According to these studies, the public is capable of making these choices because of their ability to interpret cues from elite sources. Individuals know which elites they generally agree with and adopt positions from these cues. In matters of war, it is argued that the public attends to cues from party leaders (Berinsky 2007). Yet, international organizations may be another important “elite cue” when it comes to using military force.

International institutions (and the deliberations that occur within them) may be especially salient places for the public to look for a “second opinion” regarding the use of force. While the public may not get to see the classified information that drives decisions about war, foreign leaders being asked to join a military mission probably do (or they at least have access to their own privileged information). By extension, their voting representatives in international institutions (and thus the institutions acting collectively) are likely to be better informed about the case. The public could reasonably infer that allies and international institutions are useful outside validators of claims made by the Administration. Thus, foreign

leaders and international institutions could become crucial figures in convincing the public to support the president. Individuals will vary in the extent to which they rely on these “second opinions.” In general, we would expect that the lower one’s trust in the President as a source of information, the greater one’s reliance on a second opinion from an international organization. The less trust, the greater the need to verify with a second opinion.

The American Public's Interest in a Second Opinion: Aggregate Data

Over the years polls have asked Americans *if* they are multilateralists, but none appear to have asked *why* Americans hold these preferences. Hence, we lack definitive data from actual military engagements to examine directly why Americans prefer multilateralism. Still, we can evaluate the available data to determine whether multilateralism is consistent with relying on international institutions for a “second opinion” when deciding whether to support a commander-in-chief’s recommendation for the use of force. Looking at the Iraq War (an action proposed by a Republican president), the “second opinion” hypothesis predicts that Democrats should have had a greater preference for allies and a UN authorization for war than Republicans. Similarly, those who lack confidence in President Bush should have expressed a greater preference for external support.

Of course, Democrats may simply be more multilateralist than Republicans. Thus, we want to separate general preference for international support from contextual forces like which party occupies the White House. We expect that Republicans voice greater support for multilateral support when a Democrat is in the White House, because of the importance of a second opinion.

The available survey data are consistent with these expectations. When asked in February 2003 if the United States should obtain a UN resolution before it started a war against Iraq, 76% of Democrats in the Pew-CFR survey agreed that it “should get [a] UN

resolution,” while only 43% of Republicans agreed that it should do so.¹² Similarly, Americans who disapproved of President Bush's overall job performance expressed a stronger preference for international backing for war than those who approved of his overall performance in office—79% of those who disapproved wanted a UN resolution, while only 52% of those who approved expressed a need for a resolution¹³

These data cannot be dispositive regarding the second opinion hypothesis because Democrats may have been more likely than Republicans to have conditioned their support for war against Iraq on a multilateral approach. Unfortunately, the available surveys did not ask broader questions about attitudes toward IOs, making it difficult for us to disentangle these mechanisms with regard to Iraq. But if the second opinion hypothesis is correct, then we should expect that Republicans will express stronger preferences for multilateral action than Democrats when a Democrat is in the White House. Polling results contained in a June 1995 report by the Times Mirror Center for the Press & the People (now the above-noted Pew Center) allow us to probe this expectation. In response to the proposition, “In deciding on its foreign policies, the US should take into account the views of its major allies,” 73% of Democrats responded in the affirmative, and 81% of Republicans did so. Republicans were perhaps more multilateralist in their opinions than were Democrats, at least when Bill Clinton was president.¹⁴ The partisan gap in this case does not appear to be nearly as large, however, suggesting that partisan differences in preference for IO endorsements are partly a result of

¹²The difference is significant at the the 95% confidence interval.

¹³This difference is also statistically significant at the 95% confidence internal.

¹⁴Robert Toth, Carol Bowman, and Kimberly Parker, *Public Opinion of the UN: Strong Support, Strong Criticism*, Times Mirror Center for the Press & the People, June 25, 1995, 22, and available at <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/19950625.pdf>. Unfortunately, frequencies for party ID are not published in this report so it is not possible to test whether the difference is significant. However, if the distribution of party ID is consistent with other polling done by The Times Mirror Center at roughly the same time, then the difference between Republicans and Democrats is not significant. USUSUSThanks to Dr. Scott Keeter of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press for his guidance in this matter.

differences in the value placed on international institutions for their own sake and partly a result of differing levels of confidence in the President's decision making.

Support for International Intervention

The aggregate data are consistent with our expectations regarding the importance of a "second opinion" in public support for the use of force. Nonetheless, aggregate data do not allow us to test the mechanisms by which these "second opinions" matter. We would expect the overwhelming majority of the public prefers that the US use force with U.N approval rather than without. The central question, however, is what the president should do if he tries and fails to achieve U.N support. Should he wait until he can persuade the Security Council, or should he proceed without IO support? In a survey fielded in October 2004 through Knowledge Networks, we asked a sample of the public what they thought the president should do in this circumstance. Specifically, we asked "Before deciding to take military action, the president often seeks the approval of international organizations like the United Nations. What should the president do if he is not able to gain that approval?" Of course, some people will never support the use of force, even with U.N approval, while others believe that UN approval is not even desirable, so we allowed respondents to offer these opinions as well. Table 1 reports the answer categories and the distribution of responses to this question. We see clearly that the vast majority of the public believes that the US ought to attempt to obtain U.N support before using force, with only very small minorities believing either that the US should not even seek UN approval or that the US should not use force regardless of UN authorization. The public is fairly divided, however, about what to do if the US cannot obtain UN sanction. It is this variation that we seek to explain with the second opinion hypothesis.

Table 1 About Here

The second opinion hypothesis suggests that those who are less confident in the President will be more likely to look to international organizations for a cue when deciding whether to support the use of military force. To see how confidence in the White House affects the need for a second opinion before using force, we analyze respondents in the two middle categories. We set aside those who oppose force no matter what and those who think a president should be free to use force regardless of IO approval because we expect that those responses will be driven by other factors.¹⁵ Specifically, we take the two middle categories of the question in Table 1 to form a dependent variable. We code “[The President] should take military action even without international approval if he thinks it is necessary” equal to 0, and set “He should delay military action until he receives international approval” equal to 1. We use this dependent variable in a probit analysis. Positive coefficients indicate a stronger preference for wanting the endorsement of international organizations before supporting the use of force. Our independent variables include sex, education, age, and two variables concerning our second opinion hypothesis: party identification and confidence in the White House. Partisan identification is coded -1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, and 1 for Republicans. For “confidence in the White House” our survey asked respondents to state whether they are very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, or not at all confident “in the people running the White House.” This variable is measured as a 4-point likert scale with higher values indicating greater confidence in the White House.

Following from our aggregate data analyses, we expect a negative coefficient for party ID because Republicans should be less likely to rely on the cue from the UN. As we noted above, however, this partisan difference could be due to a difference in party preferences regarding the value of the UN per se or could be due to a lack of confidence in

¹⁵ We tested this assumption by analyzing all the responses with a multinomial logit model which allows for categorical rather than ordinal responses. This analysis indicated that variation into the extreme categories was

cues from the President. Thus when we include “confidence in the White House” to our analysis, we expect that variable to have a negative coefficient and we expect the substantive size of the coefficient for party ID to be reduced. This coefficient should now reflect the impact of partisanship *after* controlling for its “second opinion” effect. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 About Here

Both of these expectations are strongly supported. Party identification is significant and negative in both analyses, but its substantive size is cut nearly in half when we control for confidence in the White House. This result suggests that about half of the partisan differences over multilateralism is due to a lack of confidence in presidential cues, while about half is due to other factors – such as a difference in the valuation of international institutions. Confidence in the White House also has a significant and negative impact on preference for UN endorsement. Education is also significant and negative—those with more education are less inclined to require the approval of an international organization in order to use military force. Gender is significant and positive; women prefer to have international assent for the use of force.

Finally, we perform a third analysis to investigate the relative importance of confidence elite cues and inherent preferences for IO endorsement. If Democrats, on average, exhibit stronger support for multilateral policies, we would expect that confidence in the White House will play a smaller role in determining Democrats opinion about the need for UN approval because they will value such endorsements regardless of their views of the President. For Republicans, who generally care less about getting international approval, on

driven by different factors than within the central two categories. The multinomial logit also yielded similar

the other hand, confidence in the White House should be a more powerful predictor of whether international approval is required for the use of force. Thus our third analysis adds an interaction term between *Party ID* and *Confidence in White House* to the previous model we see that the coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant at the $p < .1$ level. Thus, party ID is a modifying variable for *Confidence in White House*. More specifically, the effect of *Confidence in WH* is greater for Republicans than it is for Democrats. For Democrats, going from being “Very Confident” in the people running the White House to “Not at all Confident” changes the predicted probability of wanting UN endorsement before supporting the President’s call for force 34 percentage points (53% to 87%). For Republicans, the same change in confidence in the White House changes the probability of needing international approval for the use of force by 62 percentage points (13% to 75%). Thus, while at the same level of confidence in the White House Democrats always have a stronger preference for IO approval (as would be expected because of the greater commitment to multilateralism that Democrats express), the effect of confidence is much stronger for Republicans. Figure 1 depicts the predicted probabilities that respondents will prefer waiting for the UN when approval is not forthcoming by party ID. Slightly over a half (53%) of Democrats who are “very confident” in the White House (while controlling for other factors) would still like to see approval from an international organization, which again demonstrates the strong preference Democrats have for multilateral institutions. For Republicans, only 13% of those who are “very confident” in the White House (again, controlling for other factors) see the need to have the approval of an international organization before the President uses force.

results to the probit model we report regarding variation between the two central categories.

Experiments on the “Second Opinion” Hypothesis

Thus far we have presented aggregate data indicating that partisan differences over the use of force are consistent with the “second opinion” hypothesis. We have also provided individual level evidence that shows that those who have low confidence in the White House are more apt to support waiting for international approval before using force abroad. However, neither of these analyses show whether support from an IO really would increase support using force—they just show a preference for asking for international approval before consenting to use force. It may be the case that asking for an international requirement is simply an “easy answer” to saying no the use of force without expressing pacifism.

To see how presence of international approval affects support for the use of force, we conducted a more focused test of these hypotheses with individual level data using a survey experiment where we employ treatments that expose subjects to different cues from domestic elites and international institutions. These conditions are embedded within a hypothetical scenario of sending troops to East Timor in response to an Indonesian attack against the newly independent state. Because we are measuring the effect of elite cues we wanted to choose a mission that would not overpower the elite cues in the experimental conditions. We chose East Timor because it is obscure enough that respondents probably have few well-entrenched predispositions regarding that county, yet the plausibility of an actual incident of this type would prevent respondents with greater political information from dismissing the scenario as impossible. The data for this experiment were gathered in a survey we designed that was conducted via telephone by the Parker Group, between September 22 and October 12, 2003. The experiment yielded a total of 1,203 respondents, and the complete text of the survey instrument is available from the authors.

Our experimental treatment provided respondents with information about the views of three major elite groups regarding a potential intervention in East Timor: 1) The views of the

President, 2) the views of the UN Security Council and our NATO allies, and 3) the views of Democratic and Republican leaders of Congress. We chose to rely on both the UN and NATO for our cue from international organizations because these are the two most salient institutions pertaining to American foreign military policy. We chose to cue both domestic and international elite messages so as to compare the impact of these two reference groups. Finally, for our domestic cue we included both Democratic and Republican Congressional support so as to have a cue from domestic elites that should appeal as broadly as possible to our respondents. This provides us with a relatively high standard for comparing the importance of cues from IOs relative to domestic actors.

The baseline condition for analysis is one in which only the President supports a mission, while Congressional leadership of both parties, the UN Security Council, and NATO allies all oppose sending force (we refer to this condition as *President*). The president's views are constant across all the categories, since US intervention is impossible without presidential support.¹⁶ Other conditions include: 1) all parties agree on the use of force (*All*), 2) President, UN Security Council, and NATO allies support while Congress opposes (*International*), and 3) the President and Congress support, but the UN security council and NATO allies oppose (*Domestic*). Condition names can be used as a heuristic to see who supports a mission.

We expect that *All* will have the strongest support, while at the other end of the spectrum, we would expect *President* to have the lowest support. We are agnostic as to whether *International* or *Domestic* should have more support. The majority of the literature

¹⁶ At a theoretical level, however, the issue of presidential support is not moot. It is possible that the public or Congress, or portions of the public or Congress, will press a reluctant President to consider the use of force. Certainly, a segment of the American public has argued that President Bush has been too slow to consider military options to address the genocide in Darfur. Likewise, there is a debate over how much US military action is appropriate in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where Bin Laden and senior Al Qaeda leaders are presumed to be hiding. It is at least possible that the public considers second opinions valuable checks on a President that it worries is unduly *reluctant* to use force. We do not have survey data to address this issue.

on elite cues has focused on domestic elites as the central sources of these cues (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996, 2000; Berinsky 2007). Thus one might expect to find such domestic cues to be more salient and influential than those provided by the UN and NATO, but that is not crucial to our argument.

Table 3: Elite Consensus Experiment {about here}

Table 3 presents the level of support for intervention by treatment category, and these results strongly indicate that elite messages can influence support for intervention. As expected, the public has the most support for an East Timor mission when there is a unified message from elites (*All*) and shows the least support when the President supports a mission, but all other elites are opposed (*President*). The effects, however, are strikingly large. Nearly 75% of respondents support intervention in East Timor if the UN and NATO and Congress join in support, while only 25% support intervention if the president stands alone against the views of these other elites. Interestingly, the net impact of disapproval by Congress or by the UN and NATO appears to be about equal, with about 48% approving when the UN and NATO endorses and about 42% when Democrats and Republicans in Congress do so.

We would not, of course, infer that such elite cues will always be so influential. The hypothetical intervention in East Timor is clearly an “elective” mission in which the security and economic interests of the United States are not directly threatened. This would seem to be the ideal circumstance for “second opinions” to influence public opinion. Nonetheless, we believe that such missions have become a very prominent part of American foreign policy and are arguably the most common kind of scenario for considering the use of force over the past couple of decades. Thus responses to this kind of intervention represent a plausible

testing ground for understanding the potential impact of domestic and international “second opinions” on public support for using force.

These results provide more solid support for the argument that elite cues – both from domestic and international organizations – can substantially influence support for the use of force. Despite the size of these treatment effects, however, they do not demonstrate the mechanism by which these cues matter. Does the endorsement of NATO and the UN increase support because respondents value those organizations *per se*, or does their endorsement matter because it provides a “second opinion” that supports a President whose judgment regarding the use of force our respondents might not otherwise trust?

In order to tease out these differing mechanisms, we turn to a statistical analysis of the responses. We begin our test by accounting for the respondent’s party identification. Our experiment did not draw attention to President Bush by name, but we conducted our survey in October 2003 in the midst of an ongoing war with a Republican in the White House and Republicans in control of Congress. Thus respondents almost certainly interpreted our statement that “the President” supported using force as a message from a Republican Commander-in-Chief. According to the “second opinion” hypothesis, we would expect to see Republican respondents support the President’s decision regardless of the cues that they receive from international organizations. Democrats, on the other hand, should be supportive if they receive cues from IOs that the use of force is legitimate, but should be less likely to do so in the absence of such a cue. Likewise, under these specific conditions, the second opinion hypothesis should expect Democrats to look more to IO’s than to a Republican-controlled Congress for outside validation. Thus we would expect party identification to have a significant impact on support in the absence of IO endorsement, but to have no significant impact when the UN and NATO agree with the President.

As we discussed earlier, an important barrier to testing the second opinion hypothesis – especially during a Republican administration - is the possibility that Democrats are more supportive of using force because they value IOs more than Republicans, not specifically because they use the IOs as a check on the judgment of elites in whom they do not have confidence. Thus the next step in our analysis is to attempt to separate the impact of partisanship into its two major components: confidence in the President and value placed on IO's in principle. Our measure of confidence is similar to the one used in the analyses in Table 2, but in this case we asked specifically about confidence in the President rather than “the people running the White House.” With regard to IO's we asked our respondents a set of more general questions about the importance that they felt the opinions of various groups should play in determining whether the United States should use military force. These questions did not specify any particular scenario for the use of force, nor did they mention the President by name or the office of the presidency. Instead the question asked respondents whether statements of opinions by differing groups would make them more or less likely to support the use of force or whether such statements would make no difference in their support.

Two of the groups that we asked about were the endorsement of the United Nations and NATO. Not surprisingly, respondents did – on average - say that NATO and UN endorsements would – in the abstract – increase their support for the use of force. For example, 41% of respondents stated the refusal of the UN Security Council to endorse the use of force would reduce their support for doing so, while 22% said that the UN refusal would increase their support. Similarly, 47% of respondents stated that the lack of NATO endorsement would reduce their support for using force, while 21% stated that it would increase their support. We measured these variables on 5-point scales. A value of 1 indicated that the respondent felt that the failure of the relevant IO to endorse the use of force

would make them “much more likely” to support using force, while a value of 5 indicated that the respondent felt that a lack of endorsement would make them “much less” supportive. A value of 3 indicated that the respondent felt the cue from the IO made no difference. We averaged the response to these two questions as a measure of the importance that respondents place on the opinions of the UN and NATO in the abstract – absent any specific scenario for the use of force or any specific cues from the President.

As expected, both confidence in the President and the value that respondents placed on the opinions of the UN and NATO were correlated with party identification, but not nearly as strongly as one might expect. For example, the correlation between party identification and our scale for the value of the UN and NATO was 0.22. This correlation was statistically significant, but not overwhelmingly large. For example, about 55% of Democrats stated that UN endorsement would increase their support for the use of force, while about 30% of Republicans expressed this view. Similarly, about 60% of Democrats stated that NATO endorsement would increase their support for using force, and 40% of Republicans agreed with them. The correlation between partisanship and confidence in the President was higher at 0.58. More than 90% of Republican respondents indicated that they were “somewhat confident” or “very confident” in the President. But responses among independents and Democrats were more divided. About 60% of independents expressed confidence in the President at the time of our survey, and even 37% of Democrats shared this view.

These relationships are strong enough to validate our concerns that the apparent impact of NATO and the UN could be due to differences between the parties regarding their views of these institutions and not due to their desire for a “second opinion” on the President’s judgments. However, the correlation between confidence in the President, views of the UN and NATO and party identification are not so large as to preclude separating out these two types of partisan effects.

We also include several other control variables that previous research suggests may be important in shaping public support for the use of force. First, since much of the literature regarding public support for the use of force focuses on the impact of casualties on support (see, for example, Mueller 1971, 1973; Larson 1996; Gartner and Segura 1998; Klarevas 2000), we asked respondents about the number of casualties that they expect would occur in the hypothetical East Timor mission.¹⁷ Second, previous research by Feaver and Gelpi (2004), Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005/2006), and Eichenberg (2005) indicates that public expectations of success is critical in shaping public support for the use of force. Thus we asked respondents about their expectation of the likelihood that the US would succeed if it undertook this mission.¹⁸ Finally, we include gender, age and education as demographic controls.

The results of these ordered probit models are presented in Table 4. Our analysis pools the data for all four treatment categories and includes dummy variables for each treatment with *President* as the excluded category. The first model simply includes partisanship as a control variable, while the second model analysis adds confidence in the President and value placed on IO's as control variables.

Table 4 About Here

Our first analysis shows that even after accounting for the impact of other explanatory variables, the public has the most support for an East Timor mission when there

¹⁷ This variable is a 6-point ordinal scale. Respondents could state that they expected 0 casualties, 1-50 casualties, 50-500 casualties, 500-5,000 casualties, 5,000 to 50,000 casualties or more than 50,000 casualties. The modal response was 50-500 casualties (37% of respondents), with 17% and 22% choosing the categories above and below that level respectively. Thus the responses showed some variation but generally appeared to be reasonable estimates of what the US might experience in such a mission.

¹⁸ This variable is a 4-point ordinal scale. The response categories were “very likely” to succeed, “somewhat likely” to succeed, “not very likely” to succeed, and “not at all likely” to succeed. Respondents were quite

is a unified message from elites (*All*) and shows the least support when the President supports a mission, but all other elites are opposed (*President*), and there is little substantive difference between the influence of domestic and international elites. These results are indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficients for the *International, Domestic and President* treatment categories. The substantive size of these coefficients also indicates that the impact of the *Domestic* and *International* treatments is approximately equal, since their coefficients are not significantly different. ($\chi^2=1.35$, 1 d.f., $p < .25$). The positive and statistically significant coefficients for these variables in Table 4 indicates that these conditions generate significantly more support than the *President* condition. Similarly, gaining support from both domestic and international elites increases support significantly over either the Domestic ($\chi^2=56.00$, 1 d.f., $p < .00$) or International ($\chi^2=43.39$, 1 d.f. $p < .00$) treatments.

The respondent's expectations regarding the number of casualties that would result from the conflict have a statistically significant but substantively modest impact on support for intervention. Unfortunately, the coefficient for this variable seems to be in the wrong direction! Contrary to our expectations, the positive coefficient indicated that respondents who stated that they expected a larger number of casualties tended to be more supportive of intervention. The mention of casualties within a survey question generally decreases support for the use of military force (Mueller 1994; Larson 1996; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). In this instance, however, our question about expected casualties was asked after the question about support for intervention. By asking the questions in this order we sought to measure respondents' support for the mission without cuing casualties. Then we asked about their expectations of casualties to see if those expectations matched up with their policy preference regarding intervention. We had some concern that those having expressed a preference for

confident in America's ability to accomplish this mission with almost 80% of the respondents stating that the

intervention might feel pressure to state that they did not expect casualties – creating a potential endogeneity problem. However, this concern turned out to be unfounded. Those who supported the mission expected more casualties.

Returning to the impact of elite cues, the analyses in Table 4 clearly indicate that the partisan differences over the use of force can be separated into at least two distinct effects. Our first analysis in Table 4 indicates that there is a significant partisan difference regarding support for intervention in East Timor. The negative coefficient indicates that Democrats are more supportive – on average – than Republicans. This result might seem contrary to the “second opinion” hypothesis, until we separate out partisanship into its differing effects. In the second analysis in Table 4 we control for the impact of confidence in the President and the value that respondents place on IOs and the impact of partisanship disappears. Instead, we see that confidence in the President increases support for intervention, while support for IOs decreases support. These results indicate that our measures of confidence in the President and valuation of IOs act as intervening variables between partisanship and support for intervention.

Before drawing any conclusions about the impact of these variables, however, we must recall that the expected effect of confidence and valuation of IOs should differ significantly depending on the experimental condition that the respondent received. Thus the third model in Table 4 allows for interactions between the treatment conditions and the impact of confidence in the President and valuation of IOs. Not surprisingly, the effects of the demographic and other control variables are generally unaffected by the inclusion of the interaction terms. Moreover, the direct impact of party identification remains insignificant and substantively small. However, the results clearly indicate an interaction between the treatments and our key variables. Three of the six interaction terms are statistically

US was “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to succeed.

significant and a fourth is nearly statistically significant ($p < .11$). Moreover, a log-likelihood ratio test clearly indicates that the model including the interaction terms is a significantly better fit (chi-squared 40.1, 6 d.f., $p < .01$). Because of the interactive nature of the model, however, simply looking at the coefficients in Table 4, however, cannot tell us the impact of confidence and valuation of IO's within each treatment condition. In order to determine the total effect of each of these variables within each experimental category, we must add together the coefficient for the base category (*President*) with the interaction effect for each of the other categories. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficient and statistical significance for confidence in the President and valuation of IOs across the 4 experimental treatment categories.

Table 5 About Here

The first row of Table 5 indicates that neither confidence in the President nor support for the UN and NATO have any impact on support for using military force when Congress and the UN and NATO endorse the mission. That is, when all elites are sending the same message regarding the mission, then differences over confidence in elite cues or multilateralist values do not influence support for the hypothetical mission in East Timor. The coefficient for confidence in the President is positive, but substantively modest and is not statistically significant ($p < .15$). The second row of the table provides even stronger support for the "second opinion" hypothesis, indicating that when the UN and NATO endorse a mission but Congress does not, neither of these variables has any impact. The coefficient for both confidence in the President and valuation of IOs is essentially zero.

In both of the conditions when the UN and NATO do not support the mission, however, confidence in the President and an individual's own views about the UN and NATO have a significant impact on support for the hypothetical mission. Specifically, the

positive coefficient for confidence in the President indicates that when the president does not obtain IO endorsement for the use of force, those who have confidence in him personally are likely to support the mission, but those who do not have confidence are significantly less likely to do so. Since the President lacks a credible “second opinion” in this context, those who do not have confidence in him do not support the mission. This holds true even when we account for attitudes toward the UN and NATO. In addition to this “second opinion” mechanism, respondents’ attitudes about the UN and NATO clearly also influence their support for the use of force when these institutions do not endorse the mission. The negative coefficients in rows 3 and 4 of Table 5 indicate that the more the respondent values the UN and NATO the less likely they are to support the use of force when these institutions do not endorse the mission.

The probit coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the second opinion hypothesis, but how big an influence do these second opinions have relative to other factors such as perceptions of success and attitudes toward the IOs themselves? The model indicates that these three factors have approximately equal effects on support for the mission, and all three stand out as the largest factors in determining support for the use of force. Specifically, the interactive model in Table 4 predicts that an increase in a respondent’s expectations of the success of the mission from “not at all likely” to “very likely” to succeed increases the probability that they will approve of the mission by approximately 37%. This effect is especially important because it holds true regardless of the experimental condition.

The “second opinion” effects are captured by the changing importance of confidence in the President across the treatment conditions. For example, in the *President* treatment condition, those who are “very confident” in the President are about 25% more likely to support intervention in E. Timor than those who are “not at all confident.” In the *International* treatment condition, however, the same change in confidence in the President

only increases support for intervention by 3%. Thus once respondents receive a “second opinion” validating the President’s judgment, their confidence in the President no longer shapes their policy preference.

The impact of attitudes toward the UN and NATO is similarly conditional. In the *President* treatment condition, an increase in the respondent’s valuation of UN and NATO endorsement from “much less likely” to “much more likely” to support decreases the probability that they will support the mission by about 29%. In the International condition, however, support for the UN and NATO only reduces the probability that a respondent will support intervention by about 4%. Thus when the UN and NATO do not endorse a mission, individuals who value those institutions are substantially less likely to support the use of force. When the UN and NATO sanction the mission, however, then those who value those institutions do not differ substantially from those who do not value them.

Thus the endorsements of international organizations can have a significant impact on the support for using military force through their role as providers of a second opinion on the wisdom and legitimacy of undertaking a mission. However, at the outset of our investigation, we noted that multilateral endorsements might be important for another reason: they might convince the public that the mission will succeed at lower cost. How important is the “second opinion” mechanism relative to these other influences of multilateralism? Our experiment regarding a hypothetical intervention in East Timor did collect two variables that speak to this question: expectations of casualties and expectations of success. While obviously not the only kind of costs to a military mission, casualties are the most salient and obvious costs to the public. Moreover, our question about expected success would seem to tap directly into the concept that is central to that argument about multilateralism. Did our experimental treatments influence respondent’s expectations regarding the costs and likely success of the East Timor mission? Tables 6 and 7 display the responses for each of these

variables by treatment category. If the hypothesis regarding expectations of cost and success is correct, then we would expect to see respondents estimate the greater probabilities of success and lower expectations of casualties in the All and International conditions, and the lower prospects for success with greater casualties in the President and Domestic conditions. No such pattern appears in the data. In Table 6 we see no relationship between expected casualties and the experimental treatments with the possible exception that those in the President treatment category were slightly less likely to expect casualties. However, the difference across all of the categories is not statistically significant ($p < .12$), and a regression analysis using a dummy variables for each of the treatment categories separately revealed that none of the individual treatment effects approached statistical significance. The results regarding expectations of success in Table 7 are somewhat more encouraging. In this instance we can see that 44% of those in the All treatment and 41% of those in the International treatment expected that the US was “very likely” to succeed. Only 37% in the Domestic condition and 35% under the President condition shared this view. These results are consistent with the notion that multilateral endorsements increase public expectations of success, but the differences across are not statistically significant. ($p < .12$).

We would be cautious, however, in drawing broad conclusions from these results regarding perceptions of costs and success because of the kind of mission described in our experiment. As noted above, our hypothetical intervention in East Timor is a prototypical “elective” use of force that has become so common in American foreign policy during the post-Cold War era. Because of the nature of this mission, respondents’ expectations of success were generally quite high, and their expectations of casualties were generally low. We would recognize that in missions against more militarily capable enemies, public concerns about cost and success might be influenced by multilateral endorsement. What we can say with certainty, however, is that in our experiment regarding East Timor, the

endorsement of the UN and NATO had a substantial impact on public support because of its role as a second opinion and not because of its influence on expected costs or likely success.

Tables 6 and 7 About Here

Conclusions

The proposition that some Americans look to the capacity of their leaders to win international sanction for war as a way of seeking a second opinion on their leaders' recommendation for that course of action receives consistent support. Aggregate public opinion data as well as our individual level data and experimental data on a hypothetical American intervention in East Timor point clearly to the conclusion that members of the public who are less likely to trust messages from the Commander-in-Chief look to international institutions such as the UN and NATO for cues as to whether they should support the use of military force. Specifically, with regard to the 2003 Iraq war Democrats placed greater emphasis on obtaining allies and international authorization for a war against Iraq in early 2003 than did Republicans. The same pattern held for Americans who disapproved of the President's overall performance relative to those who approved. Importantly, we also found that when a Democrat was in the White House in the mid-1990s, Republicans were more multilateralist (in terms of paying attention to the views of major allies) than were Democrats. Individual level data shows that confidence in the White House is indeed a key component in desiring a second opinion. And as we might expect, for Democrats (who have a stronger affinity for international organizations) confidence is less important in requiring a second opinion than it is for Republicans. Finally, our experimental data allowed us to compare the endorsements of different elite actors within the same military conflict and control for the impact of respondents' intrinsic preferences for multilateralism.

By demonstrating that the impact of partisan identification on support for using force varied significantly depending on the cues from international organizations, this experiment clearly demonstrated that the “second opinion” effect of international authorization is significant and substantial.

If this assessment of the potential utility of the second-opinion thesis is correct, then a number of questions present themselves for further investigation. For example, we might seek to determine through surveys if Americans believe that the influence of different international actors as providers of “second opinions” varies as a function of the identity or characteristics of those alliances or institutions. Many surveys simply ask respondents about the importance of allies or ask about several specific allies and organizations at once. Indeed, our own experiment followed this pattern by asking about the UN and NATO at the same time. We did so because we lacked a strong empirical basis for determining which allies and institutions would be most salient. However, future research should investigate the relative impact of various international institutions on American public opinion.

Additional lines of research might focus on the domestic characteristics of foreign allies when it comes to their capacity to provide Americans with a credible second opinion. For example, we might expect that Americans believe that democratic leaders on average have more to lose than do authoritarian leaders in terms of domestic political support and even tenure in office if they incorrectly support the United States in a war. Knowing that, Americans might believe that the decisions of democratic allies to support or not to support the United States in a war provide a more reliable second opinion about the wisdom of that war than do the decisions of authoritarian allies. By the same logic, as a provider of a reliable second opinion, we should expect that the American public would place much greater weight on allies that can reasonably be expected, perhaps on the basis of past experience, to put

forces at risk if war actually occurs as opposed to allies that are not expected to put forces at risk.

A similar logic may be found to operate in terms of the value assigned by Americans to the UN Security Council and NATO as providers. Does the impact of these institutions on the American public depend on the extent to which they are perceived as being “democratic?” Does their impact depend on the perceived probability that they will contribute military forces to the conflict? Finally, it would be interesting and important to understand the conditions – if any – under which Americans might view a “coalition of the willing” as a functional substitute for NATO or UN Security Council endorsement of a mission. We are not aware of any national survey that has asked Americans if and when they would view such coalitions as equal in value to the support of formal alliances or the UN. One might expect that, because they know that US leaders can forge coalitions with economic and political incentives and sanctions, members of the US public would discount their value as a source of reliable second opinions. On the other hand, if foreign governments join coalitions without UN authorization and, by consequence, as we saw in the Iraq case, in the teeth of popular discontent, Americans might view them as stronger rather than as weaker evidence that their own leaders were taking the country in the right direction.

In an international environment that remains anarchic at its root, states will remain capable of using military force regardless of the actions of international organizations such as the UN Security Council. The United States – as the preeminent military power – is especially difficult for international organizations to constrain in this regard. Nonetheless, if Americans do assign value to international institutions and allies during war, then American presidents will pay substantial costs in terms of public support for using force in the absence

of international authorization.¹⁹ In this work we have demonstrated that one of the pathways by which such costs might be imposed relates to the process of opinion formation, including public support for or opposition to the initiation of war by an American president.

Asymmetric information problems make it difficult for members of the public to evaluate their leaders' claims about the wisdom of using military force. Citizens cope with their lack of information by evaluating the cues provided to them by competing elites. While some members of the public will accept the cues provided by the President and rally to his support, those who distrust his judgment will look elsewhere for cues. Our research indicates that international institutions such as the UN Security Council and NATO can be important sources of such cues for substantial segments of the American population. If U.S. presidents ignore the resulting inference that publics draw from those cues, and use them as a basis to form their own opinions about the need and legitimacy of force, then they may expect public resistance to his or her claims that the use of force in a particular instance is wise for the nation.

¹⁹ In making this argument, we build on three premises: (1) majorities of the US public have stable views on foreign policy; (2) Americans vote in part on the basis of foreign policy; and (3) US presidents are constrained to accommodate US public opinion in the crafting of American foreign policy. For a summary of the evidence regarding these premises, see John Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Sharp, "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (June 2007). On behalf of the first premise, see Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 22-33, 39-51; and Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June 1988), 211-247. On the second premise, see John Aldrich, John Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience'," *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989), 123-141, and especially 134-135; Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "The Means and Ends of Foreign Policy as Determinants of Presidential Support," *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (May 1987), 236-258; and Sowmya Anand and Jon A. Krosnick, "The Impact of Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Goals on Public Preferences among Presidential Candidates: A Study of Issue Publics and the Attentive Public in the 2000 Presidential Election," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 20 (March 2003). On the third premise, see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), 175-190; Richard Sobel, *The Impact of Public Opinion on US Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988), 452-475.

Table 1: “Before deciding to take military action, the president often seeks the approval of international organizations like the United Nations. What should the president do if he is not able to gain that approval?” (October 2004, Column percents)

	Total	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
He should not take military action period, regardless of whether he can get international approval	99 10%	13 4%	29 10%	57 14%
He should delay military action until he receives international approval	439 42%	66 20%	130 44%	240 61%
He should take military action even without international approval if he thinks it is necessary	436 42%	244 72%	111 38%	84 21%
He should not seek international approval before deciding to take military action	53 5%	15 4%	23 8%	15 4%
Total	1027	338	293	396

Table 2: Partisanship, Confidence in the White House, and Preferences for the Multilateral Use of Force			
	Wait for UN	Wait for UN	Wait for UN
Party Identification	-0.713	-0.459	-0.706
	(12.85)**	(7.10)**	(4.65)**
Sex	0.405	0.455	0.453
	(4.42)**	(4.78)**	(4.75)**
Age	-0.020	-0.040	-0.033
	(0.44)	(0.86)	(0.72)
Education	-0.093	-0.165	-0.151
	(1.97)*	(3.32)**	(3.02)**
Confidence in White House		-0.448	-0.471
		(7.95)**	(8.13)**
Confidence x Party ID			0.123
			(1.80)
Observations	875	870	870
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%			

Table 3: Support for Intervention in East Timor Depending on Elite Cues (October 2003, Column percents)				
	All Elites Approve	Domestic Elites Approve	International Elites Approve	Only the President Approves
Strongly Approve	98 35%	47 19%	50 18%	30 11%
Somewhat Approve	112 40%	56 22%	85 30%	35 13%
Somewhat Disapprove	29 10%	58 23%	71 25%	63 24%
Strongly Disapprove	43 15%	88 35%	76 27%	139 52%
Total	282	249	282	267

Table 4: Elite Cues, Confidence in the President and Support for Intervening in E. Timor			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
International	0.584	0.607	0.833
	(5.83)**	(5.95)**	(1.99)*
Domestic	0.507	0.491	0.523
	(4.93)**	(4.67)**	(1.18)
All	1.226	1.251	0.883
	(11.88)**	(11.90)**	(2.02)*
Sex	-0.169	-0.172	-0.149
	(2.38)*	(2.38)*	(2.04)*
Age	-0.000	0.008	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.36)	(0.20)
Education	-0.044	-0.014	-0.016
	(1.44)	(0.44)	(0.51)
Expected Casualties	0.077	0.069	0.076
	(2.44)*	(2.14)*	(2.32)*
Expected Success	0.454	0.430	0.425
	(9.87)**	(8.95)**	(8.79)**
Party Identification	-0.092	0.016	0.014
	(2.34)*	(0.33)	(0.29)
Value IO's		-0.128	-0.313
		(3.49)**	(4.07)**
Confidence in President		0.121	0.272
		(2.88)**	(3.34)**
Intl x Value IO			0.275
			(2.66)**
Dom x Value IO			0.017
			(0.16)
All x Value IO			0.370
			(3.53)**
Intl x Confidence			-0.298
			(3.01)**
Dom x Confidence			-0.021
			(0.20)
All x Confidence			-0.165
			(1.62)
Observations	1016	993	993
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%			

Table 5: Impact of Confidence in the President and Importance of UN and NATO on Support for Intervention in East Timor Depending on Elite Cues		
	Coefficients for Confidence in President	Coefficients for Value of IO Endorsement
All Elites Endorse Mission	0.11 (1.51)	0.06 (0.79)
International Elites Endorse Mission	-0.02 (0.39)	-0.04 (0.55)
Domestics Elites Endorse Mission	0.25 (3.36)**	-0.31 (4.10)**
Only the President Endorses Mission	0.27 (3.34)**	-0.30 (3.78)**
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%		

Expected Casualties	East Timor Intervention Treatment Category				
	All	International	Domestic	President	Total
Zero	40 15%	50 18%	41 18%	51 22%	182 18%
1-50	63 24%	68 26%	49 21%	44 19%	224 22%
51-500	101 39%	96 35%	99 42%	73 31%	369 37%
501-5,000	45 17%	42 15%	37 16%	50 20%	174 17%
5,001-50,000	6 2%	8 3%	4 2%	11 5%	29 3%
50,001 +	6 2%	13 5%	4 2%	8 3%	31 3%
	261	277	234	237	

Cells display frequency and column percentages
Chi-squared = 21.62 (15 d.f.) p < .12

Expected Success	East Timor Intervention Treatment Category				
	All	International	Domestic	President	Total
Very Likely	124 44%	121 41%	95 37%	96 36%	436 40%
Somewhat Likely	100 35%	125 42%	101 40%	118 44%	444 40%
Not Very Likely	44 16%	43 14%	42 42%	33 12%	162 15%
Not At All Likely	14 5%	8 3%	16 6%	20 8%	58 5%
	282	297	254	267	

Cells display frequency and column percentages
Chi-squared = 14.09 (9 d.f.) $p < .12$

Figure 1

