

Let's Get a Second Opinion:
Allies, the UN, and U.S. Public Support for War

Joseph M. Grieco
Duke University

June 2003

I thank Carol Atkinson, Marco Cesa, Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, Ole Holsti, and Scott DeMarchi for their excellent comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper, and Robert Jackson for his help in accessing data archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Abstract

Many observers have expressed the concern that the Bush administration has decided to separate America from its allies in NATO and its partners on the UN Security Council. The theme of this essay is that the current administration, and those that follow it, are unlikely seriously to pursue such a strategy, because the American public has a strong and rational preference for allies and UN authorization for the use of military force, and presidents do not stray too far or for too long from public opinion as they craft U.S. foreign policy.

The paper begins by substantiating three of its main premises: that there are reasonable grounds to be concerned about that the Bush administration would prefer to take the United States in a unilateralist direction in military affairs; that the U.S. public can, by way of public opinion polling, act as a constraint on presidential preferences in foreign policy; and that the U.S. public prefers that, if the nation goes to war, it should have allies and authorization by the UN Security Council.

The paper then explores the bases for the preference on the part of the U.S. public for allies and UN authorization. It reviews briefly the well-known factors of military efficacy and burden sharing. It then introduces a more novel explanation, namely, that allies and international authorization provide a “second opinion” on the wisdom of U.S. leaders when they recommend going to war. In the case of the lead-up to the Iraq War, for example, members of the public may have viewed the garnering of external support as a way of checking that President Bush and his top people had not fallen into a number of intellectual or political pitfalls.

The paper presents four preliminary tests of the second-opinion thesis, and finds support for it in three of the four tests. The paper concludes with the suggestion that the thesis has sufficient plausibility to merit further investigation; it suggests three future lines of research; and it derives two initial policy recommendations, and in the proposal that the second-opinion thesis, if correct, may highlight a serious weakness in a U.S. coalitions-of-the-willing strategy.

Introduction

During the past two years, and especially in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, many commentators have expressed the concern that the administration of President George W. Bush has decided to separate America fundamentally from its allies in Europe and its partners on the United Nations Security Council. I argue below that the risk that the current administration, or future administrations, can pursue such a unilateralist military strategy is extremely low. The current administration, and those that will follow it, will remain committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN Security Council because large majorities of the American public want their government to have military allies and UN authorization when the United States goes to war.

Americans want allies and international authorization because their possession increases the chances of pre-war coercive diplomatic success and, if war is necessary, success during and after it at lower cost. But I argue below that Americans want allies and international authorization for another reason as well, one that to date has not been the subject of public or scholarly conversations. That is, I propose that Americans want allies and UN authorization as a way of obtaining a “second opinion” on the wisdom and the intentions of their leaders in taking them down a path that may end in war.

For example, in late-2002 and early 2003, President Bush argued that a military campaign to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein would yield future security gains for America sufficiently large to justify the risks of a war. Just as a patient, when advised by his or her family doctor to undergo a potentially beneficial but definitely risky surgical procedure, often seeks a second medical opinion, so too Americans may have sought a second opinion about President Bush’s recommendation for war with Iraq. And, just as a patient may become more confident in his or her family doctor's recommendation if another doctor concurs with it,

Americans, observing that Prime Minister Tony Blair and other foreign leaders supported the President, may have been more confident that the President was right in recommending war.

In pursuit of this thesis, in the next section I argue on behalf of two of the three main premises of the paper, that President Bush would like to pursue a unilateralist U.S. military strategy, and that U.S. public opinion by itself could moderate such a re-orientation of American policy. In the subsequent section I offer support for the paper's third key premise, that big majorities of Americans prefer a U.S. grand strategy that is founded on multilateralism. I then offer reasons as to why it is rational for members of the American public to have this preference, and are likely therefore to press their government to remain committed to alliances and the UN Security. As noted above, I suggest that some of these reasons relate to crisis efficacy as well as risk and burden sharing during and after a military conflict. These arguments are quite well known in public conversations. However, I also put forward what may be the more novel argument that Americans view the capacity of their presidents to win allies and international institutional support for war as a way of checking on their own top leaders. I subsequently put forward and evaluate four different empirical expectations about what we ought to see in surveys of U.S public opinion if the second-opinion thesis is plausible. I find that three of the four tests lend credence to the thesis, and suggest that it therefore merits further investigation. Finally, I offer recommendations for future research on the second-opinion thesis, and derive initial policy implications, including the possibility that the thesis may pinpoint a weakness in a U.S. strategy that would replace formal alliances and UN authorizations for war with ad hoc coalitions of the willing.

In the discussion below I employ, in the first place, a survey of members of the U.S. general public, and of U.S. political and social leaders, that was conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund during the summer of 2002 and released in October of that year.¹ I also employ two polls of U.S. citizens that were

conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. The first was undertaken and released in January 2003, and the second, co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, was undertaken in two waves, just before and after Hans Blix made his key 14 February presentation to the UN Security Council.² Finally, I employ two surveys of U.S. citizens that were conducted by the Program in International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and a private firm, Knowledge Networks (KN). The first PIPA-KN survey was conducted just after the Iraq war began on March 19; and the second was completed just after main allied combat operations ended in mid-April.³

Is There a Bush Unilateralism Problem? Could U.S. Public Opinion be a Solution?

As noted above, the paper's first premise is that the Bush administration, if left on its own, would prefer to de-emphasize formal military alliances, and in particular NATO, as well as the UN Security Council. The second premise is that U.S. public opinion is capable of constraining the administration's interest in and effort to pursue such a unilateralist strategy.

The first premise, that the Bush administration prefers to act outside the framework of NATO and the UN Security Council, has been articulated in dozens if not scores of articles and opinion essays.⁴ For the sake of economy of space, I will present the views along these lines of two respected observers: Michael Hirsh, former foreign affairs editor of the high-quality, mass-circulation magazine, *Newsweek*, and John Judis, a senior editor at *The New Republic*, which appeals to an elite reading audience.⁵

Writing in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, itself one of the most influential international affairs periodicals in the world, Hirsh argues that American political-military policy has indeed become radically more unilateralist, and he puts the onus of responsibility for that on George W. Bush. His administration, Hirsh argues, still adheres to the formalities

of multilateralism, such as continuing to participate in meetings of such arrangements as NATO, the World Trade Organization, and the Group of Seven industrialized countries. However, "Bush, to judge by his actions, appears to believe in a kind of unilateral civilization. NATO gets short shrift, the United Nations is an afterthought, treaties are not considered binding, and the administration brazenly sponsors protectionist measures at home such as new steel tariffs and farm subsidies."⁶ Hirsh recalls that the Bush administration sidelined NATO during the Afghan war of 2002 in favor of a U.S.-controlled coalition of the willing, and in connection to the Atlantic alliance he reports that "One senior hard-liner at a Pentagon meeting summed up the view thus: 'Preserve the myth, and laugh.'"

Why has this happened? Hirsh suggests that the problem results from the lack of effective leadership by President Bush, and the fact that some of his top people are intellectual extremists. As he suggests, the Bush administration is "almost as much at war with itself as with the terrorists." He explains that the main protagonists consist of "Secretary of State Colin Powell and his lonely band of moderate multilateralists, the Donald Rumsfeld-Dick Cheney axis of realist unilateralists, and a third group of influential neoconservatives led by [Paul] Wolfowitz." Hirsh believes that Bush does not have strong views of his own on foreign policy, for he goes on to suggest that, in the face of these warring camps in his administration, the President seems uncontrollably to steer his administration between the extremes of isolationism and adventurist internationalism. However, Hirsh argues that, between these two polar extremes, "the overall tilt of his administration remains toward disengagement except in the use of military force."

John Judis brings forward a similar argument. His basic thesis in a recent issue of the *American Prospect* is that "Except for a brief respite after September 11, the Bush administration has supported what conservatives call 'unilateralism' but really a variant of 1920s isolationism." He explains that "The isolationists of the 1920s did not reject overseas

intervention; they just rejected intervening through alliances or on behalf of concerns that didn't reflect the most narrow and immediate definition of the national interest."⁷ And, for Judis, Bush's isolationism "reflects the administration's scepticism that it could ever win diplomatic support for its aims, and its confidence that it can achieve through military superiority what it cannot achieve through diplomacy."⁸

Thus, from the viewpoint of these (and many other) observers of U.S. foreign policy, the current administration is steering the nation toward a new, extreme form of unilateralism in the military domain. This brings us to the paper's second premise, namely, that U.S. public opinion has the capacity, if it prefers multilateralism in military affairs, to moderate the unilateralist thrust of the current leadership. Are there solid grounds for this premise about the efficacy of the public in influencing U.S. foreign policy?

In order to answer that question, we need to address three separate issues. First, does the American public have stable, coherent views or preferences in regard to foreign policy? Second, assuming that Americans generally do have stable preferences on foreign policy, do they act politically--in particular, through their voting--on the basis of those foreign policy preferences? And third, do U.S. politicians, and especially presidents, know that the American public has stable preferences on foreign policy, and vote on the basis of them, and do those politicians shape U.S. policy to accommodate them?

The relevant political science literature answers these three questions largely in the affirmative. First, while analysts of U.S. public opinion at the outset of the 1950s suggested that Americans lack a stable and coherent set of views about international matters, the overwhelming consensus in the scholarly literature produced in recent decades is that Americans consistently report highly stable, coherent opinions on foreign policy.⁹

Second, there is strong evidence that the U.S. electorate votes on the basis not just of their views on domestic policy issues, but on the basis of their preferences on foreign policy

as well. For example, a team of scholars in the late-1980s designed a statistical model of candidate choices made by voters during the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections as a function of their preferences regarding domestic and foreign policy matters. The research team first demonstrated that voters cared a great deal about foreign policy issues both in 1980 and 1984. They also showed that voters were well aware of and interested in the differences in the stances of the candidates on foreign matters in both elections. Most importantly, the research team concluded that "in a reasonably fully specified model foreign and defense issues appear to be very important influences on the choices voters make."¹⁰

Finally, there is the critical matter of whether U.S. national leaders and, in particular, U.S. presidents, are concerned about, and believe they need to accommodate, American public opinion on foreign policy issues.¹¹ One general perspective in the literature is that public opinion is so readily manipulated by presidents that they have little reason to be constrained by it. For example, according to one line of inquiry, U.S. presidents, by virtue of the vast institutional resources of the White House, can now track and shape the views of the public on most issues, including those relating to foreign policy.¹² In addition, members of the U.S. public may be prone to a "rally 'round the flag" effect when their leaders take the country into a war.¹³ If the "rally 'round the flag" effect is strong and reliable, presidents may believe that they can count on shaping public opinion to their benefit by using force abroad.¹⁴

Yet, the larger body of scholarship in political science suggests that U.S. politicians, and especially presidents, are often constrained in their foreign policy choices by American public opinion. Presidents might sometimes be able to bolster their public standing by taking bold military actions overseas, but they cannot count on that outcome, and in fact there may not be any systematic "rally 'round the flag" political payoffs for the use of military force abroad.¹⁵ Indeed, there is some evidence that, when the public itself has expressed a high

level of concern about an international crisis, a president becomes less rather than more likely to use force in that crisis.¹⁶

More generally, in a comprehensive study of U.S. public opinion and actual U.S. domestic and foreign policy between 1935 and 1979, scholars observed a remarkably high level of convergence between public opinion and actual government behavior in both domains. They also found no significant difference in the level of government responsiveness to public preferences in foreign policy as compared to domestic issues.¹⁷

Further, a recent study of the impact of U.S. public opinion on foreign policy from the administrations of Lyndon Johnson to Bill Clinton, and in particular its impact on presidents and secretaries of state and defense, demonstrates that top decision-makers were very much aware during that period of public opinion on foreign policy matters, and shaped U.S. policy to accommodate public preferences. As the study concludes, "decision-makers were constantly aware of public opinion and were by necessity constrained in the timing, extent, and direction of their actions." Presidents throughout the period from the mid-1960s to the late-1990s were especially sensitive to public opinion on foreign matters; as the study also concludes, presidents in respect to foreign policy opinions of the public "follow the polls for both governing and electoral purposes."¹⁸

Finally, there is evidence that, during the Cold War, the public tended to voice opinions about the Soviet Union that cut against the predominant course of action of whichever president was then in office. That is, public opinion was more hawkish in regard to the Soviet Union than were the policies of the bulk of the Carter years, and it was more dovish than were the policies at the outset of the Reagan administration. More importantly, the pattern of shifts in public opinion and U.S. policy towards the USSR suggest that the public's expression of views contrary to that of their presidents may have moderated to a significant degree U.S. policy during the Cold War years.¹⁹

Just as public opinion may have caused dovish presidents to be more hawkish during the Cold War, and hawkish presidents to be more dovish, so too an internationalist public might induce the current president to be more multilateralist in his policies than he might otherwise prefer. Systematic empirical research will surely be done on this proposition in the years ahead. But, for the moment, consider President Bush's first steps as he moved toward war against Iraq. According to recent in-depth reporting by the *Financial Times*, Bush had decided in early September 2002 "to move on Iraq." Further, he had made up his mind by that time "to tackle Iraq through the UN." In part, according to the report, the President elected to go the UN route to deal with well-known "cracks in his administration." But there was another reason: according to the *Financial Times* report, Bush "was also responding to electoral pressures." Specifically, "His political advisors were telling him that voters in the November mid-term congressional elections were keen to see UN support for US policy."²⁰

This early reporting by the *Financial Times* on President Bush's concern about public opinion on Iraq is consistent with the systematic research that has found that presidents are typically responsive to U.S. public opinion when crafting American strategy. Thus, if the U.S. public prefers military multilateralism, then both the early reporting on the particular case of the Iraq war, and the scholarship on this overall question, both suggest that this preference may be able to constrain even the "hard case" of President Bush. Now we may turn to the third premise of the paper, that Americans prefer military multilateralism.

The American Public Preference for Multilateralism in War

Large majorities of Americans have expressed a preference that the United States attain the support of allies and international sanctioning if it uses military force overseas.²¹ For example, asked how the United States should respond to international crises when it

“does not have the support of its allies,” 61% of respondents in the Chicago-GMF survey said that the United States “should not act alone,” and 31% agreed that it “should act alone.”²²

In addition, on the particular matter of using force “to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq,” Americans in the summer of 2002 expressed a preference for military multilateralism. Only 20% of those surveyed by the Chicago-GMF agreed that “The U.S. should invade Iraq even if we have to go it alone.” In contrast, a strong majority of 65% agreed that “The U.S. should only invade Iraq with UN approval and support of its allies.”²³

After the Iraq war had commenced without UN approval, the U.S. general public still expressed a marked preference for UN Security Council authorizations for the use of force by the United States. The March PIPA-KN survey found that a majority of respondents (54%) said they agreed with the President’s decision to go to war even without UN authorization, with 23% not agreeing with the decision but supporting the President, and 21% disagreeing with the President and not supporting his decision.²⁴ However, Americans believed it had been important and useful to make the effort to obtain it. For example, the April PIPA-KN survey found that while 9% of Americans thought that seeking UN authorization “was a mistake,” an overwhelming 88% agreed that it “was the right thing to do.”²⁵

Moreover, in looking to the future, while 29% of respondents in the March PIPA-KN survey believed that the U.S. “Should feel more free to use force without UN authorization,” 66% supported the view that the United States “Should not feel more free to use force without UN authorization.”²⁶ Similarly, in the April PIPA-KN survey, 35% agreed that the United States should feel freer to use force without UN authorization, while 61% said it should not.²⁷ The drop between March and April in the percentage of respondents who agreed that the United States should not feel freer to use force in the future without UN authorization, and the increase in the percentage who agreed the United States should, are unlikely to be indicative of a trend in favor of the latter view. This is because both changes

may have been due to chance, a point that was emphasized in the April PIPA-KN report in respect to the drop in support for the view that the United States should not feel free to use force without an authorization.²⁸

Finally, on the matter of the future of America's commitment to NATO, the Chicago-GMF survey found growing, not weakening, public support for the Alliance in the summer of 2002. For example, asked to choose between statements best reflecting their views, while 56% of the respondents said NATO "is still essential to our country's security," only 30% thought that NATO "is no longer essential."²⁹

Further, as can be observed below in Figure 1, the Chicago-GMF survey found that U.S. public support for NATO was higher in 2002, in terms of respondents who agreed that the U.S. commitment to it should remain constant or be increased, than at any time during most of the previous three decades. More specifically, 65% of respondents in 2002 agreed that the United States should keep its commitment to NATO constant. That was the highest percentage who agreed with this view since the Chicago Council began asking the NATO commitment question in 1974, and it was seven percentage points higher than the average of 58% for the full period. Similarly, 11% of respondents in 2002 thought the U.S. should increase its commitment to NATO. That again was the highest recorded percentage expressing this view over the eight iterations of the Chicago survey between 1974 and 2002, and a bit more than three percentage points higher than the average for all eight iterations. Whatever may be said about their leaders in Washington, Americans in recent years have become more, not less, supportive of America's participation in NATO.

Figure 1 Here

Explaining the Public's Preference for Allies and UN Authorization for Force

For Americans, there are at least two categories of benefits to be gained from the attainment of allies and UN authorization if and as the United States moves toward war. One category relates to dealing with the adversary, and its contents are likely to be familiar to observers of international affairs. The second category, as noted in the introduction, may be more novel: it includes benefits relating to the management by the public of potential problems associated with policy processes internal to United States itself.

Partners and External Risk Management: Efficacy, Risk Sharing, and Burden Sharing

Americans are likely to recognize that the support of allies and the attainment of international authorization help solve a number of problems that are **external** to the United States, and relate in particular to dealing with the adversary through the threat or use of force in the midst of a militarized crisis:

Credibility of Threats Prior to Hostilities If America's adversary in a militarized crisis sees that the United States has numerous partners and international authorization for war, if that becomes necessary, that adversary may be more readily persuaded that it will not prevail against the United States and might instead elect to capitulate to U.S. demands without force ever needing to be applied. One might argue that, if the United States threatens to use force without allies or authorization, this is a signal of American resolve, and that this would enhance American bargaining power during a militarized crisis. However, most Americans are likely to believe that if the United States is publicly backed by allies and fortified in its position by international authorization, it will then be able to use force against an adversary at a lower cost to itself, and that this should send that adversary the strongest possible signal that the United States will indeed use force unless its demands are met.

Help During and After a War If using force becomes necessary, then having allies should reduce the risks of failure and the costs, in terms of casualties and resources, that the United States would need itself to bear to achieve victory. Yes, there are coordination costs associated with coalition warfare. Yes, the actual contribution that allies can make to America's total combat power may not be as great at present or in the years ahead as it was in the past. But, Americans probably remember that the United States won its biggest victories against truly formidable opponents (during World War I and World War II) with allies, and suffered its biggest defeat (Vietnam) while fighting with only limited support from South Korea and Australia and no support from such key friends as Britain. Americans, in other words, may know intuitively what was recently demonstrated systematically: countries that have allies (and especially democratic allies) are much more likely to win the wars in which they participate than the countries that fight without allies.³⁰ Finally, after victory by America and its partners is achieved, those allies and partners are likely to have an interest in providing economic resources and political support for whatever reconstruction or stabilization efforts must be undertaken in the former adversary or its neighbors.

Partners and Internal Risk Management: the Second Opinion Function

It is likely that many Americans prefer that their government gain the support of allies and other forms of international support insofar as doing so may, for the reasons noted above, generally help the United States address its national security problems at reasonable cost and risk. However, Americans may want international support not just to solve **external** risk and cost problems relating to the use of military force, but also as a check on potential pitfalls in the making of policy that are **internal** to U.S. politics and governmental processes. Americans, in other words, may look to other national leaders for a second opinion on the diagnoses and prescriptions of their own leaders that might lead to the use of military force.

As suggested in the introduction, we may have seen this interest on the part of the U.S. public for allies and foreign approval in the case of the 2003 Iraq war.

From the viewpoint of the American public, it faced a problem when the Bush administration began to say in the late-summer of 2002 that America might have to fight Iraq if Saddam Hussein's regime did not verifiably disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush said he and his advisors had intelligence indicating that the UN sanctions and inspections regime against Iraq had collapsed, and that Saddam Hussein was well on his way to constructing a large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam's Iraq, President Bush argued, might thereby soon pose a fundamental threat to U.S. friends in the Middle East and perhaps to America itself, and thus a war today might be needed to prevent a more terrible outcome sometime in the future.

Most Americans had only limited access to the information gathered by the Bush administration on Iraq, and had few opportunities to assess the processes by which the administration had interpreted that information. More generally, they could not readily assess the quality of the overall policy-making process that produced the administration's determination that force might have to be used to disarm Saddam. At the same time, many serious individuals within the United States and from abroad argued that there were great risks attached to, and very little real need for, a preventative war with Iraq.

In these circumstances, Americans might have looked to leaders of other countries for a second opinion. If those leaders--relying on their own policy processes and, if they came from democratic countries, having their own publics to which they would have to be accountable if they made a serious blunder--also concluded that Saddam was an unacceptable threat, and therefore supported President Bush, then Americans could be more confident that he was charting the right course for the United States. Thus, for many Americans, the letters of support for the U.S. stance against Iraq from what came to be called the Group of 8 and the

Group of 10 countries of Europe, the support of the United States positions in the UN Security Council by Prime Minister Jose Marie Aznar of Spain, the provision of direct military assistance by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, and provision of political and logistical support by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, and above all the close diplomatic and military coordination between President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, may have been important evidence that President Bush was correct that the confrontation with Iraq was right and necessary.

In particular, as the Bush administration attracted allies against Iraq, Americans could be more confident that at least five policy-making risks had been avoided or managed to the degree that they were not leading the United States toward a catastrophe. These risks involve honest mistakes, ideological entrapment, special-interest capture, unsuitable presidential character, and diversionary-war politics.

Honest Mistakes Americans might have assumed, in the months leading to the Iraq war, that President Bush and the top members of his administration were acting in good faith, but might have been worried, in light of criticisms of U.S. policy, that they were receiving incorrect intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency about Iraqi intentions and capabilities, or were receiving good intelligence but for some reason were simply misinterpreting that intelligence. In addition, even if U.S. officials did have good information about Saddam and his capabilities, serious people made the case that those officials did not have a correct understanding of the ability of the United States to deter him from taking hostile actions against America or its friends, or of the opportunity costs of using force against Saddam as opposed to a policy of deterrence and containment.³¹

Americans might have hoped that the U.S. system of government would ensure that U.S. leaders had the right information and the right advice as they addressed the Iraq problem. They might have had some confidence that the division of powers between the

Executive and the Congress, multiple centers of intelligence gathering and analysis within the Executive, competition between such Executive departments as State and Defense, and the scrutiny of the whole process provided by a tough, independent news media, were working alone and in tandem to make sure that American leaders were “getting the facts straight” in regard to whether Saddam was a threat and how best to respond to it. But, many Americans may also have kept in mind that sometimes the system does not work. They may have remembered or learned of the serious, sustained errors of analysis and judgment that led to the U.S. disaster in Vietnam. Yet, countering that worry might have been the knowledge that the U.S. administration was not alone in its assessment of Saddam. That is, for many Americans, knowing that Prime Minister Blair and others shared a similar diagnosis of the facts probably provided confidence that the Bush Administration had a correct understanding of the nature of the threat posed by Saddam.

Ideological Entrapment Having allies may have been a sign for many Americans that the Bush administration and, more generally, the U.S. government, had not made serious but honest mistakes in approaching the problem of Saddam. But there was another risk during the Iraq crisis, namely, that key elements of the Bush administration were not even trying to be objective. According to this line of criticism, elements of the administration (the so-called “neo-conservatives”) were motivated by an ideological agenda, namely, to democratize and thus to pacify the Middle East.³²

Two specific criticisms were made of the neoconservatives and the issue of democratic imperialism. First, the argument was made that these officials were themselves shaping their advice to the President and his top people in such a way as to make it appear that there was no alternative but to fight Iraq. Second, and perhaps more serious, it was argued that the neoconservatives were pressing the CIA and other elements of the U.S. intelligence community to put forward analyses to top U.S. leaders that would support the

conclusion that war was necessary even though the facts themselves might suggest otherwise. The result, if these charges were true, would be that America was being taken down a course of international adventurism of the worst sort. For the average American, knowing that a wide range of countries, from strong democracies to some of a very different kind, had reached the view that Saddam had to be displaced, reduced the risk of such ideologically-driven military adventurism by the Bush Administration.

Special-Interest Capture of the American State As the Bush administration moved toward war with Iraq, many in America and around the world worried that the administration was acting not because it had made a careful, sober assessment of the facts surrounding the case, but instead because it was serving the needs of special-interest groups that wanted a war with Iraq. On the one hand, it was said that President Bush wanted to go to war to help his friends and those of Vice President Dick Cheney in the American oil industry.³³ On the other hand, it was charged that the Bush administration had been captured by individuals--again, mostly neoconservatives--who were either themselves Zionist-oriented members of the American Jewish community or were otherwise sympathizers of Israel. These individuals, according to this line of criticism, wanted the United States to make Israel more secure and powerful in the Middle East by destroying the most powerful Arab state, and were driving Bush toward war not to protect America but to serve Israeli interests.³⁴

These arguments were sometimes fanciful and often offensive, but they were made and they did have the potential of poisoning the U.S. public debate about Saddam and his regime. But those arguments never seemed to carry weight. One reason that such charges could not get political traction was that it was difficult to make the case that, whatever was going on in the Bush administration, Prime Minister Blair **and** Prime Minister Aznar **and** Prime Minister Berlusconi **and** President Kwasniewski would all decide to support the idea

of using force against Saddam in order to advance the interests of Halliburton Company or Ariel Sharon!

Diversionsary War for Political Gain It was further argued on occasion that Bush was being belligerent toward Iraq in order to distract Americans from the economic woes that the country was facing during 2002.³⁵ The idea was that Bush began to press for war with Iraq in the summer of 2002 in order to rally Americans around the flag and, not incidentally, to help Republicans who were up for election that November. But could one reasonably argue that Tony Blair or Jose Marie Aznar or Silvio Berlusconi or Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark had an interest in helping President Bush win Senate and House seats in Idaho or Georgia or Oregon? Or that they themselves were gaining in political popularity in their own countries by supporting the United States against Iraq? Indeed, the fact that all these leaders, as well as others in Europe who supported the U.S. position against Iraq, were suffering terrible losses of domestic support by virtue of standing with President Bush was evidence that the Iraq threat must indeed have been very severe.

Bush's Acumen and Character Finally, it was sometimes suggested that President Bush did not have the right analytical skills, life experiences, and more generally what David Barber termed "presidential character" to address such a complex and weighty matter as Iraq.³⁶ According to one variant of this line of criticism, George W. Bush is an impulsive cowboy, someone who lacks the subtlety, sophistication, and intelligence that is needed to manage a hard issue like Iraq.³⁷ Pursuing a related theme, it was argued that George Bush the younger might have wanted war with Iraq not to protect America, but to avenge the attempted assassination by Saddam Hussein of George Bush the elder.³⁸ More generally, it was suggested that George W. Bush, because he is a southern fundamentalist Christian, is peculiarly militaristic in his outlook; overly sympathetic, for religious reasons, to Israel; and lacking in the personal skills that are necessary to crafting effective diplomacy is a secular

world.³⁹ However much these arguments seemed to be based more on stereotypes, and sometimes bigotry, rather than on facts, or on pop psychology rather than on careful analysis, they were in the public domain. Yet, the fact that someone like Tony Blair--articulate, urbane, educated, and experienced--had reached the same conclusion about the dangers posed by Saddam and the possible need to displace him from power as early as 1999 as did the Bush and his key people in 2002, powerfully undercut the view that U.S. policy was being conducted by someone who did not have a good grasp of the realities of the Iraq situation.

Allies, the UN, and the American Public: Four Initial Tests

The discussion above suggests that the U.S. public rationally may wish for their leaders to attract allies and attain international authorization when they use force abroad in part to get a second opinion on the recommendations of their own leaders when they are considering the question of war. At this time we do not have polling data to undertake definitive tests of this second-opinion thesis. For example, polls have not been undertaken to date that ask Americans if, when their country is about to go to war, they view the presence of allies or international authorization as a way of judging whether their leaders have or have not fallen victim to one or more of the pitfalls described above. Still, we can ask what, if the second-opinion thesis has merit, we ought to see in existing public opinion data regarding U.S. foreign policy that would be at least consistent with that thesis. This is the strategy employed below.

Four expectations are derived and tested about what we ought to see in existing public opinion data if the second-opinion thesis is plausible. First, *as a general matter*, insofar as they may view allies as providers of second opinions, and therefore as a check on their own policy-makers, members of the American public ought to express a stronger preference that

the United States have allies when it responds to international crises than would the American administration officials who are actually responsible for foreign affairs. This expectation is evaluated, for important reasons discussed below, using data from both the Clinton and the Bush administrations. Second, faced during 2002 and early 2003 with the prospect of a war *with a specific country*, in this case Iraq, the public should have had a higher preference for allies than did administration officials responsible for foreign affairs. Third, given that we have at present a Republican administration, then, among members of the U.S. public, we might expect that Democrats would have had a greater preference for allies and a UN authorization for war with Iraq than did Republicans. Finally, using a similar logic, I suggest that, if the thesis has merit, members of the U.S. public who disapproved of President Bush's overall job performance should have expressed a greater preference for external support against Iraq than did those who approved of his overall performance. As we shall see, the results of the first, third, and fourth tests are consistent with the second-opinion thesis, but the second test cuts against it.

Test One: Responding to Crises without Allies--the General Public and Administration Officials Active in Foreign Policy

If members of the general public believe that allies help not just with the management of external dangers and risks, but also provide a check on the wisdom and intentions of their leaders, then we might expect that, in general, in dealing with international crises, members of the public would express a greater preference that the U.S. government garner the support of allies than would individuals in the government who are responsible for foreign policy. The rationale for this expectation is that if members of the U.S. public and U.S. government officials concur that allies help manage **external** risks and problems associated with the use of military force, but members of the public also believe that allies help them manage the

internal risks and problems that may operate within the U.S. government itself, then we should expect members of the public to express a keener interest in America having allies when it goes into international crises than do U.S. policy-makers themselves. Alternatively, if we find that the two groups express a similar level of interest in avoiding action in crises without allies, then we would have to conclude that the two groups probably concur in what allies provide America in such crises. Since foreign policy officials probably do not believe they require second opinions on their own assessments and prescriptions, then, if we to observe similar public and official views about the importance of having allies when responding to crises, the most straightforward interpretation would be that each sees allies as a way of managing the **external** risks that adhere to the use of military force in those crises.

The Chicago Council survey in 1998 and the joint Chicago Council-German Marshall Fund survey in 2002 allow us to evaluate this hypothesis. The surveys polled samples of members of the U.S. general public in each of those years, as well as samples of individuals who, according to the survey team, were members of the U.S. leadership. Among the individuals in the leadership samples in 1998 and 2002 were administration officials who were “assistant secretaries and other senior level staff”: twenty-five such senior officials participated in the 1998 survey, and 34 did so in 2002.⁴⁰ We can, then, compare the responses emerging from the samples of individuals in the general public directly to those of the leadership sub-sample consisting of high-level administration officials active and responsible for the making of U.S. foreign policy.

For the most part, members of the general public, the leadership taken as a whole, and the administration sub-sample, expressed internationalist views both in 1998 and 2002. However, as can be observed in Figure 2, on the matter of how, as a general matter, the United States should respond to international crises when it lacks the support of allies, the

surveys both in 1998 and 2002 highlight a divergence in opinion between the general public and high-level administration officials active in foreign policy.

Figure 2 Here

As can be observed in the right-hand side of the figure, in 2002, members of the American public were much less likely than were administration officials to support the idea that the United States should respond to crises by taking action on its own when it finds itself without allies. Specifically, that year, while 31% of those among the public who had a view on this matter agreed that the U.S. should go it alone in crises when it cannot attract allies, 56% of the administration respondents agreed with this proposition, producing a difference of 25 percentage points that is unlikely to be the product of chance.⁴¹

In addition, the public's relatively greater interest in allies does not appear to be driven by special or unusual concerns about the Bush administration. In 1998, members of the general public were also less likely to support action in crises without allies (23%) than were individuals in the then-Clinton administration (50%). The difference of 27 percentage points between those two groups in 1998 is not likely to have been the result of chance.⁴²

Thus, across two very different administrations, we find that members of the general public have expressed a stronger preference that the United States avoid responding to crises without allies than have high-level officials responsible for foreign policy. This difference in a preference for allies suggests that members of the general public believe that they obtain an extra "something" from allies that high-level U.S. government officials do not believe they obtain. While we cannot say what that extra "something" might be, the fact that members of the public appear to place greater weight on allies than do U.S. foreign policy officials is

consistent with the view that that "something" is a second opinion regarding the diagnosis and actions of their leaders.

Test Two: Attacking Iraq without Allies--General Public and Administration Officials

If the second-opinion thesis has merit, then, just as we should expect members of the U.S. public to express a stronger preference for allies in crises *as a general matter*, that is, when no adversary is posited, than do U.S. foreign policy officials, so too we should expect members of the public to express a stronger preference for allies when there is the prospect of a war *with a specific country*. By consequence, we might expect that, in the face of the rising tensions with Iraq during 2002 and early 2003, members of the public would have expressed a stronger preference than would high-level foreign policy officials in the Bush administration that the United States should have allies if it had to fight that country.

The available data are not consistent with this expectation. As noted above, the Chicago-GMF survey asked members of the public in the summer of 2002 if they supported a war with Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein from power even if the United States had to fight on its own. In that survey, 20% of the 707 respondents who had a view on this matter said that the United States should go it alone if necessary. The survey put the same question to U.S. leaders, and, as also noted above, of those leaders, 34 individuals occupied high-level foreign policy officials in the Bush administration. Thirty-two of those administration officials expressed a view on this question, and of them, eight, or 25% of those who expressed a view, agreed that the United States should attack Iraq even on its own if necessary.⁴³ Thus, by a margin of five percentage points, administration officials were more likely to agree than were members of the general public that the United States should attack Iraq even without allies. However, given the sizes of the two samples, the 95% confidence interval for the difference between the two groups is 5 percentage points, +/- 15 percentage points. Given that zero falls

within this 95% confidence interval, the observed difference may be the product of chance, and therefore we need to conclude that the results are not consistent with the expectation.

It may be recalled that, in Test One, when no specific adversary was posited, we saw a statistically significant difference--both in 1998 and 2002--between U.S. administration officials and the general public on the matter of responding to an adversary in a crisis when there are no allies. It is therefore puzzling that, in the summer of 2002, and in regard to the specific matter of Iraq, the general public and administration officials converged on the need for allies. It is possible that a majority of the 32 administration officials who were interviewed for the 2002 Chicago-GMF survey and did express a view on this question did not believe that Iraq met the standard of crisis as that term was employed in the more general survey question. In addition, the Chicago-GMF survey of administration officials was concluded on July 15, while the first main war speech by a senior person in the administration, that by Vice President Dick Cheney before the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, occurred on August 26.⁴⁴ There is the possibility, then, that the Iraq matter was still under review within the administration when the Chicago-GMF survey was being conducted, and for that reason many administration officials may not have yet coded it as a crisis requiring, if necessary, unilateral U.S. action. Still, the results on the matter of Iraq and allies are at variance with the expectation specified at the outset of this test.

Test Three: Importance of Allies and UN Authorization of War with Iraq--Differences between Republicans and Democrats

We might expect that, within the U.S. general public, Democrats would be more sceptical of the Bush administration, especially in matters of war, than would be true of Republicans. By consequence, Democrats at present may want stronger safeguards against the risk of unwise uses of force by the United States than do Republicans. If this line of

reasoning is correct, we may expect that, prior to the war with Iraq, Democrats would have expressed a greater preference than did Republicans that the Bush administration should garner the support of allies and obtain international authorization for such a war.

Survey data are consistent with this expectation. As can be observed below in Figure 3, in the January 2003 Pew survey, when asked if they would support an administration decision to use military force against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power, without any other information provided, 60% of Democrats and 87% of Republicans replied in the affirmative.⁴⁵ When the poll takers provided additional information surrounding the war scenario, namely, "major U.S. allies do not go along," support for the use of force dropped to 21% among Democrats and 43% among Republicans. Support for war with Iraq dropped sharply among both groups when there was the prospect of no allies, but the biggest change, in terms of the movement away from initial positions, occurred among Democrats. That is, while the magnitude of the drop in support among Republicans was by about one-half, the drop in support among Democrats was by almost two-thirds. Hence, consistent with the second-opinion thesis, Democrats appear in fact to have believed that allies would provide something useful in connection to a proposed war by a Republican administration beyond what Republicans thought they could provide.

Figure 3 Here

We find similar results in support by Democrats and Republicans for war against Iraq as a function of the prior attainment by the administration of a UN Security Council resolution. As can be observed below in the left side of Figure 4, when asked in February 2003 if the United States should obtain a UN resolution before it started a war against Iraq, while 76% of Democrats in the Pew-CFR survey agreed that it "should get [a] UN

resolution," 43% of Republicans agreed that it should do so. There is little chance that the difference of 33 percentage points between the two groups is due to chance.⁴⁶

Figure 4 Here

Test Four: Importance of UN Authorization of War with Iraq--Differences as a Function of Presidential Approval

Regardless of their party identification, we might expect that those members of the public who approved of President Bush's overall job performance would be more inclined to accept his rationale for war against Iraq than would those who did not approve of his overall performance. We might therefore further expect that members of the latter group would have been especially keen to know that the President about whom they have doubts in general was able, prior to going to war, to attain international support for that war. Hence, we might expect that, in the lead-up to the Iraq war, Americans who disapproved of President Bush's overall job performance would have expressed a stronger preference for international backing for war than those who approved of his overall performance.

Here again, the available survey data are consistent with this expectation. As can be observed in the right side of Figure 4, while 79% of the Pew-CFR survey respondents who disapproved of President Bush's overall performance agreed that, before undertaking military operations, the United States should obtain a UN resolution authorizing a war with Iraq, 52% of those who approved of his performance said the United States should obtain a resolution prior to war. We observe then a difference of 27 percentage points between the two groups on the importance of a UN authorization for war with Iraq, a difference that is large and unlikely to be the result of chance.⁴⁷

Summary and Implications for Research and Policy

The proposition that Americans look to the capacity of their leaders to win international support for war as a way of seeking a favorable second opinion on their leaders' recommendation for that course of action appears to receive initial support as a result of three of the four tests undertaken above. First, members of the public have indicated a greater level of support for the view that the United States should not respond to crises without allies than have high-level foreign policy officials. Very importantly, this difference between members of the general public and high-level officials is observed in surveys taken during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. Second, Democrats wanted allies and international authorization for a war against Iraq more than did Republicans. Third, Americans who disapproved of the President's overall performance wanted such authorization more than did persons who approved of his performance. On the other hand, one test yielded results that are inconsistent with the second-opinion thesis: we found that administration officials and members of the public both gave very little support for a war with Iraq if America did not have allies. Overall, this first battery of tests seems to yield moderate support for the second-opinion thesis, and it may be reasonable by consequence to conclude that it is worthy of additional, more rigorous tests.

If this assessment is correct, then a number of questions present themselves for further investigation. First, is it on UN authorization or on military allies that Americans focus their attention in seeking a second opinion in regard to their government's policies on the matter of war? In working with the 2002 Chicago-GMF survey, for example, one finds that the designers of the survey often put UN authorization and allies into the same questions about the use of force, thus making it difficult to parse out whether one or the other is important to Americans, or both but in differing degrees. Polling questions should therefore be redesigned

to allow for such an assessment of the relative importance to Americans of allies and UN authorization.

Second, it should be feasible to design survey questions that directly test the thesis that the U.S. public preference for allies and UN authorization is motivated in part by a belief that they provide useful second opinions on the question of war. For example, one might ask members of the public if they are aware of and place a value on the intelligence analyses that may be made public by allies in the midst of a crisis. It may be useful further to ask members of the public if they view the presence of allies or UN authorization as an indication that ideology or special interests are not driving America to war. Another question that could be posed to members of the public is whether they believe that a president who garners external support in a crisis is demonstrating good leadership qualities and thereby fortifies their confidence in that individual.

Third, we might seek to determine through surveys if Americans believe that the **reliability** of second opinions provided by allies varies as a function of the identity or characteristics of those allies. As may be observed in the body of this essay, surveys tend to ask Americans if having allies affects their support for the use of force by the United States, without specifying anything about those allies. However, at least when they wish to employ them as sources of second opinions about the wisdom of such force, Americans probably discriminate among U.S. partners. For example, we might expect that Americans believe that democratic leaders on average have more to lose than do authoritarian leaders in terms of domestic political support and even tenure in office if they incorrectly support the United States in a war. Knowing that, Americans might believe that the decisions of democratic allies to support or not to support the United States in a war provide a more reliable second opinion about the wisdom of that war than do the decisions of authoritarian allies. By the same logic, as a provider of a reliable second opinion, we should expect that the American

public would place much greater weight on allies that can reasonably be expected, perhaps on the basis of past experience, to put forces at risk if war actually occurs as opposed to allies that are not expected to put forces at risk.

Indeed, if we design a research program that puts the domestic-institutions and forces-at-risk factors together, we might be able to understand more fully why many Americans apparently turned to Prime Minister Blair for a second opinion on the Iraq war. We might anticipate that Americans believed they could look to Blair's views on what to do about Saddam as a reliable second opinion insofar as they believed that he is accountable to his home public, that he would put British forces at risk were war to occur, and that he would be political vulnerable if he took Britain into a war that was unnecessary.

A similar logic may be found to operate in terms of the value assigned by Americans to the UN Security Council as a provider of reliable second opinions in the face of the possibility of war. In the Iraq war, as was found in the March PIPA-KN survey, a majority of Americans agreed with or at least supported the decision by the Bush administration to unleash military operations. However, a majority of Americans in the February Pew-CFR survey indicated that they wanted an explicit UN authorization prior to the onset of those operations, which the administration did not get. One possibility that could be investigated is that the American public, while wanting a UN resolution, changed over time its weighting of that preference as a function of which countries were supporting U.S. efforts to obtain a resolution, and which were opposing those efforts. It would be very interesting to learn if, at some point, it may have been sufficient for many Americans that the United States and Britain had made a good-faith effort to get a UN resolution, and had been prevented from doing so because of the efforts of Russia and especially France.

Fourth, it would be interesting and important to learn if, as a source of second opinions, or for other reasons, Americans view coalitions of the willing as a functional

substitute for NATO or the UN Security Council. To my knowledge, no national survey has yet asked Americans if, for whatever reason, they do or do not view such coalitions as equal in value to the support of formal alliances or the UN. One might expect that, because they know that U.S. leaders can forge coalitions with economic and political incentives and sanctions, members of the U.S. public would discount their value as a source of reliable second opinions. On the other hand, if foreign governments join coalitions without UN authorization and, by consequence, as we saw in the Iraq case, in the teeth of popular discontent, Americans might view them as stronger rather than as weaker evidence that their own leaders were taking the country in the right direction. Finally, it is likely to be the case that, in respect to coalitions, some countries are more likely to evoke a positive U.S. public response than others. For example, we may recall the tremendous impact that Tony Blair's support for the Bush administration had on the Iraq debate in America, and consider what the impact on the U.S. debate would have been had Blair opposed the administration's stance against the Hussein regime.

Two policy implications emerge from the preceding discussion. First, it is unlikely that the Bush administration will infer that, because it enjoyed the support of the American people in the Iraq war without an explicit UN authorization for action, it can dispense with efforts to obtain such authorizations in the future. Top members of the current administration are likely to be aware of two key findings that came out of the March and April PIPA-KN surveys and are discussed above. First, as reported in the April survey, Americans overwhelmingly agreed that it had been a good idea to try to get UN authorization. Second, as reported in both surveys, roughly two-thirds of the American public believe that the Iraq case does not set a precedent and that the United States should not consider itself freer to use force in the future without UN authorization because it had not done so prior to the Iraq war. Thus, in future military crises, we may expect that the public will want the president, if at all

possible, to get such UN authorization, and the current and future presidents are likely to be responsive to that public preference.

We should also recall that the Bush administration went into Iraq with three military allies--Australia, Poland, and especially Britain--plus the political and in many cases the logistical support of a number of other countries. If the President had not done so and if in particular he had authorized an invasion of Iraq without the support of Prime Minister Blair and the participation of a sizable contingent of British military forces, it is quite possible that U.S. public support for the invasion would have been much less robust.

The second policy implication has to do with coalitions of the willing: even if research were to show that Americans view such coalitions as functional substitutes for formal alliances and UN authorization, a strategy that relies too early or too often on them may still be self-defeating. That is, just as Americans may prefer allies and international authorization for war to manage external and internal risks, so too the home publics in many potential coalition members may themselves have such a preference, and in democratic countries those home publics can penalize leaders who ignore that preference. If U.S. presidents press national leaders of democratic countries to join in coalitions of the willing outside the UN or some other formal arrangement, then they may find that they will in time have fewer and fewer potential partners to whom they can turn to form them.

The current administration probably recognizes that it cannot push the coalition option too hard or too often. As we observed in the Iraq crisis, President Bush elected to go to the UN prior to the war with Iraq to accommodate public opinion in the United States and, in connection to the idea of a second UN resolution, that in Great Britain. Hence, we may expect that the current president and those who follow him in that office will in the future, as in the past, seek to work through and with the UN and NATO and other formal alliances when they consider the question of war.

Figure 1
U.S. Commitment to NATO: Views of the American Public, 1974-2002




Figure 2
Appropriate U.S. Response to Crises Without Support of Allies:
Views of General Public and Administration Officials, 1998 and 2002




Figure 3
Support for Military Action Against Iraq Without Allies:
By Party Identification, January 2003





Figure 4
Importance of a UN Resolution Before Taking Military Action Against Iraq,
by Party Identification and Presidential Approval, February 2003



Footnotes

¹ Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States, "Worldviews 2002: American Public Opinion & Foreign Policy," October 2002, available on the web at <http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>; also see Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Worldviews 2002: U.S. General Population Topline Report*, October 2002, available at <http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>; and Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Worldviews 2002: U.S. Leaders Topline Report*, October 2002, available at <http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>.

² Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, *Public Wants Proof of Iraqi Weapons Programs: Majority Says Bush Has Yet to Make the Case*, January 16, 2003, and available on the web at <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=170>; and Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Council on Foreign Relations, *Post-Blix: Public Favors Force in Iraq, But U.S. Needs More International Backing*, February 20, 2003, and available at <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=173>.

³ Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks, *Americans on Post-War Iraq and the Future of the UN*, March 31, 2003, available on the web at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraqmar31/report_mar31.pdf; and Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks, *Americans on America's Role in the World After the Iraq War*, April 29, 2003, available at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/PostWarIraq/report_april29.pdf.

⁴ As evidence of a **general** unilateralist orientation of the Bush administration, critics cite rejection of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 on global warming, its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, its de-signing of the Rome Statute of 1998 that established the International Criminal Court, its rejection of the idea of a new verification protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, its decision not to ask the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, which the United States signed in 1996 but which failed to achieve Senate ratification in 1999, and its continuance of the policy of the Clinton Administration not to sign the 1997 International Treaty to Ban Land Mines. For arguments on the general unilateralism in the administration's foreign policy, see, for example, Barbara Crossette, "Killing One's Progeny: America and the United Nations," *World Policy Journal* (Fall 2002), pp. 54-59; James Chace "Present at the Destruction: The Death of American Internationalism," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2003), pp. 1-5; Samantha Power, "Bush's Illiberal Power: Force Full," *The New Republic*, March 3, 2003, available through Infotrac; and, on the specific matter of the verification protocol, Michael Crowley, "Combating Biological Weapons," *UN Quarterly* 39 (June-August 2002), pp. 73-75.

⁵ A sample of additional serious critiques of the Bush administration's foreign policy and the specific issue of military unilateralism would include that by Harold Meyerson, editor of *The American Prospect*, in "The Most Dangerous President Ever: How and Why George W. **Bush** Undermines American Security," *American Prospect*, May 2003, p. 26; by Matthew Rothschild, editor of *The Progressive*, Matthew Rothschild, in "Bush Trashes the United Nations," *The Progressive*, April 2003, pp. 19-23; and Fareed Zakaria, editor of *Newsweek International* and a columnist for *Newsweek*, in "The Arrogant Empire: America's Unprecedented Power Scares the World, and the **Bush** Administration Has Only Made It

Worse," *Newsweek*, March 24, 2003, available at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/885222.asp?0cv=KA01>.

⁶ Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2002, pp. 18-43, and available on Proquest. Hirsh develops his critique of the Bush administration in his book, *At War With Ourselves: Why America is Squandering its Chance to Build a Better World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁷ John Judis, "Two Steps Backward," *American Prospect*, August 12, 2002, p.10, and available on Proquest.

⁸ Judis, "Two Steps Backward," , p.11.

⁹ For a superb overview of the development of the literature on the question of the stability and coherence of U.S. public opinion on foreign policy issues, see Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 22-33, 39-51. For examples of early scholarship that was more skeptical of the American public's capacity to express clear preferences on foreign policy, see Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950); and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61. For an example of a key piece of scholarship that demonstrates that the American public does have strong, clear preferences on foreign policy, and has done so for a long time, see Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June 1988), pp. 211-247.

¹⁰ John Aldrich, John Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience'," *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989), pp. 123-141, and especially pp. 134-135. Robert Erikson, Michael Mackuen, and James Stimson have also recently found that the public-opinion "mood" of the electorate, in terms of a preference expressed by members of the electorate for more or less government activism along a traditional liberalism-conservatism dimension, is a good predictor of the balance between Democrat and Republican electoral victories at the federal level in any given campaign season. See Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson, "Public Opinion and Policy: Causal Flow in a Macro System Model," in Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook, and Benjamin I. Page, eds., *Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy, and the Future of American Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), especially pp. 44-46.

¹¹ For an overview of much of this literature, see Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 52-62.

¹² See Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and Democracy: How Presidents Use Public Opinion," in Manza, Cook, and Page, eds., *Navigating Public Opinion*, p. 192.

¹³ For an early statement of the "rally 'round the flag effect," see John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). For an excellent survey of the development of the literature on the diversionary war hypothesis, see Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (April 1997), pp. 256-258; and see pp. 268-270 and 277-78 for results suggesting that democratic leaders, but not authoritarian

leaders, become more likely to employ military force in the midst of a crises as a function of rising domestic discontent.

¹⁴ For empirical studies of the “rally 'round the flag effect” in the American context, see Charles W. Ostrom and Brian L. Job, "The President and the Political Use of Force," *American Political Science Review* 80 (June 1986), especially pp. 557-558; Robin F. Marra, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Dennis M. Simon, "Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity: Creating Windows of Opportunity in the Perpetual Election," *American Political Science Review* 34 (December 1990), p. 612; and Matthew A. Baum, “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (June 2002), pp. 263-298.

¹⁵ Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal, “Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (June 1993), pp. 277-300. More generally, see Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, *Handbook of War Studies* (New York: Unwin-Hyman, 1989).

¹⁶ Ostrom and Job, "President and the Political Use of Force," pp. 556-557. One might argue that, so long as they achieve victory, American leaders can use force without regard for public opinion. However, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson have found that, in general, and regardless of the outcome of the use of force, democratic leaders tend to lose more time in office when they employ military force abroad than do non-democratic leaders: see Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," *American Political Science Review* 89 (December 1995), pp: 841-55. Indeed, Kurt Gaubatz has

suggested that democratic leaders avoid the use of force prior to elections: see Gaubatz, "Election Cycles and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (June 1991), pp. 212-44.

¹⁷ Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), pp. 175-190, and especially p. 182 on the lack of significant differences in government responses to public opinion in foreign affairs and domestic matters. Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson have found that, in addition to the influence voters have on the policy positions and policy making by way of determining whether the president, members of the House, and members of the Senate are Democrats or Republicans, voters have a second influence on policy by way of the views they express on the matter of government activism at any given time. See Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson, "Public Opinion and Policy," especially pp. 39-43.

¹⁸ Richard Sobel, *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 238-239. Members of the House of Representatives appear also to be highly responsive to the opinions relating to defense spending expressed by the public in their home districts: see Larry Bartels, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: the Reagan Defense Buildup," *American Political Science Review* 85 (June 1991), pp. 457-474.

¹⁹ Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988), pp. 452-475.

²⁰ See Quentin Peel, Robert Graham, James Harding, and Judy Dempsey, "War in Iraq: How the Die Was Cast Before Transatlantic Diplomacy Failed," *Financial Times*, May 27, 2003, p. 11.

²¹ See Ole R. Holsti, "A Return to Isolationism and Unilateralism? American Public Opinion, Pre- and Post-September 11," prepared for the Centennial Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2003, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

²² The remaining 8% of the respondents were not sure or declined to reply. See Chicago-GMF, *Worldviews 2002*, p. 27, Figure 3-9; and Chicago Council-GMF, *Worldviews 2002: U.S. General Population Topline Report*, p. 128. The Chicago Council-GMF survey polled more than 3000 members of the American public, but not all individuals were asked the same questions. The number of individuals who were asked this question totalled 1095.

²³ Thirteen percent of the sample was opposed to war under all circumstances, and 2% gave no response. See Chicago-GMF, *Worldviews 2002*, p. 27, Figure 3-10; and *U.S. General Population Topline Report*, p. 102; the number of respondents to this question totalled 721.

²⁴ PIPA/KN, *Americans on Post-War Iraq and the Future of the UN*, p. 4.

²⁵ PIPA/KN, *Americans on America's Role in the World After the Iraq War*, p. 7.

²⁶ PIPA/KN, *Americans on Post-War Iraq and the Future of the UN*, p. 6.

²⁷ PIPA/KN, *Americans on America's Role in the World After the Iraq War*, p. 7.

²⁸ PIPA/KN, *Americans on America's Role in the World After the Iraq War*, p. 7. Focusing on respondents who expressed a view on the subject, the 95% confidence interval for the difference across the two months for respondents who believed the U.S. should not feel freer to use force is 5% +/- 5 percentage points, and the 95% confidence interval for the difference between March and April in the percentage of respondents who agreed the United States should feel freer to so use force is also 5% +/- 5 percentage points. Thus, both observed differences over the two months may have been the result of chance.

²⁹ Chicago-GMF, *Worldviews 2002*, p. 28; and *U.S. General Population Topline Report*, p. 122, where it is reported that this question was posed to 698 Americans.

³⁰ Ajin Choi, *Cooperation for Victory: Democracy, International Partnerships, and State War Performance, 1816-1992* (Durham: Duke University, 2001); for a summary of her analysis, see Ajin Choi, "The Power of Democratic Cooperation," *International Security* 28 (forthcoming Summer 2003).

³¹ For the best critiques of the war option--from the viewpoint of opportunity costs and alternative strategies, and especially containment and deterrence--see Steven E. Miller, "Gambling on War: Force, Order, and the Implications of Attacking Iraq," in Karl Kaysen, Martin Malin, Steven Miller, William Nordhaus, and John Steinbrunner, *War in Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives* (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2002), pp. 7-50; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping Saddam in a Box," *New York Times*, February 2, 2003, and available on Proquest; Mearsheimer and Walt, "An

Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, No. 134 (January-February 2003); and Nicholas D. Kristof, "War and Wisdom," *New York Times*, February 7, 2003; and available on Proquest.

³² See John Donnelly and Anthony Shadid, "Debate Over Iraq Policy in Administration: Iraq War Hawks Have Plans to Reshape Entire Mideast," *Boston Globe*, September 10, 2002, p. A11; Mark Danner, "The Struggles of Democracy and Empire," *New York Times*, October 9, 2002, p. A27; Charles A. Kupchan, "Foreign Affairs: It's Up to EU to Check U.S. Hubris," *Los Angeles Times*, November 10, 2002, and available on Proquest; and Robert Kuttner, "Grasping Bush's Overreach," *Boston Globe*, February 19, 2003, and available on LexisNexis. For a balanced assessment of the views and importance of neoconservatives in the Bush administration, see "The Shadow Men," *Economist*, April 26, 2003, pp. 21-23.

³³ One presidential hopeful, Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, made this charge in February 2003 on "Meet the Press": for an analysis, see Richard Cohen, "Antiwar and Antilogical," *Washington Post*, February 25, 2003, p. A23. For good arguments on the oil thesis, see Michael T. Klare, "Oiling the Wheels of War," *Nation*, October 7, 2002, and available on Proquest; and Jay R. Mandle, "A War for Oil: Bush, the Saudis, and Iraq," *Commonweal*, November 8, 2002, pp. 22-25, and available on Proquest.

³⁴For commentaries on this matter, see Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Toxic Talk on War," *Washington Post*, February 18, 2003, p. A25, and available on Proquest; Samuel G. Freedman, "Don't Blame Jews for this War," *USA Today.com*, April 3, 2003, and available on Proquest; and, in respect to Europe, "Shadow Men," p. 21. American Jews were actually sharply divided on the Iraq war, see Laurie Goodstein, "American Jews: Divide Among Jews

Leads to Silence on Iraq War," *New York Times*, March 15, 2003, p. A7, and available on Lexis-Nexis.

³⁵See Robert Scheer, "The Boom or Bust Cycle: Like Father, Like Son, Expect a War Soon," *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 2002, p. B13, and available on Proquest; Robert Scheer, "Dick Cheney's Nightmare of Peace; War Could be Just the Thing to Banish the Halliburton Specter," *Los Angeles Times*, September 3, 2002, p. B13, and available on Proquest; John Nichols, "Congress and War," *Nation*, September 30, 2002, pp. 4-5, and available on Proquest; and "Rush to Judgment," *The American Prospect*, October 7, 2002, pp. 6-7, and available on Proquest. For reporting on the subject, see Dan Balz, "Democrats Worry About Iraq as Issue; Debate on War Seen as Diversion From Economy," *Washington Post*, August 19, 2002, p. A1, and available on Proquest; and Dana Milbank, "Democrats Question Iraq Timing; Talk of War Distracts from Election Issues," *Washington Post*, September 16, 2002, p. A1, and available on Proquest.

³⁶See James David Barber, *The Presidential Character : Predicting Performance in the White House*, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992).

³⁷See Tyler Marshall and William Wallace, "Cowboy Style Won't Lasso Support," *Los Angeles Times*, October 7, 2002, p. A10, and available on Proquest; David E. Sanger, "To Some in Europe, the Major Problem is Bush the Cowboy," *New York Times*, January 24, 2003, p. A1, and available on Proquest; and Paul Krugman, "George W. Queeg," *New York Times*, March 14, 2003, p. 29, and available on LexisNexis.

³⁸ See, for example, Edwin Chen, "Bush's Iraq Stance Hints at a Bid to Settle Old Score," *Los Angeles Times*, October 3, 2002, p. A8, and available on Proquest; and Kevin Phillips, "Of Politics and Vengeance," *Los Angeles Times*, October 13, 2002, p. M1, and available on Proquest.

³⁹ See Michael Lind, "Deep in the Heart of Darkness: Under George W. Bush, the Worse of Two Texas Traditions is Shaping America," *Washington Monthly*, January-February 2003, especially p. 27, in which he suggests that "ex-leftist, mostly Jewish neo-conservatives and reactionary white Southern fundamentalists" are the main strategists and supporters of Bush's foreign policy, and "These two groups now dominate the right wing of the Republican Party and have controlled the foreign policy of the executive branch for the first years of the 21st century."

⁴⁰ The data for 1998 are from Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Opinion Data: Opinion Leader Data* [Computer file], 2nd ICPSR version (Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization [producer], 1999), ICPSR study number 2747 (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000). For a description of the various components of the leadership sample, including the information that the administration officials were assistant secretaries or other senior staff, see Technical Appendix of the Gallup Organization to the Chicago Council in *Volume2: Opinion Leaders Topline Report*, December 1998. For a similar description of the 2002 leadership sample, see Chicago Council-GMF, *U.S. Leaders Topline Report*, Technical Appendix, October 2002.

⁴¹ In 2002, the number of members of the public who had a reply to this question was 1007, and the number of Administration officials was 34. Given these sample sizes, the 95%

confidence interval for the difference in replies in the affirmative between the two groups is 25 percentage points +/- 17 percentage points. For the purposes of conducting tests of difference through the construction of 95% confidence intervals for this and other observed differences in proportions discussed below, individuals who replied don't know or declined to answer are treated as missing data. The data for responses and the number of respondents from the general public in 2002 for this question come from Chicago Council-GMF, *U.S. General Population Topline Report*, p. 128. Neither the *Worldviews 2002* general report nor the *Leaders Topline Report* provides the number of respondents from the different leadership sub-samples to survey questions. The data on responses and the number of respondents from the administration for this question come from the original SPSS data files for the leaders survey: see Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German-Marshall Fund, "CCFR 2002 Leaders SPSS.zip." I thank Christopher Whitney, Assistant Director at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, for providing this data.

⁴² The number of administration officials in the 1998 who responded to this question was 22; the number of members of the public was 1401; the 95% confidence interval for the difference in proportions supporting action without allies was 27 percentage points, +/- 22 percentage points. The data are taken from Chicago Council, *Opinion Leader Data*, ICPSR study number 2747.

⁴³ The data for responses and the number of respondents from the general public in 2002 for this question come from Chicago Council-GMF, *U.S. General Population Topline Report*, p. 102. The data for responses and the number of respondents from the administration for this question come from Chicago Council-GMF, "CCFR 2002 Leaders SPSS.zip."

⁴⁴ "Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention," August 26, 2002, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html>.

⁴⁵ Pew Center, *Public Wants Proof*, pp. 3-4. There were 202 Republicans in the January Pew survey and 186 Democrats. I thank Nilanthi Samaranayake, Project Director at the Pew Center, for providing me with this information.

⁴⁶ There were 364 Democrats in the Pew-CFR survey that had a view on this matter, and 364 Republicans; hence, the 95% confidence interval for the difference between the two groups in agreeing that a UN Security Council resolution was necessary is 33 percentage points, +/- 7 percentage points.

⁴⁷ Having views in the Pew-CFR survey on the need for a UN resolution were 635 Americans who approved of the president's performance, and 406 who did not. The 95% confidence interval for the difference between the two groups is 27 percentage points, +/- 6 percentage points. It may be noted that, in the Pew-CFR survey, 89% of those Americans who approved of the President's job performance supported military action against Iraq, while only 37% of those who disapproved of his job performance supported such action.