.m:2

2.5 The being of becoming: the ethical synthesis of the efficient will

     When Deleuze approaches the question a Nietzschean synthesis he

comes back once again to the affirmation of multiplicity and the

attack on the dialectical.  "Hegel wanted to ridicule pluralism" [4]:

the dialectic of the One and the Multiple sets up a false image of

multiplicity which is easily recuperable in the unity of the One.  We

have treated this charge at some length above in the second phase of

Bergson study.  As we have seen, the most potent attack against the

dialectic in this regard is the construction of a veritable

multiplicity, of differences of nature.  We find this same attack in

Deleuze's Nietzsche: "Pluralism sometimes appears to be dialectical--

but it is its most ferocious enemy, its only profound enemy." [page?] 

Pluralism or multiplicity is so dangerous for the dialectic precisely

because it is irreducible to unity.  Through the analysis of Bergson's

work, Deleuze brings out the irreducibility and eminence of

multiplicity in clear logical terms; but, as we have seen, in this

context Deleuze only succeeds in posing the complementary moment of

the organization of the multiple in very weak terms.  Indeed, it seems

that the irreducibility of the multiplicity prohibits any idea of

organization.  We have argued that it is the failure to provide an

adequate notion of organization is what makes Deleuze's Bergson most

vulnerable to an Hegelian counter-attack.  This is where Nietzsche

provides Deleuze with an enormous advance.

     "The game has two moments which are those of the dicethrow--the

dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back." [25]  The two

moments of the dicethrow constitute the basic elements of Nietzsche's

alternative to the dialectic of the One and the Multiple.  The first

moment of the game is the easier to understand.  The throw of the dice

is the affirmation of chance and multiplicity precisely because it is

the refusal of control: just as we saw in the Bergson studies, this is

not the multiplicity of order, there is nothing pre-formed in the

possibility of this moment--it is the indeterminate, "l'impr‚visible". 

This is Bergson's creative evolution (or emanation) of being, and in

Nietzschean terms this is the becoming of being: pure multiplicity. 

The moment that the dice falls back, however, is more obscure and more

complex.  "The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of

chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation

of necessity.  Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the same

sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of

multiplicity." [26]  The falling back of the dice is not merely a

confirmation of the necessity of the given, of multiple reality: this

would merely be a determinism, and it would risk negating rather than

affirming the first moment of the game; instead, the falling back of

the dice is a moment of the organization of unity--it is not the

passive revelation but the active creation of being.  To understand

this we have to relate the dicethrow metaphor to the eternal return:

"the dice which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny

which brings the dice back.  ...  The eternal return is the second

moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the

number which brings together all the parts of chance.  But it is also

the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the

reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself." [27-8, emphasis

mine]  The dicethrow metaphor is admittedly somewhat strained at this

point, but we must recognize the second moment as a moment of

organization which constructs unity, constitutes being by bringing

together "all the parts of chance" created in the first moment--not

according to any pre-formed order, but in an original organization. 

The return of the dice is an affirmation of the dicethrow in that it

constitutes the original elements of chance in a coherent whole.  Not

only then does the first moment, of multiplicity and becoming, imply

the second moment, of unity and being, but this second moment is also

the return of the first: the two moments imply one another as a

perpetual series of shattering and gathering, as a centrifugal moment

and a centripetal moment, as emanation and constitution.

     What is the logic of the synthesis or constitution of being in

the eternal return?  We can no longer pose this question on a purely

logical plane; Nietzsche has transformed the terrain so that we can

only consider such ontological questions in terms of force and value. 

"The synthesis is one of forces, of their difference and their

reproduction; the eternal return is the synthesis which has as its

principle the will to power.  We should not be surprised by the word

'will'; which one apart from the will is capable of serving as the

principle of a synthesis of forces by determining the relation of

force with forces?" [50]  We have seen from the outset that the

will is the dynamic which moves and animates the horizon of force and

value: the logic of the synthesis, then, is the logic of the will. 

The will to power is the principle of the synthesis which marks the

being of becoming, the unity of the multiplicity and the necessity of

chance.  How, though, does the will provide a foundation for being? 

We are not so far from the Scholastic horizon which we drew on so

heavily earlier.  In effect, the will to power is the principle of the

eternal return in that it plays the role of a primary cause, defining

the necessity and substantiality of being.  Nietzsche's terrain,

however, quickly transforms this logical/ontological point into an

ethics.  The eternal return of the will is an ethics in as much as it

is a "selective ontology". [72]  It is selective because not every

will returns: negation comes only once, only affirmation returns.  The

eternal return is the selection of the affirmative will as being. 

Being is not given in Nietzsche, being must be willed.  In this sense,

ethics comes before ontology in Nietzsche.  The ethical will is the

will that returns; the ethical will is the will which wills being. 

This is the sense in which the eternal return is a temporal synthesis

of forces: it demands that the will to power wills unity in time. 

Deleuze formulates the ethical selection of the eternal return as a

practical rule for the will: "whatever you will, will it in such a way

that you also will its eternal return." [68]  We should note here,

however, that when we read Deleuze's rule of the eternal return we

must be careful not to emphasize the word "also".  This "also" can be

very misleading because the eternal return is not separate from the

will but internal to it.  "How does the eternal return perform the

selection here?  It is the thought of the eternal return that selects. 

It makes willing something whole." [69]  The ethical will is whole,

internal to its return: "always do what you will ...." [69,

Zarathustra 191]  The principal of the eternal return as being is

the efficient will as an ethical will.

     We can now trace a beautiful trajectory of this fundamental idea

of efficiency or internality: from the logical centrality of efficient

difference (the difference internal to the thing) to the ontological

centrality of efficient power (the force internal to its

manifestation) and now to the ethical centrality of the efficient

will, the principle of the eternal return.  A Scholastic logic runs

through this series as the guiding thread, providing it a materialist

metaphysical foundation: the internal nature of the cause to its

effect is what supports the necessity, substantiality, singularity and

univocity of being.  This is how we can understand the eternal return

of the efficient will as the ethical pillar of a Nietzschean

philosophy of being.  We asked ourselves above in the Bergson section

how a philosophy of "indetermination" can also be a philosophy of

being, how can we have both becoming and being.  Here we have a

Nietzschean answer.  The dice throw, the moment of becoming, of

indetermination, is followed by dice falling back, the selection of

being, which in turn leads to a new dice throw.  The ontological

selection does not negate the indetermination of the dice throw, but

enhances it, affirms it, just as the eternal return is an affirmation

of the will.

     Finally, pure being is attained in Nietzsche, as an achieved

state, a finality, and it is presented in the persona of Ariadne.  The

love of Ariadne for Dionysus is the affirmation of the eternal return,

it is a double affirmation, the raising of the being of becoming to

its highest power.  Dionysus is the god of affirmation, but it takes

Ariadne to affirm affirmation itself: "Eternal affirmation of being,

eternally I am your affirmation." [187, from Dionysian Dithyrambs] 

Dionysus' affirmation marks the being of becoming; therefore, since

Ariadne takes Dionysus for the object of her affirmation, she marks

the pure affirmation of being.  Ariadne's affirmation is a double

affirmation ("le ®oui¯ qui r‚pond au ®oui¯" ["MystŠre d'Ariane" 15]),

or more properly it is a circular, infinite affirmation--affirmation

raised to the n-th power.  Ariadne's creation of pure being is an

ethical act, and act of love.

 

2.6: The total critique as the foundation of being

     On this ethical terrain of the efficient, affirmative will,

Deleuze reproposes the drama of the total critique, one last time, now

in terms of valuation--as "transmutation".  Deleuze presents the

critique this time through a combination of refurbished Kantian and

Scholastic terms.  In effect, transmutation moves from Kantianism to

Scholasticism in that it moves from a critique of knowledge to a

foundation of being. (13)  Here, also, we find Deleuze's final attack

on the Hegelian dialectic, albeit in distant, indirect form.  As we

have already seen, the standpoint of the critique, free from its

transcendental instance, is the will to power.  Now, the antagonistic

moment, the pars destruens of the critique, is played by nihilism. 

Deleuze explains that nihilism is the ratio cognoscendi of the will to

power: "what we in fact know of the will to power is suffering and

torture...." [173, emphasis mine]  Deleuze has explained at great

length that nihilism, as a project of interiority and consciousness,

is full of pain and suffering; however, this same nihilism is that

which reveals "all the values known or knowable up to the present."

[172]  We gain knowledge of ourselves and our present through the

suffering of the negative will to power.  As Kant has taught us,

though, there is a beyond to this knowledge: "We 'think' the will to

power in a form distinct from that in which we know it.  (Thus the

thought of the eternal return goes beyond all the laws of our

knowledge.)" [172-3]  Nihilism itself is what takes us beyond

interiority, beyond suffering: the power of the negative in this

critique does not operate an Hegelian "standing negation"; instead,

this "completed" nihilism is an active will to nothingness--"self-

destruction, active destruction." [174]  Completed nihilism is self-

destruction in two senses: completion means that nihilism defeats

itself so that the final act of the negative will to power is to

extinguish itself; also, the completion of nihilism is the end of

"man" as a constructed interiority, it is the suicide of the "last

man".

     At the limit of this destruction, at midnight, the focal point,

there is a transformation, a conversion from knowledge to creation,

from savage negation to absolute affirmation, from painful interiority

to joyful exteriority: "the legislator takes the place of the

'scholar', creation takes the place of knowledge itself and

affirmation takes the place of all negations." [173]  Affirmation, the

pars construens of the will to power, is "the unknown joy, the unknown

happiness, the unknown God" [173] which is beyond the ratio

cognoscendi.  With the active completion of nihilism and the

transmutation to affirmation and creation, we are finally finished

with negativity, interiority and consciousness as such.  Exteriority

is the condition for the foundation of being: the ratio essendi of the

will to power, Deleuze explains, is affirmation.  These terms allow

Deleuze to reformulate a statement of Zarathustra as an ontological

ethics: "I love the one who makes use of nihilism as the ratio

cognoscendi of the will to power, but who finds in the will to power a

ratio essendi in which man is overcome and therefore nihilism is

defeated." [174]  Being is primary over knowledge.  Like Ariadne,

Zarathustra loves being, the creation and affirmation of being. 

Exteriority, affirmation, the efficient will to power: this is the

ratio which supports being and this is what Zarathustra loves.

 

Remark: The end of Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism

     We noted at the outset of this chapter that one of the central

goals in Deleuze's study of Nietzsche is to flesh out an alternative

to dialectical opposition which would be an "opposition to the

dialectic itself." [17]  It is precisely the dialectic's ability to

recuperate opposition which is often used to critique the contemporary

anti-Hegelians.  Judith Butler poses the question of an opposition to

Hegelianism very forcefully in her recent Subjects of Desire.  "What

constitutes the latest stage of post-Hegelianism as a stage

definitively beyond the dialectic?  Are these positions still haunted

by the dialectic, even as they claim to be in utter opposition to it? 

What is the nature of this 'opposition', and is it perchance a form

that Hegel himself has prefigured?" [176]  Butler answers these

questions in strictly Hegelian fashion: "references to a 'break' with

Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the

very notion of 'breaking with' into the central tenet of the

dialectic." [183-4]  From this perspective, opposition itself is

essentially dialectical, and hence "opposition to the dialectic

itself" can only mean a reinforcement or repetition of the dialectic. 

In other words, any effort to be an "other" to Hegelianism can be

effectively recuperated as an "other" within Hegelianism.

     Through our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche we have explored two

points which could constitute adequate responses to Butler's

proposition.  Deleuze's elaboration of the total critique provides us

a direct response by showing that there are two different types of

opposition.  Dialectical opposition is a restrained, partial attack

which seeks to "preserve and maintain" its enemy; it is a sort of low-

intensity warfare which can be prolonged indefinitely in a "standing

negation".  In effect, the dialectic pillages and reforms the essence

of its predecessor through a partial critique.  Therefore, the

"breaking with" which is a central tenet of the dialect can only be a

partial rupture, preserving the continuity which characterizes the

prefix "post".  Non-dialectical opposition, however, is that which

operates a complete rupture with its opponent through an unrestrained,

savage attack.  The result of this profound opposition is a separation

which prohibits the recuperation of relations.  It would be a mistake,

then, to call this Nietzschean position "post-Hegelian", as if it

built on, reformed or completed Hegelianism.  Deleuze's claim that the

Nietzschean total critique is a "post-Kantian" position--it corrects

the Kantian errors to realize the goals of Kant's own original

project.  Kant's critique allows established values to persist on the

transcendental plane as essence: this exception is a result of Kant's

incompleteness and this is the fundamental error which Nietzsche

corrects.  In Hegel's dialectical critique, however, the established

values which are posed as essence are presented as the central

protagonist of the critical drama.  It is impossible to conceive of

the Nietzschean total critique and its unrestrained pars destruens as

a reform of this position--it can only appear as profound rupture.  At

this point, we can clearly see the need for Deleuze's care in

positioning the relation to proximate and fundamental enemies. 

Deleuze's Nietzsche can appear as "post-Kantian" but only "anti-

Hegelian": the difference is between reform and rupture.  Posed in

historiographic terms, Butler's Hegelian claim is that there are only

continuous lines in the history of philosophy, reformed to a greater

or lesser extent as differences of degree.  Deleuze, on the contrary

insists that the history of philosophy contains real discontinuities,

veritable differences of nature, and that discontinuity is the only

way of posing the Hegel-Nietzsche relationship: "There is no possible

compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche." [195]

     Deleuze offers us, however, a second response.  As we have

proceeded through the evolution of Deleuze's thought we have seen the

terrain on which he can address Hegelianism constantly shrinking and

we have seen that Deleuze's attacks on the dialectic have become more

and more indirect.  The Bergsonian attack on the One and the Multiple

and the Nietzschean attack on the master-slave relation are carried

out on planes completely removed from Hegel's discourse.  Deleuze's

strategy of developing a total opposition to the dialectic is

accompanied by another strategy to move away from the dialectic, to

forget the dialectic.  We have arrived at the end of Deleuze's anti-

Hegelianism.  Even though rhetoric against the dialectic will

reappear, in Diff‚rence et r‚p‚tition for example, it is only to

repeat the arguments developed in these early studies, not develop new

ones.  The development of a total opposition to the dialectic seems to

have been an intellectual cure for Deleuze: it has exorcised Hegel

and created an autonomous plane for thought, one which is no longer

anti-Hegelian, but which quite simply has forgotten the dialectic.

 

2.7: Pathos and joy: toward a practice of affirmative being

     A philosophy of joy is necessarily a philosophy of practice. 

Throughout Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche we have the impression that

practice plays a central role, but the terms never come out clearly. 

It is very clear, on the other hand, what Deleuze's Nietzsche is not:

it is not an investigation of consciousness, it is not only a

reformation of the understanding or an emendation of the intellect; in

short, it is not the construction of an interiority, but a creation of

exteriority through the power of affirmation.  The exteriority of

thought and of the will, however, is not yet an adequate

characterization, because Nietzschean affirmation is also corporeal. 

We have one last passage to make in our reading of Deleuze's

Nietzsche: from will to appetite and desire, from exteriority to

practice.

     Deleuze's elaboration of Nietzschean exteriority rediscovers

a Spinozian proposition: "will to power is manifested as a power to

be affected (pouvoir d'ˆtre affect‚)." [62, modified] (14)  Spinoza

conceived a positive relation between a body's power to be affected

and its power to effect.  "The more ways a body could be affected the

more force it had." [62]  Two aspects of this Spinozian conception

interest Deleuze in the context of Nietzsche's work.  First, this

power to be affected never deals with a possibility, but it is always

actualised in relations with other bodies.  Secondly, this power

defines the receptivity of a body not as a passivity but as "an

affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation." [62]  What this notion

affords Deleuze is a means of posing inner experience as a mode of

corporeal exteriority.  The receptivity of a body is closely tied to

its active external expression: affectivity is an attribute of the

body's power.  In Nietzsche as in Spinoza, then, pathos does not

involve a body "suffering" passions; on the contrary, pathos involves

the affects which mark the activity of the body, the creation which is

joy.

     To arrive at a practical conception of joy, however, this rich

sense of the power of the affectivity of bodies must be accompanied by

an elaboration of the activity of bodies in practice.  The very last

section of Deleuze's Nietzsche approaches this problem.  "Nietzsche's

practical teaching is that difference is happy; that multiplicity,

becoming and chance are adequate objects of joy by themselves and that

only joy returns. ...  Not since Lucretius has the critical enterprise

which characterizes philosophy been taken so far (with the exception

of Spinoza).  Lucretius exposes the trouble of the soul and those who

need it to establish their power -- Spinoza exposes sorrow, all the

causes of sorrow and all those who found their power at the heart of

this sorrow -- Nietzsche exposes ressentiment, bad conscience and the

power of the negative which serves as their principle...." [190]  This

history of practical philosophies of joy (Lucretius, Spinoza,

Nietzsche) is very suggestive.  However, in Deleuze's Nietzsche there

are two elements which block the development of a practical struggle

against the sad passions: elements which direct us forward to the

study of Spinoza.  First, Deleuze's "impersonal" reading of Nietzsche

blocks the development of a theory of practice because it limits our

conception of agents to the interplay of forces.  We have noted above

that when Deleuze asks the question "qui?" he avoids all "personalist"

references, but looks rather to a specific will to power.  At this

point, however, we need to look not only to the will but also to the

appetite and desire: the attributes of a practical agent must be

personalist--for a theory of practice we do not need an individualist

theory, but we do need a corporeal and desiring agent.  Spinoza is

exemplary in this regard when he defines the agent of practice, the

"Individual", as a body or group of bodies recognized for its common

movement, its common behavior, its common desire. [Ethics 2P13Def]  A

corporeal agent such as Spinoza's can lead a struggle against the sad

passions and discover a practice of joy.  Secondly, Deleuze's

Nietzsche fails to arrive at a theory of practice because it does not

arrive at a conception of a spatial or social synthesis.  The

Nietzschean synthesis, the eternal return, is a temporal synthesis

which projects the will to power in time.  Spinoza will show us,

however, that a practice of joy takes place on the plane of sociality:

Spinoza's common notions, for example, provide the terms for an

expansive collectivity, for the creation of society and thus a

powerful weapon against the sad passions.  This final section of

Nietzsche and Philosophy, then, is already looking forward to the next

passage in Deleuze's evolution: from Nietzschean exteriority to

Spinozian practice.

 

Notes

  1 - The Nietzschean charges against Kant here are similar to those

which Gramsci wages against the traditional intellectual: Kant

presents as objective knowledge and morality what is really serving

the interests of the forces of order because he fails to bring the

ground of his analysis and the interests it serves into question. 

  2 - This is one example when Deleuze appears a little over-zealous in

his attack on Hegel.  "... si l'on considŠre l'ensemble de l'histoire

de la philosophie, on cherche en vain quel philosophe a pu proc‚der

par la question ®qu'est-ce que?¯ ... Peut-ˆtre Hegel, peut-ˆtre n'y a-

t-il que Hegel, pr‚cis‚ment parce que sa dialectique, ‚tant celle de

l'essence vide et abstraite, ne se s‚pare pas du mouvement de la

contradiction." [92]  In the discussion following this presentation,

F. Alqui‚ chastises Deleuze on this count: "je regrette le rejet, un

peu rapide, de la question ®Qu'est-ce que?¯, et je ne saurais accepter

ce qu'il nous a dit, en nous intimident un peu, au d‚but, … savoir

qu'aucun philosophe ne s'‚tait pos‚ cette question, sauf Hegel." [104] 

Alqui‚ argues, rightly I believe, that Hegel cannot be singled out so

easily and that many philosophers (Plato, Leibniz, Kant, etc.) have

emphasized the question "Qu'est-ce que?" in vary degrees and in

diverse contexts.

  3 - In this Nietzschean context, Deleuze presents the argument as

if it were part of an attack on causality per se; but it is not

difficult to bring this back to the idea of internal cause developed

in the Bergson section above.  Indeed, the argument becomes clearer if

we read it as an affirmation of internal cause rather than an attack

on causality tout court.  I would argue, further, that Nietzsche's

entire polemic against causality could be read productively as a

polemic against the external cause and an affirmation of the internal

cause.  For an example of Nietzsche's argument, see Twilight of the

Idols, "The Four Great Errors".

  4 - With this polemical proposition of efficient power, Deleuze is

participating in a long philosophical tradition.  The ultimate source,

perhaps, can be found in Aristotle's distinction between potential

being and actual being in Metaphysics, Book 5.  However, this argument

can be found in various forms throughout the materialist tradition,

from Ockham to Marx.  In fact, Spinoza's distinction between potestas

and potentia, which plays such a central role in Negri's reading,

correlates very closely with Nietzsche's usage of slave power and

master power.  Later, when we consider Negri's reading of Spinoza, we

will make an extensive investigation of the metaphysical and political

implications of this distinction.

  5 - This evaluation of the two natures of power is what brings

Deleuze's Nietzsche very close to Spinoza: "By virtue and power

[potentia] I mean the same thing." [Ethics 4D8]

  6 - Mario Tronti observes that precisely what is lacking in Hegel's

master-slave dialectic is the question of value.  This is why Marx

needs to combine a critique of Hegel with a critique of Ricardo to

arrive at his notion of labor value. [133-43]

  7 - "... il y a certainement chez l'auteur une sorte de ressentiment

vis-…-vis de la philosophie h‚g‚lienne qui parfois lui dicte des pages

p‚n‚trantes, mais parfois aussi risque de le tromper ...." [353]  Wahl

is certainly correct in pointing to this danger.  Deleuze's defense

rests on his development of a non-dialectical opposition, which would

not be a ressentiment but a pure aggression.

  8 - KojŠve's reading is perhaps the most pure version of a

personalist interpretation of the confrontation between the master

and the slave: "un individu-humain se pr‚sente … un individu-humain."

[17] 

  9 - I can imagine an argument by which Hegel could be defended

against the charge that slave contents are being attributed to essence

here, but the reading of this passage as an affirmation of labor as

essence is so widespread in the Hegelian tradition that I think it is

worth considering this point.

  10 - Nietzsche and Marx are united precisely on a Spinozian

proposition: the essence of being is power. [Ethics 1P34]  One might

well object at this point that in my argument Nietzsche and Marx are

not attacking essence per se, but substituting one essence for

another.  This is true.  I would maintain that just as Nietzsche's

arguments against causality should be read as arguments against

the external causality in favor of the internal cause, the attack on

essence is the attack on an external form of essence.  The will to

power is the essence of being.

  11 - The "refusal of work" was not only a slogan but also one of the

central analytical categories of Italian Marxism in the 60s and 70s. 

Just as Marx discovered surplus value as the general term which

envelops the various forms of exploitation (rent, profit, etc.), the

"refusal of work" is the general term which comprehends the various

forms of proletarian resistance, be it constructive or destructive,

individual or collective: emigration, work stoppage, organized

strikes, sabotage, etc.  We should be very clear, however, that the

refusal of work is not the negation of productivity or creativity;

rather, it is the refusal of a relationship of exploitation.  In the

terms of the tradition, it is the affirmation of proletarian

productive force and the denial of capitalist relations of production.

  11 - In regards to the theme of the attack on essence and the joy of

destruction, the connections between Nietzsche and Lenin are very

profound.  For an analysis of the fundamental role of "smashing" in

Lenin, see Toni Negri, "Crisis of the Planner State" in Revolution

Retrieved.  For an explanation of Lenin's "art of insurrection", see

Negri, La fabbrica della strategia.

  12 - There is certainly a wide-variety of differing accounts of what

'68 was and what it should have been.  The reason I think that

Vogliamo tutto best serves our purposes here is that it gives direct

expression to the desires of the workers in action better than any

other source I have found.  In any case, even if I were to hold that

this account were exemplary of the events of '68, I would not claim

that it were representative.  Also, I should point out that just as it

is a particular reading of Nietzsche we are following here, that

defined by Deleuze's selection, it is also a particular interpretation

of Marx, that of Italian "workerism" from Quaderni rossi to Potere

operaio. 

  13 - Jean Wahl admires Deleuze's formulation of the will to

nothingness as the ratio cognoscendi of the will to power in general

and the affirmation of the eternal return as its ratio essendi, but he

finds it somewhat inappropriate for the Nietzschean context.  "Mais

n'y a-t-il pas l… un expos‚ peut-ˆtre trop scolastique en apparence de

la pens‚e nietzsch‚ene?" [378]  Wahl is certainly right in noting that

Deleuze is bringing in an element external to Nietzsche's thought,

but, as I hope I have already shown, reference to the Scholastics can

help bring to light the ontological foundation of Nietzsche's thought

(in the analysis of power, of will and of causality).

  14 - Tomlinson translates "pouvoir d'ˆtre affect‚" as "capacity to

be affected".  "Capacity" is a very poor choice because the "pouvoir

d'ˆtre affect‚" does not imply any possibility, instead it is always

actual.