.m:2

3. Spinozian practice: affirmation and joy

One can recognize immediately that Deleuze's reading of Spinoza

has a different quality than his treatment of other philosophers:

there is a certain modesty and caution before Spinoza that we do not

find elsewhere. We should keep in mind, of course, that Deleuze

presented Spinoza et le problŠme de l'expression as the historical

portion of his doctoral thesis, but this fact can only provide a

partial explanation for the change in tone. As we have seen, Deleuze

often presents his investigations in the history of philosophy in the

form of extreme simplicity, as the elaboration of a single idea:

ontological positivity for Bergson, ethical affirmation for Nietzsche.

These studies take the form of clean-cut jewels; they pose the

essential idea from which an entire philosophical doctrine follows.

In comparison, Deleuze's work on Spinoza is very ragged; it is

spilling over with underdeveloped insights and unresolved problems.

Precisely for this reason it is a more open work, and at the same time

a work which is less accessible to a general public. (1) Spinoza et

le problŠme de l'expression appears as a set of working notes which do

not present a completed interpretation, but rather propose a series of

interpretative strategies in the process of development. Therefore

the theoretical passages which we will follow here are complex and

often eliptical. "C'est sur Spinoza que j'ai travaill‚ le plus

s‚rieusement d'aprŠs les normes de l'histoire de la philosophie; mais

c'est lui qui m'a fait le plus l'effet d'un courant d'air qui vous

pousse dans le dos chaque fois que vous le lisez, d'un balai de

sorciŠre qu'il vous fait enfourcher. Spinoza, on n'a pas mˆme

commenc‚ … le comprendre, et moi pas plus que les autres." [Dialogues

22] Spinoza remains an enigma.

Our task, then, in reading Deleuze's work on Spinoza is to

discover its organizing structure, its central and animating project.

Let us go back to our methodological principles. We presented as an

hypothesis at the outset, and we have confirmed in our first two

sections, that there is an evolution in Deleuze's early thought. His

historical monographs approach the work of individual philosophers in

the framework of his own intellectual project. With Bergson, Deleuze

develops an ontology; with Nietzsche, he set that ontology in motion

to constitute an ethics. With Spinoza, then, we will take a further

step in this evolution, building on a Bergsonian ontology and a

Nietzschean ethics. However, Deleuze does not immediately proceed

beyond his previous results; rather, he takes a few steps back in

order to prepare the leap ahead. In the first half of his study,

corresponding roughly to the first two books of the Ethics, we find a

re-elaboration of the terrain which he treated in his study of Bergson

(the plenitude of being, the positivity of difference, the problem of

emanation, etc.); in the second half of Deleuze's reading,

corresponding to the final books of the Ethics, we find a re-working

and extension of the Nietzschean terrain (the affirmation of being,

the ethics of power and activity, etc.). Bergson and Nietzsche breath

life into Spinoza, standing as his principle predecessors: in

Deleuze's inverted history of philosophy, Spinoza seems to be able to

look back and see that he too is not alone on the mountain tops.

However, in Deleuze's hands, Spinoza extends this continuity

which runs from ontology to ethics toward a conception of politics.

This Spinozian leap forward is accomplished through the elaboration of

a rich conception of practice as the real, ethical constitution of

being. The importance of Deleuze's evolution -- from Bergson through

Nietzsche to Spinoza, or rather from ontology through ethics to

politics -- is that its movement does not involve a process of

transfer but rather one of constitution. In other words, each step,

each new terrain of investigation is a construction which never

abandons or negates, but reproposes the terms of its predecessor.

Nietzschean ethics is Bergsonian ontology transferred to the field of

value; Spinozian politics is Bergsonian ontology and Nietzschean

ethics transferred to the field of practice. Ontology inheres in

ethics, which in turn inheres in politics. For Deleuze, then, Spinoza

constitutes both the endpoint and the summary of the entire evolution.

Spinoza's politics is an ontological politics in that, through a rich

analysis of power and a conceptual elaboration of practice, the

principles which animate being are the very same principles which

animate an ethics and practical constitution of political

organization. We will see exactly what this means in the course of

our study.

Our focus on this Deleuzian evolution allows us to recognize

another thesis which is important in the context of Spinoza studies.

Throughout Spinoza et le problŠme de l'expression we can see that

Deleuze treats the Spinozian system as two distinct moments, as two

perspectives of thought, one speculative and another practical. This

distinction between speculation and practice, which remains implicit

in Deleuze's work, is both a theoretical claim and an interpretative

strategy. While Deleuze does not highlight this distinction, we can

see that it clearly constitutes a challenge to the traditional

commentaries on Spinozian thought. For example, Ferdinand Alqui‚, one

of the most acute readers, maintains that, unlike Descartes, Spinoza

is not a "philosophe de la m‚thode" who starts from the point of view

of Man to build toward a divine perspective, but rather he is a

"philosophe du systŠme" setting out directly from the point of view of

God: the Ethics is principally a systematic, rather than a

methodological text. [Nature et verit‚ 34] Deleuze presents the

Ethics, however, as double text which proceeds from both of the

perspectives identified by Alqui‚: the first moment of the Ethics,

speculative and analytic, proceeds in the centrifugal direction from

God to the thing in order to discover and express the principles which

animate the system of being; the second moment of the Ethics,

practical and synthetic, moves in the centripetal direction from the

thing to God by forging an ethical method and a political line of

conduct. The two moments are fundamentally linked: the moment of

research, the Forschung prepares the terrain for the Darstellung, the

moment of presentation and practice. In reading the previous works,

we have insisted at length on the importance of Deleuze's critical

procedure: pars destruens, pars construens. Here, we are presented

with a similar procedure, but the moment of opposition, of antagonism,

of destruction has changed. We still find a Deleuzian opposition in

Spinoza et le problŠme de l'expression (to Descartes, to Leibniz, to

the Scholastics, etc.) but this opposition no longer plays a

foundational role. Rather than a destructive moment followed by a

constructive moment, Deleuze's Spinoza presents a speculative logical

investigation followed by a practical ethical constitution: Forschung

followed by Darstellung. The two moments, then, are fundamentally

linked, but they remain autonomous and distinct -- each with its own

method and animating spirit. "Le sens de la joie apparaŒt comme le

sens proprement ‚thique: il est … la pratique ce qui l'affirmation

elle-mˆme est … la sp‚culation.... Philosophie de l'affirmation pure,

l'Ethique est aussi philosophie de la joie qui correspond … cette

affirmation." [251] The affirmation of speculation and the joy of

practice are the two threads which weave together to form the general

design of the Ethics.

One could say, as a very rough first approximation, then, that

the first books of the Ethics constitute a system and the later books

develop a method: Spinoza begins from the divine perspective and

proceeds to the human perspective, only to build once again toward the

divine. The two moments cover the same terrain of being, but from

different perspectives. This conception can only be a first

approximation, though, because the two perspectives are much more

closely linked. The importance of recognizing these two moments of

Spinoza's thought, as we will see below, is that there are substantial

nuances in Spinoza's major concepts (universal, absolute, adequate,

necessary, rational, etc.) when one considers them from one

perspective or the other. Thus, as an initial hypothesis, we can

divide Deleuze's reading of Spinoza in two parts: the speculative

aspect which unfolds as a theory of affirmation and the practical

aspect which develops in the pursuit of joy. In much of Deleuze's

reading of the Ethics, we can see the tendency to move from

speculation to practice, from affirmation to joy. Perhaps the most

important feature of this Deleuzian approach is that it allows us to

articulate a Spinozian theory of practice: an ontologically

constitutive practice, defined and animated by its own logical

principles as an autonomous field of human activity. Spinoza's

philosophy, Deleuze discovers, is above all a practical philosophy, a

philosophy of joy.

Two central preoccupations, then, guide our study of Spinoza et

le problŠme de l'expression: how does Spinoza intervene in the

sequence of Deleuze's evolution to enrich and extend his project, and

also how does Deleuze's interpretation renew Spinoza studies,

demonstrating the power and the continuity of Spinoza's ontological,

ethical and political thought. The fundamental theme which unites

these two endeavors is the analysis of power. In the ontological

domain, the investigation of the structure of power occupies a

privileged position because the essence of being is its productive

causal dynamic. Causa sui is the essential pillar which supports

being, in that being is defined in its power to exist and produce.

All discussions of power, productivity and causality in Deleuze, as in

Spinoza, refer us back to this ontological foundation. The analysis

of power, though, is not only an element which brings us back to first

principles, it is also the passage which allows the discussion to

forge ahead on to new terrain. In the study of Nietzsche we found

that by recognizing the distinction within power between the active

and the reactive we were able to transform the ontological discussion

into an ethics. In this study of Spinoza, the same passage through

power gains a richer and more extensive function. Here we find an

entire system of distinctions within power: between spontaneity and

affectivity, between actions and passions, between joy and sadness.

This analysis sets the terms for a real conversion within the

continuity of the theoretical framework. This investigation of power

constitutes the end of speculation and the beginning of practice: it

comes at the hour of midnight, as a Nietzschean transmutation. Power

is the crucial link, the point of passage from speculation to

practice. The elaboration of this passage will form the pivot of our

study. If the Theses on Feuerbach constitute a c‚sure in Marx's

thought, then the analysis of power functions as similar conversion in

Spinoza: it is the moment in which we stop striving to think the world

and begin to create it.

I. Speculation

3.1 Substance and the real distinction: singularity

The opening of the Ethics is remarkable. It is precisely these

initial passages which have inspired so many readers, in amazement and

irritation, in admiration and damnation, to declare that the Ethics is

an impossible, incomprehensible text -- how can we possibly embark on

a project starting from the idea of God, from the absolute? This

remarkable opening, however, does not appear as problematic to

Deleuze. On the contrary, he seems to be perfectly comfortable with

Spinoza's initial step: along with Merleau-Ponty, he sees 17th-century

thought generally as "une maniŠre innocente de penser … partir de

l'infini." [22] Starting with the infinite is not impossible, but

rather quite natural for Deleuze. We should be careful, though, not

to misread this innocence -- infinite does not mean indefinite; the

infinite substance is not indeterminate. This is the challenge which

provides an initial key to Deleuze's analysis and which, according to

Deleuze, orients and dominates the first book of the Ethics: what kind

of distinction is there in the infinite, in the absolutely infinite

nature of God? We should note immediately a Bergsonian resonance in

this problematic. The connections between Bergsonism and Spinozism

are well-known and, although we find no direct references in the text,

we can be certain that Deleuze is sensitive to the common features of

the two philosophies. (2) However, Deleuze brings the two doctrines

together in an unusual and complex way. In effect, Deleuze uses the

opening of the Ethics as a rereading of Bergson: he presents the

proofs of the existence of God and the singularity of substance as an

extended meditation on the positive nature of difference and the real

foundation of being.

To approach the question of distinctions in Spinoza, of course,

we must assume Descartes' position as a point of departure. Deleuze

notes the three distinctions of being in Cartesian philosophy: A) a

real distinction between two substances, B) a modal distinction

between a substance and a mode which it implies and C) a conceptual

distinction [distinction de raison] between a substance and an

attribute. [23] The first error in this system of distinctions, from

a Spinozian point of view, is the proposition of number in the

definition of substance: by affirming the existence of two substances,

Descartes presents the real distinction as a numerical distinction.

According to Deleuze, Spinoza challenges this Cartesian idea from two

angles in the opening of the Ethics: first, he argues that a numerical

distinction is never real [P1-P8] and then that a real distinction is

never numerical [P9-P11]. In other words, while traditional

interpretations have generally identified Spinoza's substance with the

number one or with infinity, Deleuze insists that substance is

completely removed from the realm of number. Spinoza's first

demonstration, that a numerical distinction is never real, rests on

the definition of the internal causality of substance [P6C]. Number

cannot have a substantial nature, because number involves a limitation

and thus requires an external cause: "whatever is of such a nature

that there can be many individuals of that nature must ... have an

external cause to exist." [P8S2] From the definition of substance

[D3] we know that it cannot involve an external cause. A numerical

distinction, then, cannot pertain to substance; or in other words, a

numerical distinction cannot be a real distinction. Starting with P9,

however, Spinoza proceeds to the inverse argument which is really the

more fundamental one: having shown that each attribute corresponds to

the same substance (i.e., the numerical distinction is not real), he

proceeds to demonstrate that substance envelops all the attributes

(i.e., the real distinction is not numerical). This second proof

consists of two parts. Spinoza proposes first that the more reality a

thing has, the more attributes it must have [P9] and secondly he

proposes that the more attributes a thing has the more existence it

has [P11S]. The two points essentially cover the same ground and

serve together to make the definition of God [D6] a real definition:

an absolutely infinite being (God, Ens realissimum) consists of an

absolute infinity of attributes. God is both unique and absolute.

It would be absurd to maintain at this point that we are dealing with

a numerical domain in which the two endpoints, one and infinity, are

united. Spinoza's substance is posed outside of number; the real

distinction is not numerical.

Why, though, does this complex logical development of the real

distinction appear as fundamental to Deleuze? We should be aware that

Spinoza does not use the term "real distinction" when he discusses

substance, even though he is certain to be familiar with its usage in

Cartesian and Scholastic philosophy. Deleuze introduces this term

because it serves to highlight the fundamental relation between being

and difference. This strained and tendentious usage of the "real

distinction" should draw our attention to Deleuze's original

conception of difference. Descartes' real distinction is relational

(there is a distinction between x and y); or more explicitly, it

proposes a concept of difference which is entirely founded on negation

(x is different from y). Spinoza's challenge is to eliminate the

relational or negative aspect of the real distinction: rather than

posing the real distinction as a "distinction between" or a

"difference from", Spinoza wants to identify the real distinction in

itself (there is a distinction in x; or rather, x is different). (3)

Once again, we have to be sensitive to the Bergsonian resonances here.

"Dissoci‚e de toute distinction num‚rique, la distinction r‚elle est

port‚e dans l'absolu. Elle devient capable d'exprimer la diff‚rence

dans l'ˆtre, elle entraŒne en cons‚quence le remaniement des autres

distinctions." [32] This statement bares a striking resemblance to a

passage in Deleuze's early essay on Bergson. "Penser la diff‚rence

interne comme telle, comme pure diff‚rence interne, arriver jusqu'au

pur concept de la diff‚rence, ‚lever la diff‚rence … l'absolu, tel est

le sens de l'effort de Bergson." ["Bergson et la diff‚rence" 90] What

we find in common here is the ontological grounding of difference and

the central role of difference in the foundation of being. In both

Bergson and Spinoza, the essential characteristic of difference is on

one side its internal causality and on the other its immersion in the

absolute. As I have insisted at great length, Deleuze's reading of

Bergsonian difference depends heavily on a conception of a being that

is productive, of an internal and efficient causal dynamic which can

be traced back to the materialist tradition and to the Scholastics.

This conception takes on its full import in Spinoza: "L'ontologie de

Spinoza est domin‚e par les notions de cause de soi, en soi et par

soi." [147] This internal causal dynamic is what animates the real

distinction of being. This is the absolutely positive difference

which both supports being in itself and which provides the basis for

all the differences which characterize real being. To this extent,

there is a positive correspondence between Bergson's difference of

nature and Spinoza's real distinction. "Non opposita sed diversa,

telle ‚tait la formule de la nouvelle logique. La distinction r‚elle

semblait announcer une nouvelle conception du n‚gatif, sans opposition

ni privation ...." [51] In both cases, a special conception of

difference takes the place of opposition: it is a difference which is

completely positive, which refers neither to an external cause nor to

external mediation -- pure difference, difference in itself.

We should dwell a moment on this point, though, because its sense

is not immediately evident. What can be meant by a distinction which

is not numerical? In other words, how can something be different when

it is absolutely infinite and indivisible? What is a difference which

involves no other? How can we conceive of the absolute without

negation? The enormous difficulties posed by these questions points

to the ambitious task of the opening of the Ethics: "Il fallait …

Spinoza toutes les ressources d'un ‚l‚ment conceptuel original pour

exposer la puissance et l'actualit‚ de l'infini positif." [22] Here

we are confronted with the Spinozian principle of the singularity of

being. As a first approximation we could say that singularity is the

union of monism with the absolute positivity of pantheism: the unique

substance directly infuses and animates the entire world. The problem

with this definition is that it leaves open an idealistic

interpretation of substance and allows for a confusion between the

infinite and the indefinite. In other words, from an idealist

perspective, absolute substance might be read as an indetermination,

and pantheism might be read as acosmism. Deleuze's reading, however,

closes off this possibility. Being is singular not only in that it

is unique and absolutely infinite, but more importantly in that it is

remarkable. This is the impossible opening of the Ethics. Singular

being as substance is not "distinct from" or "different from" any

thing outside itself; if it were we would have to conceive it partly

through another and thus it would not be substance. And yet being is

not indifferent. Here we can begin to appreciate the radicality of

Spinoza's definition of substance: "By substance I understand what is

in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept

does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be

formed." [D3] The distinction of being rises from within. Causa sui

means that being is both infinite and definite: being is remarkable.

The first task of the real distinction, then, is to define being as

singular, to recognize its difference without reference to or

dependence on its other. The real non-numerical distinction defines

the singularity of being in that being is absolutely infinite and

indivisible at the same time that it is distinct and determinate.

3.2 Attributes and the formal distinction: univocity

At this point, it seems that we can tentatively and partially

identify Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian virtuality with that of

Spinozian substance in that both propose singular conceptions of being

animated by an absolutely positive, internal difference. (4) Once we

propose this common terrain of the singularity of being, however,

Spinoza's conception of the attributes rises up as a real departure

and as a profound contribution. We have established thus far that the

real distinction is not a numerical distinction or, in Bergsonian

terms, that a difference of nature is not a difference of degree; now,

with Spinoza's theory of the attributes, Deleuze will extend this

argument beyond Bergson to show that the real distinction is a formal

distinction. Through the investigation of the formal distinction of

the attributes Deleuze arrives at a second Spinozian principle of

ontology: the principle of the univocity of being.

In order to grasp the univocity of being, we have to begin with

an investigation of its vocality, its expressivity. The Spinozian

attributes, on Deleuze's reading are the expressions of being.

Traditionally, the problem of the attributes of God is closely tied to

that of divine names. Spinoza transforms this tradition by giving the

attribute the active role in divine expression: "l'attribut n'est plus

attribu‚, il est en quelque sort ®attributeur¯. Chaque attribut

exprime un essence, et l'attribue … la substance." [36] Spinoza moves

the attribute from the role of an adjective to that of a verb. The

attribute expresses substance; the essence of substance does not exist

outside of the attributes which express it: "Les attributs sont des

verbes exprimant des qualit‚s illimit‚es." [40] The issue of divine

names becomes a problematic of divine expression. What is expressed

through the attribute is a common form; the characteristic of the

attribute is that it shares a common form with God.

Deleuze sets up a simple progression of theological paradigms to

situate Spinoza's theory of expressive attributes. Negative

theologies in general affirm God as cause of the world, but deny God

as its essence. In other words, while the world is a divine

expression, God's essence always surpasses or transcends its

expression: "Ce qui cache exprime aussi, mais ce qui exprime cache

encore." [44] Thus, God as essence or substance can only be defined

negatively, as an eminent, transcendent, hidden source of expression.

The God of negative theology is expressive, but with a certain,

essential reserve. Spinoza's conceptions of the singularity of being

and the real distinction which we have already examined serve to show

his opposition to this negative theological paradigm: immanence is

opposed to eminence; pantheism is opposed to transcendence. Spinoza's

God is fully expressed in the world, without reserve.

Positive theologies, on the contrary, affirm God as both cause

and essence. However, among these theories there are important

distinctions in the way that they affirm God's positivity. Deleuze

finds it most important to distinguish expressive positive theologies

from analogical positive theologies. In other words, the theory of

the attribute and formal commonality should be contrasted with the

theory of divine properties and the analogy of being. In the

Thomistic tradition, for example, the qualities attributed to God do

not imply a common form but an analogic relation between God and the

creatures of the world. This conception both elevates God to an

eminent position and renders the expression of being equivocal. It is

equivocal because an expression is not said in the same sense of God

and of the creatures. Analogy is precisely what marks this gap.

Deleuze claims, then, that analogy is a subtle form of

anthropomorphism which confuses the essence of God and the essences of

things. Spinoza ridicules the analogic theories of God's "attributes"

(will, understanding, goodness, wisdom, etc,): if a triangle could

speak, he claims, it would certainly pronounce God eminently

triangular. Analogy proposes an essential identity between God and

things and a formal difference. Spinoza's theory of the attribute

reverses this formula: "Les attributs sont donc des formes communes …

Dieu dont ils constituent l'essence, et aux modes ou cr‚atures qui les

impliquent essentiellement." [39] Spinoza's attribute, then, in

opposition to theories of analogy, proposes a commonality of form and

a distinction of essences. "La m‚thode de Spinoza n'est ni abstraite

ni analogique. C'est une m‚thode formelle et de communaut‚." [40]

This Spinozian distinction of essence, though, should not be refered

back to a negative theological conception. Through the attributes

(the expressions), substance (the expressing agent) is absolutely

immanent in the world of modes (the expressed); once again, the divine

is absolutely expressed, nothing is hidden. Spinozian monism opposes

all dualism, both negative and analogical. The central element which

allows for this absolute expression is the commonality of forms.

This discussion becomes more clear when we distinguish attributes

from properties. If attributes are verbs, Deleuze claims, properties

are merely adjectives. "Les propres ne sont pas des attributs, …

proprement parler, pr‚cis‚ment parce qu'ils ne sont pas expressifs."

[41] The properties of God (omnipotence, omniscience, perfection,

etc.) do not express anything of the nature of God; properties are

mute. They appear to us as signs, as revelations, as commandments.

Properties are notions impressed on us which cannot make us understand

anything about nature because they do not present us with a common

form. Deleuze distinguishes, therefore, between two senses of "the

word of God": one which refers to the attribute as expression and

another which refers to the property as sign. "Le signe se rattache

toujours … un propre; il signifie toujours un commandement; et il

fonde notre ob‚issance. L'expression concerne toujours un attribut;

elle exprime une essence, c'est-…-dire une nature … l'infinif; elle

nous la faire connaŒtre." [48] Once again, expression of the

attributes can only take place in the common forms of being. This

conception can be seen from two sides: on one hand, by means of the

attributes, God is absolutely immanent (fully expressed) in the world

of the modes; and on the other hand, through the common forms of the

attributes, the modes participate fully in divine substance.

Immanence and participation are the two sides of the expression of the

attributes. It is this participation which distinguishes between the

understanding given by the expressive attributes and the obedience

imposed by the analogous properties. A system of signs tells us

nothing about being. (5)

Thus far, we have critiqued the approach of negative theology and

that of analogical positive theology on the basis of the expression of

the attributes through the common forms of being. To an extent, the

conception of common forms is implied by the real distinction: the

singularity of being requires the absolute immanence of the divine in

the world because if God were not absolutely immanent we would need to

distinguish between two substances. Absolute immanence, however, is a

necessary but not sufficient condition for univocity. The attributes

are not only characterized by an internal common form (immanence) but

also by an external plurality. In other words, in order to pursue

this theory of an expressive positive theology, the formal commonality

embodied in each infinite attribute has to be complemented by the

formal distinction among the different attributes. The divine essence

is not only expressed in one attribute, but in an infinite number of

formally distinct attributes. To fill out this positive theological

framework, then, Deleuze traces Spinoza's theory of the attributes

back to Duns Scotus. (6) "Duns Scot sans doute est celui qui mena le

plus loin l'entreprise d'une th‚ologie positive. Il d‚nounce … la

fois l'‚minence n‚gative des n‚o-platoniciens, la pseudo-affirmation

des thomists." [54] The positive theology of Duns Scotus is

characterized by the theory of the formal distinction. This concept

provides a logical mechanism whereby he can maintain both the

differences among the attributes and the unity of being: the

attributes are formally distinct and ontologically identical. "Il y a

l… comme deux ordres, l'ordre de la raison formelle et l'ordre de

l'ˆtre, la pluralit‚ de l'un se conciliant parfaitement avec la

simplicit‚ de l'autre." [55] The positive expression of the formally

distinct attributes constitutes, for Spinoza as for Duns Scotus, a

conception of the univocity of being. Univocity means precisely that

being is expressed everywhere in the same voice; in other words, the

attributes each express being in a different form but in the same

sense. Therefore, univocity implies a formal difference but a real

and absolute unity among the attributes as expressions of being.

Deleuze is careful to point out, however, that Spinoza's theory

of univocal being well surpasses that of Duns Scotus, thanks to the

Spinozian conception of the expressivity of the attributes. In Duns

Scotus, what are called attributes -- justice, goodness, wisdom -- are

really merely properties. In the final analysis, Duns Scotus

remains too much of a theologian and thus he cannot abandon a certain

eminence of the divine: "Car la perspective th‚ologique, c'est-…-dire

®cr‚ationniste¯, le for‡ait … concevoir l'Etre univoque comme un

concept neutralis‚, indiff‚rent." [58] In Duns Scotus, God the creator

is not the cause of all things in the same sense that it is cause of

itself; since univocal being in Duns Scotus is not absolutely

singular, it remains somewhat indifferent, somewhat inexpressive.

Spinoza's real distinction, though, elevates univocity to affirmation.

In the Spinozian attribute, the expression of being is the affirmation

of being. "Les attributs sont des affirmations. Mais l'affirmation,

dans son essence, est toujours formelle, actuelle, univoque: c'est en

ce sens qu'elle est expressive. La philosophie de Spinoza est une

philosophie de l'affirmation pure. L'affirmation est le principe

sp‚culatif dont toute l'Ethique d‚pend." [51] In the Spinozian

context, Deleuze gives affirmation an original and precise definition:

it is a speculative principle based on the absolute singularity and

univocity of being, or in other words on the full expressivity of

being. And here, once again, we can recognize a typical Bergsonian

appreciation of Spinoza: "Spinoza nous fait toucher du doigt ce qu'il

y a d'h‚ro‹que dans la sp‚culation...." [Ecrits et paroles 587]

Affirmation constitutes the pinnacle, the heroic moment of a pure

speculative philosophy.

Remark: Ontological speculation

Let us pause for a moment and consider more carefully the ground

we have covered. In effect, Deleuze has read the first two great

steps of the Spinozian system, the elaborations of substance and the

attributes, as an alternative logic of speculation -- not in

opposition to, but completely autonomous from the Hegelian

progression. This conceptual autonomy shows us not only that Spinoza

represents a turning point in the evolution of Deleuze's work, but

also that Deleuze's interpretation constitutes a revolution for Spinoza

studies which had been long dominated in Continental philosophy by an

Hegelian reading. In reading Deleuze's study of Nietzsche we argued

that Deleuze was disengaging his own thought from the dialectical

terrain through the theory of the total critique. In Spinoza, this

process is complete. However, even though there is no mention of

Hegel in the entire text, we can easily construct a comparison with

Hegelian ontology in order to demonstrate the important conceptual

autonomy marked by Deleuze's Spinozian foundation. Hegel's own

interpretation and critique of Spinozian ontology, in fact, serve to

highlight the issues of difference; from an Hegelian perspective we

will be able to recognize the radical departure constituted by

Deleuze's reading of the singularity of substance and the univocity of

the attributes in Spinoza.

The crux of the issue, here, is the Hegelian conception of

determination. Hegel claims not only that Spinozian substance is

indeterminate, but further that all determinations are dissolved in

the absolute. [Science of Logic 536] From an Hegelian perspective,

since it involves no other or limitation, a unique and absolute being

cannot provide a basis for determination or difference. Determinate

being must negate and subsume its other within itself in order to

attain quality and reality. Singularity, in an Hegelian framework, is

a logical impossibility. The Spinozian definition of being as

singular is precisely what irritates Hegel most and it is the point

which he refuses to recognize. Spinozism, he claims, is an acosmism.

Singularity is a real threat to Hegel because it constitutes the

refusal of the speculative foundation of dialectics. Now we can

understand very clearly the theoretical demands which could drive

Hegel to give this final judgement of Spinoza: "The cause of his death

was consumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in

harmony with his system of philosophy, according to which all

particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance."

[Lectures in the History of Philosophy 257] When determination is

denied, so too Spinoza the philosopher dissolves into nothingness.

Deleuze's reading of the real distinction stands in sharp

contrast (but not opposition!) to this interpretation. As we have

argued above, the real distinction presents being as different in

itself. Singular being is not different from anything outside being,

and neither is it indifferent or abstract: it is simply remarkable.

It would be false, then, to set up an opposition between singular

being and determinate being. Singularity is and is not determination.

In other words, Spinoza's being, the unique substance, is determinate

in the sense that it is qualified, that it is different. However, it

is not determinate in the sense of being limited. This is where

Deleuze's discussion of number comes into play. If substance were to

be limited (or to have number) it would have to involve an external

cause. Substance on the contrary is absolutely infinite, it is cause

of itself. Causa sui cannot be read in any ideal sense: being is the

material and efficient cause of itself and this continual act of self-

production brings with it all the real determinations of the world.

Omnis determinatio est negatio? Clearly there is no room for this

equation in Deleuze's Spinoza -- not even as a point of opposition.

Being is never indeterminate; it brings with it immediately all the

freshness and materiality of reality. I would argue that here, with

this real conceptual autonomy from the Hegelian problematic, we can

recognize a significant evolution of Deleuze's thought. In the

earlier Bergson studies we noted a certain equivocation on this issue.

There was a tendency for Deleuze, along with Bergson, to oppose

determination and to affirm indetermination instead. The proposition

of indetermination allowed that being would not be restricted or

constrained by an external cause. Both aspects of this position, the

opposition to determination and the acceptance of indetermination,

have proved to be problematic. In effect, in opposing the rhythm of

the dialectical process of determination, Deleuze was accepting its

opposite (indetermination) and thus remained locked on the dialectical

terrain. However, in the Spinozian context, we find that

determination and indetermination are equally inadequate terms.

Singularity is the concept which marks the internal difference, the

real distinction which qualifies absolutely infinite being as real

without recourse to a dialectic of negations. The concept of

singularity constitutes the real dislocation from the Hegelian

theoretical horizon.

This difference in the two interpretations of the Spinozian

substance continues and develops in the interpretations of the

attributes. To a great extent, Hegel's reading of the attribute

follows directly from his interpretation of substance: since substance

is an infinite indetermination, the attribute serves to limit

substance, to determine it. (7) "Spinoza's definition of the absolute

is followed by his definition of the attribute" which is defined "as

determination of the absolute." [Science of Logic 537] Hegel

conceives of the theoretical movement from substance to the attributes

as the shadow image of the dialectic of determination, which is doomed

to failure because it omits the fundamental play of negations.

Deleuze's reading of the attribute moves in a very different

direction, again based on his different interpretation of substance.

Since in his view substance is already real and qualified, there is no

question of determination, but rather according to Deleuze the

attributes fill the role of expression. Through the attributes we

recognize the absolute immanence or expressivity of being.

Furthermore, the infinite and equal expressions constitute the

univocity of being, in that it is always and everywhere expressed in

the same voice.

If in the interpretation of substance the central issue is

determination, the interpretation of the attributes focuses on

emanation. Deleuze's theory of expression effectively constitutes a

challenge to Hegel's judgement that Spinozism is an "oriental

conception of emanation." [SL 538] According to Hegel, the Spinozian

movement of being is an irrecuperative series of degradations: "The

process of emanation is taken only as a happening, the becoming only

as a progressive loss." [539] Deleuze offers us a response to this

Hegelian critique in the form of an extended analysis of the relation

between emanation and immanence in the history of philosophy. Indeed,

this Deleuzian history of philosophy completely disregards the

Hegelian and dialectical tradition, by considering only positive

ontological processes. This positive movement is precisely what

philosophies of emanation and immanence share: both are animated by an

internal causality. "Leur caractŠre commun, c'est qu'elles ne sortent

pas de soi: elles restent en soi pour produire." [155] Since being is

singular, its production can involve no other. Nonetheless, there is

an important difference in the way in which the emanative cause and

the immanent cause produce. "Une cause est immanente ... quand

l'effet lui-mˆme est ®imman‚¯ dans la cause au lieu d'en ‚maner. Ce

qui d‚finit la cause immanente, c'est que l'effet est en elle, sans

doute comme dans autre chose, mais est et reste en elle." [156] The

difference between the essence of the immanent cause and the essence

of its effect, therefore, can never be interpreted as a degradation:

at the level of essences, there is an absolute ontological equality

between cause and effect. In an emanative process, on the other hand,

the externality of the effect with respect to the cause allows for a

successive degradation in the causal chain and an inequality of

essences.

We can see at this point that Spinoza's ontology is a

philosophy of immanence, not emanation. The essential equality of

immanence demands a univocal being: "non seulement l'ˆtre est ‚gal en

soi, mais l'ˆtre apparaŒt ‚galement pr‚sent dans tous les ˆtres."

[157] Immanence denies any form of eminence or hierarchy in being:

the principle of the univocity of the attributes requires that being

be expressed equally in all of its forms. Therefore, univocal

expression is incompatible with emanation. What Deleuze's explanation

makes clear is that Spinoza's ontology, a combination of immanence and

expression, is not susceptible to the Hegelian critique of the

dispersion, the "progressive loss" of being. Deleuze explains this

with the terms of Medieval philosophy, citing Nicholas de Cues: "Dieu

est la complication universelle, en ce sens que tout est en lui; et

l'universelle explication, en ce sens qu'il est en tout." [159] The

immanence and expression of Spinozism, according to Deleuze, presents

a Modern version of this Medieval couple complicare-explicare. In as

much as expression is an explicative or centrifugal movement, it is

also a complicative or centripetal movement, gathering being back

within itself. Deleuze's analysis, then, not only presents Spinoza as

an alternative logic of ontological speculation, but it also provides

us with the terms to respond to the Hegelian critique of Spinoza.

We have thus far treated Deleuze's reading of the opening of the

Ethics (roughly as far as IP14) which presents in very compact form

the principles of ontological speculation. We should be very clear

about the simplicity of what has been developed thus far: "une

constitution logique de la substance, ®composition¯ qui n'a rien de

physique." [69] This logical constitution developed in the opening of

the Ethics consists of two principles: singularity and univocity. We

can affirm this same claim in another way by saying that in the

opening of the Ethics, Spinoza shows that the definition of God [D6]

is not merely a nominal definition but a real definition. "Cette

d‚finition est la seule qui nous livre une nature, cette nature est la

nature expressive de l'absolu." [70] The expression of the absolute

is singular and univocal. Spinoza accomplishes a logical constitution

of the idea of God. If we read this theological terminology in a

traditional sense, though, we will certainly be disappointed.

Bergson, for one, reacts to the purely logical character of Spinoza's

presentation. "Le Dieu de la premiŠre partie de l'Ethique est

engendr‚ en dehors de toute exp‚rience, comme le serait un cercle,

pour un g‚omŠtre qui n'en aurait jamais vu." [quoted in Moss‚-Bastide,

"Bergson et Spinoza" 71, from Bergson's course at the College de

France, 1912] Spinoza is not constructing an image or idea of God in

any conventional sense. He is excavating being to discover the real

ontological principles of speculation. What Spinoza has arrived at is

simply the fundamental genetic principles, singularity and univocity,

which guide the production and constitution of being. There is

nothing hypothetical about the opening of the Ethics, then; instead,

it is a speculative development of the genetic sequence of being, "une

g‚n‚alogie de la substance." ["Spinoza et la m‚thode g‚n‚rale de M.

Gueroult" 432] The principles which demonstrate the reality of D6 are

those of the life of substance itself, they are the a priori

constitution of being. [70] When Deleuze says that D6 is a genetic

definition, he means precisely that the principles of being are active

and constructive: from these principles being itself unfolds.

This is all we know about being (about God) at this point in the

analysis: it is singular and it is univocal. There is an implicit

polemic in this affirmation about the nature and the limits of

speculation. The truths which we can learn through speculation are

very few and very simple. Speculation does not constitute the world

or construct being; it merely can provide us with the fundamental

principles by which being is constituted. Spinoza is clearly

conscious of this fact, and if we demand more of his speculation we

are bound to be disappointed, as Bergson is, with his "Dieu de glace."