.m:2
III.
Power
3.6 The true and the adequate
The question of the
attributes has touched on Spinoza's
epistemology,
but really it has only scratched the surface. Thus far
we have
treated Deleuze's defense against an intellectualist reading
of
Spinoza's epistemology. This
defense rests primarily on a
conception
of ontological parallelism which is developed through an
extension
of the principle of univocity. Now
we should turn to
Deleuze's
positive exposition of Spinozian epistemology which depends
on the
strategy of the adequate idea.
Deleuze shows that the
epistemology
never leaves the terrain of ontology: the proposition of
the
adequate idea is an extension of the ontological principle of
singularity
in that Spinoza's epistemology links the question of truth
to that
of internal causality.
From one of his
earliest works, The Emendation of the Intellect
(TdIE),
Spinoza searches for an intrinsic definition of the true idea.
Just as
real being is cause of itself and gains its distinction from
within,
so too the true idea must be defined through an internal
causality. Deleuze begins to trace the development
of this intrinsic
definition
from Spinoza's critique of the very conception of truth
implied
by the epistemological parallelism discussed above: the true
idea
agrees or corresponds with its object (res ideata). This
conception
of truth as correspondence implies a dualism between the
form
and the content of the idea; the definition of truth is
indifferent
to the content but looks only to a formal correspondence.
This
indifference to the content of the true idea already shows the
material
limitation of the correspondence strategy. However, this
correspondence
cannot provide even an acceptable formal definition in
the
Spinozian system because of the autonomy of the attributes. As we
have
noted above, the mind is a spiritual automaton and it forms ideas
with
reference only to the internal progression of the attribute of
thought. The epistemological strategy, then,
which seeks to identify
a
correspondence between a mode of thought with a mode of another
attribute
is very weak even as a formal definition of the true idea.
"La
conception de la v‚rit‚ comme correspondance ne nous donne aucune
d‚finition
du vrai, ni mat‚rielle ni formelle; elle nous propose
seulement
une d‚finition nominale, une d‚nomination extrinsŠque."
[117] In epistemology, the extrinsic
denomination is a weak
conception
of truth just as in ontology the external cause is a weak
determination
of being. We can already note from
this first critique
that it
is an ontological logic which provides the foundation for
Spinoza's
epistemological investigation.
In this context, the
Cartesian proposition of "clear and
distinct"
as the condition for truth provides us with a much more
promising
strategy because it addresses not only the form but also the
content
of the idea. Deleuze argues,
however, that the conception of
clear
and distinct is insufficient for a Spinozian theory of truth in
three
respects. First, while the
Cartesian proposition does succeed
in
referring to the content of the idea, this reference remains
superficial
as a "representative" content. [117] The content of the
clear
and distinct idea cannot be a material content because "clear
and
distinct" does not recognize or comprehend the material cause of
that
idea. We know that since the mind
is a spiritual automaton the
proximate
material cause of any idea is always another idea. The
superficiality
of representation is precisely its detachment from the
material
cause. Secondly, the form of the
clear and distinct idea
also
remains superficial in the form of a "psychological
consciousness".
[117] This Cartesian form does not
attain the logical
form of
the idea which would explain the connection and order of ideas
one to
the other. The superficiality in
this case is due to the
detachment
from the formal cause of the idea, which is precisely our
power
to think. Thirdly, the Cartesian
conception does not succeed in
posing
the unity of the content and the form of the true idea; in
other
words, Descartes does not conceive of the spiritual automaton
"qui
reproduit le r‚el en produisant ses id‚es dans l'ordre d–." [138]
In
short, the critiques of the "clear and distinct" strategy all
spring
from the fact that it attempts to define the true while only
referring
to the idea itself; the Cartesian strategy does not deal with
the causes
of ideas, and thus it cannot explain their production.
Once
again, in the focus on causality and production, we can recognize
Spinoza's
ontological approach to truth.
Deleuze relates this
critique
to the idea of expression: to be expressive an idea must
explain
its cause. "L'id‚e claire et
distincte est encore
inexpressive,
et reste inexpliqu‚e. Bonne pour
la r‚cognition, mais
incapable
de fournir un v‚ritable principe de connaissance." [138]
Finally,
precisely because of its failure to express or explain the
true
idea by means of the cause, the conception of truth as clear and
distinct
does not give us the terms to answer a fundamental question:
what
does a true idea do for us, and why should we prefer it to a
false
idea; or as Nietzsche might ask, why do we want truth?
The ontological
critique of the clear and distinct idea prepares
the
terms for Spinoza's proposition of the adequate idea. The
essential
feature of Spinoza's conception of truth is the internal
relation
of an idea to its cause.
"L'id‚e ad‚quate, c'est pr‚cis‚ment
l'id‚e
comme exprimant sa cause." [119]
We can contrast this with the
Cartesian
theory on all three points presented above. First, the
adequate
idea presents its content as the expression of its proximate
material
cause (another idea). Secondly,
the form of the adequate
idea is
a logical form which is explained by its formal cause (the
power
to think). "L'id‚e ad‚quate,
c'est l'id‚e qui exprime sa propre
cause
et qui s'explique par notre propre puissance." [136] Thirdly,
the
content and the form of the adequate idea are united in the
movement
internal to the attribute of thought: "l'automate spirituel
tel
qu'il se manifeste dans l'enchaŒnement des id‚es est l'unit‚ de la
forme
logique et du contenu expressif." [138] We can see Spinoza's
insistence
on replacing the Cartesian clear and distinct with his
conception
of adequateness as an ontologization of epistemology.
"L'ontologie
de Spinoza est domin‚e par les notions de cause de soi,
en soi
et par soi." [147] Spinoza'
epistemology too is dominated by
this
same focus on causality: truth, like being, is singular to the
extent
that it envelops and expresses its own cause. Through the
causal
chain expressed by the adequate idea, through the move from the
true to
the adequate, Spinoza's epistemology takes on an ontological
character. Spinoza's revolution in epistemology is
to apply these
same
ontological criteria which define being as singular to the realm
of
truth. Along with Thomas Mark, a
very perceptive American
commentator,
Deleuze shows that Spinoza's theory of truth is a theory
of
"ontological truth." (16)
Adequate ideas are
expressive and inadequate ideas are mute. (17)
In other
words, the distinctive characteristic of an adequate idea is
that it
tells us something about the structure and connections of
being
through a direct expression of its material and formal causes.
From an
ontological perspective, the inadequate idea tells us nothing
because
we cannot recognize its place in the productive structure of
thought;
it is not situated in the dynamic causal mechanism of the
spiritual
automaton. One importance of the
adequate idea, then, is
that
through the expression of its causes it increases our power of
thought:
the more adequate ideas we have, the more we know about the
structure
and connections of being and the greater our power to think.
"Whatever
ideas follow in the Mind from ideas that are adequate in the
mind
are also adequate." [IIP40]
Spinoza, however, accompanies this
claim
with a realistic assessment of our condition: the vast majority
of the
ideas we have are inadequate ideas.
At this point it is
obvious
how Spinoza would answer the Nietzschean question: we want
truth
in order to increase our power to think.
The strategy of the
adequate
idea makes the question of truth a project of power. Once
the
question of power enters the discussion, however, this
epistemological
discourse quickly transforms into an ethical project.
"Spinoza
demande: Comment arriverons-nous … former et produire des
id‚es
ad‚quates, alors que tant d'id‚es inad‚quates nous ont
n‚cessairement
donn‚es, qui distraient notre puissance et nous
s‚parent
de ce que nous pouvons?" [134-5]
Here in this transformation
of the
epistemological toward the ethical we see a combined
application
of the principle of singularity (an absolutely infinite
being
as cause of itself, the adequate idea as enveloping its cause)
and the
principle of power (being as productivity, truth as creation);
the
principle of singularity gives us the terms for the definition of
the
adequate idea and the principle of power transforms this
definition
into a project.
We should pay close
attention here because this transformation
marks a
profound moment of Spinozian thought: the introduction of the
adequate
idea as the condition of truth constitutes a revolution in
epistemology. Through his focus on causality and productivity,
Spinoza
has grounded epistemology in an ontological foundation, in the
fundamental
principles of being, and thereby gained the force to forge
the
theory of ideas into an ethical and practical project. The clear
and
distinct idea lacks this capability because it does not situate
truth
within a dynamic of production.
This Cartesian strategy is
limited
on two ways: on one hand, since epistemology is detached from
ontology,
from the causal dynamic of being, truth lacks a real
foundation
and appears as the extrinsic sign of an external or absent
cause
rather than the inherent recognized as the effect in a causal
expression
of being; on the other hand, since the true idea is not
relation,
there are no means by which we can enter into the causal
dynamic
through an ethical practice.
Spinoza's conception of the
adequate
idea radically transforms this terrain.
At the outset, our
condition
is such that our minds are largely constituted by inadequate
ideas. The ethical project, which is directed
toward the increase of
our
power, has to ask how from these inadequate ideas can we produce
adequate
ideas. As we remarked above,
Spinoza's principle of power
always
enters the scene as a principle of conversion: it marks the end
of
speculation and the beginning of practice. The terms are set now
for
Spinoza's practical epistemological project which will lead him to
a
theory of common notions. We have
to postpone this discussion of
common
notions for the moment, but what is important at this point is
to
recognize the radical departure achieved by Spinoza's epistemology
through
the interplay of the ontological principles and the role of
power
as a means of conversion.
Before moving on, let
us investigate one more aspect of the
Spinozian
conception of adequacy. We claimed
above that if we are to
maintain
Deleuze's ontological parallelism then in principle each
claim
we make about the structure of one attribute should be equaled
by a
parallel claim about the other attributes. The concept of truth
presents
an interesting test for this theory.
In a Cartesian theory
of
truth, for example, it would make very little sense to try to find
a
parallel for the "clear and distinct" idea of the mind in the realm
of the
body: would we have to say that a clear and distinct mode of
extension
should be called true just as is a clear and distinct mode
of
thought? This is obviously
absurd. However, when we adopt the
Spinozian
concept of adequacy, we can pose a meaningful parallel. An
adequate
mode of extension is one which envelops and expresses its
causes:
its material cause is another mode of extension and its formal
cause
is the power of the body to act.
Therefore, just as an adequate
mode of
our mind increases our mental power to act (to think), an
adequate
mode of our body increases our corporeal power to act. There
is no
priority of the mind over the body in this discourse, because
since
adequacy is grounded in causality (and thus ultimately on
ontological
principles) it can refer equally to thought and extension.
The
traditional problematic of truth refers exclusively to the mind:
Spinoza's
theory of adequacy shifts the problematic to involve all the
attributes
and, through its focus on causality, brings the question of
truth
back to the question of being.
3.7 What a body can do
With the conception
of adequacy, Spinoza is able to pose an
initial
ethical question. One aspect of
the very steep path which
Spinoza
is leading us on will direct us to proceed from inadequate
ideas
to adequate ones. We can easily
pose this ethical goal more
generally
as the increase of our power to think, or more generally
still
as the increase of our power to exist and act: how can we
increase
our power to exist, or in theological terms how can we
approach
God (the infinite power to exist and act). At this point,
however,
we have very little idea how this operation is possible; we
are
still very far from being able to embark on an ethical practice.
In
fact, posing the ethical question in such grand terms is empty and
pointless
without some specific and concrete means of addressing our
goal.
The conversion from
speculation to practice, as we claimed above,
is
accomplished through the principle of power; as such, we need a
much
more refined analysis of the internal structure of power before
we can
begin to move to a creative project.
Spinoza does not choose
to
conduct this investigation in terms of epistemology, but rather in
terms
of physics. The mind has been the
model of speculation; now we
have to
shift our concentration to the body, because it is the body
which
will be the model of practice.
"Spinoza semble bien admettre
que
nous devons passer par une ‚tude empirique des corps pour savoir
quels
sont leurs rapports et comment ils se composent." [193]
Spinozian
physics is an empirical investigation to try to determine
the
laws of the interaction of bodies: the meetings of bodies, their
composition
and decomposition, their compatibility (or composability)
and
their conflict. A Body is not a
fixed unit with a stable or
static
internal structure. On the
contrary, a body is a dynamic
relationship
whose internal structure and external limits are subject
to
change. What we identify as a body
is merely a temporarily stable
relationship. [IIP13Def] (18) This proposition of the dynamic nature
of
bodies, of the continual flux of their internal dynamic, allows
Spinoza
a rich understanding of the interaction among bodies. When
two
bodies meet there is a meeting between two dynamic relationships:
either
they are indifferent to each other; or they are compatible and
together
compose a new relationship, a new body; or rather they are
incompatible
and one body decomposes the relationship of the other,
destroying
it, just as a poison decomposes the blood. [cf. Letter 32
to
Oldenberg] This physical universe
of bodies at motion and rest, in
union
and conflict, will provide the context in which we can delve
deeper
into the functioning and structure of power: Spinoza's physics
are the
cornerstone of his ethics.
Deleuze is fascinated
by a passage in one of the early scholia of
Book
III: "no one has yet determined what the Body can do.... For no
one has
yet come to know the structure of the Body so accurately that
he
could explain all its functions...." [IIIP2S] The question of
power
(what a body can do) is immediately related to the internal
structure
of the body. This charts the
direction of our
investigation:
to understand the nature of power we must first
discover
the internal structure of the body.
Deleuze reminds us that
the
investigation of this structure must be conducted not in terms of
the
power to act (spontaneity) but rather in terms of the power to be
affected. "La structure d'un corps, c'est la
composition de son
rapport. Ce que peut un corps, c'est la nature
et les limites de son
pouvoir
d'ˆtre affect‚." [198] The
internal structure of the body is
the
differences within power; the power to be affected, which
corresponds
to the power to exist, is filled by active affections and
passive
affections. There is an important
distinction between these
two
affections. To the extent that our
power to be affected is filled
by
active affections it relates directly to our power to act, but to
the
extent that it is filled by passive affections it relates only to
our
power to feel or suffer (puissance de pƒtir). Passive affections
really
mark our lack of power.
"Notre force de pƒtir n'affirme rien,
parce
qu'elle n'exprime rien du tout: elle ®enveloppe¯ seulement notre
impuissance,
c'est-…-dire le plus bas degr‚ de notre puissance
d'agir...."
[204] We said earlier that the
power to be affected
demonstrates
the plenitude of being in that it is always completely
filled
with active and passive affections; yet the power to be
affected
only appears as plenitude from the physical point of view.
From the
ethical point of view, on the contrary, the power to be
affected
varies widely according to its composition: to the extent
that it
is filled with passive affections it is reduced to its
minimum,
and to the extent that it is filled with active affections it
is
increased to its maximum.
"D'o— l'importance de la question
‚thique. Nous ne savons mˆme pas ce que peut un
corps, dit Spinoza.
C'est-…-dire:
Nous ne savons mˆme pas de quelles affections nous
sommes
capables, ni jusqu'o— va notre puissance.
Comment pourrions-
nous le
savoir … l'avance?" [205]
This, then, is the first order of
business
in preparing the terrain for an ethical project: investigate
what
affects we are capable of, discover what our body can do.
Spinoza's theory of conatus
(or striving) marks precisely the
intersection
of production and affection which is so important to
Deleuze. "Les variations du conatus en tant
qu'il est d‚termin‚ par
telle
ou telle affection sont les variations dynamiques de notre
puissance
d'agir." [211] Conatus is the
physical instantiation of the
ontological
principle of power. On one hand,
it is the essence of
being
insofar as being is productive; it the motor which animates
being
as the world. To this extent
conatus is Spinoza's continuation
of the
legacy of Renaissance naturalism: being is spontaneity, pure
activity. On the other hand, however, conatus is
also the
instantiation
of the ontological principle of power in that conatus is
a
sensibility: it is driven by not only the actions but also the
passions
of the mind and the body. [cf. for example IIIP9] It is this
rich
synthesis of spontaneity and affectivity which marks the
continuity
between the ontological principle of power and the conatus.
At this point the
ethical project requires a moment of empirical
realism. When Spinoza begins to take stock of
the state of our body,
of our
power, he notes that by necessity our power to be affected is
largely
filled by passive affections. God,
or Nature, is completely
filled
with active affections, because there is no cause external to
it. However, "the force by which a man
perseveres in existing is
limited,
and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes."
[IVP3] To the extent that our power is
surpassed by the power of
Nature
as a whole, to the extent that external forces are more
powerful
than our own forces, we will be filled with passive
affections. Now, since passive affections largely
constitute our
existence
we should focus our investigation on these affections to see
if we
can make meaningful distinctions among them. Within the domain
of
extension, passive affections are characterized by meetings between
our
body and other bodies: meetings which can appear as random because
they
are not caused by us. The order of
passions, then, is the order
of
chance meetings, the fortuitus occursus. [217] However, not all
chance
meetings are alike. Deleuze
insists that we have to
distinguish
between two cases of meetings. In
the first case, I meet
a body
whose internal relationship is compatible with the internal
relationship
of my body. The two bodies
together compose a new
relationship. We can say, then, that this external
body "agrees with
my
nature" or that it is "good" or "useful" for me. Furthermore, this
meeting
produces an affection in me which itself agrees with or is
good
for my nature: it is a joyful meeting.
"Insofar as a thing
agrees
with our nature, it is necessarily good." [IVP31] Spinoza
always
links the themes of good and useful to that of power. Joy,
according
to Spinoza, is the increase in our power to act, or rather
it is
our power itself in as much as increased by an external cause.
The
first case of chance meeting, then, results in a joyful passive
affection
because it presents a "composable" relationship, it
increases
our power to act. Such joyful
meetings engender a desire,
which
is love. In the second case of
chance meeting, though, I meet a
body
whose internal relationship is not compatible with that of my
body;
this body does not agree with my nature.
Either one body will
decompose
the relationship of the other or both bodies will be
decomposed. In either case, the important fact is
that there will be
no
increase of power because a body cannot gain power from something
which
does not agree with it. Since this
meeting results in a
decrease
of power, the affection produced by it is sadness, and this
sadness
can give rise to hatred. Spinoza
and Deleuze, of course,
recognize
that actual meetings are more complicated than this: there
may be
different degrees of partial compatibility and partial conflict
in a
meeting, or further the affects can combine in a myriad of ways
(the
sadness of what we hate brings us joy, etc.) These two cases,
however,
joyful passive affections and sad passive affections, provide
us with
the limit cases of possible meetings and thus they allow us to
posit a
further distinction in our model of power.
.m:1
power to
exist === power to be affected
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
active affections passive affections
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
joyful passive sad passive
affections affections
.m:2
It is once again time
for a moment of Spinoza's realism.
What is
the
relative frequency of joyful and sad meetings? In principle, or
rather
in the abstract, humans agree in nature and thus human meetings
ought
to be purely joyful. However, this
is only true to the extent
that
our power to be affected is filled by active affections.
"Insofar
as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree
in
nature." [IVP32] Therefore,
"en r‚alit‚, les hommes conviennent
fort
peu en nature les uns avec les autres" and the large majority of
chance
meetings are sad. This new
recognition allows us to modify the
ethical
proposition which we ventured above: now we no longer ask how
can we
experience more active affections?, but rather how can we
experience
more joyful passive affections?
We began this section
by posing the Spinozian question, what can
a body
do? In the investigation of the
structure of the body, at each
point
that we have recognized a distinction we have also recognized
that
the human condition lies largely on the weak side of the
equation:
our power to be affected is filled largely by passive
affections
rather than active affections; and further our passive
affections
are constituted largely by sad passive affections rather
than
joyful passive affections. One
could easily be disheartened at
this
point by Spinoza's pessimistic appraisal of the human condition
-- but
that would be to miss the point of the project. The
investigation
of the internal structure of power and the realistic
evaluation
of our condition are oriented toward refining the ethical
question
so that it can provide the basis for an ethical practice;
what
may appear as pessimism is Spinoza's practical perspective. To
appreciate
the richness of this approach, consider the typical
Nietzschean
ethical mandate: become active.
How can such an ethical
proposition
be transformed into an ethical practice?
In other words,
through
Nietzsche we can clearly recognize the desire, the power (and
in this
sense the good) of becoming active, but we find no means to
follow
it through in practice. Spinoza
too recognizes ethics as an
issue
of becoming active, but he delves one step deeper to enrich that
ethical
perspective. "La question
‚thique, chez Spinoza, se trouve
donc
d‚doubl‚e: Comment arriverons-nous … produire des affections
actives? Mais d'abord: Comment arriverons-nous …
‚prouver un maximum
de
passions joyeuses?" [225]
Through the investigation of power,
Spinoza
has now prepared the terrain for the conversion from
speculation
to practice which will put his ethics in motion.
IV.
Practice
3.8 The ethics of joyful practice: common
notions
Through our
investigation of the structure of power and our
realistic
estimation of the human condition we have arrived at the
limit
of speculation. The human
condition resides principally in the
point
of the minimum of power; when we adopt this position we can
adopt
too a truly ethical position. This
is the end of speculation,
this is
the moment of transmutation -- the hour of midnight.
Spinozian
speculation has illuminated the terrain of power, defined
its
principal structures; now, we must convert this speculative
dynamic
into a practical project. How can
we effect this
transmutation? Where can we find the impetus to put a
practical
project
in motion? A first hint that
Deleuze gives us is that we must
shift
our focus from affirmation to joy.
"Le sens de la joie apparaŒt
comme
le sens proprement ‚thique; il est … la pratique ce que
l'affirmation
elle-mˆme est … la sp‚culation." [251] Joy is to
practice
what affirmation is to speculation: joy, in other words, is
the
affirmation of being in the moment of its constitution; our
increase
of power is the affirmative constitution of being itself. It
is not
immediately evident, however, how our practice can begin with
joy. Just like Nietzsche's ethical mandate
"become active", so too a
Spinozian
mandate such as "become joyful" lacks the mechanism by which
to
initiate a practical project.
Deleuze attempts another tact,
presenting
the project in negative form, to give it a more practical
thrust:
the first practical task of the Ethics, he claims, is to
combat
sadness. "La d‚valorisation
des passions tristes, la
d‚nonciation
de ceux qui les cultivent et qui s'en servent, forment
l'objet
pratique de la philosophie." [251]
We have already noted,
though,
that in reality most of our passions are sad passions, that
most
chance meetings among bodies are incompatible and destructive.
How can
we begin a practice of joy from such a state? The attack on
sadness
still lacks an initial practical key.
It may be helpful, as
a point of comparison, to recall a
frequently
cited phrase from the TdIE which served there as part of a
constructive
epistemological argument: habemus enim ideam veram. [TdIE
33] We have a true idea; or rather, even
though our mind is largely
constituted
by false and confused ideas, nonetheless let us grant that
we have
at least one true idea and, once we have distinguished it from
the
false ideas, we can begin to construct a system of true ideas on
the
basis of this one. Spinoza asks us
in this early text to accept
the
existence of this true idea as given.
Now, if we transpose this
framework
from the epistemological to the ethical terrain, we find
that we
are faced by the same dilemma: our life of chance meetings is
largely
constituted by sad encounters.
Spinoza could posit, as he
does in
the earlier text, that we have at least one joyful encounter
and
then he could try to construct a system of joy on that basis.
However, at this
point, we can provide a foundation which
supports
this initial epistemological proposition -- we have a wealth
of
speculation behind us which has prepared the terrain for our
practice. We come back then to Spinoza's physics
of bodies: "no one
has yet
come to know the structure [fabrica] of the Body so accurately
that he
could explain all its functions...." [IIIP2S] What does
Spinoza
mean by structure? "C'est un
systŠme de rapports entre les
parties
d'un corps .... On cherchera
comment les rapports varient
dans
tel ou tel autre corps; on aura le moyen de d‚terminer
directement
les ressemblances entre deux corps, si ‚loign‚s soient-
ils."
[257] Our investigation of the
structure or relationships which
constitute
the body allows us to recognize common relationships which
exist
between our body and another body.
A meeting between our body
and
this other body will necessarily be joyful because the common
relationship
guarantees a compatibility and the opportunity to compose
a new
relationship, thereby increasing our power. It is precisely in
this
way that the analysis of bodies allows us to begin a practical
project. By recognizing similar compositions or
relationships among
bodies
we have the criteria necessary for a first ethical selection of
joy: we
are able to favor compatible meetings and thereby we also
favor
joyful passive affections. When we
make this selection of
compatible
meetings and joyful passions we are producing common
notions. "La notion commune est toujours
l'id‚e d'une similitude de
composition
dans les modes existants." [254]
The formation of the
common
notion constitutes the first step of an ethical practice.
Deleuze explains that
we must make a distinction between common
notions
which are more universal and common notions which are less
universal. The most universal common notions are
those which
recognize
a similarity from a very general point of view: they may
represent,
then, what is common to all bodies such as extension,
motion,
rest, etc. These very universal
common notions, however, are
precisely
those which are least useful to us.
The least universal
common
notions, in fact, are those which immediately present us with
the
greatest utility. These notions
are those which represent a
similar
composition between two bodies which directly agree with each
other,
from their own local points of view.
Just as we continually
descended
within the internal structure of power, here too we must
descend
to the lowest most local level of commonality to initiate our
practical
project. "Ces notions nous
font donc comprendre les
convenances
entre modes: elles n'en restent pas … une perception
externe
des convenances observ‚es fortuitement, mais trouvent dans la
similitude
de la composition une raison interne et n‚cessaire de la
convenance
des corps." [255] We can see,
then, especially in the most
specific
of cases, that the common notion discovers an internal logic,
that
the common notion envelops and explains its cause, or in other
words
that the common notion is an adequate idea: "les notions
communes
en g‚n‚ral sont n‚cessairement ad‚quates; en d'autres terms,
les
notions communes sont des id‚es qui s'expliquent formellement par
notre
puissance de penser et qui, mat‚riellement, expriment l'id‚e de
Dieu
comme leur cause efficiente." [258]
The common notion provides
us the
means to construct for ourselves an adequate idea.
We have now refounded
the initial epistemological moment which
Spinoza
posited in the TdIE (habemus enim ideam veram) with a
practical
process. The first adequate idea
we can have is the
recognition
of something in common between two bodies; this adequate
idea
immediately leads to another adequate idea: in this way we can
begin
our constructive project to become active. Deleuze, however, is
not yet
satisfied that we have presented this initial moment in
sufficiently
practical terms. "Toutefois,
la notion commune risque
d'intervenir
comme un miracle tant que nous n'expliquons pas comment
nous
arrivons … la former. ...
pr‚cis‚ment, comment les formons-nous,
dans
quelles circonstances favorables?
Comment arrivons-nous … notre
puissance
d'agir?" [259-60] When we
consider the Spinozian theory of
common
notions, Deleuze warns us that we should be careful to avoid
two
dangerous interpretative errors.
The first error with respect to
the
common notions would be "n‚gliger leur sens biologique au profit
de leur
sens math‚mathique." [260] In
other words, we should remember
that
common notions refer principally to a physics of bodies, not a
logic
of thought: we would do better to locate them as rising up from
a
Hobbesian material terrain, rather than from a Cartesian
mathematical
universe. The second
interpretative error we might make
with
respect to the common notions would be "n‚gliger leur fonction
pratique
au profit de leur contenu sp‚culatif." [260] When common
notions
are first introduced in Book II of the Ethics, they are
introduced
precisely in their logical order, from the speculative
point
of view. This speculative
presentation regards the commons
notions
as moving from the most universal (motion, rest, etc.) toward
the
least universal. The practical
progression of common notions in
Book V
is exactly the opposite: we move from the least universal (a
specific
compatible relationship between two bodies) toward the most
universal. Furthermore, speculation does not found
practice, but
merely
provides the terms and the structures for it; practice begins
with
bodies in motion and rest.
Here, to begin the
practical progression, we can assume that by
chance
we experience a compatible meeting.
"Quand nous rencontrons un
corps
qui convient avec le n“tre, quand nous ‚prouvons une affection
passive
joyeuse, nous sommes induits … former l'id‚e de ce qui est
commun
… ce corps et au n“tre." [261]
The process begins with the
experience
of joy. This chance meeting with a
compatible body allows
us or
induces us to recognize a common relationship, to form a common
notion. There are two processes going on here,
however, which Deleuze
insists
must be kept distinct: Deleuze calls them the two moments of
reason.
[266] In the first moment, we
strive to avoid the sad
passions
which diminish our power to act and accumulate joyful
passions.
This effort of selection does
increase our power, but never
to the
point of becoming active: joyful passions are always the result
of an
external cause, they always indicate an inadequate idea. "Il
faut
donc que, … la faveur des passions joyeuses, nous formions l'id‚e
de ce
qui est commun entre le corps ext‚rieur et le n“tre. Car cette
id‚e
seule, cette notion commune, est ad‚quate." [262] The first
moment,
the accumulation of joyful passions, prepares the condition
for
this leap which provides us with an adequate idea.
Let us look more
closely at this second moment of reason, at the
"leap"
from the joyful passion to the common notion. How do we make
this
leap, how do we construct an adequate idea? In other words, how
do we
arrive at reason? Deleuze leads us
through this difficult
territory
in terms of the passage from a joyful passion to a joyful
action. We know that joy is the experience of
an affection which
agrees
with our nature, an affection which increases our power. The
same
joy is constituted by a joyful passive affection and a joyful
active
affection; the only difference is that a joyful passion arises
from an
external cause while a joyful action arises from an internal
cause. "Quand Spinoza suggŠre que ce qui
convient avec la raison peut
aussi
en naŒtre, il veut dire que toute joie passive peut donner lieu
… une
joie active qui s'en distingue seulement par la cause." [253-4]
The
passage from passive joy to active joy involves substituting an
internal
cause for the external cause. This
substitution of one cause
for
another, however, still remains obscure until we recognize that a
joyful
passion presents us necessarily with a situation of
commonality:
a joyful passion can only arise from an external body
which
is composed of a relationship common to our body. When our mind
forms
an idea of the common relationship shared between this body and
our
body (a common notion) the joyful affection ceases to be passive
and
becomes active. "Il se
distingue du sentiment passif dont nous
‚tions
partis, mais s'en distingue seulement par la cause: il a pour
cause,
non plus l'id‚e inad‚quate d'un objet qui convient avec nous,
mais
l'id‚e n‚cessairement ad‚quate de ce qui est commun … cet objet
et …
nous-mˆmes." [263] This
process of substitution of an internal
cause
for an external cause allows Spinoza to claim that "an affect
which
is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear
and
distinct idea of it." [VP3] This
process of substitution
constitutes
the "leap" which is the second moment of reason.
The common notions
constitute for Deleuze the "c‚sure
‚pistemologique"
of Spinoza's thought. "Les
notions communes sont une
des
d‚couvertes fondamentales de l'Ethique." [271] At the time when
Spinoza
had drafted his early works, the Short Treatise and the TdIE,
he had
certain presentiments of this concept but he had not yet
adequately
formulated the common notion as a practical and
constitutive
element. Precisely for this
reason, for the lack of a
theory
of common notions, Spinoza could not complete the TdIE. "Cette
hypothŠse
permettrait ... de dater la pleine formation de la th‚orie
des
notions communes par Spinoza entre l'abondon du Trait‚ de la
r‚forme
et la r‚daction de l'Ethique." [272]
In Deleuze's view, if we
fail to
recognize this "c‚sure ‚pistemologique" in Spinoza's thought
we will
not adequately appreciate the Spinozian revolution of
epistemology,
which transforms the blocked speculative project of
emendation
into a dynamic practical project.
Through the strategy
of the formation of common notions,
Spinozian
practice is beginning to climb up the same ladder which
the
analysis of Spinozian speculation has constructed moving downward.
A
constitutive practice is defined by the series joyful passive
affections
-> common notions -> active affections.
.m:1
active
passive
affections
affections
^
/ \
|
/ \
|
/ \
|
/ \
(common notions)
<----- joyful passive sad passive
affections
affections
.m:2
Speculation
has mapped the terrain of power and now practice is
inhabiting
that terrain, breathing life into its internal structure.
Practice
is moving upward, constructing the relations of being from
below. The driving motor which animates this
entire operation is
conatus:
when Spinozian physics is transported to an ethical plane we
no
longer see simply bodies in motion and rest, but rather we find
bodies
with intention, infused with desire.
As we move from sadness
to joy,
from passions to actions, we are discovering the path of the
increase
of our power. We should
continually keep in mind that this
path of
corporeal and spiritual emendation is not simply presented as
an
ethical mandate; when Spinoza poses "becoming active" as a goal he
also
presents the practical means of attaining this goal. "Il y a
tout un
apprentissage des notions communes, ou du devenir-actif: on ne
doit
pas n‚gliger dans le Spinozisme l'importance du problŠme d'un
processus
de formation ...." [267] The
Spinozian path to beatitude is
an
apprenticeship in power, an education in virtue.