.m:2

III. Power

 

3.6  The true and the adequate

     The question of the attributes has touched on Spinoza's

epistemology, but really it has only scratched the surface.  Thus far

we have treated Deleuze's defense against an intellectualist reading

of Spinoza's epistemology.  This defense rests primarily on a

conception of ontological parallelism which is developed through an

extension of the principle of univocity.  Now we should turn to

Deleuze's positive exposition of Spinozian epistemology which depends

on the strategy of the adequate idea.  Deleuze shows that the

epistemology never leaves the terrain of ontology: the proposition of

the adequate idea is an extension of the ontological principle of

singularity in that Spinoza's epistemology links the question of truth

to that of internal causality. 

     From one of his earliest works, The Emendation of the Intellect

(TdIE), Spinoza searches for an intrinsic definition of the true idea. 

Just as real being is cause of itself and gains its distinction from

within, so too the true idea must be defined through an internal

causality.  Deleuze begins to trace the development of this intrinsic

definition from Spinoza's critique of the very conception of truth

implied by the epistemological parallelism discussed above: the true

idea agrees or corresponds with its object (res ideata).  This

conception of truth as correspondence implies a dualism between the

form and the content of the idea; the definition of truth is

indifferent to the content but looks only to a formal correspondence. 

This indifference to the content of the true idea already shows the

material limitation of the correspondence strategy.  However, this

correspondence cannot provide even an acceptable formal definition in

the Spinozian system because of the autonomy of the attributes.  As we

have noted above, the mind is a spiritual automaton and it forms ideas

with reference only to the internal progression of the attribute of

thought.  The epistemological strategy, then, which seeks to identify

a correspondence between a mode of thought with a mode of another

attribute is very weak even as a formal definition of the true idea. 

"La conception de la v‚rit‚ comme correspondance ne nous donne aucune

d‚finition du vrai, ni mat‚rielle ni formelle; elle nous propose

seulement une d‚finition nominale, une d‚nomination extrinsŠque."

[117]  In epistemology, the extrinsic denomination is a weak

conception of truth just as in ontology the external cause is a weak

determination of being.  We can already note from this first critique

that it is an ontological logic which provides the foundation for

Spinoza's epistemological investigation.

     In this context, the Cartesian proposition of "clear and

distinct" as the condition for truth provides us with a much more

promising strategy because it addresses not only the form but also the

content of the idea.  Deleuze argues, however, that the conception of

clear and distinct is insufficient for a Spinozian theory of truth in

three respects.  First, while the Cartesian proposition does succeed

in referring to the content of the idea, this reference remains

superficial as a "representative" content. [117]  The content of the

clear and distinct idea cannot be a material content because "clear

and distinct" does not recognize or comprehend the material cause of

that idea.  We know that since the mind is a spiritual automaton the

proximate material cause of any idea is always another idea.  The

superficiality of representation is precisely its detachment from the

material cause.  Secondly, the form of the clear and distinct idea

also remains superficial in the form of a "psychological

consciousness". [117]  This Cartesian form does not attain the logical

form of the idea which would explain the connection and order of ideas

one to the other.  The superficiality in this case is due to the

detachment from the formal cause of the idea, which is precisely our

power to think.  Thirdly, the Cartesian conception does not succeed in

posing the unity of the content and the form of the true idea; in

other words, Descartes does not conceive of the spiritual automaton

"qui reproduit le r‚el en produisant ses id‚es dans l'ordre d–." [138] 

In short, the critiques of the "clear and distinct" strategy all

spring from the fact that it attempts to define the true while only

referring to the idea itself; the Cartesian strategy does not deal with

the causes of ideas, and thus it cannot explain their production. 

Once again, in the focus on causality and production, we can recognize

Spinoza's ontological approach to truth.  Deleuze relates this

critique to the idea of expression: to be expressive an idea must

explain its cause.  "L'id‚e claire et distincte est encore

inexpressive, et reste inexpliqu‚e.  Bonne pour la r‚cognition, mais

incapable de fournir un v‚ritable principe de connaissance." [138] 

Finally, precisely because of its failure to express or explain the

true idea by means of the cause, the conception of truth as clear and

distinct does not give us the terms to answer a fundamental question:

what does a true idea do for us, and why should we prefer it to a

false idea; or as Nietzsche might ask, why do we want truth?

     The ontological critique of the clear and distinct idea prepares

the terms for Spinoza's proposition of the adequate idea.  The

essential feature of Spinoza's conception of truth is the internal

relation of an idea to its cause.  "L'id‚e ad‚quate, c'est pr‚cis‚ment

l'id‚e comme exprimant sa cause." [119]  We can contrast this with the

Cartesian theory on all three points presented above.  First, the

adequate idea presents its content as the expression of its proximate

material cause (another idea).  Secondly, the form of the adequate

idea is a logical form which is explained by its formal cause (the

power to think).  "L'id‚e ad‚quate, c'est l'id‚e qui exprime sa propre

cause et qui s'explique par notre propre puissance." [136]  Thirdly,

the content and the form of the adequate idea are united in the

movement internal to the attribute of thought: "l'automate spirituel

tel qu'il se manifeste dans l'enchaŒnement des id‚es est l'unit‚ de la

forme logique et du contenu expressif." [138]  We can see Spinoza's

insistence on replacing the Cartesian clear and distinct with his

conception of adequateness as an ontologization of epistemology. 

"L'ontologie de Spinoza est domin‚e par les notions de cause de soi,

en soi et par soi." [147]  Spinoza' epistemology too is dominated by

this same focus on causality: truth, like being, is singular to the

extent that it envelops and expresses its own cause.  Through the

causal chain expressed by the adequate idea, through the move from the

true to the adequate, Spinoza's epistemology takes on an ontological

character.  Spinoza's revolution in epistemology is to apply these

same ontological criteria which define being as singular to the realm

of truth.  Along with Thomas Mark, a very perceptive American

commentator, Deleuze shows that Spinoza's theory of truth is a theory

of "ontological truth." (16)

     Adequate ideas are expressive and inadequate ideas are mute. (17) 

In other words, the distinctive characteristic of an adequate idea is

that it tells us something about the structure and connections of

being through a direct expression of its material and formal causes. 

From an ontological perspective, the inadequate idea tells us nothing

because we cannot recognize its place in the productive structure of

thought; it is not situated in the dynamic causal mechanism of the

spiritual automaton.  One importance of the adequate idea, then, is

that through the expression of its causes it increases our power of

thought: the more adequate ideas we have, the more we know about the

structure and connections of being and the greater our power to think. 

"Whatever ideas follow in the Mind from ideas that are adequate in the

mind are also adequate." [IIP40]  Spinoza, however, accompanies this

claim with a realistic assessment of our condition: the vast majority

of the ideas we have are inadequate ideas.  At this point it is

obvious how Spinoza would answer the Nietzschean question: we want

truth in order to increase our power to think.  The strategy of the

adequate idea makes the question of truth a project of power.  Once

the question of power enters the discussion, however, this

epistemological discourse quickly transforms into an ethical project. 

"Spinoza demande: Comment arriverons-nous … former et produire des

id‚es ad‚quates, alors que tant d'id‚es inad‚quates nous ont

n‚cessairement donn‚es, qui distraient notre puissance et nous

s‚parent de ce que nous pouvons?" [134-5]  Here in this transformation

of the epistemological toward the ethical we see a combined

application of the principle of singularity (an absolutely infinite

being as cause of itself, the adequate idea as enveloping its cause)

and the principle of power (being as productivity, truth as creation);

the principle of singularity gives us the terms for the definition of

the adequate idea and the principle of power transforms this

definition into a project. 

     We should pay close attention here because this transformation

marks a profound moment of Spinozian thought: the introduction of the

adequate idea as the condition of truth constitutes a revolution in

epistemology.  Through his focus on causality and productivity,

Spinoza has grounded epistemology in an ontological foundation, in the

fundamental principles of being, and thereby gained the force to forge

the theory of ideas into an ethical and practical project.  The clear

and distinct idea lacks this capability because it does not situate

truth within a dynamic of production.  This Cartesian strategy is

limited on two ways: on one hand, since epistemology is detached from

ontology, from the causal dynamic of being, truth lacks a real

foundation and appears as the extrinsic sign of an external or absent

cause rather than the inherent recognized as the effect in a causal

expression of being; on the other hand, since the true idea is not

relation, there are no means by which we can enter into the causal

dynamic through an ethical practice.  Spinoza's conception of the

adequate idea radically transforms this terrain.  At the outset, our

condition is such that our minds are largely constituted by inadequate

ideas.  The ethical project, which is directed toward the increase of

our power, has to ask how from these inadequate ideas can we produce

adequate ideas.  As we remarked above, Spinoza's principle of power

always enters the scene as a principle of conversion: it marks the end

of speculation and the beginning of practice.  The terms are set now

for Spinoza's practical epistemological project which will lead him to

a theory of common notions.  We have to postpone this discussion of

common notions for the moment, but what is important at this point is

to recognize the radical departure achieved by Spinoza's epistemology

through the interplay of the ontological principles and the role of

power as a means of conversion.

     Before moving on, let us investigate one more aspect of the

Spinozian conception of adequacy.  We claimed above that if we are to

maintain Deleuze's ontological parallelism then in principle each

claim we make about the structure of one attribute should be equaled

by a parallel claim about the other attributes.  The concept of truth

presents an interesting test for this theory.  In a Cartesian theory

of truth, for example, it would make very little sense to try to find

a parallel for the "clear and distinct" idea of the mind in the realm

of the body: would we have to say that a clear and distinct mode of

extension should be called true just as is a clear and distinct mode

of thought?  This is obviously absurd.  However, when we adopt the

Spinozian concept of adequacy, we can pose a meaningful parallel.  An

adequate mode of extension is one which envelops and expresses its

causes: its material cause is another mode of extension and its formal

cause is the power of the body to act.  Therefore, just as an adequate

mode of our mind increases our mental power to act (to think), an

adequate mode of our body increases our corporeal power to act.  There

is no priority of the mind over the body in this discourse, because

since adequacy is grounded in causality (and thus ultimately on

ontological principles) it can refer equally to thought and extension. 

The traditional problematic of truth refers exclusively to the mind:

Spinoza's theory of adequacy shifts the problematic to involve all the

attributes and, through its focus on causality, brings the question of

truth back to the question of being.

 

3.7  What a body can do

     With the conception of adequacy, Spinoza is able to pose an

initial ethical question.  One aspect of the very steep path which

Spinoza is leading us on will direct us to proceed from inadequate

ideas to adequate ones.  We can easily pose this ethical goal more

generally as the increase of our power to think, or more generally

still as the increase of our power to exist and act: how can we

increase our power to exist, or in theological terms how can we

approach God (the infinite power to exist and act).  At this point,

however, we have very little idea how this operation is possible; we

are still very far from being able to embark on an ethical practice. 

In fact, posing the ethical question in such grand terms is empty and

pointless without some specific and concrete means of addressing our

goal. 

     The conversion from speculation to practice, as we claimed above,

is accomplished through the principle of power; as such, we need a

much more refined analysis of the internal structure of power before

we can begin to move to a creative project.  Spinoza does not choose

to conduct this investigation in terms of epistemology, but rather in

terms of physics.  The mind has been the model of speculation; now we

have to shift our concentration to the body, because it is the body

which will be the model of practice.  "Spinoza semble bien admettre

que nous devons passer par une ‚tude empirique des corps pour savoir

quels sont leurs rapports et comment ils se composent." [193] 

Spinozian physics is an empirical investigation to try to determine

the laws of the interaction of bodies: the meetings of bodies, their

composition and decomposition, their compatibility (or composability)

and their conflict.  A Body is not a fixed unit with a stable or

static internal structure.  On the contrary, a body is a dynamic

relationship whose internal structure and external limits are subject

to change.  What we identify as a body is merely a temporarily stable

relationship.  [IIP13Def] (18)  This proposition of the dynamic nature

of bodies, of the continual flux of their internal dynamic, allows

Spinoza a rich understanding of the interaction among bodies.  When

two bodies meet there is a meeting between two dynamic relationships:

either they are indifferent to each other; or they are compatible and

together compose a new relationship, a new body; or rather they are

incompatible and one body decomposes the relationship of the other,

destroying it, just as a poison decomposes the blood. [cf. Letter 32

to Oldenberg]  This physical universe of bodies at motion and rest, in

union and conflict, will provide the context in which we can delve

deeper into the functioning and structure of power: Spinoza's physics

are the cornerstone of his ethics.

     Deleuze is fascinated by a passage in one of the early scholia of

Book III: "no one has yet determined what the Body can do....  For no

one has yet come to know the structure of the Body so accurately that

he could explain all its functions...." [IIIP2S]  The question of

power (what a body can do) is immediately related to the internal

structure of the body.  This charts the direction of our

investigation: to understand the nature of power we must first

discover the internal structure of the body.  Deleuze reminds us that

the investigation of this structure must be conducted not in terms of

the power to act (spontaneity) but rather in terms of the power to be

affected.  "La structure d'un corps, c'est la composition de son

rapport.  Ce que peut un corps, c'est la nature et les limites de son

pouvoir d'ˆtre affect‚." [198]  The internal structure of the body is

the differences within power; the power to be affected, which

corresponds to the power to exist, is filled by active affections and

passive affections.  There is an important distinction between these

two affections.  To the extent that our power to be affected is filled

by active affections it relates directly to our power to act, but to

the extent that it is filled by passive affections it relates only to

our power to feel or suffer (puissance de pƒtir).  Passive affections

really mark our lack of power.  "Notre force de pƒtir n'affirme rien,

parce qu'elle n'exprime rien du tout: elle ®enveloppe¯ seulement notre

impuissance, c'est-…-dire le plus bas degr‚ de notre puissance

d'agir...." [204]  We said earlier that the power to be affected

demonstrates the plenitude of being in that it is always completely

filled with active and passive affections; yet the power to be

affected only appears as plenitude from the physical point of view. 

From the ethical point of view, on the contrary, the power to be

affected varies widely according to its composition: to the extent

that it is filled with passive affections it is reduced to its

minimum, and to the extent that it is filled with active affections it

is increased to its maximum.  "D'o— l'importance de la question

‚thique.  Nous ne savons mˆme pas ce que peut un corps, dit Spinoza. 

C'est-…-dire: Nous ne savons mˆme pas de quelles affections nous

sommes capables, ni jusqu'o— va notre puissance.  Comment pourrions-

nous le savoir … l'avance?" [205]  This, then, is the first order of

business in preparing the terrain for an ethical project: investigate

what affects we are capable of, discover what our body can do.

     Spinoza's theory of conatus (or striving) marks precisely the

intersection of production and affection which is so important to

Deleuze.  "Les variations du conatus en tant qu'il est d‚termin‚ par

telle ou telle affection sont les variations dynamiques de notre

puissance d'agir." [211]  Conatus is the physical instantiation of the

ontological principle of power.  On one hand, it is the essence of

being insofar as being is productive; it the motor which animates

being as the world.  To this extent conatus is Spinoza's continuation

of the legacy of Renaissance naturalism: being is spontaneity, pure

activity.  On the other hand, however, conatus is also the

instantiation of the ontological principle of power in that conatus is

a sensibility: it is driven by not only the actions but also the

passions of the mind and the body. [cf. for example IIIP9]  It is this

rich synthesis of spontaneity and affectivity which marks the

continuity between the ontological principle of power and the conatus.

     At this point the ethical project requires a moment of empirical

realism.  When Spinoza begins to take stock of the state of our body,

of our power, he notes that by necessity our power to be affected is

largely filled by passive affections.  God, or Nature, is completely

filled with active affections, because there is no cause external to

it.  However, "the force by which a man perseveres in existing is

limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes."

[IVP3]  To the extent that our power is surpassed by the power of

Nature as a whole, to the extent that external forces are more

powerful than our own forces, we will be filled with passive

affections.  Now, since passive affections largely constitute our

existence we should focus our investigation on these affections to see

if we can make meaningful distinctions among them.  Within the domain

of extension, passive affections are characterized by meetings between

our body and other bodies: meetings which can appear as random because

they are not caused by us.  The order of passions, then, is the order

of chance meetings, the fortuitus occursus. [217]  However, not all

chance meetings are alike.  Deleuze insists that we have to

distinguish between two cases of meetings.  In the first case, I meet

a body whose internal relationship is compatible with the internal

relationship of my body.  The two bodies together compose a new

relationship.  We can say, then, that this external body "agrees with

my nature" or that it is "good" or "useful" for me.  Furthermore, this

meeting produces an affection in me which itself agrees with or is

good for my nature: it is a joyful meeting.  "Insofar as a thing

agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good." [IVP31]  Spinoza

always links the themes of good and useful to that of power.  Joy,

according to Spinoza, is the increase in our power to act, or rather

it is our power itself in as much as increased by an external cause. 

The first case of chance meeting, then, results in a joyful passive

affection because it presents a "composable" relationship, it

increases our power to act.  Such joyful meetings engender a desire,

which is love.  In the second case of chance meeting, though, I meet a

body whose internal relationship is not compatible with that of my

body; this body does not agree with my nature.  Either one body will

decompose the relationship of the other or both bodies will be

decomposed.  In either case, the important fact is that there will be

no increase of power because a body cannot gain power from something

which does not agree with it.  Since this meeting results in a

decrease of power, the affection produced by it is sadness, and this

sadness can give rise to hatred.  Spinoza and Deleuze, of course,

recognize that actual meetings are more complicated than this: there

may be different degrees of partial compatibility and partial conflict

in a meeting, or further the affects can combine in a myriad of ways

(the sadness of what we hate brings us joy, etc.)  These two cases,

however, joyful passive affections and sad passive affections, provide

us with the limit cases of possible meetings and thus they allow us to

posit a further distinction in our model of power.


.m:1

 

      power to exist    ===    power to be affected

 

                                      /    \

                                     /      \

                                    /        \

                                   /          \

 

                     active affections      passive affections

 

                                                 /    \

                                                /      \

                                               /        \

                                              /          \

 

                                   joyful passive       sad passive

                                     affections         affections


.m:2

 

     It is once again time for a moment of Spinoza's realism.  What is

the relative frequency of joyful and sad meetings?  In principle, or

rather in the abstract, humans agree in nature and thus human meetings

ought to be purely joyful.  However, this is only true to the extent

that our power to be affected is filled by active affections. 

"Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree

in nature." [IVP32]  Therefore, "en r‚alit‚, les hommes conviennent

fort peu en nature les uns avec les autres" and the large majority of

chance meetings are sad.  This new recognition allows us to modify the

ethical proposition which we ventured above: now we no longer ask how

can we experience more active affections?, but rather how can we

experience more joyful passive affections?

     We began this section by posing the Spinozian question, what can

a body do?  In the investigation of the structure of the body, at each

point that we have recognized a distinction we have also recognized

that the human condition lies largely on the weak side of the

equation: our power to be affected is filled largely by passive

affections rather than active affections; and further our passive

affections are constituted largely by sad passive affections rather

than joyful passive affections.  One could easily be disheartened at

this point by Spinoza's pessimistic appraisal of the human condition

-- but that would be to miss the point of the project.  The

investigation of the internal structure of power and the realistic

evaluation of our condition are oriented toward refining the ethical

question so that it can provide the basis for an ethical practice;

what may appear as pessimism is Spinoza's practical perspective.  To

appreciate the richness of this approach, consider the typical

Nietzschean ethical mandate: become active.  How can such an ethical

proposition be transformed into an ethical practice?  In other words,

through Nietzsche we can clearly recognize the desire, the power (and

in this sense the good) of becoming active, but we find no means to

follow it through in practice.  Spinoza too recognizes ethics as an

issue of becoming active, but he delves one step deeper to enrich that

ethical perspective.  "La question ‚thique, chez Spinoza, se trouve

donc d‚doubl‚e: Comment arriverons-nous … produire des affections

actives?  Mais d'abord: Comment arriverons-nous … ‚prouver un maximum

de passions joyeuses?" [225]  Through the investigation of power,

Spinoza has now prepared the terrain for the conversion from

speculation to practice which will put his ethics in motion.

 

IV. Practice

 

3.8  The ethics of joyful practice: common notions

     Through our investigation of the structure of power and our

realistic estimation of the human condition we have arrived at the

limit of speculation.  The human condition resides principally in the

point of the minimum of power; when we adopt this position we can

adopt too a truly ethical position.  This is the end of speculation,

this is the moment of transmutation -- the hour of midnight. 

Spinozian speculation has illuminated the terrain of power, defined

its principal structures; now, we must convert this speculative

dynamic into a practical project.  How can we effect this

transmutation?  Where can we find the impetus to put a practical

project in motion?  A first hint that Deleuze gives us is that we must

shift our focus from affirmation to joy.  "Le sens de la joie apparaŒt

comme le sens proprement ‚thique; il est … la pratique ce que

l'affirmation elle-mˆme est … la sp‚culation." [251]  Joy is to

practice what affirmation is to speculation: joy, in other words, is

the affirmation of being in the moment of its constitution; our

increase of power is the affirmative constitution of being itself.  It

is not immediately evident, however, how our practice can begin with

joy.  Just like Nietzsche's ethical mandate "become active", so too a

Spinozian mandate such as "become joyful" lacks the mechanism by which

to initiate a practical project.  Deleuze attempts another tact,

presenting the project in negative form, to give it a more practical

thrust: the first practical task of the Ethics, he claims, is to

combat sadness.  "La d‚valorisation des passions tristes, la

d‚nonciation de ceux qui les cultivent et qui s'en servent, forment

l'objet pratique de la philosophie." [251]  We have already noted,

though, that in reality most of our passions are sad passions, that

most chance meetings among bodies are incompatible and destructive. 

How can we begin a practice of joy from such a state?  The attack on

sadness still lacks an initial practical key.

     It may be helpful, as a point of comparison, to recall a

frequently cited phrase from the TdIE which served there as part of a

constructive epistemological argument: habemus enim ideam veram. [TdIE

33]  We have a true idea; or rather, even though our mind is largely

constituted by false and confused ideas, nonetheless let us grant that

we have at least one true idea and, once we have distinguished it from

the false ideas, we can begin to construct a system of true ideas on

the basis of this one.  Spinoza asks us in this early text to accept

the existence of this true idea as given.  Now, if we transpose this

framework from the epistemological to the ethical terrain, we find

that we are faced by the same dilemma: our life of chance meetings is

largely constituted by sad encounters.  Spinoza could posit, as he

does in the earlier text, that we have at least one joyful encounter

and then he could try to construct a system of joy on that basis. 

     However, at this point, we can provide a foundation which

supports this initial epistemological proposition -- we have a wealth

of speculation behind us which has prepared the terrain for our

practice.  We come back then to Spinoza's physics of bodies: "no one

has yet come to know the structure [fabrica] of the Body so accurately

that he could explain all its functions...." [IIIP2S]  What does

Spinoza mean by structure?  "C'est un systŠme de rapports entre les

parties d'un corps ....  On cherchera comment les rapports varient

dans tel ou tel autre corps; on aura le moyen de d‚terminer

directement les ressemblances entre deux corps, si ‚loign‚s soient-

ils." [257]  Our investigation of the structure or relationships which

constitute the body allows us to recognize common relationships which

exist between our body and another body.  A meeting between our body

and this other body will necessarily be joyful because the common

relationship guarantees a compatibility and the opportunity to compose

a new relationship, thereby increasing our power.  It is precisely in

this way that the analysis of bodies allows us to begin a practical

project.  By recognizing similar compositions or relationships among

bodies we have the criteria necessary for a first ethical selection of

joy: we are able to favor compatible meetings and thereby we also

favor joyful passive affections.  When we make this selection of

compatible meetings and joyful passions we are producing common

notions.  "La notion commune est toujours l'id‚e d'une similitude de

composition dans les modes existants." [254]  The formation of the

common notion constitutes the first step of an ethical practice. 

     Deleuze explains that we must make a distinction between common

notions which are more universal and common notions which are less

universal.  The most universal common notions are those which

recognize a similarity from a very general point of view: they may

represent, then, what is common to all bodies such as extension,

motion, rest, etc.  These very universal common notions, however, are

precisely those which are least useful to us.  The least universal

common notions, in fact, are those which immediately present us with

the greatest utility.  These notions are those which represent a

similar composition between two bodies which directly agree with each

other, from their own local points of view.  Just as we continually

descended within the internal structure of power, here too we must

descend to the lowest most local level of commonality to initiate our

practical project.  "Ces notions nous font donc comprendre les

convenances entre modes: elles n'en restent pas … une perception

externe des convenances observ‚es fortuitement, mais trouvent dans la

similitude de la composition une raison interne et n‚cessaire de la

convenance des corps." [255]  We can see, then, especially in the most

specific of cases, that the common notion discovers an internal logic,

that the common notion envelops and explains its cause, or in other

words that the common notion is an adequate idea: "les notions

communes en g‚n‚ral sont n‚cessairement ad‚quates; en d'autres terms,

les notions communes sont des id‚es qui s'expliquent formellement par

notre puissance de penser et qui, mat‚riellement, expriment l'id‚e de

Dieu comme leur cause efficiente." [258]  The common notion provides

us the means to construct for ourselves an adequate idea.

     We have now refounded the initial epistemological moment which

Spinoza posited in the TdIE (habemus enim ideam veram) with a

practical process.  The first adequate idea we can have is the

recognition of something in common between two bodies; this adequate

idea immediately leads to another adequate idea: in this way we can

begin our constructive project to become active.  Deleuze, however, is

not yet satisfied that we have presented this initial moment in

sufficiently practical terms.  "Toutefois, la notion commune risque

d'intervenir comme un miracle tant que nous n'expliquons pas comment

nous arrivons … la former.  ... pr‚cis‚ment, comment les formons-nous,

dans quelles circonstances favorables?  Comment arrivons-nous … notre

puissance d'agir?" [259-60]  When we consider the Spinozian theory of

common notions, Deleuze warns us that we should be careful to avoid

two dangerous interpretative errors.  The first error with respect to

the common notions would be "n‚gliger leur sens biologique au profit

de leur sens math‚mathique." [260]  In other words, we should remember

that common notions refer principally to a physics of bodies, not a

logic of thought: we would do better to locate them as rising up from

a Hobbesian material terrain, rather than from a Cartesian

mathematical universe.  The second interpretative error we might make

with respect to the common notions would be "n‚gliger leur fonction

pratique au profit de leur contenu sp‚culatif." [260]  When common

notions are first introduced in Book II of the Ethics, they are

introduced precisely in their logical order, from the speculative

point of view.  This speculative presentation regards the commons

notions as moving from the most universal (motion, rest, etc.) toward

the least universal.  The practical progression of common notions in

Book V is exactly the opposite: we move from the least universal (a

specific compatible relationship between two bodies) toward the most

universal.  Furthermore, speculation does not found practice, but

merely provides the terms and the structures for it; practice begins

with bodies in motion and rest.

     Here, to begin the practical progression, we can assume that by

chance we experience a compatible meeting.  "Quand nous rencontrons un

corps qui convient avec le n“tre, quand nous ‚prouvons une affection

passive joyeuse, nous sommes induits … former l'id‚e de ce qui est

commun … ce corps et au n“tre." [261]  The process begins with the

experience of joy.  This chance meeting with a compatible body allows

us or induces us to recognize a common relationship, to form a common

notion.  There are two processes going on here, however, which Deleuze

insists must be kept distinct: Deleuze calls them the two moments of

reason. [266]  In the first moment, we strive to avoid the sad

passions which diminish our power to act and accumulate joyful

passions.  This effort of selection does increase our power, but never

to the point of becoming active: joyful passions are always the result

of an external cause, they always indicate an inadequate idea.  "Il

faut donc que, … la faveur des passions joyeuses, nous formions l'id‚e

de ce qui est commun entre le corps ext‚rieur et le n“tre.  Car cette

id‚e seule, cette notion commune, est ad‚quate." [262]  The first

moment, the accumulation of joyful passions, prepares the condition

for this leap which provides us with an adequate idea. 

     Let us look more closely at this second moment of reason, at the

"leap" from the joyful passion to the common notion.  How do we make

this leap, how do we construct an adequate idea?  In other words, how

do we arrive at reason?  Deleuze leads us through this difficult

territory in terms of the passage from a joyful passion to a joyful

action.  We know that joy is the experience of an affection which

agrees with our nature, an affection which increases our power.  The

same joy is constituted by a joyful passive affection and a joyful

active affection; the only difference is that a joyful passion arises

from an external cause while a joyful action arises from an internal

cause.  "Quand Spinoza suggŠre que ce qui convient avec la raison peut

aussi en naŒtre, il veut dire que toute joie passive peut donner lieu

… une joie active qui s'en distingue seulement par la cause." [253-4] 

The passage from passive joy to active joy involves substituting an

internal cause for the external cause.  This substitution of one cause

for another, however, still remains obscure until we recognize that a

joyful passion presents us necessarily with a situation of

commonality: a joyful passion can only arise from an external body

which is composed of a relationship common to our body.  When our mind

forms an idea of the common relationship shared between this body and

our body (a common notion) the joyful affection ceases to be passive

and becomes active.  "Il se distingue du sentiment passif dont nous

‚tions partis, mais s'en distingue seulement par la cause: il a pour

cause, non plus l'id‚e inad‚quate d'un objet qui convient avec nous,

mais l'id‚e n‚cessairement ad‚quate de ce qui est commun … cet objet

et … nous-mˆmes." [263]  This process of substitution of an internal

cause for an external cause allows Spinoza to claim that "an affect

which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear

and distinct idea of it." [VP3]  This process of substitution

constitutes the "leap" which is the second moment of reason.

     The common notions constitute for Deleuze the "c‚sure

‚pistemologique" of Spinoza's thought.  "Les notions communes sont une

des d‚couvertes fondamentales de l'Ethique." [271]  At the time when

Spinoza had drafted his early works, the Short Treatise and the TdIE,

he had certain presentiments of this concept but he had not yet

adequately formulated the common notion as a practical and

constitutive element.  Precisely for this reason, for the lack of a

theory of common notions, Spinoza could not complete the TdIE.  "Cette

hypothŠse permettrait ... de dater la pleine formation de la th‚orie

des notions communes par Spinoza entre l'abondon du Trait‚ de la

r‚forme et la r‚daction de l'Ethique." [272]  In Deleuze's view, if we

fail to recognize this "c‚sure ‚pistemologique" in Spinoza's thought

we will not adequately appreciate the Spinozian revolution of

epistemology, which transforms the blocked speculative project of

emendation into a dynamic practical project.

     Through the strategy of the formation of common notions,

Spinozian practice is beginning to climb up the same ladder which

the analysis of Spinozian speculation has constructed moving downward. 

A constitutive practice is defined by the series joyful passive

affections -> common notions -> active affections.

 


.m:1

            active                      passive

            affections                  affections

 

                ^                        /    \

                |                       /      \

                |                      /        \

                |                     /          \

 

     (common notions) <----- joyful passive        sad passive

                             affections            affections


.m:2

 

Speculation has mapped the terrain of power and now practice is

inhabiting that terrain, breathing life into its internal structure. 

Practice is moving upward, constructing the relations of being from

below.  The driving motor which animates this entire operation is

conatus: when Spinozian physics is transported to an ethical plane we

no longer see simply bodies in motion and rest, but rather we find

bodies with intention, infused with desire.  As we move from sadness

to joy, from passions to actions, we are discovering the path of the

increase of our power.  We should continually keep in mind that this

path of corporeal and spiritual emendation is not simply presented as

an ethical mandate; when Spinoza poses "becoming active" as a goal he

also presents the practical means of attaining this goal.  "Il y a

tout un apprentissage des notions communes, ou du devenir-actif: on ne

doit pas n‚gliger dans le Spinozisme l'importance du problŠme d'un

processus de formation ...." [267]  The Spinozian path to beatitude is

an apprenticeship in power, an education in virtue.