Publications
(forthcoming). "Is the Trade-Off Hypothesis Worth Trading For?" w/ Phelan, M. Mind & Language
- Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe’s work—the 'trade-off hypothesis'—which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and argue that, given the number of variables at play, any parsimonious account of the relevant data is implausible.
(2008). “The folk strike back: Or, why you didn’t do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it.” w/ Phelan, M. Philosophical Studies
- Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.
(2007). “Naturalizing ethics.” w/ Flanagan, O. and Wong, D. In Moral Psychology, Vol. 1: The Evolution of Morality. Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT Press
- In this paper we provide (i) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized (ii) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (iii) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies – Hume and Moore’s – that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (iv) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. The latter substantive view constitutes the essence of Duke Naturalism.
(2007). “What is the nature of morality? A response to Casebeer, Railton, and Ruse.” w/ Flanagan, O. and Wong, D. In Moral Psychology, Vol. 1: The Evolution of Morality. Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT Press
- A response to comments by William Casebeer, Peter Railton, and Michael Ruse on the paper above ("Naturalizing Ethics").
Under Review
- Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.
"Minor tweaks, major payoffs: The problems and promise of situationism in moral philosophy"
- Moral philosophers of late have been examining the implications of experimental social psychology for ethics. The focus of attention has been on situationism—the thesis that we routinely underestimate the extent to which minor situational variables influence morally significant behavior. This has been cause for alarm in some quarters, where situationism is seen as a threat to prevailing lay and philosophical theories of character, personhood, and agency. In this paper, I outline the situationist literature and critique one of its upshots: the admonition to carefully select one’s situational contexts. Besides being limited in application, this strategy accentuates an untenable person/situation dichotomy. The deeper lesson of situationism lies in highlighting the interconnectedness of all social behavior—how we are inextricably involved in the actions of others, and how minor tweaks in our own behavior can lead to major payoffs in our moral lives. Thus, I argue that situationism is better seen as an opportunity for moral progress than a threat to individual autonomy.
"What does the nation of China think of phenomenal states?" w/ Huebner, B. and Bruno, M.
- Critics of functionalist theories of the mind often rely on the intuition that
collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper we consider the merits of appealing to this intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We report empirical evidence demonstrating that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense. We also report experimental evidence demonstrating that resistance to collective mentality is culturally specific rather than universally held. Finally, we provide evidence that the source of this intuitive resistance to collective mentality is at least partially a product of our Western cultural heritage. Thus, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular.
In preparation
- “Rituals, intuitions and social magic: Emotions and automaticity in the Analects”
- “Dao Success and Dao Satisfaction in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi”