

JUSTIN JEFFREY

October 2007

212 Howell Street
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 619-7806 (Home)
(919) 660-2413 (Office)
E-mail: jdj10@duke.edu

Department of Philosophy
Duke University
201 West Duke Building Box 9074
Durham, NC 2770
Phone: 919-660-3050
Fax: 919-660-3060

EDUCATION:

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Ph.D., August 2007

Dissertation Title: "Normative Progeny" (abstract below)

Committee: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Director), Thomas E. Hill Jr., Susan R. Wolf, Douglas MacLean, Bernard Boxill

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: M.A., May 2002

Master's Thesis Title: The Value of Equality

Committee: Thomas E. Hill Jr. (Director), Gerald Postema, Bernard Boxill

Cornell University: B.A. in Philosophy, *Cum Laude* with Distinction in all Subjects (2000)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University, 2007-2008

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:

Meta-ethics, Normative Ethics, Bioethics/Medical Ethics

AREAS OF COMPETENCE:

Ancient Ethics, Environmental Ethics

PUBLICATIONS:

"The Tyranny of Romantic Love: continuing the conversation with Cephalus," *Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics*. Volume 7 No 1 June 2005.

"Ethical Considerations in CT Angiography," *International Journal of Cardiovascular Imaging*. 2006 Dec 21. Samuel Wann MD, L. Andy Nassef MD, Justin Jeffrey PhD, Joseph V. Messer MD, Norbert M. Wilke MD, Andre J. Duerinck MD, PhD, James C. Blankenship MD, Michael K. Rosenberg MD, and Donald H. Dembo MD.

Review of Robert Merrihew Adams' "A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good," forthcoming in *Journal of Moral philosophy*.

PRESENTATIONS:

“Reflected Glory: Deriving Final Normativity,” delivered at Dartmouth College for the annual meeting of ISUS (International Society of Utilitarian Studies), August 2005.

Invited Speaker at UNC-Chapel Hill recruitment event: Science Spectrum Symposium, Spring 2006.

Moderator for UNC-Chapel Hill faculty panel discussion of Joel Bakan’s “The Corporation”, Spring 2006.

“Inheriting Normativity,” delivered at UNC-Chapel Hill, Fall 2006.

“Financial and Moral Forgiveness,” to be delivered at the first Global Conference on Forgiveness in Salzburg, Austria (March 7-9, 2008).

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Utility and the virtues,” (under review at *Utilitas*)

“Contextualism about Intrinsic Value”

“Financial and Moral Forgiveness”

“Moral Purity as a Secular Virtue?”

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill:

Full Responsibility:

Bioethics (five courses)

Introduction to Ethics (five courses)

Introduction to Philosophy

Teaching Assistant:

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems (with Don Garrett)

Bioethics (three courses, with Douglas Long)

Introduction to Ethics (with Geoffrey Sayre-McCord)

Applied Ethics (with Douglas MacLean)

Duke University:

Environmental Philosophy

Introduction to Philosophy (seminar style)

Ancient Philosophy

Introduction to Ethics

FELLOWSHIPS

James Rachels Fellowship: Fall 2006-Spring 2007

Fellow of the Parr Center for Ethics: Fall 2005-Spring 2006

Bertha Williams Fellowship: Spring 2005

Bertha Williams Fellowship: Spring 2004

Henry Williams Fellowship: Spring 2003

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Research Assistant at UNC Chapel Hill Parr Center for Ethics, Fall 2005-Summer 2006
 Referee for special edition of "Topics in Spinal Cord Injury Rehabilitation," 2007
 Research Assistant to Thomas E. Hill Jr., Fall 2004-Summer 2007
 Duke Hospice Inpatient/Outpatient Volunteer, 2007-2008
 Editorial Assistant to Thomas E. Hill Jr., *Blackwell Guide to Kant*. Blackwell Publishing, Forthcoming. Summer 2007-present

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS:

Member of APA 2004-2007
 Member of "American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics" 2007
 Member of "International Society of Utilitarian Studies" 2007

GRADUATE COURSES TAKEN (*indicates audit)

<u>Logic</u>	Mike Resnik	<u>Epistemology</u>	Douglas Long
<u>Rationalism</u>	Don Garrett	<u>Philosophy of Law</u>	Jerry Postema
<u>British Empiricism</u>	Simon Blackburn	<u>Contemporary Moral Theory</u>	G. Sayre-McCord
<u>Philosophy of Science</u>	John Roberts	<u>Kantian Ethics</u>	Thomas Hill
<u>Ancient Philosophy</u>	C.D.C. Reeve	<u>History of Ethics</u>	Thomas Hill
<u>Philosophy of Language</u>	Dorit Bar On	<u>Utilitarianism</u>	Susan Wolf
<u>Philosophy of Science</u>	Alex Rosenberg (Duke)	<u>Normative Concepts*</u>	G. Sayre-McCord
<u>Protoseminar</u>	Jay Rosenberg, Don Garrett	<u>Seminar in Moral Theory*</u>	Susan Wolf, G. Sayre-McCord

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT:

Attempts to justify evidently important parts of morality regularly seem to rob these same parts of their importance. If asked to defend the goodness of generosity, for example, one might point to its salutary effects. But to the extent that this defense succeeds it seems simultaneously to imply that it is not generosity, but rather generating salutary effects, that is of fundamental importance. The “defense” of generosity’s value has apparently exposed it as “merely derivative”, a phrase that often amounts to a philosophical slur. But in this and other cases we might hope to do better.

This undermining effect of moral justification has been encountered in various substantive contexts, but it has been treated as only a particular problem for particular cases. I argue that these various problems can be understood as versions of a general problem for morality. Recognizing the generality of the problem makes clear the view of justification required for its solution, a view that I claim has been instantiated within numerous particular contexts, but not recognized as a general view of moral justification. According to this view, a kind of normative “transfer” can take place between objects of justification and their justifying ground, allowing the recipient to attain a kind of normative independence in spite of its obvious justificatory dependence. I call this phenomenon “normative inheritance”. If defensible, normative inheritance would allow for a proper vindication of rights, rules, virtues, and so on, whose normativity is apparently derivative but, one hopes, not *merely* so.

Standard forms of rule-utilitarianism provide the most familiar example of an attempt to make sense of normative inheritance. But this attempt is not unique to rule-utilitarianism, and in fact extends well beyond various breeds of ‘indirect consequentialism’. R.M. Hare, Peter Railton, Thomas Scanlon, Joseph Raz, Christine Korsgaard, David Gauthier, and others each, in their own ways, work to establish normative inheritance. None of these attempts, I argue, succeed. And they fail for reasons that reflect a failure to appreciate the underlying structure of the problem we all face in trying to sustain the idea that something might be of independent value even as we justify the value we take it to have. What is needed, and what I offer in the thesis, is a clear articulation of the problem’s structure and then, against this background, a specification of the criteria a proposed solution must meet in order to be successful.

REFERENCES:

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
sayre-mccord@unc.edu, (919) 962-2695

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kenan Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
thill@email.unc.edu, (919) 962-3326

Susan Wolf, Koury Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
susanw@email.unc.edu, (919) 962-3315

Douglas MacLean, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
maclean@unc.edu, (919) 843-4500

Jan Boxill, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill,jmboxill@email.unc.edu, (919) 962-3317

Complete Dossier Available upon Request From:

Department of Philosophy
CB #3125, Caldwell Hall

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125