

Public Policy Seminar 264S.58*
Political Science 299- IR

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION(S)

Wednesday 7:00 – 9:30 pm
Place: Sanford 224
Limit: 15 students

Professor Judith Kelley
Office: Sanford Institute, 237
Email: jkelly@duke.edu
Office hours: Monday 4-5 pm and Tuesday 12:15-1:15 pm

The seminar examines the changing (and growing?) role of institutions in the international system. The course surveys the theory on international organization and the effect of international organizations on international cooperation and governance. This will include a basic introduction to game theory – an essential component of analyzing international cooperation. We will ask questions such as: How do international institutions affect state behavior and collective outcomes? Are international institutions more effective in some areas than in others? What does it mean for international institutions to be effective, and what factors influence their effectiveness? We will explore the factors and conditions for why institutions are created, why they endure, what functions they perform, why they change, and what form they take. We also consider questions such as: If states are the dominant actors in world politics, why do they set up institutions to restrict their freedom of action? Why do or don't they comply with international agreements? How can the cooperation, or lack thereof, in the international system be understood if one looks at it through the lenses of power, interests and ideas? In what ways do institutions matter?

As a seminar, this course will encourage you to work on your writing, presentation and class participation skills. Your grade will be based on written work and on class participation. As the course will be conducted as a seminar, not a lecture course, all students are expected to complete the weekly readings and come prepared to actively contribute to class discussions.

Course requirements

Class participation:

As the last classes of the course are devoted to student presentations (see below) the front end of the class is more reading intensive. (Note that there are four weeks total with no reading assignments). When reading the materials, *students should focus on the analytical arguments* of each author: what are they trying to explain, what factors do they use in their explanation, and what are the causal arguments? Prior to each class, I will give students a list of questions to guide them through the readings and facilitate discussion. Everyone should come prepared to offer his or her opinion and insights. Each week I will assign certain students to prepare short write-ups

and discuss the readings. I will also encourage students to follow international issues related to international cooperation and organizations in the news and bring issues up for discussion. I will email you news articles each week and we will discuss these in the context of the readings.

Written work and presentation:

Short papers:

There are some 26 starred readings for the course. For each class with starred readings students will turn in a short 1-2 page commentary either on *one* of the starred readings, or *comparing two or more* starred readings (for a total of 7 commentaries, 1 per week for weeks with starred readings). Each week a few students will be responsible for starting discussion, based on their commentaries. This responsibility will be assigned in advance.

Research paper:

Students work on a research paper of their own choosing, as long as it fits within the parameters of the course. Students working on a larger thesis or project as part of their program of study will also be encouraged to use the class to help in their overall project. Mid-semester we will have a research paper workshop, sharing ideas and getting a briefing on research resources. A draft will be due before the final version is due, and comments will be returned on the draft.

Grading: 50 % paper and presentation, 25% short commentaries, 25 % participation. On paper grading, see <http://bokcenter.fas.harvard.edu/docs/GradingPapers.html>

Lateness: The grades of late papers and commentaries will decrease by half a grade for each day they are late.

Plagiarism: If you quote or paraphrase or are closely inspired by the written work of others it is essential to cite them. Internet references need to be well documented with address and date of access.

COURSE MATERIALS

I have made an effort to use materials that are primarily available online. The single most important source of analysis of international organization(s) is the journal publication: International Organization. The articles in the syllabus are from IO or World Politics, International Security and similar journals can be found either on JSTOR (until 1997) or on Catchword, or other e-journal sources, which are available through the university library system. There is one required book:

Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 1997. Should be at the campus bookstore.

Robert Keohane, *After hegemony : cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. (Buy this used from www.Amazon.com for less than \$7! – order quickly as you will need it soon)

Recommended further reading:

For a list of further reading, students are recommended to consult: *The Effects of International Institutions: an Annotated Bibliography*, by Lisa Martin et al, available at:
<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~llmartin/bibliography8-28-99.pdf>

Other Links & Resources:

 [Richard Tucker: Political Science Links](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~rtucker/polisci/)
(<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~rtucker/polisci/>)

 [The Ultimate Political Science Links Page!](http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/PSLinks.htm)
(<http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/PSLinks.htm>)

Transnational Relations
(<http://www.lib.duke.edu/reference/class/PS158D.htm>)

A detailed DUKE library guide to resources and strategies appropriate for this class.

International Public Policy

<http://www.lib.duke.edu/reference/subjects/pubpol/intlpubpol.htm>

READING LIST

Class 1

Wednesday August 27: Introduction (no reading)

Course Overview

Introductions

Understanding theories (Steve Van Evera's Guide to methods for Students of Political Science)

Reading texts (& finding them online)

Probing the questions of international cooperation

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/final_leadership_act.pdf

Class 2

Wednesday September 3: Introduction to the study of International Institutions and Organizations [86]

Definitions

Background readings:

Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 729-57 [27].
<http://ernesto.ingentaselect.com/vl=2278962/cl=19/nw=1/rpsv/cw/mitpress/00208183/v52n4/contp1-1.htm>

Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories." *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998), pp. 29-46.

http://web2.infotrac-custom.com/pdfserve/get_item/1/Scd4ac3w3_1/SB019_01.pdf

Keohane, International institutions: can interdependence work? *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998. At http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1181/n110/20492567/p1/article.jhtml?term=keohane [11]

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, chaps. 1-2 [22]

For discussion:

*Cheryl Shanks, Harold K. Jacobson, Jeffrey H. Kaplan, Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992, *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 4, Autumn, 1996, pp. 593-627

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199623%2950%3A4%3C593%3AIACITC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9>

Krasner, 1984. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences *International Organization*, Vol.

36(2): 185 <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198221%2936%3A2%3C185%3ASCARCR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3>

*Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory; A Critique, *Review of International Studies* 17 (January 1991): 67-85. (E-reserves through blackboard)

Analytical tools tools; economics, game theory and collective action problems

James Morrow: Game Theory for Political Scientists: Princeton University press, 1994. [Chapter Two](#) - and [Chapter Three](#). On e-reserve through black board.

Take a look at the following websites:

<http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/PRISDIL.html>
<http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SUBOPTIM.html>
<http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/playground/pd.html>

<http://www.princeton.edu/~ariel/99/gt100.html#experiments>

Class 3

Wednesday Sept 10: Institutionalist/ interest-based explanations

**Keohane, *After hegemony : cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Chaps. 1, 4-7 (pp. 5-17, 49-132) [99]

*Arthur A. Stein, 1982. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world," *International Organization* Vol. 36 (2): 229.

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198221%2936%3A2%3C299%3ACACRIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N>

*Lisa L. Martin [Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions](#), *World Politics*, 45 (3): pp. 406-432

Stable URL: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28199304%2945%3A3%3C406%3ACCAICO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B>

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, chaps. 3 (23-83) [50]

Further reading:

Robert Keohane. [The Demand for International Regimes](#), *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring, 1982: pp. 325-355

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198221%2936%3A2%3C325%3ATDFIR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J>

Class 4: Weds September 17: Power based explanations Security and cooperation

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, chaps. 4 (83-136) [53]

*Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 336-356 [20]

*Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? American's response to Japanese Industrial Policy, In Baldwin, Ch. 10, pp. 250-268 [18].

Old Sores Pain China and Japan. *Financial Times*, August 26, 2003. Access this through lexis nexis.

*Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the limits of cooperation – *International Organization*, Vol. 42(3) (1988): 485-507 [22]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198822%2942%3A3%3C485%3AAATLOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z>

*John Mearsheimer, The false promise of international institutions. *International Security* 19, 3, pp. 5-49. (Focus on arguments about liberal institutionalism. Pp 5-27. and conclusion.) [25+]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199424%2F199524%2919%3A3%3C5%3ATFPOII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C>

Responses to Mearsheimer in *International Security*, 20,1,pp. 39-93.[53]

[**The Promise of Institutional Theory**](#), pp. 39-51

Robert O. Keohane; Lisa L. Martin

Stable URL: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C39%3ATPOIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N)

[2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C39%3ATPOIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C39%3ATPOIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N)

[**The False Premise of Realism**](#), pp. 62-70

John Gerard Ruggie

Stable URL: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C62%3ATFPOR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B)

[2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C62%3ATFPOR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C62%3ATFPOR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B)

*Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes. International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes, Spring, 1982

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198221%2936%3A2%3C357%3ASR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23>

Class 5

Wednesday September 24

Knowledge based explanations

Epistemic communities

*Radoslav S. Dimitrov. Knowledge, Power and Interests in Environmental Regime formation. *ISQ* 47, 123-150.

<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=isqu&volume=47&issue=1&year=2003&part=null>

*Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, pp. 1-35 *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter, 1992 [35]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199224%2946%3A1%3C1%3AIECAIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23>

*and an article of our choice from the issue in general:

<http://www.jstor.org/browse/00208183/dm980277?config=jstor&frame=noiframe&userID=9803732e@duke.edu/018dd553400050c5379f&dpi=3>

Institutions as autonomous actors?

*Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy. *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 565-597. [33]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199323%2947%3A4%3C565%3AIOATON%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V>

*Barnett and Finnemore, The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International organizations. *International Organization* Vol.53, 4, 1999. p. 699-732. [33]

<http://gessler.ingentaselect.com/vl=324230/cl=13/nw=1/fm=docpdf/rpsv/catchword/mitpress/00208183/v53n4/s3/p699>

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, chaps. 5 (136-211) [75]

Class 6, October 1: Critiques and other theories of international cooperation

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, chaps. 6

*[Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,"](#) *International Organization* 51:4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553.

*Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A critique of regime analysis,

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198221%2936%3A2%3C479%3ACHDACO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K>

***Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games**

Robert D. Putnam

International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460.

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198822%2942%3A3%3C427%3ADADPTL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K>

[University Wire](#), September 6, 2002, Friday, 707 words, U.S. considers anti-discrimination treaty, By Evan McLaughlin, Daily Illini – look up in lexis nexis

*Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Apr., 1992), pp. 466-496.

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28199204%2944%3A3%3C466%3AITOCAN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N>

Class 7, Wednesday Oct 8:

Class will attend Helen Milner's seminar at the Franklin Center, 240. Paper to be disseminated.

Class 8, Wednesday October 15: Research paper workshop

Deadline for submitting your research paper proposal and sign up for presentation date

Your paper proposal should be 2-3 pages, typed, and include a list of references.

Seminar devoted to discussing initial proposals, how to write a research paper, getting ideas and feedback from each other, as well as learning about library research:

Library research tutorial with Catherine Shreve

Class 9, October 22: How do legal commitments matter to states? Why do they make them and why do they keep them?

*Andrew Moravcsik, "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe," *International Organization* 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 217-52 [35].

<http://journals.cambridge.org/bin/bladerunner?REQUNIQ=1060032105&REQSESS=3409706&117000REQEVENT=&REQINT1=164772&REQAUTH=0>

Do you agree or disagree with Moravcsik? Why? Try to draw his argument.

If Moravcsik is right, that democracies in transition primarily make commitments to human rights regimes, why do we see so many established democracies taking the lead on treaties that deal with soft norms, such as childrens' rights, women, etc? Landmines?

*[International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs](#)

Beth A Simmons. *The American Political Science Review*. Menasha: Dec 2000. Vol. 94, Iss. 4; p. 819 (17 pages)

Do international rules reflect rather than alter governments' interest in pursuing a particular course of action?

How would we know the answer to this question?

Does Simmons make a convincing argument that the rules change behavior?

If the argument is true, then why do governments sometimes NOT comply?

*Jonas Talberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, *International Organization*, Volume 56 - Issue 03 - August 2002

Available at:

<http://journals.cambridge.org/bin/bladerunner?30REQEVENT=&REQAUTH=0&500002REQS UB=&REQSTR1=internationalorganization>

How is the answer to the question of why states comply with international agreements relevant for the question of how to get states to comply?

How would you answer this question if you were thinking about IRAN and nuclear weapons? How would you answer the question if you are thinking about Romania's failure to provide for orphans?

Simmons talked about reputation, and Talberg talks about intentional shirking (intentionally NOT complying): how can both of these make sense to do?

What about France and Germany's compliance problem with the Stability Pact? Is this a management or an enforcement issue?

What are the implications of decentralized versus centralized compliance systems? How does the need for each type vary with issues? What is it about the issue that determines what is most needed?

Norms versus interests: do we care?

Do states always act to maximize their interests? Do they ever act just for the moral good of an action? How do norms develop in the international society? What effect do norms have on state behavior?

*Ethan A. Nadelmann. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 4. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 479-526.[47]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199023%2944%3A4%3C479%3AGPRTEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q>

What is regime leakage (483?)

Break down the component/ steps that form the foundation of regime development. Are they all necessary? Which are most important?

Will we have new prohibitive norms develop? Are they likely to be successful in stopping the behavior in question?

*Chaim D. Kaufmann; Robert A. Pape. Explaining costly international moral action.

International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4

<http://ernesto.ingentaselect.com/vl=1646288/cl=63/nw=1/rpsv/catchword/mitpress/00208183/contp1.htm>

Compare the authors description of slavery with that of Nadelman: what do you find?

How does today's issue of human trafficking differ from slavery?

*Ellen L. Lutz, Kathryn Sikkink.

International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America

International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3

Available at:

<http://journals.cambridge.org/bin/bladerunner?30REQEVENT=&REQAUTH=0&500002REQS UB=&REQSTR1=internationalorganization>

Class 10: Wednesday October 29:

Guest speaker -- Colleen Thouez, senior Program Officer at the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP), a United Nations program based in Geneva, designed to strengthen the capacity of developing country governments and civil society to address migration and refugee challenges. Prior to this position, she worked with the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a consultant.

Readings TBA

Class 11, Wednesday November 5: Pooling sovereignty: The European Union, supranationalism and the future of international cooperation [72+]

This class we will focus on the EU as a unique phenomenon of cooperation among nations. We will examine how and when nations came to pool sovereignty, and discuss the differences in EU and US conceptions of sovereignty and how this influences multilateral initiatives. Finally, we will discuss to what extent a EU could emerge in other regions (please be prepared to comment if you are from another region).

We will then slightly change gears and discuss the future of international cooperation in the form of the UN.

How and why did the EU members pool their sovereignty?

BACKGROUND:

CASE STUDY: The Development of the European Union

Lucy Lyons and Hendrik Spruyt, Arizona State University

<http://www.ciaonet.org/teachfrm.html>

Anne-Marie Burley, Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration." *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Winter, 1993), pp. 41-76. [35]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199324%2947%3A1%3C41%3AEBTCAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23>

Geoffrey Garrett, "The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union" *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Winter, 1995), pp. 171-181.[10]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199524%2949%3A1%3C171%3ATPOLII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8>

Walter Mattli, Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett" *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Winter, 1995), pp. 183-190.[17]

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199524%2949%3A1%3C183%3ALAPITE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S>

Craig Parsons, Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union, *International Organization* Volume: 56 Number: 1 Page: p47 -- p84 [37]

<http://isacco.ingentaselect.com/vl=1534486/cl=14/nw=1/rpsv/cw/mitpress/00208183/v56n1/contp1-1.htm>

Is there a future for supra-nationalism, such as the format invented by the EU, where states actually delegate part of their sovereignty to an international authority? Why, why not?

* Keohane on 'Ironies of sovereignty' in 2002 Journal on Common Market Studies -- on e-reserves

Class 12 Wednesday November 12:

No class: Draft of papers due

Prof. Kelley out of the country Nov. 11- 16. Please submit papers via email and supply a hard copy in my box before my return.

Class 13 Wednesday November 19: Class presentations

Note: this class will run until 10 pm

Wednesday November 26: THANKSGIVING

Class 14 Wednesday December 3: Class presentations

Note: this class will run until 10 pm

Class 15, Wednesday December 10: Wrapping up the class ... Papers due

Is there a future for global multilateralism as embodied in the UN?

Why the Security Council Failed

Michael J. Glennon (*Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2003)

Why America Still Needs the United Nations

Shashi Tharoor (*Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003)

Jesse Helms' "American Sovereignty and the UN"