TA: Jeff Grynaviski
Professor: Mike Munger
E-mail: jdg6@duke.edu
E-mail: munger@duke.edu
Home Phone: 919-956-8204
Home Phone: 919-844-0154
Office Phone: 919-660-4301
Course Description:
This course introduces the key concepts and applications of rational choice to political science. Rational choice refers to the theory of the rational, utility-maximizing individual originally developed in economics and statistical decision theory. Topics will include theories of utility, collective action and public goods, cooperative and noncooperative games, and social choice. By the end of the semester, students will be expected to have sufficient background in these subjects to be able to pursue more advanced material on their own or in future courses.
Course Schedule:
The class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays from 9:10-10:25. Arrangements may be made to hold an additional problem session to answer student questions about homework. Students will also be expected to attend departmental and university seminars related to positive political economy.
Assignments:
The course has been divided among fifteen
topics with required readings for each. These readings have been
further subdivided into three parts. The first component concerns
the fundamental theoretical concept for the topic and should be considered
mandatory reading for each week. The second component is an article
or articles that are applications of the topic’s central theoretical question.
They will generally be classics in the field or illustrations of the concept
that I have found to be particularly helpful. Aside from the fact
that these papers are typically more accessible reading than textbook presentations
of the theory, they should also be considered required reading for anyone
who intends to pass a preliminary exam in political economy or methods.
The third, optional component of the readings consists of a series of papers
designed to question whether positive political theory is really “positive.”
That is, these articles question whether the theoretical foundations for
rational choice are empirically sound, and if not, what implication that
might have for the utility of rational choice for understanding politics.
We will rely heavily on three texts for
the class that all students will be expected to buy from the book store
or other retailer. These texts include:
Copies of these books will also be
made available at the reserve desk in Perkins. All additional reading
materials can be printed from JSTOR (www.jstor.org from a Duke terminal)
or will be made available as photocopies in the graduate student lounge.
It will be obvious on the reading list where to find each source.
Please note that on the main floor in the library there are computers dedicated
to printing articles from e-reserve and JSTOR that are faster than what
we have in the computer cluster. Do not clog the print cue in the
political science computer lab with your readings assignments!
The course is designed as an introduction to an applied methodology akin to statistics, not as an opportunity to discuss the great works. Consequently, the bulk of class time will be spent in lecture. This is not to say that discussion or questions are not encouraged. I will try to reserve some time for discussion and you are always, always encouraged to ask questions. The best questions usually takes the form of something like, “huh?” or “I don’t understand that?” If you don’t understand, chances are others are in the same boat, so do not be timid about asking questions.
Grades will be based on class participation
and preparation (read!), a series of ten or so short assignments that will
typically be problem sets or perhaps one page single-spaced papers,
and a final exam. Because some students benefit more from collective
learning while others prefer to work alone, the decision of whether to
work alone or in groups of two or three on the problem sets will be left
to the discretion of the individual student. No groups larger than
three will be tolerated. The take home final exam will contain a
“timed” open book component with problems similar to those you have already
seen on your homework and an “untimed” component in which you will be asked
to answer an essay question or two similar to what you might find on a
prelim exam. Absolutely no group work will be allowed on the final.
Course Schedule
Topic 1. Axiomatic Approaches
to Politics—An Overview
Elster, Rational Choice, Introduction
[photocopy]
Feldman, Welfare Economics and Social
Choice Theory, Introduction
Topic 2. Formal Logic and Set Theory
Theory: Nolt, Informal Logic, Ch.5
“Deductive Arguments.” [photocopy]
Degroot, Probability and Statistics, Ch.
1.4. [photocopy]
Marsden and Hoffman, Elementary Classical
Analysis, Introduction [photocopy]
Application: May, “A Set of Independent
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, Econometrica
(1952): 680-684 [jstor]
Comment: Freidman, TBA
Topic 3. Foundations of Economic Man—Utility
Theory
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics, Ch.
1.
Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Ch. 2.
Application: Neufeld, Hausman, and
Rapoport, “A Paradox of Voting: Cyclical Majorities and the Case of Muscle
Shoals,” Political Research Quarterly 1993 [photocopy]
Comment: Tversky, “Intransitivity of Preferences,”
Psychological Review 31-48 [photocopy]
Topic 4. Behavior of Economic Man—Optimize,
Optimize, Optimize
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics, Ch.
2-3
Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Ch. 2.2-2.3
Application: Niskanen, Bureaucracy
and Representative Government [photocopy]
Comment: Simon, “A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1955 [jstor]
Topic 5. Market Failures—Collective
Action, Externalities, and Public Goods
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics, Ch.
5-6.
Application: Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action, Chapters 1 and 2 [photocopy]
Conybeare, “International Organization
and the Theory of Property Rights,” IO 1980
Comment: Arrow, “The Rationality of Self
and Others in an Economic System,” in Rational Choice, ed. Hogarth and
Reder 1986 [photocopy]
Topic 6. Expected Utility Theory
Theory: Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic
Theory Ch. 3.
Application: Riker and Ordeshook,
“A Theory of the Calculus of Voting,” APSR 1968 [jstor]
Comment: Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgement
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 1974 [photocopy]
Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect theory:
An analysis of decision under risk,” Econometrica 1979 [jstor]
Topic 7. Introduction to Strategic
Interaction and Game Forms
Theory: Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic
Theory Ch. 11.1-11.3
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff,
Thinking Strategically, Introduction and Chapter 1.
Comment: Arrow, “Methodological
Individualism and Social Knowledge,” AER 1994 [jstor]
Topic 8. Dominant Strategies, Nash Equilibrium,
and Equilibria in Mixed Strategies
Theory: Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic
Theory Ch. 12.1-12.6
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff,
Thinking Strategically, Finish Part I.
Comment: Robert Aumann, “Correlated
Equilibria as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,” Econometrica 1987
[jstor]
Topic 9. Refinements of Nash
Theory: Gibbons, “A Survey of Applicable
Game Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 1997 [jstor]
Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic
Theory Ch. 12.7
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff,
Thinking Strategically, Part II.
Comment: Kreps, Game Theory and
Economic Modelling, Ch. 5 and 6 [photocopy]
Topic 10. Repeated Games and Folk Theory
Theory: Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation excerpts [photocopy]
Campbell, Incentives, Ch. 4.5-4.6 [photocopy]
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff,
Thinking Strategically, Part III.
Comment: Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic
Theory, Ch. 14.1-14.2
Topic 11. Instability of Majority Rule—Black,
Downs, and McKelvey
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics,
Ch. 9.
Feld and Grofman, “Necessary and
Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting
Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach,” AJPS 1987 [jstor]
Coughlin and Hinich, "Necessary and Sufficient
Conditions for Single-Peakedness in Public Economic Models," J of Pub Econ
1984
Application: Miller, “Pluralism
and Social Choice,” APSR 1983 [jstor]
Comment: Stokes, “Spatial Models of Party
Competition,” APSR 1963 [jstor]
Topic 12. Arrow’s Theorem
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics, Ch.
10.
Application: Barry and Hardin ed., Rational
Man and Irrational Society excerpts [photocopy]
Comment: Buchanan, “Social Choice, Democracy,
and Free Markets,” JPE 1954 [jstor]
Topic 13. Strategy Proofness—Strategic
Voting and Truthful Revelation of Preferences
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics,
Ch. 11.
Application: Baron and Ferejohn,
“Bargaining in Legislatures,” APSR 1989 [jstor]
Comment: Krehbiehl and Rivers, “Sophisticated
Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration,” JOP 1990 [jstor]
Topic 14. The New Institutionalism
Theory: Aldrich, Why Parties? Ch. 1-2
[photocopy]
Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,”
AJPS 1984
Application: Shepsle, “Institutional
Arrangements an Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” AJPS 1979
[jstor]
Comment: Riker, “Implications from the
Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” APSR 1980
[jstor]
Topic 15. Rational Choice Theory as
Cumulative Science?
Aumann, The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics and Law ed. Newman 1987.
Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of
Rational Choice excerpts
Lalman, source TBA
Friedman ed., The Rational Choice
Controversy Reconsidered excerpts