Class home page: http://www.duke.edu/~munger/class/PPE/Spring
2006/PS103.syl.sp06-2.html
The Prisoner’s
Dilemma
&
Distributive
Justice
Philosophy 146 /
Political Science 103 Spring 2006
Monday - Wednesday 4:25 PM-5:40 PM Allen 326
Michael Munger munger@duke.edu
Office: Perkins Library, Room 301b office
phone: 660-4301
Alexander Rosenberg alexrose@duke.edu
Office: 203-A
skip to readings & lecture schedule
to see Duke Examination Calendar
INTRODUCTION
The
course begins with the attempt to understand the problem of coordination and
cooperation in groups of humans, and for that matter in any collection of
independent organisms. But it connects
the problem of efficient solutions to the problem of coordination to the ethical
problem of justice in distribution, or access to resources and power.
To understand “social
cooperation” one needs to understand the problems that social cooperation has
to overcome. In this respect, the prisoners’
dilemma is a foundational element in the study of social institutions. We begin with the PD in its simplest form
and then extend to the iterated case and the more relevant many-person version.
We shall deal with the theory of public goods, and offer several applications
of PD reasoning, including the Hobbesian account of
the origin of the state, the Lockean account of the origin of property, and the Demsetzian account of
the origin of property rights. We
will consider the experimental evidence in relation to PD and social dilemma
games. We also examine the related “trust
problem” and its implications for the possibility of pre-commitment.
We then turn to the problem
of justice, distribution, and control and direction of power. The object of this part of the course is
two-fold: first to examine an issue that is of enormous interest in its own
right: second, to isolate the disciplinary differences and complementarities in
the philosophical, political and economic approaches to this issue. So we shall
consider the pure ‘ethics’ of distributive justice as understood say by Marx,
Rawls and Nozick.
We shall also deal with the feasibility of various distributive schemes,
focusing on “incentive effects” and their implications. Finally, we bring
together the problem of coordination and distribution by examining the problem of
power in anarchic systems of international relations.
ASSIGNMENTS & GRADES
·
One
(10-12 page) Paper (30% of final grade): You will be asked to write one paper, of no
more than 12 typed, double-spaced pages, or 3,000 words, whichever is
smaller. The paper will be due Thursday,
March 12, at the beginning of class.
Papers not turned in at that time will be considered late. Late papers will lose a letter grade per
calendar day. Papers turned in after
class will be counted as one day late.
·
Class
Discussion and Participation (10% of final grade): Each student is expected to attend class,
prepared to participate in the discussion that day.
·
Class
Assignment—Choose and Play a Strategy, or finite state automaton (FSA) (10% of
final grade): You will
be asked to choose one of 16 strategies, or “players”, for an Axelrod style tournament.
Your FSA will be played against all n FSAs in
the class (yes, that means you will play against yourself). In order to get above an “8” on this
assignment, you have to have above the median score for the entire class. For more information, see this web
site. You will be asked to choose
one of the 16 strategies, and you must write a one-page essay on why you made
this selection, given that your induced goal is to come in first in the tournament.)
·
Midterm
Exam (20% of final grade): The midterm will be
partly multiple choice, partly short answer essay questions.
·
Final
Exam (30% of final grade):
Standard blue book exam, in the regularly scheduled exam period
(Saturday, May 6, 2006, 9 am – noon).
The final will be comprehensive, with an essay format. Full credit will only be given for answers
that integrate the material in the course, rather than simply regurgitating
back the separate parts. Practice questions
will be handed out the week before the exam is given.
TEXTBOOKS
The
following books (listed here alphabetically) are on order at the Regulator
Bookstore on
Axelrod, Evolution
of Cooperation, Basic Books
Dixit
and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, WW
Norton
Skyrms, Evolution
of the Social Contract,
Skyrms, The
Stag Hunt,
In addition, there are a number of different
readings available in electronic format on the web. In most cases, these can simply be obtained
by clicking on the reading in the on-line version of this syllabus, which will
direct your browser to a pdf or html version of the
required text.
In the case of both the books and the reserve
readings, the last name(s) of the author(s) constitutes a unique identifier,
except for the two Skyrms books. References in the syllabus will therefore
simply be to these names (plus, in the case of the Skyrms
books, the initials of the book’s title, ESC or TSH). The student is responsible for having read
the assigned material before class, and before discussion section. Lack of preparation will be reflected in your
participation grade, so:
Do the reading!
TOPICS AND
Jan 11, 18, and
23: Background I—The normative problem of political authority
How can someone, or
some group, morally exert coercive
power over one or more other competent adults, forcing them to do something
against their will? We don’t mean just the successful use of force, in the sense that the other person's
behavior is compelled. We want to ask
what legitimates the use of force by
a government to compel adherence to government edicts or laws. This
question is normative, not empirical or descriptive — we want to know what makes
the use of power morally right, not merely what causes a government to use
force or makes force effective in producing obedience.
·
divine
authority either depends on
unverifiable religious claims or it forces us to accept that anyone who
successfully gains political power has political authority.
·
natural
subordination relies on dubious
empirical assumptions about the inequalities among people, and even so cannot
account for political authority over those in the elite.
·
perfectionist
theories of political authority
assume that there can be a group of people who have clear knowledge of what is
good for a community. But even if this were possible, it implies that no
other governments have had any political authority.
·
consent
based theories seem more
plausible, but they need to answer many questions to succeed, such as:
Who needs to consent? What about individuals who don't consent?
What constitutes consent? What are the limits of the authority gained by
this consent?
Jonathan Bennett’s “translation” of Hobbes’
Leviathan, Chapters 1-31
Jonathan Bennetts’s “translation” of Locke’s
Second Treatise, Chapters 1-6
David Hume, Of the
Original Contract and
Of
Passive Obedience
Optional Further
Plato’s Apology, (B. Jowett translation).
Magna Carta (translated
1297 version)
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,
Parts I and II (Chapter 1 to Chapter 31, inclusive)
Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract (CUP, 1986).
Chapters 1-2 (e-reserve)
Jan 25, 30, &
Feb 1: Background II—The empirical problem of how social orders emerge
Philosophers want to
know why we should obey the law.
Social scientists want to know why we do obey
the law (if we do). Social scientists
are more likely to focus on why social and political institutions (like laws)
exist, how they emerge, why they persist, how they differ and why they change.
As Hume argued in “Of the original contract”, institutions don’t emerge by
decision or design. Nor can coercive force alone maintain them. One explanation
which has emerged in recent decades depens on the
notion of ‘spontaneous order.’
Spontaneous order is simply the appearance, with no external direction
or coercion, of ordered processes. F.A.
Hayek’s conception of spontaneous order goes something like this: The theory of spontaneous order is concerned
with those regularities in society, or orders of events, which are neither
- the product of deliberate human
contrivance (such as laws or economic planning) nor
- purely natural phenomena (something like gravity, or the weather,
which exist in complex and apparently orderly forms independent from human
actions).
Spontaneous orders, in this sense, are
conventions, regularities, and social practices arising from human action but which are not the result of
any specific human intention. But we
can’t just assume the existence of spontaneous orders in the
social or economic realm any more than we can assume the moral rightness of political cohesion. That is, one would have to demonstrate that
spontaneous orders really exist, since it is by no means obvious.
Norman Barry, The Tradition of
Spontaneous Order, “Adam
Smith, 1723-1790”
R.A.
Radford, “Economic
Organization of a POW Camp”, Economica
1945.
F. Hayek, “The
Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review, 1945.
Optional Further
A.A.
Alchian, “Uncertainty,
Evolution, and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 1950.
“Philosophy of
Economics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A. Rosenberg. ““Does Evolutionary Theory Give Aid or Comfort to
Economics,” in P. Mirowski, ed. Natural Images in
Economic Thought,
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapters
1-3, 10; Bk
III, Chapter 1; Bk IV, Chapter 2
February 6 and 8:
Background III—Thinking
Strategically-Basics of PDs
Can we model the
moral problem of legitimizing state coercion as a PD? Can we model the obstacle
to spontaneous order as a PD? The
“prisoner’s dilemma,” in its classic form, is always a 2x2 game with the
following properties: (a) There is
exactly one Nash Equilibrium
(b) There is exactly
one Pareto Optimum
(c) The NE and the
There are many other
games that are related, but only 2x2 games with these properties are PDs. Question for
discussion: how wide spread are PDs, as an empirical
matter? Are they simply intellectual
exercises, or do they teach us something about the world?
Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking
Strategically, Introduction, Chapters 1-7
Prisoners Dilemma
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (slightly more technical, and much briefer
than D&N)
Optional Further
February 13 and
15: Can
Cooperation Be A Spontaneous Order?
Hobbes said,
“Covenants, without the sword, are but words.”
Is that true? Or can cooperation
emerge from an anarchic setting? In other
words, can groups of organisms cooperate without external coercion or design?
Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (entire)
Axelrod Tournament Demo
Page (Chris Wood)
(NOTE: You have to choose
your own strategy, and play an nxn tournament. Assignment due Feb 27!! You are graded in part on your competitive
performance…)
K. Binmore, Review of Axelrod’s Complexity of Cooperation
February 20 and
22: Justice and Equality
Two great problems
of political philosophy have always been the question of what justice consists
in, and why I should be just (especially when no one is looking). These are the
two questions that absorbed Plato in The Republic. (Don’t worry; we
won’t make you read it). Instead, let’s consider some classic views: Rousseau’s
(for now) and later Locke’s and Rawls’. It will be evident that though some of
us may endorse Rawls’ view, his conclusions certainly do not serve our
interests. So why honor his claims? Shouldn’t we expect justice to be
rationally defensible? This raises the question of what “rational
defensibility” is. And on the economist or rational choice theorists’
definition of rationality, the answer is simple: acting justly is not rational. But the moral
philosopher has no alternative definition that doesn’t simply beg the
question. Or does he? (note
on question begging).
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality
Demsetz, Harold, "A Theory of
Property Rights," American
Economic Review, May 1967
Hardin, Garrett, “Tragedy
of the Commons”, Science, 1968
February 27 and
March 1: Can Justice be Rational?
Can game theory and
evolutionary theory give us an account of rationality that explains our
conception of justice? Can it also provide an answer to the question, why
should we be just? And even if the
answer is “yes,” is such a contractual understanding reflected in stable social
and psychological processes in human societies?
Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract
Chapters 1-3
March 6:
Review for Midterm
March 8:
In-class Midterm
March 13 and 15: No class, Spring Break!
March 20 and
22: Justice and Property?
Locke treats
property as a natural right. And Hume
seemed to think that justice was exclusively a matter of property rights. It
emerges when
property does, and does no more than govern our actions in regards our own and
others property. How, we want to ask
Locke, can he
be so sure that there are natural frights in property? According to Hume such
rights emerge spontaneously and
suggest
themselves to our self interest. Is there a good argument for this claim?
Hume, A
Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 2, “Of Justice and Injustice,” Sections
1-6 (takes a while to load!)
Locke, Two
Treatises, Book II, Chapters 1-5
(section 1-51)
Smith,
Adam. On Primitive Accumulation, Wealth of Nations, Bk II, Introduction, and Chapters 1-2
Karl
Marx, Wages and Primitive Accumulation Capital, V. 1, Chapter 1 and Chapter
26
Rawls, Theory
of Justice (Chapters 1 and 3) (e-reserve)
March 27 and 29: Natural Rights and Property
Solving the problems
raised for Hume’s theory of Property. Here game theory seems to come to the
rescue. Is it enough to satisfy the social scientist or the moral
philosopher? Is the answer a unified
whole, or is our understanding of property different depending on whether we
are interested in efficiency or morality?
Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, chapter 4
Skyrms, Stag Hunt,
chapters 1-3
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Chapters 1-3
and 7-8) (e-reserve)
April 3 and 5: Markets & Welfare—N-person exchange
games. What are the efficiency
properties of markets where property rights are assumed? What are the welfare properties of markets?
Hildenbrand and Kirman, Equilibrium
Analysis, Chapters 1-2 (e-reserve)
April 10 and 12: Norms
and Passions—Can they solve the problem?
If we could all
simply agree to behave morally, society would be better off. One could argue that moral action is
intrinsically better, but it also follows from the fact that transactions costs
and monitoring / enforcement costs are much lower, enabling many more
welfare-enhancing transactions to take place.
Can we agree to be moral, since it is universally good (but perhaps
individually worse) to be moral? Can we
shape peoples’ preferences, to make them like behaving morally? Is it possible, as Rousseau suggested, to
inscribe the law, not in books, but on men’s hearts?
Garrett
Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 1968, Vol
162: 1243–1248.
Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
Norms,” in Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 14, No. 3, (Summer
2000), 137–158
Robert Frank,
Passions with Reason. (Chapters
1-5, e-reserve)
Martin
Hollis, Trust within Reason.
(Chapters 1-3, e-reserve)
April 17, 19, and
24: Power, Balance of Power, and International
Cooperation
Is there an answer
to the problem of enforcement and moral action at the level of nations, rather
than individuals? Can self-control,
rather than deterrence, be the basis of peace?
Or does self-interest and self-preservation dominate all other
considerations?
Hume, Of the Balance
of Power
James Morrow, Alliances: Why
Write Them Down? Annual Review of
Political Science, Vol. 3. (Jun, 2000), pp. 63-83.
Harrison Wagner,
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Jul,
1986), pp. 546-576.
Duncan Snidal,
“Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes,” American Political Science Review, 79 (4):
923–942 (December 1985).
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the
Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, (January 1978), pp.167–214
Optional Further
Roger
Myerson, On
the Value of Game Theory in Social Science
Rationality and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1. (Jan, 1992),
pp. 62-73.
Robert
Powell, War
as a Commitment Problem International
Organization, forthcoming, 2005.
Robert Powell, Crisis
Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD American Political Science Review,
Vol. 81, No. 3. (Sep, 1987), pp. 717-736.
M.D. Intrilligator and D.L. Brito. Can
Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Mar, 1984), pp.
63-84
April 26: Last
Class—Overview and Wrap-up
Exam for this
class:
|
Saturday,
May 6 |
9:00 AM -
NOON |
A
usage note: the phrase “begs the
question” has a very specific meaning in philosophy. To say that “you are begging the question”
does not mean that what you just said requires some other question be
asked. Instead, it means that your claim
assumes an unargued premise, or is circular. Any misuse of this phrase in this class will
result in immediate public flogging.
Correct
usage: “You can’t say that sweet vermouth is the
embodiment of universal good just because you like it. You are begging the question.”
Incorrect
usage: “Well, sure, once he was there he had to puke
in the flower pot. But that begs the
question, ‘Why did he do all those sweet vermouth shots in the first place?’”