PS 230S
An Introduction to
Positive Political Theory
Spring, 2005: Monday,
Trent Hall, Room 040
John Aldrich Mike Munger
408 Perkins 330 Perkins
660-4346 660-4301
aldrich@duke.edu munger@duke.edu
Introduction: This course is intended to be a first graduate-level introduction to what is known, variously, as positive political theory, formal political theory, or rational choice theory (as applied to politics). The course assumes you are not familiar with either mathematical (or “formal”) theorizing or rational choice theory. Thus, we will begin at the beginning, as it were. In addition, students are assumed to have varying levels of exposure to mathematical and logical analysis, and no particular background is assumed. We will, however, adjust the level and pace of the course to reflect actual background. The course does rest on the assumption that all students are willing to learn mathematical, logical, and formal theoretic reasoning.
Nature
of the Questions Addressed in the Course:
Rational choice accounts of politics are ancient. Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes….all of these
were, in important ways, rational choice theorists. Putting political theory in the forms you
will encounter it, in modern journals, is another matter: the conversation is largely mathematical. It could be said that a social science first
had such a basis in or about the Marshallian
revolution in Economics, about a century ago.
Most of the formal basis of the work we will be considering became clear
and systematic between 1950 and 1965.
Thus, for a half century, roughly speaking, rational choice theory has
been developing its current form.
Conveniently, that is also when the first serious applications to
Political Science occurred. That “early”
work was generally done by economists, or at least those in Economics. Rational choice entered Political Science and
political scientists began to use and to be trained in it in the late 1960s,
mostly through the efforts of William H. Riker as scholar and as founder of the
Ph.D. program at the
This course covers two basic questions. The first is about individual choice: Why, from a choice theoretic approach, do people reason, believe, and choose as they do? The second question concerns the political area in which rational choice theory was first and remains most fully applied: Why does democracy work as it does, given how people reason, believe, and (especially) choose as they are understood to do theoretically? Rational choice theory has been applied to many other problems and areas, but the classic works, questions, and results, are in the field of democratic politics.
The course begins with a section on decision theory (a term being used very broadly), which is the individual choice theory part. In this section, we will cover ordinal and cardinal utility functions, critiques of either or both, alternatives that arise from what is known as “behavioral decision theory,” and applications, especially to the question of turnout to the vote. Subsequent topics will include social choice theory, spatial modeling, and theories of democratic institutional politics (sometimes called the “new institutionalism”). Additional topics will be chosen depending upon your interest.
Syllabus
and
Assignments:
We will have a midterm (25%) and final
(essay, take-home, 40%). This is a
seminar, so participation will also be important (35%). Part of your participation grade will be the
weekly problem sets or literature reviews, which will be assigned starting in
the third week of the class (
Reading List, under
Construction
(Timing tentative and ambitious)
Week 1 Introduction (January 12, because of MLK day…)
Individual Decision, Choice Theories
Week 2: Ordinal Preferences (January 24)
A. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Chaps. 1 and 1* (Blackboard)
H Brady and
Week 3: Cardinal Utility
Luce & Raiffa, handout;
Hinich and Munger, Analytical Politics, Chapters 1-3, 1994
Week 4: Applications to Turnout
Aldrich, (AJPS, 1993) (click-JSTOR)
Riker and Ordeshook (APSR, 1968) (click-JSTOR)
Ferejohn and Fiorina (APSR, 1974) (click-JSTOR)
Hinich and Munger, Chapter 7 (1994)
Palfrey and Rosenthal (APSR, 1985) (click-JSTOR)
Schwartz (Public Choice, 1987) (handout)
Week 5: Optimization and Choice
H. Simon, 1955. “A behavioural
model of rational choice.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 69, 99--118. (click-JSTOR)
H. Simon, “Human
Nature in Politics” (APSR, 1985) (click-JSTOR)
Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk Econometrica, 1979. (click-JSTOR)
Rabin, Bendor and Diermeier
Charness and Rabin
Social Choice Theory
Weeks 6 & 7: Classic Results and Arguments
Sen (Collective Choice Rules) 2 and 2*, Riker, 2 and 3; Sen (Arrow’s Theorem) 3 and 3*, Riker 5
Week 8: Strategy-Proofness:
Gibbard
and Satterhwaite, Riker, 6
McLean, Iain.
2003. “Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s).” British
Journal of Political Science 32:535–558.
Week 9: Spatial
Models
Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Ordeshook, Peter C.; "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model
of the Electoral Process"; American
Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 2; June, 1970; 426-448; (J-stor
click)
Kramer,
McKelvey, Richard, 1986. “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 2. (May, 1986), pp. 283-314. (J-stor click)
Hinich and Munger, Chapters 4 and 6
Week 10: Chaos
Plott, Charles, 1967.
“A
Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under
Majority Rule.” American
Economic Review, 57, 4:
787-806. (J-stor click)
McKelvey, Richard, Peter C. Ordeshook. 1976.
“Symmetric Spatial Games Without
Majority Rule Equilibria.” The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 70, No. 4. (Dec., 1976), pp. 1172-1184.
(J-stor
click)
McKelvey,
Richard. 1976. “intransitivities
in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal
of Economic Theory 12:472–482.
Scofield, Norman. 1978. “Instability of Simple Dynamic
Games.” Review of Economic Studies
45:575–594.
Grofman and Feld, Riker 7
Week 11: Applications of Median Voter/Agenda Control
Black (1948), Romer and Rosenthal (two items), Gerber and Other Applications
Week 12: Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions
Riker, William,
1980. “Implications from the
Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review,
74, 2: 432-446.
(J-stor
click)
Tullock, Gordon. 1981. “Why So Much Stability?” Public Choice. 37(2):189-202. (e-reserve click)
Shepsle, K. A., and B. Weingast, 1981. “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” Public Choice. (e-reserve click)
Shepsle, K.A.
1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting
Models” American Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 23, No. 1. (Feb., 1979), pp. 27-59. (J-stor
click).
Diermeier and Krehbiel
Hinich and Munger, Chapter 8
Week 13: Parties and Interest Groups
J Aldrich, “A Downsian Spatial Model With Party Activism,” American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 974-990
J Aldrich and M McGinnis, “A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 12 (1989): 437-450.
R. Barro, “The Control of Politicians,” Public Choice, (1973).
A. Denzau, & M. Munger. Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented. APSR, (1986).
R. Hall and F. Wayman.
“Buying Time: Moneyed Interests & Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.” APSR, (1990).
Week 14: “Induced” Public Sector Preferences
Barr, James L. and
Denzau, A. and R. Parks, 1977, A problem with public sector preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, 14, 454-457. (e-reserve click)
Denzau, A. and R. Parks, 1979, Deriving public sector preferences, Journal of Public Economics, 11, 335-352. (e-reserve click)
Hinich and Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice, Chapter 2
Slutsky, S., 1977, A voting model for the allocation of public goods: existence of an equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory, 14, 299-325. (e-reserve click)