Spring 2004
Tuesday evenings, 7-9:30 pm Allen
Building, Rm 306
Michael C. Munger munger@acpub.duke.edu
Office: Perkins Library, Room 330 office
phone: 660-4301
Office
Hours:
INTRODUCTION
This is a formal theory course. That is, the epistemological basis of much of
what we will do is formal, analytical, and deductive. I make no claim that this approach is best, but
this is the approach we will take in the course.
You will notice that there are relatively few
readings in the class. The readings are
difficult, and will require hours to master.
The language barrier posed by the mathematics is, for many people,
formidable. I fully expect that everyone
will have read, and understood, every reading for each class before that class
actually meets. Failure to do so will be
reflected in the final grade. If you are
taking the course, you are agreeing to this arrangement.
ASSIGNMENTS
Discussion
Leader (40% of final grade): For every week, one student will be charged
with leading discussion, and will prepare an outline of discussion along with
major questions. Every Monday, by
The outline should address, among any other
goals the leader(s) wants to accomplish, the following:
(a) Identify the crux of the critical
question(s) expressed in the current week's readings,
(b) Present a summary of the theoretical
perspective, and technique employed by the authors, with a critique of
the appropriateness of that theory for the question. What other approaches might have been
better?
(c) Summarize the findings of the week’s
research, and identify links with other literatures. What are the main researchable questions
still to be answered, and what directions should scholars just coming into this
field take?
A
note on topic selection: each student
will present at least two, and possibly three, topics, depending on the number
of people in the class. The selection
process will work as follows--
1. Each student will have 100 “points”
2. You may cast your vote points on as many, or
as few, topics as you like. If you
really want one particular topic, put all 100 points on it. If you like four topics equally, cast 25
votes on each, and so on.
3. Votes will be taken and tabulated immediately
after the first class. Conflicts
(scarcity) will be resolved by adding the intense demander(s) to the topic,
providing all topics are covered.
One-page
papers (30% of final grade): Every week, following the presentation, each
student who was not a discussion
leader should critique the substance of the presentation, giving suggestions
for alternative perspectives or explanations, or identifying links to the
literature that the discussion leader(s) missed. These papers should be no more than five
pages long (they can be, and most often will be, shorter!), and should be
emailed to the instructor no later than Friday of every week. These essays will be graded, and then passed on
to the discussion leader(s) for their information and future use in developing
their research program.
Final
Exam (30% of final grade):
Your final project for the semester will be a take-home final exam,
where the questions will address significant points in closed book format.
Reading List
(In order of
topics covered, alphabetical within topic)
1. Introduction:
Parties and Institutions
(Discussion Leader—Munger)
J. Aldrich, Why Parties?,
Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast. 1994. “Positive
Theories of Congressional Institutions,” Kenneth A. Shepsle;
Barry R. Weingast Legislative
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2. (May, 1994), pp. 149-179. (J-stor
click)
2. Deriving Public Sector Preferences: The Representation Problem
(2 weeks) (Discussion
Leader—Munger)
Barr, James L. and
Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Ordeshook, Peter C.; "An Expository Development of a
Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process"; American Political
Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 2; June, 1970; 426-448; (J-stor
click)
Denzau, A. and R. Parks, 1977, A problem
with public sector preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, 14, 454-457. (e-reserve
click)
Denzau, A. and R. Parks, 1979, Deriving
public sector preferences, Journal of Public Economics, 11, 335-352. (e-reserve
click)
M. Hinich and M. Munger, Ideology
and the Theory of Political Choice, U of
M. Hinich and M. Munger, Analytical Politics 1997, U of
Milyo, Jeffrey. 2000.
“Logical Deficiencies of Spatial
Models: A Constructive Critique”, Public Choice, 105(3\4): 273-289. (e-journal click, go to “journal contents”)
Slutsky, S., 1977, A voting model
for the allocation of public goods:
existence of an equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory, 14,
299-325. (e-reserve
click)
3. Chaos
(Discussion Leader—TBA)
Plott, Charles, 1967.
“A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule.” American
Economic Review, 57, 4: 787-806.
(J-stor
click)
McKelvey, Richard, Peter C.
Ordeshook. 1976. “Symmetric
Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 4.
(Dec., 1976), pp. 1172-1184. (J-stor
click)
Schofield,
McKelvey, Richard, 1986. “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice.” American
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 2. (May, 1986), pp.
283-314. (J-stor
click)
4. Structure Induced Equilibrium
(Discussion Leader—TBA)
Riker,
William, 1980. “Implications from the
Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political
Science Review, 74, 2: 432-446.
(J-stor
click)
Tullock, Gordon. 1981.
“Why So Much Stability?” Public Choice. 37(2):189-202. (e-reserve click)
Shepsle, K. A., and B. Weingast,
1981. “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,”
Public Choice. (e-reserve click)
Shepsle, K.A. 1979.
“Institutional Arrangements and
Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models” American
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Feb., 1979), pp.
27-59. (J-stor
click)
Hinich, Melvin, and Michael Munger. 1997. Analytical Politics.
5. Committees as Decision-Making Bodies
(Discussion Leader TBA)
Arthur T. Denzau; Robert J.
Mackay, “Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power
of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 4.
(Nov., 1983), pp. 740-761. (J-stor
click)
Charles R. Plott; Michael E.
Levine. 1978. “A
Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions.” American
Economic Review, 68, 1:
146-160. (J-stor click)
Morris P. Fiorina; Charles R.
Plott 1978. “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study.” American
Political Science Review, 72: 575-598. (J-stor
click)
Peter C. Ordeshook; Thomas R.
Palfrey 1988. “Agendas,
Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information.” American Journal of Political Science,
32: 441-466.
(J-stor
click)
T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel. “Organization of
Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature.” AJPS, (1990).
(J-stor click)
6. Committees as Assets to Members
(Discussion Leader TBA)
Shepsle, Kenneth, and David W. Rohde. 1973. "Democratic Committee Assignments in the
House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process,"American Political Science Review 67:
889-905. (J-stor
click)
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1975. "Congressional Committee
Assignments: An OptimizationModel with Institutional
Constraints," Public Choice
Michael C. Munger. 1988.
“Allocation of Desirable
Committee Assignments: Extended Queues versus Committee Expansion.” American Journal of Political Science,
32: 317-344. (J-stor
click)
Charles Stewart III. 1992. “Committee
Hierarchies in the Modernizing House, 1875-1947.” American
Journal of Political Science, 36:
835-856. (J-stor
click)
Tim Groseclose; Charles Stewart
III. 1998. “The
Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-91.” American Journal of Political Science, 42: 453-474.
(J-stor
click)
Charles Stewart, III; Tim
Groseclose. 1999. “The Value of Committee Seats in the United States Senate, 1947-91.” American
Journal of Political Science, 43: 963-973. (J-stor
click)
7. Strategic Voting
Peter H. Aranson; Melvin J.
Hinich; Peter C. Ordeshook “Election Goals and Strategies: Equivalent and
Nonequivalent Candidate Objectives”
The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Mar., 1974), pp. 135-152. (click
J-stor)
Enelow,James. 1981. "Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected
Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting."Journal
of Politics 43 (4): 1062-89.
Denzau, Arthur; William Riker;
Kenneth Shepsle. “Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting
and Home Style.” American Political Science Review,
Vol. 79, No. 4. (Dec., 1985), pp. 1117-1134.
(J-stor
click)
Jenkins,
Jeffery A. & Munger, Michael C. (2003) Investigating the Incidence of Killer
Amendments in Congress. Journal of Politics 65 (2), 498-517.
Melvin J. Hinich; John O.
Ledyard; Peter C. Ordeshook “ A Theory
of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games.” Journal
of Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1. (Feb., 1973), pp. 154-193. (J-stor
click)
Wilkerson, John
D. 1999.
"Killer" Amendments in Congress. American
Political Science Review,
8. Parties
John Aldrich, “A Spatial Model With Party
Activists: Implications for Electoral Dynamics,” Public Choice 41 (1983): 63-100
John Aldrich, “A Downsian Spatial Model With Party Activism,” American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 974-990
John Aldrich and Michael
McGinnis, “A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 12 (1989): 437-450
John Aldrich, “A Model of a Legislature With
Two Parties and a Committee System,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 19 (1994): 313-339
R. Forgette and B. Sala, 1999. “Conditional Party Government and Member
Turnout on Senate Recorded Votes, 1873-1935.” American
Journal of Political Science.
Ordeshook,
Peter. 1970. Extensions to a Model of the Electoral
Process and Implications for the Theory of Responsible Parties Midwest
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Feb., 1970), pp.
43-70. (J-stor
click)