INTRODUCTION

The reading assignments in this class serve three purposes.  One purpose is to establish the foundation of contemporary study of the American legislative assembly in the classic writings from the postwar period through the late 1970s. Obviously, many of the debates structuring contemporary research on  Congress were shaped by these writings.  And many of the principal analytic methods had their first uses in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  Contemporary research still reaps insights from the great works of this `classic' period.  Readings of this type are identified by italics, and are required reading for all students in every class.

The second purpose is to help train graduate students in the major research questions which are now generating publications and discussion among the Congress community.   Some works have redirected thinking of scholars, or created a new area of research.  Readings of this type are identified in bold, and are required reading for all students in every class.

The third type of reading is a paper or book that explores an existing topic in depth, advancing an on-going research agenda.  An important emphasis of every class will be the identification, and elaboration as time allows, of researchable questions and possible dissertation topics, and a deep understanding of the literature is a requirement for effective research.  Readings of this type are identified by “normal” (Roman) type, and are required only for the discussion leader(s) for that week.

ASSIGNMENTS

Discussion Leader (40% of final grade):  Topics are identified with an estimate of the depth, breadth, and difficulty of the assignment for that week.  For every topic, one or more students will be charged with leading discussion, and will prepare an outline of discussion along with major questions.  All students should read the italicized, and bolded, readings, but the discussion leader(s) should also prepare the Roman type readings for presentation to the classs.  Every Monday, by 12 noon, the discussion leaders for that week must distribute electronic copies of the discussion outline and questions to the class list (which will be provided to you).  All students are expected to study the outline and questions, and prepare answers.

The outline should address, among any other goals the leader(s) wants to accomplish, the following:
(a) Identify the crux of the critical question(s) expressed in the current week's readings,
(b) Present a summary of the data and methods employed by the authors, with a critique of appropriateness of the methods used.  What other methods might have been better?
(c) Summarize the findings of the week’s research, and identify links with other literatures.  What are the main researchable questions still to be answered, and what directions should scholars just coming into this field take?

A note on topic selection:  each student will present at least two, and possibly three, topics, depending on the number of people in the class.  The selection process will work as follows--

• 1.  Each student will have 100 “points”
• 2.  You may cast your vote points on as many, or as few, topics as you like.  If you really want one particular topic, put all 100 points on it.  If you like four topics equally, cast 25 votes on each, and so on.
• 3.  Votes will be taken and tabulated immediately after the first class.  Conflicts (scarcity) will be resolved by adding the intense demander(s) to the topic, providing all topics are covered by no less than the number of people indicated.

Five-page papers (30% of final grade):  Every week, following the presentation, each student who was not a discussion leader should critique the substance of the presentation, giving suggestions for alternative perspectives or explanations, or identifying links to the literature that the discussion leader(s) missed.  These papers should be no more than five pages long (they can be, and most often will be, shorter!), and should be emailed to the instructor no later than Friday of every week.  These essays will be graded, and then passed on to the discussion leader(s) for their information and future use in developing their research program.

Final Exam (30% of final grade):  Your final project for the semester will be a take-home final exam, where the questions will be drawn from recent prelims.
 
 

1.  Introduction:  Parties and Institutions (One Person)

J.  Aldrich, Why Parties?
D.  Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action
S. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule : Partisanship and the Development of Congress
M. Collie, “Universalism & the Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921-1980.”  AJPS, (1988).
M. Collie, “Electoral Patterns and Voting Alignments In the U.S. House, 1886-1986.”  LSQ, (1989).
J. Cooper and D. Brady.  “Institutional Context and Leadership Style:  The House from Cannon to Rayburn.”  APSR, 1981.
N.  Polsby (et al.), “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House Representatives,” APSR, (1968):  144-168;
J.  Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office
 

2.  Spatial Theory (Refresher presented by Munger)

M.  Hinich and M.  Munger, Analytical Politics
(Note:  this book is neither classic nor influential, but it is required reading of all students!)
 

3.  Electoral Politics (Three People)

J. Campbell, The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections.
K. Collier and M. Munger, "Comparing Reelection Rates in the House and Senate.”  Public Choice. 78(1994): 145-154.
P. Converse, “The Concept of a Normal Vote.”  In Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, eds., Elections and the Political
    Order.  1966 (Wiley).
J. Cooper, D. Brady, and P. Hurley.  “The Electoral Basis of Party Voting.”  In L. Maisel and J. Cooper, eds., The Impact of
    the Electoral Process, 1977 (Sage).
G. Cox and M. Munger, "Contributions, Expenditure, Turnout:  The 1982 U.S. House Elections." APSR, (1989).
R.  Fenno, Home Style:  House Members in Their Districts
R. Fenno, “Home Style Revisited,” Typescript.
M. Fiorina, “The Case of the Vanishing Marginals:  The Bureaucracy Did It.”  APSR, 77:  177-181.
D. Green and J. Krasno, “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent,” AJPS, (1988).
D. Hart and M. Munger, "Declining Electoral Competitiveness in the House of Representatives:  the Differential Impact of
    Improved Transportation Technology." Public Choice 61: 217-231. (1989).
G. Jacobson, “The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-82,” AJPS, (1987).
G. Jacobson, “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986,” APSR, (1989).
M. MacKuen, R. Erikson, and J. Stimson, “Macropartisanship.”  APSR, (1989).
T. Mann and R. Wolfinger, “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections,” APSR, 1980.
D.  Mayhew, Congress:  The Electoral Connection
A. Miller, “Normal Vote Analysis:  Sensitivity to Change Over Time.”  AJPS, (1979).
W. Miller and D. Stokes.  “Constituency Influence in Congress.” APSR, (1963).
J. Mondak.  “Competence, Integrity, & the Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents.”  JoP (1995).
C. Mouw and M. Mackuen, “The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics,” APSR, (1992).
B. Page, R. Shapiro, P. Gronke, and R. Rosenberg.  “Constituency, Party, and Representation in Congress.”  POQ, (1984).
 

4.  Careers (One person)

C. Bullock.  “House Careerists:  Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition.”  APSR, 1972.
D. Coates and M. Munger.  "Win, Lose, or Withdraw:  A Categorical Analysis of Career Patterns in the House of Representatives, 1948-1978" Public Choice 83:  91-115.
T. Groseclose and K. Krehbiel.  “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks and Strategic Retirements from the 102nd House.”  AJPS.  (1994).
J. Hibbing, “Contours of the Modern Congressional Career.” APSR, 1991.
D.R. Kiewiet and L. Zeng.  “An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 1947-1986.” APSR, (1993).
D. Matthews, “Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers.”  In Loewenberg, Patterson, and Jewell, Handbook of Legislative Research.  Harvard Press, 1985.
D. Rohde.  “Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition,” AJPS, 1979.
 

5.  Voting on Legislation (Two people)

W. Bianco, D. Spence, & J. Wilkerson.  “The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress,” AJPS, (1996).
M. Collie, “Voting Behavior in Legislatures.” In Loewenberg, Patterson, and Jewell, Handbook of Legislative Research.
    Harvard Press, 1985.
C. Covington, J.M. Wrighton, and R. Kinney. “A ‘Presidency-Augmented’ Model of Presidential Success on House Roll
    Call Votes.  AJPS, (1995).
J. Jenkins and M. Munger, “Two Killer Amendments in 1872: Failures of Expectations, or Failures of Trust?”  Typescript.
J.   Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions
L. Richardson and M. Munger, "Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior:  Voting on the 1983 Amendments
    to the Social Security Act," Public Choice 67(1991):  11-34.
K. Poole and T. Romer, “Ideology, ‘Shirking’, and Representation.” Public Choice 77(1993): 185-196.
H.  Weisberg.  “Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Behavior,” AJPS, 1979
J. Wilkerson.  “‘Killer’  Amendments in Congress.” APSR.  (1999).
 

6.  Institutions and Equilibrium (Three people)

D. Baron, “A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization.” LSQ, 1994.
J.  Buchanan and G.  Tullock, Calculus of Consent
T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel.  “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature.”  AJPS, (1990).
R. Hall and B. Grofman.  “The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias.”
     APSR.  (1990).
K.  Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization. (1991).
K. Krehbiel, “Are Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?”  APSR, (1990).
N.  Polsby, M. Gallaher, and B. Rundquist, “The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives,”
    APSR (1969):  787-807
K. Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” AJPS (1979).
K. Shepsle and B. Weingast, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” Public Choice (1981).
B. Weingast and W. Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress,” JPE, (1988).
 

7.  The Committee System (Two People)

J. Cooper, The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Origins of the Modern House
R.  Fenno, Congressmen in Committees
T. Groseclose and C. Stewart.  “The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-1991.”  AJPS, (1998).
D. King.  Turf Wars:  How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction.
M. Munger, “Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments:  Extended Queues vs. Committee Expansion,” AJPS, (1988).
D. Rohde and K. Shepsle, “Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives.”  APSR, (1977).
K. Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle
S.  Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress, 2nd ed.
C. Stewart and T. Groseclose.  “The Value of Committee Seats in the United States Senate, 1947-1991.”  AJPS, (1999).
 

8.  Organizing Principles: Parties and Ideologies (Three People)

J. Aldrich and M. McGinniss, "A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions," Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 1989.
J. Aldrich and D. Rohde, “Theories of Party in the Legislature and the Transition to Republican Rule in the House,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 4, Winter, 1997-98.
J. Aldrich and D. Rohde, “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House:  Theory and Evidence on Conditional
    Party Government,” Typescript.
G. Cox and M. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan
G. Cox and M. McCubbins, “Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties:  Party Government in the House.”
     LSQ, 19 (1994):  215-233.
W. Dougan and M. Munger, “The Rationality of Ideology.”  JLE, (1989).
A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 1958.
R. Forgette and B. Sala, “Conditional Party Government and Member Turnout on Senate Recorded Votes, 1873-1935.”
    AJPS, (1999).
M. Hinich and M. Munger,  Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice, U of Michigan Press, (1994), Chapters 1 & 4.
D.  Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House (1991)
 

9.  $$$ & Policy:  Inferences on Influence & Institutions (Two people)

D. Austen-Smith and J. Wright, “Counteractive Lobbying,” AJPS, (1994).
R. Barro, “The Control of Politicians,” Public Choice, (1973).
G. Cox & E. Magar.  “How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?”  APSR 93(1999): 299-308.
A. Denzau, & M. Munger. Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized  Interests Get Represented.   APSR, (1986).
K. Grier & M. Munger. "Corporate, Labor, and Trade Association Contributions to the U.S. House and Senate,1978-1986,"
    JoP, (1993).
M. Hojnacki & D. Kimball. “Organized Interests & the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress.”  APSR, (1988).
R. Hall and F. Wayman.  “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests & Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.” APSR, (1990).
J. Milyo.  1997.  “Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power.”  JLE, (1997).
M. Munger, “Pangloss was Right:  Reforming Congress is Useless, Too Expensive, or Harmful,” Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, 9(1998).
T. Romer and J. Snyder.  “An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions.”  AJPS 38 (1994):  745-769.
 

10.  Issues and Dynamics (One person)
E.  Carmines and J.  Stimson, Issue Evolution:  Race and the Transformation of American Politics
K. Poole, and H. Rosenthal,  Congress:  A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.
 

11.  Oversight of the Executive (Two people)
R. Calvert, M. McCubbins, and B. Weingast, “A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion,” AJPS, (1989).
J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan.  “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy.” JLEO, (1990).
A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, “Designing Bureaucratic Accountability.” Law & Contemp. Problems, (1994).
A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, “Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making.”  LSQ, (1994).
M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked:  Police Patrols v. Fire Alarms.” AJPS: 28 (1984):  165-179.
M.  McCubbins, R.  Noll, and B.  Weingast. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.”  JLEO
T. Moe, “Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy:  An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance.”
    LSQ, (1987).
I. Morris and M. Munger.  “First Branch, or Root?” Public Choice, 96 (1998): 363-380.
M. Munger and B. Roberts.  "Political and Economic Control of the Federal Reserve:  A Review of the Literature," in
      Thomas Mayer (ed.), The Political Economy of Monetary Policy, Cambridge University Press.  (1990).
W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government.

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