Moo-Young Han
Editor-in-Chief
KASTN/IEKAS
Professor of Physics
Duke University
myhan@phy.duke.edu
The HANUL project, an ambitious Korean high-energy physics project to catch and analyze neutrinos, the illusive ghost of one of the earliest elementary particles of the universe, was axed in June 1999, exactly 18 months after its launching. Its demise did not come to light, however, until it was first reported worldwide by KASTN in November 1999. Since then, the whole affair was covered by SCIENCE magazine (December 1999) and PHYSICS TODAY (scheduled for publication in February 2000), as well as by further articles in the pages of KASTN.
Ever since the story broke, I have had several running communications with some of the major participants; they include Professor Jewan Kim [J W Kim] of Seoul National University [SNU], Professor Chungwook Kim [C W Kim] of Johns Hopkins University and the Korea Institute of Advanced Study [KIAS], Professor Wonyong Lee [W Y Lee] of Columbia University, and Mr. Jong-Hyun Rhiee of Korea Science and Engineering Foundation [KOSEF].
Some further details of the affair became available and while far from being a sufficiently complete documentation they do provide enough outlines of the events that can constitute a meaningful timeline. What follows is just that, a timeline of events and people involved in the 18-month saga of what it never was, the "coming out" party for the elementary particle physics of Korea.
SUMMER AND FALL OF 1997
The project was conceived and proposed by W Y Lee of Columbia. It gained momentum as J W Kim of SNU got on board. J W Kim wrote [KASTN 99-47, 11/29/99]:
"There were much debate as to whether one can effectively discriminate muon flux coming down from the sky, but Won Yong convinced me that he could do this..//..Once you are convinced, you would help out whatever you could to realize it. That is why I was ALL OUT TO PERSUADE funding agencies in Korea."
Another source adds: As far as the funding is concerned, the credit goes almost entirely to J W Kim who was at that time very familiar with the KOSEF. The idea was that of W Y Lee. W Y Lee, J W Kim and C W Kim tried to persuade Korean physicists to join the project.
Although, technically speaking, the project was funded at the recommendation of a committee, an in-house committee of KOSEF, it is clear from available data that KOSEF made the decision to fund the HANUL project based largely on the lobbying by a handful of individuals who are the proponents of the proposed project - W Y Lee, J W Kim and C W Kim.
This is the first mistake that KOSEF committed. A proposal of this magnitude, for Korea, should have proceeded on more established way of doing things - form a blue-ribbon panel of experts from both within Korea and its high-energy experts and from the pool of international experts. Apparently the project was approved without a critical panel review by outside experts.
In a smaller scale, this is not all that different from the government-business collusion that contributed to the eventual deterioration of the Korean economy. A bank loan is approved without the benefit of a careful credit/risk analysis, but by the strings pulled by a handful of government officials.
DECEMBER 1997
The project that was foreseen to have eventually cost about US$ 10 - 15 million was officially launched on December 15, 1997 with an initial grant of US$260,000 for the first two years to build and test a prototype.
FEBRUARY 1998
The HANUL project gains a worldwide attention as an article, written by Dennis Normile, appears - a full-page spread - in the February 6, 1998 issue of SCIENCE magazine.
JUNE 1998
Barely 6 months after the launching, an extremely troubling sign breaks out in the open. Professor Haeshim Lee, an astrophysicist trained at U Penn, circulates a 3-page letter not only to all participants of the project but also to many physicists not directly involved with the project as well as to government officials. Titled, "I impeach Wonyong Lee and Chungwook Kim," the letter brings forth not only his scientific criticism, but, more to the point, deeply hurtful personal criticisms. The letter, widely distributed in Korea, reaches the desk of KASTN. Although we have translated the letter, we decided not to publish it.
This is the occasion in which KOSEF commits its second blunder. It should have been abundantly clear that there was cancer growing among the participants and that there was no way the project could ever make progress under the setup it was operating under.
Just as the Kim Young-sam administration displayed its worst ineptitude when it dragged out the Hanbo steel bankruptcy - the first and one of the largest collapse in the history of Korea - for a full year, before finally the financial meltdown of Korea occurred in November of 1997, KOSEF should have seen from the Haeshim Lee's letter that the project was already a lost cause. KOSEF would drag it out for another year, from June of 1998 till June of 1999; either the personal makeup of the team should have been completely changed for the survival of the project or, if that could not be arranged, the project should have been axed right then and there.
JULY 1998
At a meeting of the participants and KOSEF on July 4, 1998, KOSEF reiterates its intention to support the HANUL project by recognizing the importance and far-reaching effect of HANUL over Korean Science and Technology community.
OCTOBER 1998
Things go beyond the point of no return. At a meeting held at Kyoungsang University, with all HANUL committee members and KOSEF in attendance, Professor Song, the Principal Investigator of the HANUL project, proposes himself a final vote to terminate the project. However, some committee members suggest to postpone the final decision by having enough time to dissolve current problems, and KOSEF agrees on the proposal.
A politically expedient decision perhaps, but this is the third time KOSEF blunders. Remember Hanbo and Kim Young-sam?
APRIL 1999
Professor Haeshim Lee quits the project altogether. Other group leaders also express their intention not to continue, as long as Professor Song remains the Principal Investigator. Disintegration begins.
JUNE 1999
A full one year after the first sign of deep-seated problems showed up, KOSEF finally cut off funding for the project. To this date, a full accounting of the fund expended has not been given. C W Kim wrote (KASTN 99-47, 11/29/99):
"I would like to see a public accounting of how the funds for the HANUL project have been expended to date. I would appreciate your [President of the Korean Physical Society] assistance in seeing to it that the a full public accounting of the funds be made."
EPILOGUE
The termination of the project came to light when it was mentioned in a letter by Hashim Lee published in the September 1999 issue of PHYSICS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY, a publication of the Korean Physical Society [in Korean; the published letter is a sanitized version of his LETTER OF IMPEACHMENT of June 1998]. The published letter is translated into English and carried in KASTN 99-45, 11/20/99. The demise of the project has since been reported by Michael Baker in December 3, 1999 issue of SCIENCE magazine and a similar report by Toni Feder is scheduled to appear in February 2000 issue of PHYSICS TODAY.
It is hoped that this whole episode will provide lessons not only to the community of Korean physicists but, more to the point, to Korean organizations such as KOSEF how not to launch and manage a large science project in this age of global communication and international transparency.