

**THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF CIVIL SOCIETY:  
PRACTICAL ROOTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY**

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## DISSERTATION PROPOSAL ABSTRACT

This dissertation pursues a theoretical synthesis between the theories of political economy and political culture, between the institutionalism of Shepsle, Weingast, North, and Riker, emphasizing the importance of the political institutions of the state, and the sociological school of Tocqueville, Dahl and Putnam, focusing on the norms held by members of society, particularly as a result of local civic associations. The compromise seeks an understanding of the institutional structure of civil society. A focus on civil society reveals faults in blindly statist understandings of political science, while institutionalist analysis disaggregates the black box of civic engagement.

In terms of methodology, the research question involves the “effects of causes”: what effects on national-level political behavior result from variation in the decision rules, decentralization strategies and deliberative practices adopted by voluntary associations? I will impute contextual information gathered about associational institutions to survey respondents and follow up this analysis with participant observation of selected associations. Tested hypotheses include the expectation that increased formalization of constitutional arrangements in associations will produce political efficacy and government trust in members of these associations, and that democratic practice at the associational level will produce support for and understanding of democratic practice at the national level.

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# THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF CIVIL SOCIETY: PRACTICAL ROOTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

## Introduction and Overview

### *The Little League tutors adults in democracy*

The Little League children's baseball organization is a profoundly democratic voluntary association, in which local parent members elect league presidents, who in turn elect district administrators, who in turn elect regional representatives to the international Board of Directors. The Little League trumpets its democratic form of organization on its web site: "This democratic process is designed to provide both enthusiastic participation and equitable representation from the local to the global level in the administration of the Little League program."<sup>1</sup> Of 1,534 respondents to the post-election 1996 American National Election Study, at least 44 (2.9%) mentioned involvement with the Little League (although some may be referring to other organizations with a similar function). In comparison, 47 (3.1%) mentioned participatory involvement with either major political party. The Little League's philosophy of governance has a relatively substantial opportunity to influence the public's attitudes toward democratic practice.

The Little League contrasts markedly with the modal form of organization among large voluntary associations and non-profit organizations in the United States, which have shifted away from a political base in grass-roots membership and toward the

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<sup>1</sup>[www.littleleague.org/divisions/index.htm](http://www.littleleague.org/divisions/index.htm) (last viewed March 4, 2002)

professionalized model encouraged by dependence on mail-order donations and the regulatory demands of the 501(c)(3) tax code (Dobkin Hall 1992:91). Meanwhile, grass-roots participation in voluntary associations as a proportion of the population has apparently dropped precipitously (Putnam 1995a, 1995b, 2000).

### *The research question*

The Little League's claims, along with the presumably broad institutional diversity of American voluntary associations, raise two very practical questions: First, can the implementation of democratic associational institutions in fact increase "enthusiastic participation" *within* such associations, enhancing their ability to achieve goals of public service, policy influence or mutual benefit? Second, do citizens involved with differing forms of associational governance differ significantly in their political attitudes and behavior in the governmental sphere? Can some associations, by their institutional form alone, acculturate members who are relatively more sophisticated in their approach to politics, more efficacious in their perception of self and government, and more supportive of democratic forms of government?

This project has a single major theoretical goal: to integrate the insights of literature on constitutional design and democratic institutions with the increasing recognition of the importance of civil society and voluntary associations. Much theoretical and philosophical literature—John Rawls' *Political Liberalism*, as a prominent example—has founded the stability of the national democratic polity on a process of practical education in democratic values. This belief in "practice makes perfect" has

some empirical foundation, as Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999) show in a study of the 1996 U.S. presidential election. The election acts partly as a “ritual of solidarity,” in the terms of Emile Durkheim (1915/1976), that has a net positive influence on trust in government and in one’s fellow citizens. But exposure to practice in national political institutions is just a small slice of the whole political-participation pie. The average citizen’s frequency of interaction with government in general is relatively low. By contrast, citizens who are members of associations engage in politics constantly. The central thesis is that the rules and institutions structuring the political environment of civil associations are potentially powerful determinants of attitudes and behaviors in the national political arena. Scholarship has demonstrated the influence of membership in civic associations, but has largely neglected, except in speculation and anecdote, to open the black box of civic engagement and look at its constituent institutional parts. I propose to collect data that will allow a rich analysis of the connections between institutionalized political practice in civil society and the nation-state.

### *Defining politics*

Situating this research within the discipline of political science requires some definition of terms; *politics* must be broadly defined. Politics encompass, simply, *any process of collective human decision-making*. I advance this definition partly in recognition of the analytical utility of the game-theoretic archetypes of political economy, which demonstrate the practical universality of the problems of collective choice. Whether choosing a restaurant, choosing a volunteer director or choosing a U.S. president,

people face similar “economic” dilemmas which may be solved by similar *political* rules and institutions. Some of these rules are relatively informal and simply “polite”, others formal and compulsory, but all are part of a common set of standards about acceptable behavior toward other human beings in political (collective decision-making) settings.

My proposed definition rejects the reliance on coercion in many narrower definitions of politics, particularly the categories of Max Weber (1978: 37ff). Weber defined *political* strictly in terms nation-states, “authoritarian associations” with a territorial monopoly secured by force; the definition is overly narrow, and more appropriate to the term *governmental*. As game theory demonstrates, persons who wish to cooperate in a wholly voluntary manner still face problems of coordination, problems which can be resolved through some form of constitutional design and organized arbitration or deliberation. Indeed, a chief virtue of democratic politics is that participants implicitly declare themselves to be honor-bound to comply with decisions made under the mutually agreed rules *without* any need for direct coercion, whether implicit or explicit. Citizens “coerce themselves” to comply with the decisions reached by elections and legislation. Such decisions are “authoritative allocations of value” (Easton’s 1953 definition of politics) only in the sense that the rules make the decision itself authoritative – not *necessarily* meaning that any individual or subgroup of individuals holds any specific authority. To deny that this everyday process is political is nonsensical; it is non-governmental, yes, but not apolitical.

The limitations on access to coercion in a civil society accentuate the political nature of interaction between people – of necessity, decisions are based on rules and

persuasion, and they become more collective and less unilateral. The use of political solutions in civil society as substitutes for coercive governmental measures are the very essence of a society's potential for *self-government*. This observation is not intended to demonize government in a knee-jerk, neo-conservative fashion. But it is a profoundly healthy sign for a society when government agencies emulate the non-coercive politics of civil society, becoming in their essence and function a part of civil society. Self-government is self-coercion, when authority is transmitted from group to group and person to person by persuasive reference to mutually-held principles of collective choice and collective action.

Thus, politics are ubiquitous, in keeping with the word's Greek roots and its common usage; for example, a dictionary includes this definition of politics:

**5 a:** the total complex of relations between people living in society **b:** relations or conduct in a particular area of experience especially as seen or dealt with from a political point of view <office politics>" (Merriam-Webster 2000)

The ubiquity of politics does not imply that they are too broad to distinguish and therefore meaningless; much political activity – including much of national governmental politics! – is trivial when compared with other economic and cultural factors and therefore worthy of our ignorance. But the recognition that politics happen everywhere facilitates a better theoretical linkage between citizens, civil society, and the state.

### *The importance of institutions within civil society*

Recalling the metaphor in de Tocqueville's characterization of political associations as "great free schools" of the "general theory of association" (1835-1840/1969: 522), my central thesis can be restated as follows: the rules and institutions guiding everyday decision-making practices in the non-governmental settings of civil society are influential "educators" in political values and behaviors, especially democratic values and behaviors. It is by learning *self-government* in civil settings that citizens learn to appreciate the value and utility of democratic government at the national level. The corollary of this thesis, extending Tocqueville, is that associations have widely varying institutional designs, some of which fail in their tutorial duties. In order for citizen-students to learn democracy, the associational "classroom" must teach it. As Douglass North has persuasively argued (North 1990), institutions with inefficient, even pathological characteristics can and do survive; reference to the Ku Klux Klan, an "uncivil" voluntary association, suffices to illustrate this (Hefner 1998: 36).

As Hefner notes (1998: 37), critiquing Putnam (1993), the relationship between associational structure and cultural civility is neither simple nor direct. "Horizontal," egalitarian organizations can still produce intolerant authoritarianism, while "vertical," hierarchical organizations can produce great civility and efficacy. My approach allows for this complexity; I argue that both vertical and horizontal organizations benefit from formal, transparent constitutionality of organization. I expect to find that specific design choices within at the associational level produce pronounced differences in the attitudes and behaviors of citizens both within their associations and at the level of the

national polity. The more it happens that everyday organizations make decisions governed by equitable rules, rather than by coercion or ascriptive authority, the more likely it is that their members accept the renunciation of coercion and the authority of democratic rules in associational and national politics.

The study will pursue empirical evidence of the impact of constitutional choices in voluntary associations on attitudes and behaviors in both the associational and the national political arenas, including political efficacy, “regime support” for democracy, voter turnout and campaign involvement (see Carlson 1999 for operationalizations of these concepts). While many previous studies have engaged the question of the effects of associational *membership*, none, to my knowledge, have examined the institutional design conditions under which such memberships are most conducive to “democratic learning.” Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) are notable for establishing the role that business and voluntary involvement plays in creating “civic skills,” such as public speaking and group organizing. But their data provides little or no resolution to distinguish the constitutional properties of the associations where these skills were learned; we are left to *infer* the effects of institutional differences between African American and white Protestant churches, for example. African American Protestants are exposed to greater political stimuli from the pulpit and “belong to churches whose internal structure nurtures opportunities to exercise politically relevant skills” (1995: 383); but Verba *et al* have no data on what those structures are, specifically. Do African American Protestant churches hold more internal elections? Do they have public board meetings with open agenda? Do they have larger numbers of leadership positions?

I propose to make explicit and extensive efforts to measure the formal and informal constitutional properties of American associations.<sup>2</sup> These organizational properties can then be introduced as independent variables in statistical models where individual citizens' survey responses provide the smallest unit of analysis, and attributes of their civic associational exposures provide a higher level of analysis. The best case scenario is confirmation of a factor-analytic commonality among a set of associational constitutional characteristics; where past research (Brehm and Rahn 1997, Rahn, Brehm and Carlson 1999) has combined membership reports into a single "civic engagement" latent variable, I will seek to identify a "democratic engagement" factor that describes the individual's exposure to multiple forms of democratic practice in civil society. I will further seek to enrich the statistical models with participant observation of a few case studies carefully selected to maximize variation in constitutional design while minimizing variation on other dimensions (a "most similar systems" design).

## **Theory and Literature**

### *Dahl vs. Rawls: behaviorist sociology vs. the new institutionalism*

In the early days of the "behavioral revolution" in political science, Robert Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1954) fired a critical shot. Where the "old institutionalist"

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<sup>2</sup>If the American study is fruitful, a later step in this research agenda is to carry a similar data collection effort to a selection of countries around the world (such as Russia, Brazil and Peru). The goal of the research program is to provide an institutionalist account of the nature of "political culture," defining culture not by the symptomatic measures of attitudes as Almond and Verba (1963) did, but by the modal forms of civil organization. Such information can inform the efforts of political development work by suggesting "engineering principles" for designing new grass-roots organizations.

heritage of political science had held constitutions and political procedures in high regard as protectors of peace and liberty, Dahl called the importance of formal institutions into question. Using James Madison's claims for the virtues of the American Constitution as a rhetorical foil, Dahl attacked the premise that the Constitution's political devices prevent "majority tyranny" in any meaningful way. He argued that underlying social phenomena are much more important; the rules of democratic practice are effective only if political views are largely consensual or disagreements are moderate. Intensely-held opposing views will cause the constitutional mechanism to fail, as it did in the case of the Civil War (1954: 98). Dahl drew some rather dramatic conclusions, drawing on anecdotal Latin American comparative politics:

Because we are taught to believe in the necessity of constitutional checks and balances, we place little faith in social checks and balances. We admire the efficacy of constitutional separation of powers in curbing majorities and minorities, but we often ignore the importance of the restraints imposed by social separation of powers. Yet if the theory of polyarchy is roughly sound, it follows that *in the absence of certain social prerequisites, no constitutional arrangements can produce a non-tyrannical republic*. The history of numerous Latin-American states is, I think, sufficient evidence. Conversely, an increase in the extent to which one of the social prerequisites is present may be far more important in strengthening democracy than any particular constitutional design. Whether we are concerned with tyranny by a minority or tyranny by a majority, the theory of polyarchy suggests that *the first and crucial variables to which political scientists must direct their attention are social and not constitutional*. (1954: 83, emphasis added)

What are these "social prerequisites" on which polyarchal stability is founded? Dahl lists "the extent of consensus on the polyarchal norms, *social training in the norms*, consensus on policy alternatives, and political activity" (1954: 135, emphasis added), with implicit reference to the favorite prerequisites of 1950's modernization theory, education and personal income. In short, Dahl held that political institutions are

symptoms of the normative content of the underlying society, and “social training in the norms” of polyarchy is a generally unspecified process.

Now the theoretical pendulum has swung from behaviorism back toward considering institutional design as a powerful determinant of the success of democratic governments. Hordes of political economists have demonstrated the positive theory of institutional design, from majority rule (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) to the veto (Shugart and Carey 1992) to the control of the agenda (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975). But strong empirical support for these arguments is difficult to document; there are simply too few cases (a few dozen countries in the largest studies) and too many covarying influences – region, economic linkages, cultural heritage, ideology. One potent example is the ongoing debate between the opponents and proponents of presidential systems. Since variation in regime form is always accompanied by changes in society, whether over time or space, it is extremely difficult to show that institutional choices have had unique, non-trivial effects on the health and stability of any polity. Juan Linz’ critique of presidentialism (Linz 1994) in Latin America and other developing countries can fairly be shrugged off by skeptics as the symptoms of a traditionally patrimonial culture, while the volumes of criticism of the Weimar Republic’s constitutional defects are trumped by the autocratic social heritage that fostered Nazism.

Another challenge to the new institutionalism comes from Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work* (1993), which shows that the institutional innovation of regional governments in Italy produced dramatically better results in northern regions where

“civic engagement” in voluntary associations is stronger; for Putnam, the success of institutional reforms is heavily conditioned by what could easily be called “social prerequisites.” Dahl’s essentially cultural argument is certainly not anachronistic.

Dahl’s perspective contrasts with that of contemporary political philosopher John Rawls. In *Political Liberalism* (1993), Rawls hangs his hat on a historical interpretation of the origins of democratic government. He describes a progression from a pragmatic compromise on pseudo-democratic rule, a temporary *modus vivendi* between warring factions, to a “just and stable society” where democracy is pursued as an end in itself, as a matter of principle. For Rawls, this progression is facilitated by a constant rehearsal of democratic actions, an almost sacramental practice. Where Dahl says consensus and stability comes first, for Rawls, the institution of rules and rituals predates and even creates consensus:

Suppose that at a certain time, because of various historical events and contingencies, certain liberal principles of justice are accepted as a mere *modus vivendi*, and are incorporated into existing political institutions. This acceptance has come about, let us say, in much the same way as the acceptance of the principle of toleration came about as a *modus vivendi* following the Reformation: at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife. Our question, then, is this: how might it happen that over time the initial acquiescence in a constitution satisfying these liberal principles of justice develops into a constitutional consensus in which those principles themselves are affirmed? (Rawls 1993: 159)

Whether the third requirement of stable constitutional consensus is met by liberal principles depends on the success of the preceding two [that is, 1) fixing of the content of rights and liberties and 2) reference to generally available public rules of inquiry and evidence]. The basic political institutions incorporating these principles and the form of public reason shown in applying them—when working effectively and successfully for a sustained period of time (as I am here assuming)—tend to encourage the cooperative virtues of political life: the virtue of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which

are connected with the willingness to cooperate with others on political terms that everyone can publicly accept. (1993:163)

The story is an old one: practice makes perfect. The creation and enforcement of good institutional practices fosters virtuous political attitudes.

Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999) provide some recent empirical support for Rawls' conception of institutional democratic consolidation. Before and after the November 1996 elections, respondents to the American National Election Study increased their trust in abstract other people ("interpersonal trust"), in government, and in their own political competence or "efficacy." The survey results suggest that the election itself provided what Emile Durkheim called a "ritual of solidarity," increasing commitment to the political community and to democratic practice, just as Rawls suggests it should. The evidence shows that the more engaged and informed a person is in the political process, the greater the trust-promoting effects of the electoral event. Clearly, political institutions have a Rawlsian, pedagogical socializing effect on members of society. But Rawls does not triumph unequivocally; the effect of the election is a ripple on the surface of a deep pool of attitudes and perceptions. We have no comparison with the effect of elections in other societies, and Dahl's critique can still be evoked: elections may work the way they do in the U.S. only because the citizenry exhibits certain normative "social prerequisites." This research is intended to demonstrate that many of those prerequisites are preserved in the institutional designs of the associational sector.

### *Drawing a parallel with Locke and Hobbes*

The implicit contrast between Dahl and Rawls can be traced back to the differences between Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. For Hobbes, the state of nature is by definition a state of war, and only the institution of Leviathan can preserve the peace. Like Rawls, Hobbes views the imposition of institutional rules of conduct as the means to arriving at the good society.<sup>3</sup>

Locke's view of the state of nature is much more benign; in his *Treatises*, he objects to Robert Filmer's absolutism – which was in practice if not in rationale similar to Hobbes' – as itself a state of war, in which individual freedoms are jeopardized. For Locke, the state of nature (that is, the absence of the state) is to be preferred to an absolutist state; the justification for a liberal state is for its mutually beneficial ends, not solely for the prevention of chaos. Locke's view is implicitly like Dahl's: the existence of "social prerequisites" – norms of moral and tolerant behavior – can make Hobbesian absolutism superfluous. Scott (2000: 554) supports this reading of Locke, citing Locke's *Second Treatise*, section 19:

The distinction Locke draws between the state of nature and the state of war allows him to create a sovereignless state wherein the absence of a common judge among the claimants to supreme power need not necessarily be a condition of war. Against those who have confounded the state of nature and the state of war, apparently Hobbes, Locke insists that the two states must be distinguished. "Men living together according to reason, without a common

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<sup>3</sup>Hobbes is often characterized as the founder of modern rational choice theory, since his theory of society is apparently predicated on individuals' instinct for self-preservation. However, readers of *Leviathan* will find that Hobbes does not take the rational behavior of individuals for granted; in fact, his chief nemesis is the irrationality of the religious wars and the English nobility's pursuit of honor and vengeance instead of self-preservation. Hobbes' goal is to use the state and educational institutions to coerce and coax individuals into adopting a rational, self-interested utility function. My thanks to Ruth Grant for offering this astute observation to her students.

superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war.”

The table below diagrams the contrast; Hobbes’ world is dichotomous between the State of Nature/War and Leviathan; Locke’s world is fluidly trichotomous, where the State of Nature can be peaceful, can degenerate into War, and can be improved upon by the institution of a cooperative, sovereignless liberal state:

<b>Social Utility:</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Parallel</b>
Hobbes	State of Nature, equal to State of War	- none -	Leviathan, the contractual, absolutist state	Rawlsian institutional pedagogy
Locke	State of War, equal to absolutist state and tyranny	State of Nature (in which a stateless but <i>civil</i> society is at least possible)	Liberal, sovereignless state pursues collective good	Dahl’s normative “social prerequisites”

Hobbes does not recognize the possibility that civil society can consist of a plural multitude of “little Leviathans,” creating social order without the need for the absolutist solution. Locke, meanwhile, does not articulate an institutional theory of civil society that would facilitate understanding by Hobbesian critics; he writes as if the absence of state power leaves a pure political vacuum, while it is clear that he believes otherwise. Hobbes, and later Rawls, view coercive state institutions as the solution to social order; Locke, and later Dahl, see social order as a necessary property of pre-constitution society, but do little themselves to explain its origin. What is needed is a

holistic theory of political socialization that allows for a Hobbesian/Rawlsian institutional pedagogy to occur within a Lockean/Dahlian civil society.

*Tocqueville: tying things together with civil society.*

The resolution of Locke versus Hobbes and Dahl versus Rawls may be found in the now-omnipresent figure of Alexis de Tocqueville. Where Dahl called for “training in social norms” and Rawls for democratic institutions as the trainers, Tocqueville found both in one place: civil society. According to Tocqueville, the atomizing force of egalitarian democracy is counteracted by the ubiquity of opportunities to learn cooperative virtues in the meetings of civic associations. These associations are both political and apolitical (in the traditional, government-oriented sense), and they encompass all kinds of endeavors:

Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types – religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute. Americans combine to give fêtes, found seminaries, build churches, distribute books, and send missionaries to the antipodes. Hospitals, prisons and schools take shape in that way. Finally, if they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form an association. In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association.

. . . Thus the most democratic country in the world now is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the objects of common desires and have applied this new technique to the greatest number of purposes.

. . . But among democratic peoples all the citizens are independent and weak. They can do hardly anything for themselves, and none of them is in a position to force his

fellows to help him. They would all therefore find themselves helpless if they did not learn to help each other voluntarily. (de Tocqueville 1835/1969: 513-514)

Tocqueville's gushing praise for association holds obvious weaknesses for the modern skeptic. In Tocqueville, as in Durkheim, there is a certain nineteenth-century optimism about the mere proximity of people; he considers repeatedly bringing individualistic people together in a meeting room to be enough to create sympathy and cooperation. He expected almost any association between people to produce positive consequences for the solidarity, tolerance and compromise necessary for a healthy society:

But when the people who live there have to look after the particular affairs of a district, the same people are always meeting, and they are forced, in a manner, to know and adapt themselves to one another. (1835/1969: 511)

Feelings and opinions are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another. (1835/1969: 515)

This study concerns itself with whether and how much such optimistic results depend on the design of the decision-making institutions that define associations' internal politics. Is the "heart enlarged" by participating in a meeting in which a single personality dominates? Is "understanding developed" in informally hierarchical organizations? If so, why and how? If not, which alternative forms of organization produce better results?

Tocqueville's simple approach is reflected in much present-day work on civic engagement. Putnam (1993), Brehm and Rahn (1997) and to some extent Verba, Brady and Scholzman (1995) take simple involvement in associations as the key independent variable in their work. Civic engagement is at root a simple binary measure of the

presence or absence of association, or at best a count of the number of memberships held by each individual or observed within a given polity. Contemporary institutionalism finds this at best naïve; mere existence is not proof of beneficence. It is possible that the simple involvement measure is masking the real effects of association, perhaps measuring instead the raw sociability of the respondents' personalities. Like other institutions, associations are diverse; some associations have organizational designs that foster trust and cooperation, but others are almost certain to discourage cooperation and to create distrust and other social malignities. We might expect an evolutionary selection process to weed out such pathologies over time, but this is exactly what North (1990) shows to be the blind spot in neoliberal political economy: "inefficient" institutional arrangements may have every bit as much staying power as "efficient" ones. Banfield's (1958) classic work on "amoral familism" in southern Italy and Putnam's (1993) follow-on illustrate such pathologies. Southern Italy is not utterly devoid of associations, but it is clearly mired in a sticky associational environment that discourages political efficacy and undermines cooperation and consensus.

Knight (1992) is also instructive; civic associations are as likely as any other institutions to become battlegrounds for distributional advantage. Knight attacks Rawls' concept of the "veil of ignorance" as unrealistic; the probability is extremely low that individuals cannot predict a stable distributional position for themselves and therefore act justly to create impartial institutions (Knight 1992: 45-6).

These observations provoke the central interest of my investigation. Where associations are present, should not their institutional structure cause variation in their

ability to provide Dahl's desired "training in social norms"? Should not "constitutional democracy" at the associational level be a better "school" for democratic government generally than associational oligarchy? If Rawls is right that the institutions of the state, properly designed, can create a democratic consensus, should not individuals steeped in daily democratic practice in their associational memberships be that much more integrated into the national democratic consensus? In essence, I am asking a question of engineering as much as of science (Ordeshook 1996): Are there institutional design principles that make a civic association effective in producing democratic values, especially values that are "portable" into the national context? For example, Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999) show that national elections generate "social capital" and democratic solidarity; by extension, associations with numerous elective institutions should produce greater support for democratic process and national electoral procedures than do organizations that have few or no electoral practices. I will elaborate further on the hypotheses generated by this line of thinking in the next section.

### *Prior research*

The questions outlined above have been asked, and often answered with inference and speculation, but they have hardly been studied empirically. The classic case study by Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) described the conditions that can produce effective formal democratic institutions within a labor union. They provided some strong evidence of the impact of national political conditions on union politics, but they had

very little to say about the impact of these institutions on the attitudes of union members toward democracy in the national polity. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) do find variation in the presence of “civic skills” caused by the differences in organization among various churches, but they do not have explicit data about the constitutional arrangements of the associations their respondents belonged to, nor do they draw strong causal conclusions about the relationship between these local structures and the national polity. Skocpol *et al* (1999, 2000) raise interesting questions about the importance of one facet of institutional design in civil society, that of federal structure in imitation of the national Constitution, but she does not (at least not yet) have systematic data about electoral procedures, agenda-setting rules and other institutions.

One research program does have some relevant data. Knoke and Wood (1981), a study of Indianapolis-area associations, and Knoke (1990) – the “National Association Study” (NAS) – both ask questions of association leadership and members about organizational structure and participation. I will elaborate on these studies’ findings in the dissertation; for my purposes, their key shortcomings are a lack of constitutional detail in the associational data and a focus only on dependent variables at the associational level, such as membership commitment, excluding their impact on political culture at the national level.

## Research Design

### *Dependent variables*

This research is concerned with four primary dependent variables or values, as follows:

1. *Membership commitment* to the association, which has both intrinsic value to the association and instrumental value in the stability of the civil society which produces the next three. The greater the commitment to the association, the greater the association's ability to achieve its goals (charity, mutual benefit, issue advocacy, etc.) and the greater its ability to "tutor" citizens in the use of its institutional forms.
2. *Internal political efficacy*, the individual's confidence in her own personal political competence. Internal efficacy is a kind of human capital, similar to the civic skills addressed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); it is portable from one context (such as the association meeting) to another (voting in a national election or contacting a Congressional representative). See Carlson (1999) for a factor-analytic operationalization. Without internal efficacy, citizens are paralyzed and do not act except as pawns of other players or anti-system saboteurs. The more confidence they sense, the more they can resist fear of others and respond with restraint to perceived challenges to their interests and wishes.
3. *External political efficacy*, the individual's confidence in the responsiveness of leadership of political systems, in two forms, both *associational* and *national*. This confidence is similar to internal efficacy, with the exception that it is less portable, being focused on the reliability of others in a specific context. For example,

confidence in the responsiveness of associational leaders is not tightly connected with the responsiveness of national leaders. However, there is a generic, portable, abstract component to external efficacy which I will argue is transferable to leadership figures in homologous contexts, such as leaders elected by or appointed by the same procedure. Confidence in leadership is a controversial subject; some consider distrust of leadership to be a necessary component of democratic systems. Others will object that the variable is too unstable over time to reflect anything real (witness the emotive surge in trust in government following the terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center). I will argue that external efficacy is actually a less ambiguous indicator of system health than actual participatory behavior, since abstention can indicate any or all of satisfaction, apathy and alienation (Carlson 1999).

4. **Regime support** for political practice (Easton 1957; Carlson 1999): the expression of confidence directly in political institutions and practices, both associational and governmental. Where efficacy concerns persons, regime support concerns the political technology itself – does the citizen believe democracy (or hierarchy or oligarchy) works? The fairness of elections, the legitimacy of appointed positions and the appropriateness of executive powers all fall under this rubric. With low regime support, individuals, both as association members and citizens, have little reason to expect political solutions to problems and can be expected to seek remedies outside the regime, thereby destabilizing it. This is as true of a children's sports league as much as a national government.

These four values can be loosely characterized in two categories from Albert Hirschman's famous work, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (1970): membership commitment and regime support are two forms of "loyalty" to the association and the nation; both kinds of efficacy affect the individual's perceived ability to exercise "voice."

### *A brief categorization of hypotheses*

I expect the data I collect to reveal the following patterns:

1. ***Constitutionality***: The greater the individual's exposure to associations with explicit written rules for group membership, agenda-setting and decision-making, the greater her membership commitment, internal and external political efficacy, and regime support. Formal constitutions produce these effects both by reducing uncertainty – when the individual is conceived as a rational actor – and by creating routine expectations – when the individual is conceived as a psychological object. These effects are expected to hold *independently* of whether the association's practices are in fact democratic. *All else equal*, a participant in a highly hierarchical but formally transparent organization should have greater efficacy than a participant in a similar organization that lacks any written constitutional structure. Membership commitment is enhanced and regime support is fostered by the security of public rules and procedures. Even where such formal rules are widely ignored in practice, they offer a focal point for internal debate and a means for the rank and file to legitimate protest and criticism of the leadership. Organizations

without formal rules are more vulnerable to arbitrary manipulation of their internal politics, and arbitrariness is the enemy of efficacy.

2. *Democracy*: The broader the individual's potential for participation in agenda-setting and decision-making at the associational level, the greater should be the respondent's efficacy (in all forms) *and* support for democracy at the associational and national governmental levels. We should find greater efficacy in associations where any of the following are true:
  - a. Elections are held for leadership positions;
  - b. The "franchise" in these elections is generally broader;
  - c. Agenda-setting is open to a greater number of participants (that is, rules allow a wider franchise of members to propose "new business" in open meetings);
  - d. A greater number of decisions are made by a public vote of either a representative board or council, or by the members themselves.

The opportunity- rather than action-based approach follows Carlson (1999) in allowing that the non-participant may abstain precisely because the opportunity to vote or influence discussion exists. Efficacy is a subjective perception of potential influence. Psychologists (Brehm and Brehm 1981) have demonstrated that people are more likely to act to restore an opportunity or "freedom" that has been removed than to create a new freedom; the asymmetry suggests that the freedom to participate offered by democratic institutions should produce stable underlying support even when active participation is low. Again, considering the individual as both rational actor and psychological object, electoral and democratic institutions

can create rational expectations of future influence, thus lengthening the actor's time horizon and decreasing the discount rate. Psychologically, the individual becomes habituated and comfortable with the practice of consulting others for approval before acting. Both approaches are transmissible from the associational to the national level; successful implementation of elections as a decision-making technology in associations provides evidence to participants that this mechanism is also reliable on a national scale.

3. ***Professionalization and Bureaucratization:*** this secondary hypothesis conditions the previous two; the greater the dependence of the associational organization on professional staff for leadership, the less effective are constitutional and democratic provisions in promoting efficacy and support for national democracy. Originating with Michels (1911) to some extent, and following Knoke and Wood (1981: 74-76) more closely, I expect a high level of specialization in leadership roles to attenuate the perception of efficacy at the level of the individual participant. Leadership specialization lowers the participants' expectation that they are personally competent to understand the nature of decisions to be made and the expectation that leaders will be responsive to the membership. Operationally, organizations with tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status should be more likely to professionalize and bureaucratize in response to the requirements of government regulation (Dobkin Hall 1992).
4. ***Federalism:*** another secondary hypothesis expects associations with relatively more autonomous local chapters or offices to produce greater respondent efficacy

and – conditional on the association’s level of democratic practice – confidence in democracy. In a rational actor model, localization of authority, especially in smaller associations, greatly increases the simple probability that the individual can influence decisions and electoral outcomes. Psychologically, the individual is more likely to have a personal acquaintance with group leadership or to have been involved in that leadership herself, producing a higher level of familiarity and comfort with organizational practice and channels of influence.

See Data Collection Methods below for information on how these hypotheses can be subjected to measurement.

### *Modeling civil society's impact on the national polity*

This inquiry asks a simple pair of questions: when we are concerned with the health of the national constitutional-democratic polity, does the formal institutional political structure of voluntary associations matter? If so, in what ways? The first question suggests a simple causal model, with variation in voluntary associations as independent variable and the support for democracy in the national polity as dependent variable:

#### *Democratic Associational Design Æ Support for National Democracy*

The second question requires disaggregation of the variables. For the dependent variable, I propose to evaluate the health of the polity by means of a class of attitudinal dependent variables drawn from public opinion polls, particularly the American National Election Study (NES) for 1996. These variables are indicators of the American

public's confidence in the integrity of the political system: trust in government, political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy as a practice, and the perception of fair elections. I have already shown (Carlson 1999) that this battery of attitudinal variables are important predictors of political behavior, including voter turnout and campaigning. The measures of satisfaction with democracy and fair elections are the most important, components of a latent factor I term "regime support" (Carlson 1999). These items are available only in the 1996 NES data, and they have a unique virtue: where trust in government and similar measures inquire about attitudes toward *people* in government, that is, politicians, these items reflect broadly abstracted attitudes toward the institutions of government. Mistrust in politicians may be hailed as a sign of healthy democratic skepticism, but low scores on the regime support variables are fairly unequivocal indicators of democratic malaise, associated with lower turnout *and* mistrust for government.

As for the independent variables, Rawls (1990) insists on describing his idealized political system by the phrase "constitutional democracy," with the adjective distinguishing a formal and legal system of government from other possible forms (traditionalism or anarchism, for example). Using the simple phrase as heuristic reveals a constitutional dimension – that is, the formalization of rules and procedures – and a democratic dimension – the degree of mass participation in decision-making. These dimensions parallel variables measured by Knoke and Wood (1981) in their study of Indianapolis-area voluntary organizations; constitutionality resembles their variable of "formal legitimation of authority," while democracy parallels their variable of



coefficient on the interaction term); constitutionality creates greater confidence in the consistency and fairness of democratic practice and provides guarantees not only of the powers of leadership but also the rights of the mass membership. Although I lean toward Rawls' position, the resolution of this debate will depend on the facts, and the dimensions themselves are not perfectly independent; constitutions may enshrine the privileges of a few or reinforce the rights of all, or both, and democratic participation may be consistent with constitutional procedure or undermine it with inconsistent informal practices, or both. My operationalizations of constitutionality and democracy, outlined below, will attempt to permit and examine these complexities.

### *Indicators of constitutional democracy*

The classes of indicators of constitutionality and democracy within associations break down into several categories that have both dimensions. The table below outlines the areas in which I hope to collect data. For now, the items are described as if they were binary presence/absence indicators, although some gradations may become appropriate. In each case, the presence of an indicator of (I) constitutional rules or (II) democratic practices are hypothesized to contribute to positive attitudes toward democracy at the national level.

The objective is to impute scores for exposure to constitutionality and democracy to the original 1996 NES respondents. I can then use confirmatory factor analysis to score a latent variable for each dimension which can then be tested in models of regime support and efficacy. This approach substitutes a measure of the quality of associational

involvement, or “democratic engagement,” for the blunter “civic engagement” instrument based on the presence or absence of involvement.

The following table provides a heuristic for designing a questionnaire to be sent to national association leadership. Each cell in columns I and II suggests a set of questions about procedures and practices. Questionnaire design is the first impending task for this project.

### *Indicators*

<i>Row</i>	<i>Concept</i>	<i>I. Constitutionality</i>	<i>II. Democracy</i>	<i>Comment</i>
A.	Citizenship/ Membership	Explicit definition of formal membership status 1) Entry 2) Maintenance 3) Exit	Equality of condition for all members or participants	An organization may be democratic (permitting decisive participation by a large base) without having formal standards of membership.
B.	Decentralization or Federalism	Central offices and subunits have explicit boundaries and areas of internal autonomy	Decision-making power is not concentrated in one body (separation of powers)	
C.	Leadership Selection	Formal procedures for choosing leadership 1) Franchise 2) Term length	Elections 1) Broad franchise 2) Competition 3) Plurality, majority or supermajority rule 4) Highest office elected 5) Subunit offices elected	There are myriad possibilities here; elections may be held in spite of formal procedures that call for appointment, and <i>vice versa</i> . Numbered indicators are independent; e.g., a board-governed organization with limited franchise could still score high on competition, majority rule and elected leadership.

### *Indicators*

<i>Row</i>	<i>Concept</i>	<i>I. Constitutionality</i>	<i>II. Democracy</i>	<i>Comment</i>
D.	Agenda Setting	Formal procedures for agenda definition	Broad ability for members to add things to the agenda	Column I would indicate whether any procedures exist; Column II would show whether members have access to the agenda.
E.	Meetings	Formal definition of when, where and how decisions are made.	Meetings open to all relevant members or participants.	
F.	Parliamentary Procedure	Rules for discussion, argument and proposals (e.g. Roberts' Rules of Order)	The floor is open to discussion and debate	The "deliberative democracy" school (Habermas, Fishkin) holds these procedures and practices to be crucial.
G.	Decision Rules	Written specifications for how decisions are arrived at and finalized	Policy decisions are made by voting, whether in the board room, in local chapters or by mass referenda.	Policymaking decision rules may not themselves be democratic, but if they are made in a constitutionally prescribed fashion by elected officials in open meetings, many of the criteria are met.

As discussed in the Overview, my goal is to develop a set of institutional "exposure" variables for each NES respondent. I will collect information about large organizations mentioned by multiple respondents (see the next section). Respondents with one large organizational mention will receive the institutional scores for that organization; respondents with several mentions will receive indicators of the mean and variance of the measures for all the large organizations they mention.

## Data Collection Methods

### *1996 American National Election Study*

The 1996 NES was the first NES survey to adopt the General Social Survey's battery of 22 organizational involvement categories, from veterans' and seniors' organizations to sports leagues and self-help societies. Of 1,534 respondents to the post-election interviews, 1,306 named at least one organization with which they were involved.<sup>4</sup> A total of 4,728 organizational mentions were made; I have identified 117 large organizations with at least two mentions (see Appendix); these currently account for 1,560 (33%) of the group mentions. 842 respondents mentioned at least one of these 117 large organizations; of these, 446 (52.9%) mentioned only one, 219 (26%) mentioned two, and 177 (21%) mentioned three or more, up to a maximum of ten. The remaining organizations are either local or highly specialized (for example, a neighborhood homeowners' association or the American Institute of Chemical Engineers). For these organizations, I am coding distinguishing features across categories (religious, neighborhood, sports-related, etc.) to facilitate further analysis.

I have obtained approval from the NES Board to send questionnaires to the leadership of these 117 national organizations. The list of organizational mentions is held in confidence by the NES to protect the privacy of the respondents, who might be identified by the specificity of the organizational names. The Board originally strictly

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<sup>4</sup>The number of respondents and organizational mentions remain subject to revision, mainly downward; the data requires a great deal of clarification, and some mentions are simple data entry errors.

prohibited any direct contact with these organizations. I persuaded the Board otherwise on the basis of the following arguments:

1. These organizations are large, national associations with high public profiles; the chance that contact with their national leaders would result in contact with a respondent, or even someone who knows the respondent, is minimal.
2. The questions I plan to ask the associational leaders make no reference to the respondents in any way, but rather focus on general associational practices.
3. The data I have received is scrambled in any event, so any ability to discern the identity or memberships of a specific respondent will be entirely lost when the data I collect is merged into the original 1996 NES dataset by NES personnel.

An Internet survey (located at <http://www.poli.duke.edu/surveys/volorgs/>) will be conducted with organizational officials to collect the constitutional data. The survey results will be supplemented by follow-up observation, telephone interviews with willing leaders, and textual analysis of constitutions, charter documents and other written resources obtained from public sources.

The resulting data will provide the basis for two major lines of analysis. First, the raw organizational data will yield a descriptive picture of the distribution of constitutional design types; tests can show whether particular constitutional designs are more likely to appear in certain types of associations. Secondly, the data can be “collapsed” from multiple organizational memberships to a single average value on each variable for each 1996 NES respondent. These scores for exposure to democratic constitutional arrangements can then be entered as independent variables in statistical

models predicting responses to survey items on both kinds of efficacy and regime support.

*Case studies: Local participant observation and focus groups*

The other primary approach to the research is to draw a sample of organizations from local directories of associations<sup>5</sup>. Sample will be chosen for both “most similar” and “most different” comparisons, using J. S. Mill’s method of comparison. In the “most different” grouping (Mill’s “Method of Difference”), I will look for maximum variation on the institutional variables of interest and minimum variation in other variables, particularly the organizational field and mission. For instance, a comparison of the PTA (Parent-Teacher Association) and its schismatic child, the PTO (Parent-Teacher Organization) would likely be fruitful; similarly, I could conduct comparisons of two environmentalist organizations or two sports leagues that perform similar functions but differ on institutional lines. For the “most similar” group (adopting Mill’s “Method of Agreement”), I will seek organizations with very similar institutional structures but little else in common; if their members exhibit similar levels of efficacy and regime support, we may conclude that associational institutions are strong explanatory candidates.

I anticipate selecting a total of four to eight cases. Interviews conducted with local association leadership and members will contribute an independent, qualitatively rich

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<sup>5</sup>If the NES Board permits the contact, these organizations may be selected from the 1996 NES list in the Appendix. Any risk to respondent confidentiality can be eliminated by choosing local chapters in congressional districts not surveyed by the NES in 1996.

data set. Participant observation of several selected cases from local associations will provide checks on the validity of statistical results and further insights. Participant observation offers an opportunity to develop the second arm of this research, pursuing knowledge of the impact of associational design on the association's own membership commitment and efficacy and regime support. I will create a structured schedule for interviewing and observation to ensure consistency in the resulting data. If funding becomes available, I will conduct a systematically formatted set of focus groups in which associational members from each case study organization discuss their perceptions of the national polity and their associations. One study providing a potential model for this participant observation is a recent dissertation on the longevity of volunteer membership commitment at the University of Minnesota (Haney 1999). Haney uses several methods, including participant observation, elite interviewing and focus groups. I am currently awaiting delivery of the manuscript to Duke's library.

## Data Analysis Plan / Proposed Outline

The following is a preliminary outline for the entire dissertation, with special emphasis on steps in data analysis. Roman numerals mark sections which may represent a single chapter or multiple chapters as appropriate:

- I. Introduction
  - A. Illustration(s) from case studies
  - B. Research design
  - C. Overview
- II. Theory and Literature
  - A. Background theory (Dahl/Rawls, Locke/Hobbes, Tocqueville)
  - B. Normative basis: a theological argument for associational democracy [tentative]
  - C. Contemporary empirical work (Putnam, Verba et al, Knoke, Hefner, Haney, etc.)
  - D. Institutionalism and civil society (application of Riker, Shepsle, contemporary comparativists such as Shugart and Carey)
  - E. A holistic theory of political socialization
- III. Associational Political Systems
  - A. Anecdotal evidence and descriptive statistics from database of large national associations derived from questionnaires and/or constitutional analysis.
  - B. A few examples of possible tests for significance:
    1. Are larger organizations more or less likely to have elected national leaders?
    2. Are older organizations more or less likely to have elected national leaders?
    3. Further comparisons of elective and non-elective, formal and informal, federal and central characteristics with NES functional categories (charities, fraternal, professional, etc.) and collapsed categories (all religious, service-to-other versus issue advocacy, etc.).
    4. Multivariate models; I expect to find constitutional, federal, and democratic structure to be most likely in older, larger other-regarding organizations.
  - C. Confirmatory factor-analytic models of clusters of institutional characteristics, expecting to find the following:
    1. Latent variable confirming covariance of measures of formal constitutionality (written rules for various associational practices)

2. Latent variable confirming covariance of measures of democracy (membership enfranchisement, elected leadership, open meetings, etc.
  3. Second-order latent variable confirming covariance of constitutionality and democracy latent variables
  4. Comparison of factor loadings and reexamination of models using latent variable scores.
- IV. The Effects of Democratic Civic Engagement on 1996 NES Respondents
- A. Imputation of civil society institutional exposure scores to NES respondents and description of basic distributional characteristics
  - B. Confirmatory factor analysis of institutional exposure scores (attempting to duplicate results with raw organizational population above); expect to confirm the validity of a “constitutional/democratic civic engagement” variable.
    1. Comparison of factor loadings
    2. Distribution of latent variable scores and simple tests of significance
  - C. Models of political efficacy and regime support comparing effects of membership-only civic engagement with institutional-exposure “democratic engagement” version(s).
  - D. Fully reciprocal structural-equations model to test for endogeneity between efficacy and democratic engagement.
- V. Case-Study Participant Observation Results
- A. Description of chosen cases and reasoning for choices (probably most similar systems design)
  - B. Results of elite interviews and/or membership focus groups
  - C. Observations about meetings and group events, with emphasis on associational policy-making.
  - D. In-depth comparisons of associational pairs (such as PTA and PTO); systematic discussion of remarks from members who have experienced both organizations as much as possible.
- VI. Conclusions

## Appendix: Large Voluntary Associations Mentioned by 1996 NES Respondents

Count	OrgNum	Acronym	Name	Mentions	% of 1,534 R's
1	98	Catholic	Roman Catholic Church	125	8.15%
2	37	AARP	American Association of Retired Persons	110	7.17%
3	42	PTA	Parent-Teacher Association	100	6.52%
4	49	AmLeg	American Legion	72	4.69%
5	71	UMC	United Methodist Church	71	4.63%
6	48	VFW	Veterans of Foreign Wars	57	3.72%
7	25	BSA	Boy Scouts of America / Cub Scouts	49	3.19%
8	70	LL	Little League	44	2.87%
9	24	GSA	Girl Scouts of America / Brownies	39	2.54%
10	92	PRES	Presbyterian Church (USA)	35	2.28%
11	30	NRA	National Rifle Association	28	1.83%
12	43	PTO	Parent-Teacher Organization	27	1.76%
13	15	GOP	Republican Party	24	1.56%
14	28	4H	Four H Club	24	1.56%
15	60	Masons	Fraternal Order of Masons	24	1.56%
16	16	DEM	Democratic Party	23	1.50%
17	76	SalvArm	Salvation Army	23	1.50%
18	41	AA	Alcoholics Anonymous	21	1.37%
19	103	Episc	Episcopal Church in America	20	1.30%
20	34	KOC	Knights of Columbus	19	1.24%
21	57	CC	Chamber of Commerce	19	1.24%
22	102	CoC	Church of Christ	18	1.17%
23	13	NEA	National Education Association	17	1.11%
24	69	LDS	Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints	16	1.04%
25	100	AoG	Assembly of God	16	1.04%
26	33	BPOE	Elks	15	0.98%
27	53	Eagles	Fraternal Order of Eagles	15	0.98%
28	1	AFLCIO	American Federation of Labor / Congress of Industrial	14	0.91%
29	3	UAW	United Auto Workers	14	0.91%
30	46	NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	14	0.91%
31	26	YMCA/YWC	Young Men's / Women's Christian Associations	13	0.85%
32	105	Naz	Church of the Nazarene	13	0.85%
33	31	SierraClub	Sierra Club	12	0.78%
34	59	Moose	Moose Lodge	11	0.72%
35	64	NRLC	National Right to Life Committee	11	0.72%
36	83	NAR	National Association of Realtors	11	0.72%
37	18	Lions	Lions Club	10	0.65%
38	62	FarmBur	American Farm Bureau Federation	10	0.65%
39	87	DAV	Disabled American Veterans	10	0.65%
40	2	Teamsters	Teamsters	9	0.59%
41	20	Red Cross	American Red Cross	9	0.59%
42	21	ACS	American Cancer Society	9	0.59%
43	35	ChCoal	Christian Coalition	9	0.59%
44	23	Rotary	Rotary International	8	0.52%

## Appendix: Large Voluntary Associations Mentioned by 1996 NES Respondents

Count	OrgNum	Acronym	Name	Mentions	% of 1,534 R's
45	38	NOW	National Organization for Women	8	0.52%
46	51	Nature	Nature Conservancy	8	0.52%
47	58	WomClub	General Federation of Women's Clubs	8	0.52%
48	67	UnWay	United Way	8	0.52%
49	68	JW	Jehovah's Witnesses	8	0.52%
50	19	LWV	League of Women Voters	7	0.46%
51	27	AYSO	American Youth Soccer Organization	7	0.46%
52	32	Greenpeace	Greenpeace	7	0.46%
53	45	NA	Narcotics Anonymous	7	0.46%
54	96	Humane	Humane Society	7	0.46%
55	108	MoW	Meals on Wheels	7	0.46%
56	117	Al-Anon	Al-Anon	7	0.46%
57	4	USW	United Steel Workers	6	0.39%
58	6	AFSCME	American Federation of State, County and Municipal	6	0.39%
59	7	APWU	American Postal Workers Union	6	0.39%
60	12	UFCW	United Food & Commercial Workers	6	0.39%
61	22	Habitat	Habitat for Humanity	6	0.39%
62	29	BGCA	Boys and Girls Clubs of America	6	0.39%
63	39	AAUW	American Association of University Women	6	0.39%
64	44	PP	Planned Parenthood	6	0.39%
65	54	EStar	Order of the Eastern Star	6	0.39%
66	77	AHA	American Heart Association	6	0.39%
67	78	Diabetes	American Diabetes Assoc	6	0.39%
68	94	WW	Weight Watchers	6	0.39%
69	97	Smithson	Smithsonian	6	0.39%
70	101	AME	African Methodist Episcopal Church	6	0.39%
71	104	UCoC	United Church of Christ	6	0.39%
72	5	TWU	Transport Workers Union	5	0.33%
73	40	NARAL	National Abortion Rights Action League	5	0.33%
74	47	FOP	Fraternal Order of Police	5	0.33%
75	65	Audubon	Audubon Society	5	0.33%
76	72	SoBapt	Southern Baptist Convention	5	0.33%
77	75	BigBroth	Big Brothers & Sisters	5	0.33%
78	116	NPR	National Public Radio	5	0.33%
79	36	PK	Promise Keepers	4	0.26%
80	52	MichCons	Michigan United Conservation Club	4	0.26%
81	55	Hadassah	Hadassah	4	0.26%
82	63	March	March of Dimes	4	0.26%
83	73	Awana	Awana	4	0.26%
84	80	AChemS	American Chemical Society	4	0.26%
85	81	ASQC	American Society for Quality (Control)	4	0.26%
86	111	NWF	National Wildlife Federation	4	0.26%
87	114	PEO	P.E.O. Sisterhood	4	0.26%
88	9	AFT	American Federation of Teachers	3	0.20%

## Appendix: Large Voluntary Associations Mentioned by 1996 NES Respondents

Count	OrgNum	Acronym	Name	Mentions	% of 1,534 R's
89	61	Dental	American Dental Association	3	0.20%
90	66	ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union	3	0.20%
91	74	HeadStart	HeadStart Program	3	0.20%
92	79	ASCE	American Society of Civil Engineers	3	0.20%
93	82	AICPA	American Institute of Certified Public Accountants	3	0.20%
94	86	MADD	Mothers Against Drunk Driving	3	0.20%
95	88	KID	Kidsports	3	0.20%
96	89	CAMP	Campfire Boys & Girls	3	0.20%
97	99	CathCamp	Catholic Campus Ministries	3	0.20%
98	110	WWF	World Wildlife Fund	3	0.20%
99	113	LuthLife	Lutherans for Life	3	0.20%
100	8	UMWA	United Mine Workers of America	2	0.13%
101	10	UFT	United Federation of Teachers	2	0.13%
102	11	CWA	Communications Workers of America	2	0.13%
103	14	Grange	The Grange	2	0.13%
104	17	ADA	Americans for Democratic Action	2	0.13%
105	50	ABA	American Bar Association	2	0.13%
106	56	B'naiB'rith	B'nai B'rith	2	0.13%
107	84	NSTA	National Science Teachers Association	2	0.13%
108	85	TFT	Toys for Tots	2	0.13%
109	90	CRUS	Campus Crusade for Christ	2	0.13%
110	91	FFA	Future Farmers of America	2	0.13%
111	93	PETA	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals	2	0.13%
112	95	TM	Toastmasters	2	0.13%
113	106	700	700 Club	2	0.13%
114	107	LofM	Legion of Mary	2	0.13%
115	109	Emily	Emily's List	2	0.13%
116	112	Amnesty	Amnesty International	2	0.13%
117	115	Wish	Make-a-Wish Foundation	2	0.13%
				Total Mentions	1,560

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