PUBLISHED WORK

Ashamed to be Selfish, with David Dillenberger [December 2010]
Theoretical Economics 7 (2012), 99-124
Abstract: We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on DM. We derive a representation that identifies DM's private ranking of allocations, her subjective norm, and shame. The normatively best allocation can be further characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem.

Download

WORKING PAPERS

Dynamic Preference for Flexibility, with R. Vijay Krishna [May 2011]
under revision
Abstract
Download
Companion Note: Dynamic Preference for Flexibility in a Lucas Tree Economy with Investment

Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior [December 2011]
resubmitted
Abstract
Download

Models of Subjective Learning, with David Dillenberger [December 2011]
Abstract
Download

Overeagerness [April 2008]
Abstract
Download

Department of Economics, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708, USA | 919 660 1821 | p.sadowski (at) duke (dot) edu