

## Prime Minister and Parliament: Strategic Split-Ticket Voting

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We investigate strategic considerations in a contest using run-off rules and compare our results to elections using plurality rules and to those using proportional representation. We examine the unusual case of the Israeli Election of 1999, when two votes, one for a prime minister and one for a parliamentary party, were cast. Strategic considerations should be expected to influence both votes as voters attempt to maximize utility given their preferences for the governing coalition, their expectations of who will lead that coalition, and what outcomes they will enact. We observe strategic voting in the direct vote for Prime Minister, especially when candidates are thought to be in a close race. We also find that voters incorporate expectations of the outcome of the parliamentary election when deciding whom to support. “Split-ticket” voting occurs when the voter prefers a different party to the party of the prime minister and as a consequence of expectations of coalition power interacting with expectations of who will be the Prime Minister.

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## ***Introduction***

What set of electoral laws are most effective at inducing voters to reveal their true or “sincere” preferences? Scholars of comparative politics have long been interested in identifying the conditions under which voters support less desirable candidates who have a better chance of winning. We examine strategic considerations in a contest using run-off rules and compare our results to elections using plurality rules and to those using proportional representation before examining the strategic considerations when two votes, one for a prime minister and one for a parliamentary party, are cast. Strategic considerations should be expected to affect both votes as voters attempt to maximize utility given their preferences for the governing coalition, their expectations of who will lead that coalition, and what outcomes they will enact.

The classic formulations of the strategic calculations of voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972) argue that voters choose among alternatives by looking at their possible choices as well as their perceptions of outcomes of the electoral contest. After comparing the utility expected to accrue as a result of each possible course action, citizens choose the voting strategy that will maximize their expected utility. We apply this calculus of voting to the May 17, 1999 Israeli election. This election was governed by an unusual set of electoral laws creating a hybrid semi-presidential system with a directly elected Prime Minister. During this election, Israeli voters cast two votes; one for the head of government, the Prime Minister, and one for a parliamentary party. Under this system, the Prime Minister was elected to office by a majority vote. If no candidate had a majority in the first round of voting, a run-off election was held between the top two finishers. In the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, seats are allocated through a system of proportional representation. Unlike a pure presidential system, the Prime Minister’s power remained dependent on the consent of a majority of parliamentarians. Consequently, the Israeli case served as a rare laboratory for the comparative study of voting behavior, with two votes, normally found in different systems, occurring at the same time and shaping a common outcome. We examine the strategic considerations existing for each type of vote independently, but we argue that correctly modeling the behavior of the voters requires the consideration of both votes. With two votes, each Israeli voices a preference for who should lead the governing coalition and which party should be strongest in the parliament or cabinet. The combination affects the formation of the government, leading to the most desirable set of policy outcomes. In this case study, we use data from a representative sample collected during the election campaign by Abraham Diskin and from another study conducted by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir.<sup>1</sup> We first examine strategic considerations in the Prime Minister’s race and introduce a novel method of estimating aversion to wasted votes. We then compare turn to an analysis of voting for the Knesset before considering the construction of a unified model.

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<sup>1</sup> Diskin’s survey is based upon a cluster sample of 995 respondents conducted between April 28 and May 5. The Arian and Shamir survey is based upon 1,225 respondents conducted during the six weeks before the election. Respondents to both surveys were interviewed face to face by survey researchers. Both surveys were implemented while all five candidates for Prime Minister were in the race. Both surveys include Jews and Arabs, but most of our analysis examines only the Jewish voters.

## *Strategic Voting*

One way to conceive of voting is that it represents an expression of a straightforward preference for one candidate. Indeed, this is precisely what one would expect, if, as Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974, 1975, 1993) have argued, rational voters follow a “minimax-regret” strategy - minimizing their maximum regret. The maximum regret for these voters would be for their preferred candidate to lose because they failed to vote for him or her. Thus, to minimize this regret, a rational voter would always vote for her most preferred candidate. Strategic considerations do not affect the choices made by minimax regret voters.

This strategy may be inappropriate when the voter is confronted with a choice between more than two candidates on the ballot. In these contests, many voters, whom we refer to as “sincere” voters, may continue to support their preferred candidate regardless of that candidate’s chance of winning. But at least some voters, whom we call “sophisticated” or “strategic” voters, may not vote for the candidate they like best. Rather, they may vote to maximize their expected utility by taking into account their perceptions of the probability of electoral outcomes (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972). In this environment, voters weigh their utility for a candidate against the odds of that candidate winning, under the assumption that the closer a candidate is to winning, the more efficacious is the individual’s vote. As Riker (1986, 78) defines it, strategic voting is “voting contrary to one’s immediate tastes in order to obtain an advantage in the long run.”

A strong account of strategic voting must take note that information regarding the closeness of the electoral contest, especially through media-reported polling, would have a significant impact upon voting behavior. Polls signal to the voter the viability of the candidates, defined as the probability a candidate will win a race. In a close contest, the probability of influencing the outcome of the election is assumed to be looming large in voters’ minds, affecting their voting calculations. Strategic voting should be most likely when polls show that a race between a voter’s least preferred candidate and the voter’s second choice is close, especially if the voter greatly prefers the second choice candidate. Most accounts of strategic voting emphasize the penchant to vote strategically when the voter’s preferred candidate is perceived to be a non-viable candidate with little chance of winning. The impetus for that voter to vote strategically is greatest when altering her vote will contribute to the victory of her second choice over her least preferred candidate.

We present new evidence that it is not just a hopeless candidacy that contributes to a “wasted” vote in strategic terms. If the polls project a landslide there would seem to be little reason to vote strategically since the perceived probability of altering the outcome drops as the victory margin increases. The argument is symmetric, and voting for a candidate who is running away with the contest is also considered to be a “wasted” a vote. Thus, the information about the perceived probability of the candidate winning must be “folded” at the victory point to reflect the degree of competitiveness of the electoral race and the chance that the voter may cast a decisive vote in the election.

Previous work empirically demonstrates that there has been strategic voting in American political contests. Abramson and his colleagues (1992) use data collected by the National Election Studies (NES) during the 1988 U.S. presidential primaries to suggest that at least some primary voters were “sophisticated,” or “strategic,” by incorporating their assessments of the viability of candidates in making their voting choices. Analyses of NES data also suggest that there was strategic voting in the 1968, 1980, 1992, 1996 and 2000 U.S. presidential contests (Abramson et al., 1995; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 2001).

Numerous other studies have explored the logic of supporting unviable candidates in a comparative context, especially for parliamentary elections. Most of these studies explore the extent to which voters are motivated by disaffection (Miller and Listhaug 1990), a weak attachment to the largest parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2001), or support for the niche concerns articulated by small parties (Kitschelt 1989). Duverger (1963) originally suggested that there is little reason to expect strategic voting in run-off elections. Voters may vote sincerely so that their candidates will be in a better position to extract sympathetic policy promises in exchange for their endorsement in the second round, or because they expect the opportunity to vote again in the second round (see Abramson, et al. 1995).<sup>2</sup> Cox (1997) developed the formal logic of strategic competition from single-ballot plurality elections to runoff elections. Since voters respond to the incentive structure provided by the electoral system, strategic voting limits the number of entrants in a dual-ballot race similar to the way it limits the number of entrants in a single-ballot election. Responding to voters averse to wasting support on candidates with no chance of even making it to the second round, few candidacies are launched beyond the number of candidates who can qualify for the second round plus one. However, Cox expects that strategic voting would be more unusual in run-off elections than plurality elections.

### ***Estimation of Models Based on the Multi-candidate Calculus of Voting:***

*A) Vote for Prime Minister Candidate:* We expect to observe strategic voting for Prime Minister, rather than purely sincere voting. The dependent variable in our model of the choice for Prime Minister is dichotomous. If the respondent planned to vote for their most preferred candidate as measured by the feeling thermometer scores the variable is scored a one. Otherwise, the variable is given a value of zero. The independent variables are comparisons of viability expectations. The survey asked respondents to estimate the chance of the candidate winning. These responses were normalized so that the percentages summed to 100%. The data was then folded at the victory point, 50%. So, the maximum value is 0.5, with a candidate with no chance of winning and a candidate with a 100% chance of winning being assigned a value of zero. By folding the scale at the victory point, high values reflect how close the candidate is to winning an election by a single vote.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> While these works mainly consider parliamentary elections, we expect the logic of their arguments to also apply to elections for executive offices.

<sup>3</sup> Careful readers will note that in a three-way race for a single office, a plurality can be won by a single vote over one-third (33.33%) of the votes cast. However, in this case, an outright winner of this election

Using data taken from two surveys of the 1999 Israeli election for Prime Minister, we first seek to examine the relationship between voter preferences, candidate evaluations, and citizen assessments of the chances of each of the three main prime ministerial candidate's chances of winning. We test Cox and Duverger's propositions by comparing the expected vote decisions by survey respondents in a run-off election in Israel to survey data from American survey data. We develop and test several models of voting behavior positing that the decision to vote for one's favored candidate is a function of that candidate's participation in a close race and the level of affect toward that candidate relative to his competitors. Our innovative use of folded probability scores demonstrates that voters are more likely to vote strategically to support a candidate in a competitive race.

*B) Vote for Knesset Party:* We then shift our attention to the parliamentary election and discuss whether similar considerations of wasting votes applies to an election under a system of proportional representation where the entire nation is one district and the threshold for representation is a low 1.5%. Israel's party system is extremely fragmented, with 15 independent lists<sup>4</sup> winning representation in the Knesset in 1999. In addition to considering which list will cross the minimum threshold to gain seats, a voter might also focus on the extent that the party can influence the nature of the governing coalition. While the directly elected Prime Minister will lead the cabinet, he may be able to enjoy a majority alliance with like-minded parties or he may be forced to cobble a coalition from parties across the spectrum including the main opposition party. Some parties in 1999 would have enjoyed more power and influence under a government led by the incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, others under a government led by one of his opponents. Others may benefit from being included in a "unity" government including both of the largest parties.

Like most other parliamentary systems, bargaining power comes from an interaction between the size and the ideological position of the parties (see Strom, Budge and Laver 1994). At the outset of every Israeli election campaign since the 1970's, Labor and Likud were assumed to be the two largest parties. So, the other Israeli parties desire to be the third largest party in the Knesset. The third largest party would be in the best position to negotiate with either of the two major parties (assuming the third largest party are in the "pivot" between the two parties)<sup>5</sup>. The size of parties usually determines the

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required 50% of the vote. A candidate who receives one-third of the total vote plus one is only guaranteed participation in a run-off. Furthermore, experimental psychologists suggest that when the event space is partitioned, expected probabilities will often sum to greater than one. The complement of one event, say Barak winning, is often less than the sum of the other possible events, in this case the probability of Netanyahu or Mordecai winning (Rottenstreich and Tversky 1997; see Fox 1999). So, despite some hesitations, we expect that values approaching 0.5 (rather than 0.33) will capture the competitiveness of the candidate, resulting in a greater inclination to vote for that candidate rather than one expected to coast to victory or lose in a landslide.

<sup>4</sup> Arian (1998) draws a distinction between lists and parties. Parties are formal institutions engaged in an on-going pursuit of power. Voters cast a vote for a list made up of one or more parties who choose to unify on election day.

<sup>5</sup> We define a "major" party to be a party led by a viable candidate for Prime Minister. We use this term to differentiate between the largest parties (Likud, Labor and Shas) and the "major" parties (Likud, Labor/One Israel and the Center in 1999, Labor and Likud only in 1996 and 2001).

number of cabinet seats they receive in a government. For many parties, more important than the number of cabinet seats is which cabinet seat they get (thus, this is consistent with the theory of cabinet formation developed by Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Many of the smaller parties are similar to interest groups in other countries, and care only about a select area of legislation or only matters that concern a narrow constituency. These goals are often incompatible with another party's goals,<sup>6</sup> so an extra percentage point for some small or even medium size parties could make a large difference in government influence and policy. However, the marginal value of each additional seat eventually decreases due to the inability of any party to receive a majority of seats and the necessity of including some very small parties in any viable coalition. Remaining seats in the Knesset are allocated using the d'Hondt formula that benefits larger parties (Arian 1998, p. 186). Many lists, though, enter into pre-election pacts to pool remaining votes.

We do not expect that the same notion of a wasted vote applies to the Knesset. Even though the marginal value of an additional Knesset seat presumably does decline in value for most voters, it never becomes negative. We cannot think of any realistic scenario where a voter would desire that their favorite party should not maximize votes.<sup>7</sup> However, since the marginal value of additional seats does decline, it is possible that the marginal value of increasing the vote share of one party may exceed the marginal value of increasing the vote share of one's favorite party. The logic we are trying to capture is that, to a voter, it may matter less if a large list like One Israel wins 24 or 25, or even 26 seats. However, another seat or two may greatly aid a smaller party, such as the secularist Shinui, or the leftist Meretz, so they desire to cast a vote for the smaller party. Based upon the fact that a voter must take into account the number of mandates a party is expected to receive, whether or not a particular party will act as a "pivot," and which parties will receive representation in the cabinet, we expect to observe strategic voting for the Knesset. However, we hypothesize that strategic considerations will be stronger for Prime Minister than for the Knesset since the probability of "wasting" ones vote is much lower under rules of parliamentary representation.

*C) Unified Model of Competition:* The policy outcomes that result after the election are very much dependent on the winner of the direct election for Prime Minister and the government he forms based on the distribution of seats in the Knesset. Since the policy outcomes are dependent on the results of two simultaneous elections, a properly defined utility maximization model of voting must consider:

- a) The voter's preferences for the Prime Ministerial candidates.
- b) The voter's preferences for Knesset representation.

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<sup>6</sup> For example, the two Russian parties might seek control of the Interior Ministry, but so will three religious parties. One religious party might desire either another religious party or a Russian party to get the ministry.

<sup>7</sup> There is a theoretical possibility that a voter dislikes the party whom their favorite party has an agreement to pool any unallocated votes, and would desire to vote for another party rather than see their vote pooled. Expecting one's party to have extra votes requires an exceptional level of sophistication, if not a crystal ball. In these circumstances, the probability of one's vote being enough for the list to get another seat remains positive, so it seems highly unlikely that many voters would defect for these reasons.

- c) The voter's expectations of who will win the direct election (in the first or second round).
- d) The voter's expectations of the distribution of power in the Knesset.

We compare strategic behavior in the two related contexts, but complicating matters is that the preferences for Knesset (or Prime Minister) may be conditional on the expectations of the outcome of the election of the Prime Minister (Knesset). If voters expect their favorite candidate to win the election for Prime Minister, then a sincere vote may be cast for the party of the Prime Minister or another party that more closely reflects the voter's policy preferences. Sincere vote for either the party of the Prime Minister or an extreme party may not be desirable if voters expect their favored candidate to lose. A vote for a party in "the pivot" with the opportunity to be influential in any coalition may be desirable to voters who expect their favorite candidate for Prime Minister to lose or are uncertain about the outcome. For example, the leftist<sup>8</sup> Meretz list could expect to exert little influence on a government led by the rightist Netanyahu, but would be an important player in almost any government formed by challenger Ehud Barak. So, a voter who expects Netanyahu to win may choose instead to vote for a small party such as the secularist Shinui that (if strong) would have more influence in a Netanyahu-led coalition. However, if the voters expect Barak to win, then a vote for Meretz may result in the highest expected utility for the voter. Increasing support for Meretz affects the possibility that Barak could build a coalition entirely from parties on the left and center, or that left or secular interests would be stronger in a broad or unity coalition arrangement.

So, we hypothesize that the vote for Prime Minister may reflect expectations of who will win, but voting for a party other than the party of the candidate for Prime Minister will reflect a sincere appreciation for the different party. Alternatively, split ticket voting will occur as the result of a different set of strategic considerations for Knesset, based on expectations of coalition power interacting with expectations of who will be the Prime Minister.

### ***1999 Israeli Election***

As a multi-candidate runoff election in a country with a high degree of media-reported polling, the 1999 Israeli elections provided an excellent case to examine strategic voting outside the American context. Israelis are sophisticated consumers of political information, and the Israeli media provides it incessantly. Virtually every major media source conducts weekly polls during a campaign and these poll results top the news coverage. Such an environment is the natural habitat of the strategic voter. In addition, the unique electoral rules governing the 1999 Israeli elections are ideally suited to this investigation, as will be described below. We looked to this case, then, in anticipation of understanding the voting relationship between voter preferences,

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<sup>8</sup> Careful readers will note that it is more appropriate to characterize most major parties along the "dove-hawk" security dimension. Since Microsoft Word does not believe that dove can be made into an adjective in English, we use the traditional comparative left-right terminology and warn our readers that left-right in contemporary Israel does not refer to economic policy. Nonetheless, left-right is the most common terms employed in the polity to describe the primary political cleavage (see also Arian and Shamir 1983). Doves flock to parties of the left.

candidate evaluations, and viability assessments in a multi-candidate election. First we present a discussion of our case:

### *The Campaign for Prime Minister*

In the direct election for Prime Minister, the incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu from the right-wing Likud party faced four challengers: Azmi Bishara, Ehud Barak, Yitzhak Mordecai and Benny Begin. In our analyses, we exclude Bishara and Begin since they were extremely marginal candidates from the start until their ultimate withdrawal. Bishara, a Christian, ran simply to set the precedent that an Israeli Arab nationalist could run, but was never a serious contender even in the Arab sector. Begin, the son of the late Likud icon, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, split off from the Likud to the far right because he felt that Netanyahu was a compulsive prevaricator utterly lacking in integrity. Begin also feared the possibility that Netanyahu would implement the Wye River peace accord with the Palestinians. Though many, even on the left, respected Begin’s personal honesty and integrity, his ultra-right positions regarding the peace process relegated him to a fringe candidacy before he eventually bowed out.

The two remaining candidates, Barak and Mordecai, were both significant contenders against Netanyahu. Barak had been the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces and the Defense Minister under Prime Minister Shimon Peres following the Rabin assassination. He took the helm of the center-left Labor party after the 1996 elections, when Peres lost to Netanyahu. Emulating Clinton and Blair, Barak led the party towards the center to beat Netanyahu. Though the far left considered Barak too right-wing, they acquiesced to his candidacy because they considered Netanyahu anathema. They sought Netanyahu’s defeat at all costs because they blamed Netanyahu for the Rabin assassination and for setbacks in the peace process. Barak ran as the head of One Israel, a joint list from the Labor Party and two tiny parties - the religious peace party, Meimad, and former Netanyahu cabinet minister David Levy’s Sephardic [Jews of North African or Middle Eastern descent] party, Geshar.

Mordecai, a Kurdish Jew born in Iraq, was Netanyahu’s Defense Minister until February 1999, shortly before the calling of early elections. Mordecai was considering leaving the Likud to ally with Netanyahu’s former Finance Minister, Dan Meridor, who had already resigned. When Netanyahu discovered Mordecai’s contacts with Meridor, he dismissed Mordecai immediately. Mordecai then joined a new Center Party together with Meridor, Tel Aviv mayor Roni Milo and former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak. They put forward a parliamentary list composed of “all-stars” from all parts of the political spectrum, united primarily by disrespect for Netanyahu and vague centrist policy aspirations and appeals to Sephardic voters.

But in the three-way race that developed between Netanyahu, Barak and Mordecai, the strategic competition was largely between Barak and Mordecai over who was the more viable challenger to Netanyahu. Indeed, Mordecai ran campaign ads that explicitly called for strategic voting until the last week of the campaign (Harris, May 12, 1999). Though polls showed him a distant third in the three-way race, he claimed that polls showed he had the best chance of defeating Netanyahu head-to-head, and, to a

background of rolling dice, exhorted voters not to gamble on Barak against Netanyahu. As the campaign progressed, Barak was not only preferred to Mordecai by the voters, but polls identified him as the most viable candidate head-to-head against Netanyahu as well (see Figure 1 and 2). Left without even the viability claim, Mordecai withdrew from the race the morning before the election. Barak went on to defeat Netanyahu in the first round.

[[Figures 1](#) and [2](#) about here]

These events remind us that no account of strategic voting would be complete without mentioning that on the two-way street of democracy, not only does information about candidate viability and electoral competitiveness influence levels of strategic voting, but indications of strategic voting also influence elite behavior, such as the choices made by candidates to remain in an electoral contest or to withdraw. In the particular case considered here, the Israeli elections in 1999, all candidates but the two with the most support, Barak and Netanyahu, withdrew from the race for Prime Minister in the final days of the campaign precisely because of the levels of strategic votes they anticipated being cast.

### *The Campaign for Knesset*

The need for an election was created in December 1998, after the Knesset voted to dissolve itself when Netanyahu failed to garner enough support for his security policies. While much of the Prime Minister's campaign focused on the incumbent Netanyahu, his personality and the peace process, other concerns played important roles in the campaign for parliamentary representation. Included in these concerns were special benefits for ultra-orthodox religious Jews and recent immigrants (especially from the former Soviet Union), and the prosecution for bribery of a prominent leader of Shas, the Sephardi religious party, Rabbi Aryeh Deri.

Labor had been the largest party in the out-going Knesset, with 34 seats or mandates. To Labor's left was Meretz, a coalition of doves and secularists, with nine seats. Four seats were held by Arab parties, and another five were held by the Israeli communists (Hadash). Netanyahu's Likud (and allied parties on the same list) won 32 seats. A small party further right held two seats. Netanyahu's coalition included Shas, an ultra-orthodox religious party supported primarily by Sephardi Jews (ten seats), the orthodox Zionists, National Religious Party (NRP or Mafdal, nine seats) and another ultra-orthodox religious party (four seats). Yisrael B'aliya, a party articulating the concerns of the predominantly secular new immigrants won seven seats, and the centrist Third Way, who campaigned against withdrawal from the Golan Heights, held four seats.

The Knesset campaign featured several significant new voices: a right-wing Russian immigrant party, Yisrael Beiteinu led by Netanyahu's former chief of staff, Avigdor Lieberman, Mordecai's moderate "all-star" Center Party, and the secular Shinui (Change). Shinui had participated as a part of the Meretz list in the two previous elections, but decided to run an independent list in 1999. Shinui, led by a popular Israeli talk show personality Tommy Lapid, emphasized opposition to the influence of the religious parties along with free-market policies and an ambiguous approach to the peace

process. Many smaller parties contested the election, including a party advocating the legalization of marijuana, an environmentalist party, and a party led by former model and cosmetics queen, Pnina Rosenblum. Of these, only Am Echad (One Nation), a party led by national union leader Amir Peretz, crossed the threshold.

Israeli voters chose from a bewildering array of choices in 1999. To attempt a simplification, Jewish voters could support a party on the left (Labor, Am Echad, Meretz or Hadash), on the right (Likud or the National Unity Party), in the center (Center Party, Third Way), a religious party (NRP, United Torah Judaism), an anti-clerical party (Shinui), an immigrant party (Yisrael B'aliya, Yisrael Beiteinu), or Shas (religious/Sephardi). Voters could decide to support either the largest party on the right or left (Likud and Labor, respectively), or a smaller party articulating a narrower set of interests. Most chose to support one of the smaller parties (see Figure 3).

[[Figure 3: Knesset Results about here](#)]

The number of seats held by the two major parties fell precipitously. Likud, routed amidst Netanyahu's defeat, won only 19 seats. On the right, Begin's National Unity Party won four mandates. Riding Barak's coattails, Labor held onto 26 seats, successful relative to their opponents, but a 24% decline in representation compared to the previous election. Am Echad won two seats and Meretz claimed another nine. Third Way failed to cross the threshold, but the Center Party won 6 seats. The religious parties won 10 mandates, the two immigrant parties won 11 seats,<sup>9</sup> but the big news was the strong showing of two diametrically opposed parties, Shinui and Shas. Shinui won a surprising six seats, while Shas fell just short of becoming the second largest party in the Knesset, with 17 mandates.

In 1999, most expected that the religious parties would likely play a pivotal role in post-election coalition negotiation. During the campaign, it was widely expected that one or both Russian parties, Shas, and the Center Party would also be important components of most winning coalitions. However, as Barak's lead in the polls solidified, commentators raised the question of whether Barak would be able to assemble a coalition entirely from parties that supported the peace process and/or opposed the influence of the religious parties. As a result of the strong showing by such a dissimilar set of small parties, Barak found it difficult to assemble a coalition. The strong showing by Shas and the other religious parties ensured that Barak's government, like almost every Israeli government before him, would include at least one religious party.

### ***Prime Minister Candidate Preferences***

Table 1 reports data from the survey conducted by Diskin. Diskin asked respondents to evaluate the candidates on a thermometer measure of 0-100. In Table 1, we present the percentage of voters who gave each candidate the highest feeling thermometer measure by whom they intended to vote. There is a strong suggestion here of strategic voting. While frontrunners Barak and Netanyahu each captured 97.6% of the

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<sup>9</sup> Parties representing Israeli Arabs, Ra'am (United Arab List), Hadash and Bishara's Balad Party won ten seats.

votes of those who preferred them to any other candidate, Mordecai captures only 68% of the votes when he is the preferred candidate. Similarly, when voters were indifferent between Mordecai and one of the frontrunners, they were much more likely to vote for the frontrunner. Eighty-six percent of those who liked Mordecai and Netanyahu the same (but more than Barak), voted for Netanyahu, and 65% of those who liked Mordecai and Barak the same voted for Barak. When indifferent between Barak and Netanyahu (but liking both better than Mordecai), it was virtually a toss-up over whom the voter would support. Nearly half of the respondents who were indifferent between all three candidates supported Barak. These percentages are similar to the results in the American elections mentioned above (see Abramson et al. 1999). Clearly there were substantial numbers of voters who preferred Mordecai, but voted Barak or even Netanyahu. These defections among voters who preferred Mordecai were much more likely to occur than defections from either Barak or Netanyahu.

**Table 1**

**Expected Vote Choice and Highest Preference for Prime Minister**

| <b>Vote</b>               | <b>Barak</b>   | <b>Netanyahu</b> | <b>Mordecai</b> | <b>Total</b>   |
|---------------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <b>Highest Preference</b> |                |                  |                 |                |
| <b>Barak</b>              | 97.6%<br>(327) | 1.2%<br>(4)      | 1.2%<br>(4)     | 43.5%<br>(335) |
| <b>Netanyahu</b>          | 1.6%<br>(4)    | 97.6%<br>(239)   | 0.8%<br>(2)     | 31.8%<br>(245) |
| <b>Mordecai</b>           | 23.0%<br>(23)  | 9.0%<br>(9)      | 68.0%<br>(68)   | 13.0%<br>(100) |
| <b>B-N Tie</b>            | 56.3%<br>(9)   | 43.8%<br>(7)     | 0%<br>(0)       | 2.1%<br>(16)   |
| <b>N-M Tie</b>            | 4.5%<br>(1)    | 86.4%<br>(19)    | 9.1%<br>(2)     | 2.9%<br>(22)   |
| <b>B-M Tie</b>            | 65.0%<br>(26)  | 7.5%<br>(3)      | 2.8%<br>(11)    | 5.2%<br>(40)   |
| <b>All Tied</b>           | 46.2%<br>(6)   | 30.8%<br>(4)     | 23.1%<br>(3)    | 1.7%<br>(13)   |
| <b>Total</b>              | 51.4%<br>(396) | 37.0%<br>(285)   | 11.7%<br>(90)   | 100%<br>(771)  |

Survey: Diskin (Jewish

Respondents)

Table 2 reports the similar data from the Arian-Shamir survey. Those data show a very comparable pattern. The major exception is the greater reluctance to vote for another candidate among those who preferred Mordecai the most. The difference is likely due to the fact that this survey was conducted over a six-week stretch of the campaign. The polling data presented in [Figure 1](#) clearly show how Mordecai's support eroded over the course of the campaign. Abramson, Aldrich and Diskin (2000) present evidence from

Arian and Shamir’s data that the sample reflected a similar decline in expectations of whether Mordecai would win after the first two weeks in the field. Since Mordecai voters were just as likely to remain loyal to Mordecai if they expected him to win as supporters of the other candidates who expected their candidate to win, it appears that the additional Mordecai loyalists were interviewed early in the sample.

**Table 2**

**Expected Vote Choice and Highest Preference for Prime Minister**

| <b>Vote</b>               | <b>Barak</b>   | <b>Netanyahu</b> | <b>Mordecai</b> | <b>Total</b>   |
|---------------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <b>Highest Preference</b> |                |                  |                 |                |
| <b>Barak</b>              | 94.7%<br>(374) | 3.3%<br>(13)     | 2.0%<br>(8)     | 41.1%<br>(395) |
| <b>Netanyahu</b>          | 4.2%<br>(14)   | 94.9%<br>(316)   | 0.9%<br>(3)     | 34.6%<br>(333) |
| <b>Mordecai</b>           | 19.6%<br>(21)  | 7.5%<br>(8)      | 72.9%<br>(78)   | 11.1%<br>(107) |
| <b>B-N Tie</b>            | 54.5%<br>(6)   | 45.5%<br>(5)     | 0               | 1.1%<br>(11)   |
| <b>N-M Tie</b>            | 0.4%<br>(4)    | 1.4%<br>(13)     | 0.2%<br>(2)     | 2.0%<br>(19)   |
| <b>B-M Tie</b>            | 21.1%<br>(40)  | 11.1%<br>(6)     | 14.8%<br>(8)    | 5.6%<br>(54)   |
| <b>All Tied</b>           | 41.7%<br>(18)  | 48.8%<br>(21)    | 9.3%<br>(4)     | 4.5%<br>(43)   |
| <b>Total</b>              | 49.6%<br>(477) | 39.7%<br>(382)   | 10.7%<br>(103)  | 100%<br>(962)  |

Survey: Arian and Shamir (Jewish Respondents)

As Table 3 shows (from the Arian and Shamir survey), a significant number of respondents indicated an inclination to vote strategically. When survey respondents were asked directly if they would change their vote if their favorite candidate had no chance of winning, 11.04% replied “yes” or “definitely yes” – again a percentage quite close to the percentage of strategic voters in the American context. We categorized nearly the same number of respondents as “sophisticated” in the sample (see Table 6a). 51% of the respondents answered that they would definitely not vote strategically. One should recall that 70% of the sample planned to vote for candidates who were expected to do well, Barak and Netanyahu. This may have made answering the question a difficult, academic exercise for many respondents who may have also been thinking that this question measured their

**Table 3**

Question: Would you change your vote if your candidate has no chance of winning?

|                       |       |       |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|
| <b>Definitely No</b>  | 50.8% | (502) |
| <b>No</b>             | 38.2% | (377) |
| <b>Yes</b>            | 9.7%  | (96)  |
| <b>Definitely Yes</b> | 1.3%  | (13)  |

Survey: Arian and Shamir

willingness to support their candidate or parties' traditional opponent.

***Prime Minister: Viability Expectations***

For strategic voting to take place, voters must evaluate not only candidate preferences, but viability expectations as well. Low expected viability gives a strong impetus for voters who prefer that candidate to defect strategically to their second choice. We measure viability in two ways. Diskin's survey asked the survey respondents to estimate each candidates' chances of winning.<sup>10</sup> We then normalize their responses so that the answers sum to 100%. Arian and Shamir asked who the respondent thought would advance to the second round election. If the respondent expected a first round winner, then they were asked to specify who they thought it would be (see Table 4). Tables 4 and 5 show the expected election outcomes of the voters.

[[Table 4](#) About here]

Most respondents expected that Barak and Netanyahu would advance to the second round. Few thought one or the other would win in the first round, consistent with the information from the weekly polls that were published while the surveys were being administered. Nearly 80% of the respondents to the Arian and Shamir questionnaire expected Netanyahu to reach the second round of the multi-candidate contest, and an additional 5.5% predicted an outright first round victory in such a race. Similarly, 76.3% expected Barak to reach the second round and 6.3% expected an outright first round victory. 70.6% of the respondents expected Barak and Netanyahu to oppose each other in a run-off. Mordecai's candidacy was perceived as substantially less viable and the expectations were radically lower than for either Netanyahu or Barak. Less than 13% of the respondents expected him to even reach the second round, with a miniscule 1.7% predicting an outright first round victory.

**Table 5**

**Expectations of Election Outcomes**

**Respondent's Intended Vote for Prime Minister by the Candidate the Respondent Believes will Win the Election**

| <b>Vote \ Predicted Winner</b> | <b>Netanyahu</b> | <b>Barak</b>   | <b>Mordecai</b> | <b>Total</b>    |
|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <b>Netanyahu</b>               | 96.8%<br>(362)   | 2.4%<br>(9)    | 0.8%<br>(3)     | 39.8%<br>(374)  |
| <b>Barak</b>                   | 11.4%<br>(53)    | 87.5%<br>(405) | 1.1%<br>(5)     | 49.3%<br>(463)  |
| <b>Mordecai</b>                | 33.3%<br>(34)    | 31.4%<br>(32)  | 35.3%<br>(36)   | 10.9%<br>(102)  |
| <b>Total</b>                   | 47.8%<br>(449)   | 47.5%<br>(446) | 4.7%<br>(44)    | 100.0%<br>(939) |

<sup>10</sup> Diskin's survey actually asked two sets of questions about probable outcomes, about who would win the election and who would advance to the second round.

Table 5 presents the crosstab results for intended vote choice and the expected winner. Less than 5% expected Mordecai to be the winner, and, in fact, two-thirds of those who intended to vote for Mordecai expected him to lose. The expectations for Netanyahu and Barak were virtually a dead heat with 47.3% and 47.9% respectively predicting them as the winner. This perception of a tight electoral contest between Netanyahu and Barak coupled with low viability expectations for Mordecai likely fueled intentions to vote strategically among Mordecai supporters. These defections may well have led to a vicious cycle of poor polling results, leading even more of Mordecai’s supporters to support another candidate, further decreasing his chances. While the percentage of Barak voters (46.9%) largely mimicked victory expectations, Netanyahu’s reputation did better than the actual candidacy, as the victory expectations outpaced voters (37.9%) by nearly ten percentage points. Most of those who thought Barak would win the election voted for Barak. Almost everyone who expected to vote for Netanyahu expected Netanyahu to triumph.

**Distributions of Voting Types among the Entire Electorate and by Supporters of Each Candidate**

**Table 6a**

|                        | <b>Entire Electorate</b> | <b>Netanyahu Voters Only</b> | <b>Barak Voters Only</b> | <b>Mordecai Voters Only</b> |
|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Straightforward</b> | 76.0% (563)              | 86.9% (253)                  | 75.8% (292)              | <b>27.7% (18)</b>           |
| <b>Sincere</b>         | 11.2% (83)               | 2.1% (6)                     | <b>9.4% (36)</b>         | 63.1% (41)                  |
| <b>Sophisticated</b>   | 9.5% (70)                | 8.5% (25)                    | <b>10.9% (42)</b>        | 4.6% (3)                    |
| <b>Irrational</b>      | 3.4% (25)                | 2.4% (7)                     | 3.9% (15)                | 4.6% (3)                    |

Survey: Arian and Shamir

**Table 6b**

|                        | <b>Entire Electorate</b> | <b>Netanyahu Voters Only</b> | <b>Barak Voters Only</b> | <b>Mordecai Voters Only</b> |
|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Straightforward</b> | 69.8% (518)              | 85.0% (237)                  | 71.1% (270)              | <b>13.3% (11)</b>           |
| <b>Sincere</b>         | 22.2% (165)              | 4.7% (13)                    | 21.8% (83)               | 83.1% (54)                  |
| <b>Sophisticated</b>   | 4.5% (33)                | 5.7% (16)                    | 4.5% (17)                | 0% (0)                      |
| <b>Irrational</b>      | 3.5% (26)                | 4.7% (13)                    | 2.6% (10)                | 3.6% (3)                    |

Survey: Diskin

Putting together preferences and probabilities of winning, we get the ordinal breakdown of voter types presented in Table 6a and Table 6b for the entire electorate as well as for the supporters of each candidate. “Sincere” voters, for purposes of this analysis, are those who intended to vote for their most preferred candidate despite believing that the candidate did not have the highest chance of winning. “Sophisticated” or “strategic” voters are those who believed that their second-most preferred candidate

was more likely to win than their favorite, and they intended to vote for that second-best alternative. “Straightforward” voters are those who believed their most preferred candidate was the most likely to win (or had the best chance of beating their least preferred candidate) and intended to vote for their favorite. For these “straightforward” voters, their strategic choice is the same as their sincere choice so we cannot, therefore, discriminate between strategic and sincere voting strategies for these cases (Farquharson 1969). We classify most voters in both surveys as straightforward, since they thought that the candidate whom they were going to vote for was going to win.

Comparing the two surveys reveals some variation in the distribution of voter types. The Arian and Shamir data shows that a slightly higher percentage of the voters are inclined to vote for the candidate they like the most and feel is going to win. More Diskin respondents are categorized as “sincere.” Many of the sincere respondents to Diskin survey are Barak voters. More than one in five of the Barak supporters in the Diskin survey are pessimistic about their candidate’s chances of winning the election, choosing to support Barak even though they felt that he was not going to prevail in the election. More Barak and Mordecai supporters thought their candidate would win when they spoke to Arian and Shamir’s investigators. More Barak voters preferred another candidate, according to Arian and Shamir.

These differences can be attributed to the longer time that Arian and Shamir spent in the field, both before and after Diskin administered his survey. Earlier respondents (4+ weeks before the election) in Arian and Shamir’s study who intended to vote for Mordecai thought that Mordecai had the best chance of winning in what they saw as essentially a head-to-head Mordecai-Netanyahu race (45% expected him to win versus 42% and 12% respectively for Netanyahu and Barak). However, later respondents who were Mordecai supporters calculated that he now had the worst chance of winning, slightly behind Netanyahu but far behind Barak (27% expected him to win versus 31% and 42% respectively for Netanyahu and Barak, see [Figure 4](#)). Fewer and fewer of those who gave Mordecai the highest rating on the feeling thermometers intended to vote for him. The last week Arian and Shamir were in the field (after Diskin completed his study), only 2 out of 35 respondents they interviewed gave Mordecai the highest rating on the feeling thermometers and intended to vote for him.

Meanwhile, earlier respondents who were Barak supporters thought that he had by far the best chance of winning in what they saw as essentially a head-to-head Barak-Netanyahu race (79% expected him to win versus 20% and 2% respectively for Netanyahu and Barak). These lopsided expectations became significantly more lopsided as later respondents who were Barak supporters not only wrote off Mordecai completely, but increased their expectation of a Barak win by 11 percentage points at Netanyahu's direct expense (90% expected Barak to win versus 10% and 0% respectively for Netanyahu and Mordecai, see Table 7). Only 3 out of the 101 respondents contacted the final week by Arian and Shamir who intended to vote for Barak thought Netanyahu would win.

**Table 7**

**Barak Voters: Which candidate is expected to win the election?**

| <b>Weeks before Election</b> | <b>Expected Winner</b> |       |          |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-------|----------|
|                              | Netanyahu              | Barak | Mordecai |
| 4+                           | 19.7%                  | 37.6% | 1.7%     |
| 2-3                          | 13.7%                  | 85.8% | 0.5%     |
| 1                            | 3.0%                   | 97.0% | 0.0%     |

Source: Arian and Shamir

We can compare these results to the parallel results from the study of the U.S. presidential nomination contests of 1988 (Abramson, et al., 1992, esp. Table 3). In that case, there were considerably fewer straightforward voters (largely because there were still a large number of viable candidates in those contests), with proportionately more sophisticated and irrational types, and about comparable percentages of sincere voters. At this point, it therefore appears that there are some broad similarities across very different electoral institutions. Continued comparisons across a range of contests is important, because it will enable scholars to judge the relative impact of varying numbers of candidates and competitive conditions.

***Knesset Party Preferences***

Neither survey includes feeling thermometer scores for each and every party. However, we tried to get an idea of the distribution of preferences for some of the smaller parties by looking at which issues were most salient to the voters, available feeling thermometer data and who the respondents expected to vote for (compared to who they reported voting for after the election).

Arian and Shamir ask respondents to identify the most important problem facing Israel, and then enquire which party will be best at solving the issue. Nearly 27% of all respondents identified a party other than the three parties, One Israel, Likud or the Center Party, running Prime Ministerial candidates (see Table 8). While this number is large, it is much less than the proportion of voters who supported a smaller party with their Knesset vote. While many of these voters may have used their vote to support this smaller party, other voters of smaller parties were not motivated by the largest problem they identified to a survey researcher before the election.

| <b>Table 8</b>  |                          |       |
|---|--------------------------|-------|
| <b>Which party would best be able to handle the most important problem facing Israel?</b> |                          |       |
| <b>Labor, Likud, or Center</b>  | 73.1%                    | (786) |
| <b>Other</b>  | 26.9%                    | (289) |
| N=1075  | Survey: Arian and Shamir |       |

What motivated the Knesset vote? Arian and Shamir asked respondents about seven different issues. Respondents could indicate whether each issue would be a large influence, exert some influence, be a small influence, or not be an influence at all over their Knesset vote. Four questions regarding peace and security inspired over 60% of the sample to say that the issue would be a large influence on their Knesset vote. Over 50% answered that party differences on social policy would be a large influence on their Knesset vote. Nearly the same number said that differences on state and religion would be a large influence on their Knesset vote. The only issue that most respondents did not say would be a large influence on their Knesset vote was the controversy surrounding the trial of Shas leader Rabbi Aryeh Deri. Less than 20% of the sample thought that it would be a large influence. Ironically, of this series of questions, this response may best reflect support for a single party, as Shas won about 13% of the final vote after capitalizing on the anger and frustration felt by many Sephardim about the Deri trial.

The other survey items should not be quickly dismissed, as differing opinions on the peace process determine which camp the voters support. Many voters belong to a camp (nationalist or peace),<sup>11</sup> and then choose a party within that camp. Data from Diskin's survey reinforces the perception of a deep divide between the nationalist and peace camps (Arian and Shamir 2000). Diskin asked respondents how they would vote if they had a second vote to cast for Knesset (see [Table 9](#)). 44% of Labor voters answered that if they had a second vote, they would vote for Meretz or another left party, while nearly 70% of Meretz voters said that their second vote would be for Labor or another party on the left. Most Likud voters said that they would support another nationalist party or one of the religious parties. The second choice of most Shas supporters was the Likud or another religious party. Few voters of nationalist or religious parties listed a party on the left as their second choice, and few on the left listed a right or religious party as their second choice. The only parties who appeal to voters in both camps were the two Russian parties, Shinui and the Center Party. At least 15% of the supporters of these parties named a party on the left or the right as their second choice, although more than half of the Center Party and Shinui's voters liked a party on the left second-best.

Arian and Shamir provide feeling thermometer scores for four parties, Meretz, Likud, One Israel (Labor and allies) and the Center Party. We also include the feeling thermometer for Rabbi Deri, which we employ as a proxy for the party he leads, Shas. In [Table 10](#) we present the expected vote choice of the respondents along with the party they ranked the highest on the feeling thermometer. The last row includes all those respondents who gave the same feeling thermometer scores to two or more parties. Since the feeling thermometers do not cover the entire range of vote options, we present the results as percentages of the expected votes. In [Tables 10](#) and [11a](#) we can see that over 75% of those who expected to vote for Likud and the Center Party, ranked that party the highest on the feeling thermometers. Relatively fewer, about 60% of those who expected to vote for One Israel or Meretz, actually expected to vote for one of those parties in the

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<sup>11</sup> Religious voters, especially supporters of the National Religious Party, espouse nationalist positions on the peace process (Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar 1998). While religious voters predominantly espouse nationalist positions on the peace process, the parties themselves often try to position themselves between the two camps. For example, the Shas campaign slogan was "Lo Yamin v' Lo Smole" ("Not right and Not left"). For differences in religious party strategies see Kopelowitz and Diamond (1998).

peace camp. 59 respondents ranked One Israel and Meretz the same, high score and account for the comparatively high percentage of expected voters for those parties who gave two or more parties the same feeling thermometer score. When these respondents are considered, the percentage of voters who expected to vote for One Israel and Meretz and ranked one, the other or both as their favorite on the feeling thermometer scale rises to 77%, equivalent to the percentage of expected voters for Likud and the Center Party. Presumably, if we had a feeling thermometer score for another right or religious party included in the data (or an actual feeling thermometer for Shas), we might find more respondents giving Likud the same feeling thermometer score as this other right or religious party.

All respondents who will vote for the party they rank the highest on the feeling thermometer scale must either be considered sincere or straightforward because they expect to vote for the party they like the most. While our finding that three out of every four Knesset voters were sincere or straightforward might seem high, if one compares this figure to our estimate for Prime Ministerial voters, the number is low. Despite fears of a wasted vote, about 90% of all respondents expected to act as sincere or straightforward voters when choosing the Prime Minister. Naturally, some of this difference may be caused by the absence of feeling thermometer data for many parties. However, this problem may be balanced in part by the overestimated support for the two major parties in the sample (and the underestimated support for most of the small parties, [Table 12](#)). With half the respondents, the post-election question is a better estimate of the true distribution of Knesset votes.<sup>12</sup>

Our data from Diskin differs slightly from the expected vote Arian and Shamir uncovered (see [Table 12](#)). Both surveys overestimated the number of voters for One Israel and Likud, however, only 15.3% of Diskin's sample expected to vote for Likud, much less than in Arian and Shamir's data. Nearly 11% of the sample expected to vote for Meretz, double Arian and Shamir's results.<sup>13</sup> Both underestimated support for the religious parties, although nearly 10% of Diskin's respondents expected to vote for Shas, an estimate that is much closer to the share of the electorate Shas received on election day than Arian and Shamir's low 3.2%.

Shas appears to have attracted many voters late in the campaign. 15% of the undecided voters in Arian and Shamir's sample considered voting for Shas. More

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<sup>12</sup> The post-election vote recall, when broken down by the pre-election feeling thermometer scores, show that fewer voters who ranked One Israel or Likud highest actually wound up voting for either party (Table 11b). Ten or more respondents who ranked One Israel highest wound up voting for Meretz, Shinui or another party of the left. A similar number of those who ranked Likud highest, wound up voting for Shinui, Shas, or a religious party. Many voters decided not to cast a vote for Center, suggesting that the party's support eroded over the course of the campaign along with support for Mordecai's candidacy. Meretz enjoyed the vote support of many who had given Meretz the same high score as one or more other parties. Ironically, more Shas voters ranked Likud highest on the feeling thermometer than ranked Rabbi Deri highest on the feeling thermometer (although his conviction just before the election might well have affected the rankings of Shas).

<sup>13</sup> Arian and Shamir followed up with those respondents who were uncertain about their vote choice to enquire who they were thinking of supporting. Many of these undecided voters were on the left, naming One Israel, Meretz and Shinui as the parties they were considering voting for.

respondents to Arian and Shamir recalled voting for Shas after the election than intended to vote for Shas prior to the election even though the pre-election sample size was nearly three times the size. Table 11b breaks down how voters for the five parties ranked the party on the feeling thermometer scale. 63.6% of Shas voters ranked Shas (Deri) lower than one or more of the other four parties. Only 11.4% ranked Shas (Deri) highest on the feeling thermometers. Less than 30% of Meretz voters preferred one of the major parties to Meretz, although nearly half gave Meretz the same rating as another party. These results suggest that, contrary to the hypothesis that split ticket voters sincerely preferred a smaller party, many Shas and Meretz voters did not prefer that party to one of the major parties (even though a majority of each party's supporters in the pre-election sample ranked each party highest or tied for highest on the feeling thermometers).

### ***Knesset Party "Viability"***

It is absurd to ask about a party's chance of winning when the spoils of victory are not determined in a winner-take-all fashion. This does not imply that expectations of a party's success is irrelevant to the calculations of a rational voter. Instead of winning, the voter might be expected to consider the allocation of power in parliament and cabinet. The most powerful parties are a necessary part of any minimal winning or minimal connected winning coalition. So, power comes from an interaction between a party's ideological location and its size (Strom, Budge and Laver 1994). Power in Israeli governments can also stem directly from the party's size alone, as cabinet portfolios tend to be distributed proportionately to the size of the party. Size can affect the amount of bargaining leverage the party might enjoy in coalition negotiations. As discussed above, sufficient size of one party may make it such a necessary component of a coalition that a party whose interests it opposes (such as the religious parties and the secular Shinui) can be effectively frozen out of the policy process.

Over 70% of the respondents to Diskin's survey expected One Israel to be the largest party in the Knesset. This is important because it means that most of the sample was deciding which party to support on the assumption that Labor would have the most seats. Another 23% thought that the Likud would receive the most Knesset votes, so hardly anyone expected another party to be the largest party. In [Table 13](#) we present expectations of which party was going to get the largest number of seats and the range of seats they were expected to get. Regardless of which party the respondent thought was going to have the largest delegation in the Knesset, expectations of the number of seats won by the largest party averaged 32 seats. In [Table 14](#) we present the mean expectations of how many seats the party the respondent supports is going to get. Only two parties, Shas and Shinui, won more mandates than their voters, on average, expected them to win. Most respondents overestimate the success of the largest parties, as well as overestimate the popularity of their own party. This is consistent with much of the literature in psychology about expectations of events (Fox 1999).

We expect that a strong showing by the major parties, and especially Labor, would be a disincentive to cast a vote for the other major parties. Instead, voters decide to cast a vote in favor of smaller parties to influence a coalition including the largest party. As discussed earlier, the marginal value to a voter of an additional seat for a small

party may be higher than the marginal value of an additional seat for a major party since that additional seat may greatly increase the small parties' bargaining power vis-a-vis the major coalition partner(s). Often, the third largest party in the Knesset is in the strongest negotiating position with the party of the Prime Minister. The value of an additional seat for the largest party remains high since that additional seat may provide leverage in coalition negotiations with the smaller parties. The larger the party, the greater the leverage they will have relative to both the large and the small parties both in narrow and in broad coalitions or cabinets. Therefore, it is rational (and similar to, but not theoretically identical to, straightforwardness) for supporters of the largest party to remain committed to voting for that party. So, we exclude all those respondents who thought their party was going to be the largest in the Knesset (77% of whom are One Israel supporters) to focus on how expectations of the largest party size influences supporters of other parties.<sup>14</sup>

To test whether the size of the largest party is a disincentive to vote for another major party, we perform a probit analysis using Diskin's data. The dependent variable is one when the respondents expresses a plan to vote for one of the three major parties, One Israel, Likud or the Center Party. We concentrate on two independent variables, the number of seats the largest party is expected to have and the expected number of seats for the party the respondent intends to cast a vote. Our primary expectation is that the expected size of the largest party, which runs as high as sixty seats, should decrease the chance of voting for a major party since the size of the largest party should decrease the likelihood of voting for another major party. Secondly, since larger parties are by definition those that win more seats than small parties, the number of seats the respondent expects their favorite party to win should be positively related to voting for a major party. As controls we use seven dummy variables, six of which we expect would encourage voting for a minor party. These controls include three demographic variables: whether the respondent is very religious (or ultra-orthodox, "Haredi"), whether the respondent is a Russian immigrant, and whether the respondent is in a poor financial situation. The ultra-orthodox and the Russian immigrants are served by small parties that represent their special interests in the Knesset. We also include a dummy as to whether the respondent placed themselves on either extreme on issues regarding security and foreign affairs, leading us to predict that they might support one of the smaller parties at the ideological extremes. Two other variables are taken from a question about what is the main reason why a respondent would support a party. Five answers were given to the respondent. The modal response was support for positions on foreign affairs and defense. Those who answered that non-security issues are the main reason why they support a political party, and those who answered that the main reason the party represents "people like me", were included as separate dummy variables. We expect that both variables will decrease the likelihood of voting for a major party because the main divide between the major parties is over security issues, while minor parties like Shinui, Shas and the Russian parties emphasize non-security issues, especially for particular constituency groups (Shamir and Arian 1999). We also include a dummy for whether the respondent remembers casting a vote for one of the two largest parties in the previous election (Labor and Likud in 1996), which we expect would dispose the respondent to vote for one of the major parties.

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<sup>14</sup> We also performed the analysis on all voters, and the results were substantively similar.

Our analysis confirms that the expected size of the largest party decreases the likelihood that the voter intends to cast a vote for a major party (see Table 15). Voting in the previous election for a major party and the number of seats that the respondents' party was expected to win significantly influenced voting for a major party. The additional variables, as expected, either decreased the likelihood of intending to cast a vote for a major party or were statistically insignificant.

Using first differences, we investigated how changing the voter's expectations of the size of the largest party in the Knesset would influence their likelihood of voting for one of the three major parties. Holding all controls constant at their modal response (zero), we observe that the likelihood of voting for a major party increases when the expected size of the largest party decreases. Table 15 illustrates that a respondent would be expected to cast a Knesset vote for one of the three major parties only when the voter expects the largest party to win about twenty five mandates and their party to win slightly fewer seats. This is not surprising since a situation in which the two largest parties have about the same number of seats would describe a fragmented parliament with a high chance of a national unity government.

If a respondent believes that the largest party in the newly elected Knesset will win more than 32 mandates (the mean prediction), that respondent is not likely to support one of the major parties. When the respondent is supporting a party that they do not expect to win many seats or when the citizen expects the largest party in the Knesset to hold fewer than twenty-five seats, they are predicted to support a minor party.

When varying the value of each of the attitudinal and demographic control variables, we find that the voter is likely to support a minor party regardless of the respondent's expectations of the number of mandates the largest party is likely to receive. The probability that a respondent will support a major party increases sharply if the respondents voted for a major party in 1996. If the respondent supported a major party in 1996, our results show that individual voters are likely to support a major party with more than 13 Knesset seats unless they have wildly high expectations of the size of the largest party (a party with 40 or more mandates).

In conclusion, the relative "viability" of Knesset parties impacts voter considerations. A respondent is most likely to consider voting for another major party when the respondent believes the largest party in the Knesset will only gain approximately twenty-five mandates and they predict their most favored party to gain between ten and fifteen number of seats. This is an interesting finding considering that the largest party captured only 26 mandates. The remaining voters of the major parties either have a history of voting for major parties or believe that the major party they support would also gain the most mandates in the Knesset. However, the expected size of the largest party appears to have little influence over those who we expect to support small parties on the basis of demographic or attitudinal characteristics. We found no evidence to suggest that even when a fragmented Knesset is likely that these respondents hesitate to support a small party.

### *Prime Minister Vote Model*

Using the preferences and the expected viability of the Prime Ministerial candidates, we estimate a model of voting for Prime Minister based on the multicandidate calculus of voting. The multi-candidate calculus of voting presumes that voters will be making their decisions on the basis of maximizing expected utility. In our case expected utility is arrived at by multiplying utility, as measured by feeling thermometer scores for the candidates, by “folded” probabilities expressing the viability of the candidates with reference to the victory point. We otherwise replicate analyses in Abramson, Aldrich, et al. (1992), by testing two statistical models based on the calculus of voting using the folded probability of winning terms.

The dependent variable in the following models is dichotomous. If the respondent planned to vote for their most preferred candidate as measured by the feeling thermometer scores the variable is scored a one. Otherwise, the variable is given a value of zero. The independent variables are comparisons of viability expectations. The survey asked respondents to estimate the chance of the candidate winning. These responses were normalized so that the percentages summed to 100%. The data was then folded at the victory point, 50%. So, the maximum value is 0.5, with a candidate with no chance of winning and a candidate with a 100% chance of winning being assigned a value of zero. By folding the scale at the victory point, high values reflect how close the candidate is to winning an election by a single vote. Rational choice models of the vote argue that the higher the probabilities of a single vote deciding an election, the greater the chance of that vote being cast (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972).

We first computed how the competitiveness of the first- and the second- ranked candidates predicted voting for the favorite candidate. We expected that the closer the probability of the first- ranked candidate winning was to 0.5, the more likely the respondent would cast her vote for the preferred candidate. However, if the likelihood that the second-ranked candidate would win approached 0.5, the less likely the respondent would remain loyal to their favorite candidate. The results of the model are presented in Table 16, confirming our expectations. Both coefficients are large, statistically significant, and signed in the expected direction. We observe a particularly large likelihood to vote for the favorite candidate the closer the probability of him winning was to 50%.

The table of first differences is particularly illustrative. This table presents the estimated probability of planning on voting for the favorite candidate at different levels of the “folded” probability of the candidate winning. We present the effect of the folded probability of the favorite candidate winning at three levels, the minimum (zero), one-third, and the maximum (0.5). We present the effect of the folded probability of the second-favorite candidate winning at four levels, the minimum (zero), the mean (0.196), one-third, and the maximum value (0.5). The mean of the folded probability of the favorite candidate winning is not presented because it is so close to one-third (0.342). One-third is included for illustration because that value includes those candidates who are expected to earn 33% of the vote and a guaranteed spot in a run-off (or a plurality in an even, three-way race).

Expectations that the favorite candidate is in a competitive race have a dramatic effect on how the respondents planned to vote. As the probability of winning approaches 0.5, the likelihood of voting for the favorite candidate soars to no less than 78% or even to 92.7%, depending on the probability of the second-candidate winning. In contrast, when the favorite candidate has surely won or lost, the likelihood of intending to vote for the favorite candidate is small (15.6 to 37%). Most of the increase in the probability of planning to vote for the favorite candidate occurs between the minimum value and one-third. For example, when the folded probability of the second-favorite candidate winning is held at the mean value, the likelihood that the respondent will vote for the favorite candidate rises from 27.4% to 72.3%, an increase of 45 percentage points. Between one-third and the maximum value, the likelihood of intending to vote for the favorite rises nearly 16 percentage points to 88.2%. These results suggest that the probability of voting for the favorite candidate is sensitive to a broad notion of competitiveness rather than just 50%. As the probability of the favorite candidate winning approaches this range of values around fifty, the likelihood of voting for the favorite candidate becomes very high.

Interestingly, when moving from the minimum value to the maximum value of the folded probability of the second- ranked- candidate winning, the probability of intending to vote for the favorite candidate goes down a nearly uniform 20 percentage points at every level of the favorite candidate's folded probability of winning the election. However, unless the favorite candidate's folded probability of winning the election is low (less than 0.28), voters are still predicted to vote for their favorite candidate.

To replicate the analysis in Abramson, et al. 1992, we first measured the effect of differences in "folded" viability on the decision to vote for the favorite candidate. In Table 17,  $P_{12}$  refers to the difference in folded viability between the first- and second-ranked candidates as determined by creating an ordinal ranking based on feeling thermometer scores.  $P_{13}$  is the difference in folded viability between the first- and third-ranked candidates. High values (maximum 0.5) for these independent variables suggest that the favorite candidate's probability of winning is much closer to 50% than the second- (or third- ) highest-ranked candidate. Values approaching zero reflect narrow differences in distance from 50% chance of winning. Negative values mean that the preferred candidate is less likely to be in a close race than the second favorite. Theoretically, if the respondent believes that all three candidates are equally likely to win, the value of both independent variables is zero. Of the three possible paired comparisons only  $P_{12}$  and  $P_{13}$ , both of which should have positive parameters, are presented, since by definition  $P_{23}=P_{13}-P_{12}$  (and so ought have a negative parameter).

The probit estimation of this model appears in Table 17. The overall fit of the model is strong. Both of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant and correctly signed. The impact of  $P_{12}$  is particularly large, suggesting that the competitiveness of the preferred candidate relative to the competitiveness of the second candidate is an important determinant of votes cast for the preferred candidate.

This effect can be understood by considering the table of first differences at maximum and minimum values. We present here the calculated effects of moving the value of each independent variable from zero to its minimum and maximum values. One

can clearly observe how the probability of voting for a favorite candidate rises the higher the value of each independent variable. Although the entire 3 x 3 table can be statistically estimated, only those cases highlighted in bold are arithmetically possible. For example, if  $P_{12}$  is at the maximum value of 0.5, suggesting that favorite candidates have a 50% chance of winning while the second-highest-ranked candidates' chances are hopeless, the third candidate cannot also have a folded probability of zero. But, in this situation,  $P_{13}$  could be at its maximum possible value only if the third candidate had no chance of winning. If this were the case, the normalized probabilities would not sum to one. Since the favorite candidate cannot have a 50% chance of winning against two hopeless candidates, both independent variables cannot both be at the maximum value.

Calculating these differences allows us to estimate that when all the candidates have an equal shot at winning, this model predicts that the voter will vote for her favorite candidate 60.4% of the time. If her favorite candidate has no chance while the other two candidates are locked in a close race, there is only a 10.9% chance that she will vote for her favorite. Conversely, when the second-favorite candidate has no chance of winning, but the favorite and the least-preferred candidate are in a tight race (a realistic scenario for this election), there is a 90.8% chance that the voter will vote for her favorite. As the value of  $P_{13}$  increases, as the least preferred candidate moves further away from the fifty percent mark as compared to the favorite candidate, the chances that the respondent will vote for the most favored candidate increases. In contrast, as the least preferred candidate moves closer to the fifty- percent mark as compared to the most preferred candidate, the chances that the respondent will vote for the most favored candidate decrease. These results confirm our hypothesis that the respondent's estimates as to the chances of her most preferred candidate's chances of winning relative to her second-favorite candidate will influence the decision as to whether the respondent will defect to a lesser preferred but more viable candidate. In short, these are the patterns that would result if voters do, indeed, reason via expected utility maximization.

[Table 18 about here]

Table 18 presents the result of a probit model designed to document more directly the role of expected utility, by formally including utility and probability terms in expectational form. The estimates reported in Table 18 include the same dependent variable as above with three newly created independent variables,  $PB_{12}$ ,  $PB_{13}$ , and  $PB_{23}$ . Each of the new independent variables is the difference in normalized folded probability of winning multiplied by the difference in expected utility as measured by normalized thermometer scores. So,  $PB_{jk} = ([\text{folded}] P_j - [\text{folded}] P_k)(U_j - U_k)$ . Therefore, for example,  $PB_{12}$  is the difference between the most- preferred and second- preferred candidate's probability of winning folded at the victory point (50%) multiplied by the difference between the candidates' thermometer scores. Since the normalized thermometer score for the favorite candidate is equal to one, the difference between the two thermometer scores is always positive. Thus, the sign of  $P_{12}$  is the same as the direction for  $PB_{12}$ , and the sign of  $P_{13}$  is the same as  $PB_{13}$ . So, we expect the coefficient estimates for  $PB_{12}$  and  $PB_{13}$  to be positive. As the gap between the thermometer scores between two candidates increases, the smaller the reduction in magnitude of the  $PB_{12}$  and  $PB_{13}$  compared to the independent variables in the previous model measuring only competitiveness. A larger

value for  $PB_{12}$  or  $PB_{13}$  reflects a larger relative utility for the favorite candidate, making support for the favorite candidate more likely. Conversely, we expect that the parameter estimate for  $PB_{23}$  to be negative because the more the respondent likes the second favorite candidate relative to the least favorite candidate, the more likely he will intend to vote for the second-favorite candidate. Note that (unlike the previous model)  $PB_{23}$  is not equal to the difference in the other two variables.

The coefficients for two variables,  $PB_{13}$  and  $PB_{23}$ , were large and significant. All were signed in the expected direction.  $PB_{12}$  had a relatively smaller coefficient that was only significant at the generous 0.1 standard. This represents somewhat of a surprise and a significant difference between the Israeli case and the American case explored in Abramson, et al. 1992. That analysis found that  $PB_{23}$  was large only for Democrats, while that variable's effect on Republican vote choice was small and insignificant.

$PB_{12}$  had a large, substantively significant effect on vote for the favorite candidate in the U.S., but the table of first differences suggests that in Israel,  $PB_{12}$  only exerted a substantively large effect on voting for the favorite candidate at low levels of  $PB_{13}$ . For example, when both  $PB_{12}$  and  $PB_{13}$  are at their minimum values, moving from  $-0.5$  to  $0.5$  leads to a thirty-percentage point increase in the likelihood of intending to vote for the favorite candidate. In comparison, when  $PB_{13}$  is its mean, moving all the way from the minimum value to the maximum value of  $PB_{12}$  resulted in a mere nine-percentage point increase.

These findings suggests that the decision to vote for the favorite is more sensitive to the multiplicative difference in the probability of winning and the thermometer score between the first- and the least- favored candidate, than to the first- and the second-preferred candidate. Increasing the value of  $PB_{13}$  by one standard deviation results in a 15 to 20 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting for the favorite at most values of the other independent variables. A one standard deviation increase in value ( $0.23$ ) from the mean ( $0.077$ ), increases the probability of voting for the favored candidate to 91.2%. Our model predicts that high levels of  $PB_{13}$  result in a near-certain vote for the preferred candidate. When the other two variables are held constant at their means, but  $PB_{13}$  is at its maximum value, there is a 96.2% chance of voting for the favorite. Even when  $PB_{12}$  is at its minimum value and  $PB_{23}$  is at its maximum value, if  $PB_{13}$  is at the maximum value there is a 49.1% chance of voting for the favorite candidate.

As expected, holding the means of both  $PB_{12}$  and  $PB_{13}$  steady and increasing the value of  $PB_{23}$  dramatically decreases the probability that the respondent will vote for the most liked candidate.  $PB_{23}$  had a large, negative impact on the likelihood of voting for the favorite candidate. This effect is especially visible when there are low values of  $PB_{12}$  and  $PB_{13}$ . When  $PB_{13}$  is high, there are still high probabilities of voting for the favorite at all levels of  $PB_{23}$  unless  $PB_{23}$  has values higher than the mean plus one standard deviation. For example, when  $PB_{23}$  is held constant at its mean,  $PB_{13}$  must be lower than its mean for our model to predict that the respondent would intend to vote for another candidate.

### ***Implications of Prime Minister Vote Models***

Our main finding is that strategic voting does occur in runoff elections, nearly duplicating the results found in the American cases. This result is something of a surprise, given Duverger's account (1963). There, he argued that plurality voting would lead to two-party systems due to both psychological and "mechanical" effects. These effects would not be found in run-off systems lacking, inter alia, the psychological factor studied here as the strategic vote. Contrary, to Cox's (1997) expectations, we find that strategic considerations were not uncommon in a run-off election. In a polity with high levels of information about the candidate's chances of victory, voters demonstrated a propensity to support a candidate in a close contest despite the expectation of a second-ballot.

Our use of folded probability scores is an important methodological refinement. Previous research demonstrated that strategic votes are cast for the candidate with the best chance of winning, but here we present a model that shows that voters are more inclined to vote strategically in support a candidate who is in a very competitive race. This is consistent with rational choice models of voting behavior that argue that voters are motivated, in part, by the probability of their vote making a difference in the outcome of the election. Here we show that voters are much more likely to vote for their preferred candidate if that candidate is more likely to be in a close race than their second candidate. However, when using a multiplicative variable, combining expectations of victory with utility, the difference between the first- and least- favorite candidate exerts the largest influence on voting for the favored candidate.

Israeli voters, when faced with a multi-candidate electoral contest for Prime Minister, responded overwhelmingly as rational voters, considering the viability of the candidates in addition to their sincere preferences for each candidate. When another candidate appeared to be in close competition with their least favorite candidate, they voted for this other candidate. So, now we examine whether they behave similarly for their Knesset vote choices.

### ***Knesset Vote Model***

Most previous research argues that Israeli voters are primarily driven by ideological motivations predicted by a voter's education, religiosity and the Sephardi/Ashkenazi divide (see Shalev with Kis 2000, Shamir and Arian 1999). Arian finds that as religiosity increases, education decreases and whether the voter (or the voter's father) was born in Asia or Africa determines whether they are apt to support Likud, another party on the right, or a religious party (Arian 1998). Arian (1998) found that since the outbreak of the Intifadah in 1987, these voters support these parties primarily because of their positions on peace, security and state/religion issues.

In 1996, during the first election under the hybrid system, Arian (1998, pp. 225-226) found that almost everyone who expected to cast a vote for Likud or Labor said they would have behaved in the same way if the old rules were still in effect. However, one-

third of Meretz supporters said they would have voted for Labor and 12 percent of the voters for religious parties reported that they would have voted for Likud.

This does not go very far towards explaining why increasing numbers of voters left the major parties in 1999. Using the feeling thermometer data available for four parties plus Rabbi Aryeh Deri, the leader of Shas, we calculate an ordinal ranking of parties. We then examine whether or not voters intend to cast a vote for their favorite party. We created the dependent variable by transforming the pre-election Knesset voting intention survey item so that those respondents who voted for the party that received the highest score on the feeling thermometer received a one, and all others were given a zero. The independent variables are comparisons of viability expectations. Since it is inappropriate in a system of proportional representation to ask for chances of a party winning the election, we performed analyses using the published share of the vote for each of the parties at the time of the interview. We used polls administered by Israeli pollster Mina Tzemach and published in the popular Israeli daily *Yediot Ahranot*. The combination of a politically attentive electorate and high readership of the newspaper gives us a reasonable expectation that these published results would be read- and believed by most voters.<sup>15</sup>

In Table 19,  $P_{12}$  refers to the difference in percent of vote between the first- and second- ranked parties, with preference ranking determined by creating an ordinal ranking based on feeling thermometer scores.  $P_{13}$  is the difference between the first- and third- ranked parties. High values for these independent variables suggest that the favorite party's share of the vote is much higher than the second- (or third- ) highest-ranked candidate. Although we could compare all five parties, few would consider voting for any of the five parties and we do not expect the success of the lowest-ranked parties to have much of a bearing on the vote decision. The data closely conforms to our expectations of how voters might rank order the parties, with One Israel supporters liking Meretz or Center second best, Likud voters like Shas or Center, and Center was the modal third-favorite party of every single set of party supporters. None of the models we tested using all five parties challenged this expectation,<sup>16</sup> so we present only  $P_{12}$  and  $P_{13}$ . Recall that by definition  $P_{23}=P_{13}-P_{12}$ .

Unlike the results for the election for Prime Minister, the  $P_{12}$  has a negative coefficient. The size of the favorite party's vote relative to the size of the second favorite party reduces the likelihood of the respondent's consideration of voting for the favorite party. In contrast, the size of the favorite party's vote relative to the size of the third favorite party significantly increases the likelihood of the respondent considering a vote for the favorite party. When the model uses normalized percentages of the vote, the results are similar, except that the effect of  $P_{12}$  is not statistically significant. This is virtually the opposite of our findings when we examine voting intentions for Prime Minister, but we cannot ascertain whether this change is the result of the share of the vote

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<sup>15</sup> We also performed the analysis using actual vote results with similar results. The effect of  $p_{12}$  was not statistically significant and the effect of  $p_{13}$  was larger. Because the actual results contained surprises, notably the success of Shas, and because of the decline in support for the Center Party during the campaign, it is more accurate to use the poll results.

<sup>16</sup> In some models,  $P_{15}$  predicts a significant decrease in the probability of voting for the favorite party.

being correlated with a measure of preference or whether the expected utility model does not describe parliamentary voting.

### *Unified models of voting*

To what extent does a voter's considerations and behavior in one vote affect his or her behavior when casting the second vote towards the composition of a government? In previous sections, we investigate the extent to which preferences for each of the candidates or parties and expectations of the outcome affects voter considerations for the Knesset and the Prime Minister's election separately. Now we examine the two together. Were people who acted in a sophisticated manner when voting for Prime Minister more likely than others to be sophisticated when considering whom to support in the Knesset? We expect that a voter's prediction of the outcome of the election for Prime Minister will influence how they vote for the Knesset. Some parties will be more influential under one Prime Minister than they will be under his opponent. Parties to the left of Labor would expect to have more influence if Barak was Prime Minister than if another of the candidates won. Likewise, parties to the right of Likud (and Likud itself) would have more influence if Netanyahu became Prime Minister. Parties, in the middle, though, would be desirable regardless who the expected winner was- or if the outcome of the race was in doubt.

It is plausible to think that the ability to think strategically when considering a vote in two polls would be only possible if the voter is unusually knowledgeable about politics. Are those who are sophisticated for to take into account strategic considerations when deciding whom they will support for Prime Minister also more likely to be sophisticated when considering their Knesset vote? If true, we would expect sophisticated and sincere voters to be likely to support small (unranked) parties, reflecting a high level of knowledge about these smaller parties and/or the outcome of the election. Sophisticated voters should be more likely to vote for a party other than the one like best, while sincere voters should be unlikely to support another ranked party. Table 20 presents how the categories of voters for Prime Minister intended to vote for Knesset. We found consistency in behavior across both votes. 16% of sophisticated voters for Prime Minister intended to vote for a Knesset party they did not rank the highest. Sincere and sophisticated voters were the most likely to intend to vote for a small party. Those who intended to cast a sincere vote for Prime Minister were the least likely to vote for a "ranked" party other than the one they liked best. However, the most striking finding on this table is that irrational voters for Prime Minister demonstrate a proclivity for voting contrary to their reported levels of affect. 59% irrational voters intended to vote for a Knesset party other than the one they ranked the highest.

Second, we looked to see how supporters of each candidate for Prime Minister intended to vote. Were supporters of one candidate more likely to support smaller parties? Table 21a shows how supporters of each candidate for Prime Minister intended to cast a Knesset vote, while Table 21b shows how they recalled casting a Knesset vote. About 20% of Mordecai and Netanyahu voters intended to vote for a party other than the five we have feeling thermometer data for. Disproportionately fewer Netanyahu voters intended to vote for a party tied with another party for the highest feeling thermometer

ranking. This is not surprising, since we lack feeling thermometer data for all of the religious and right wing parties other than Shas and Likud. However, after the election, more than 60% of those who intended to vote for Netanyahu or Mordecai recalled voting for a party other than the one they preferred most (or as much as any other party). In contrast, Barak's supporters were likely to vote for the party they liked best, or tied for best. This is consistent with our expectation that supporters of Mordecai or Netanyahu, expecting that their candidate would be vanquished, cast a strategic vote for a party that might exert influence in a Barak government.

Based on this descriptive evidence, we tested the proposition that supporters of one candidate for Prime Minister would vote for a smaller party when they expected their own candidate to lose. So, we performed a logit analysis to investigate whether or not people voted for a "straight" ticket, Netanyahu and Likud, Barak and One Israel, or Mordecai and the Center Party. We tested this relationship by expanding our model of strategic Knesset vote considerations. Instead of the dependent variable being a vote for a major party, the unified model's dependent variable is whether or not the respondent intends to cast a straight ticket set of votes. Diskin's survey data estimates that 40% of those who intended to vote for Netanyahu voted for Likud. About 60% of those who intended to vote for the Barak or Mordecai intended to also vote for the parties they led. We added a dummy to the model for all those who thought that their favorite candidate had the best chance of winning, and two interaction terms. These terms interacted the dummy with the size of the largest party in the Knesset, and the size of the party the candidate expected to cast a vote for in the Knesset, respectively. We used interactions because we expect that the size of the largest party in the Knesset, and the anticipated size of the party the respondent supports, to have a greater effect when the respondent expects that his candidate for Prime Minister will prevail. The interaction with the expected size of the largest party should decrease the likelihood that the respondent will intend to cast a straight-ticket vote while interactions with the size of the party should increase the likelihood of casting a straight-ticket vote. We include the same controls as before since the demographic and attitudinal variables are all expected to increase the chances of voting for a small party (and hence, a split-ticket). Voting for a major party in 1996 and the expected size of the party the respondent supports was expected to increase the likelihood that one might vote for a major party as part of a straight ticket.

Expecting one's favorite candidate for Prime Minister to win significantly increased the likelihood that the respondent would cast a straight ticket vote (see Table 22). The expected size of the largest party in the Knesset and the size of the party one intends to vote for had no significant direct effect on voting a straight ticket. However, both interaction terms were significant. The size of the largest party in the Knesset (not the one the respondent intends to vote for) decreases the chances of voting for a straight ticket when the candidate the respondent supports has the best chance of winning the election for Prime Minister. The size of the Knesset party the respondent intends to vote for increases the likelihood of voting for the same party as the Prime Minister when the respondent expects the candidate of his choice to win. Expecting the candidate you intend to vote for to win the election for Prime Minister exacerbates the effect previously observed in the model of strategic Knesset voting. Voting because of non-security issues and identifying oneself as being at either extreme on security issues also decreased the

likelihood of voting for a straight ticket. A past history of voting for a major party, as expected, increased the likelihood of intending to vote for a straight ticket.

We further analyzed this model using a variable that calculated the difference between the chance of Barak winning and the chance of Netanyahu winning. Positive values reflect an increased likelihood of Barak winning, while negative values reflect a better chance of Netanyahu winning. This variable best reflects the two-way contest that appeared most likely when Diskin administered his survey. Recalculating the same model as above using multinomial logit, the actual difference has a negative, statistically significant effect on the likelihood of voting for Likud-Netanyahu (and is insignificant for the two other categories). This analysis confirms our expectation that the better the chance one thinks Barak has of winning over Netanyahu, the less likely they will vote Likud-Netanyahu (see Table 23). The expected size of the largest party continues to decrease the likelihood of voting a straight ticket.

The evidence from these analyses confirms that voters incorporated strategic considerations about both elections when casting their votes. In addition to sincere concerns about policies that led people to vote for a party other than the one they cast a vote for Prime Minister, voters considered who they expected to prevail as Prime Minister and the expected composition of the Knesset. The interaction of the two sets of expectations had a significant effect on the likelihood that a respondent would intend to cast a “straight-ticket” vote.

### ***Conclusion***

Comparing similar models of strategic considerations for two different votes reveals significant differences in how strategic considerations impact on voting behavior. We observed strategic voting for Prime Minister, and found that strategic calculations matter most when a candidate is in a competitive race. The incidence of strategic calculations, contrary to Cox’s expectations, is similar to estimates of strategic voting in a plurality system. We also observed strategic voting for the Knesset, finding evidence that expected size of the largest party in the Knesset and the expected size of the party the respondent supports influence whether the respondent would support a major party.

We found strategic considerations were a factor whether voting under rules of a run-off and under proportional representation. While we found evidence of strategic voting in both elections, the impact of the expected performance of the candidates or parties had very different effects on voting intentions in the two votes. While Israeli respondents were averse to supporting a candidate in a run-off system with little chance of winning, many supported smaller parties at the expense of larger parties that they liked, especially if they thought one party would win a large number of seats. However, small parties in a proportional system with a low threshold are hardly losers, and their supporters would hardly think that they might have wasted a vote. Instead, strident policy demands from small parties left Barak with a very shaky coalition that would ultimately collapse long before the end of the Knesset term.

The challenge of estimating how many voters split their tickets as a result of a sincere appreciation for a smaller party or as a direct consequence of strategic calculations remains. Sadly, we have little insight into the many voters who appear to have decided to split their tickets at or near the very end of the campaign. Nor do we have a full range of feeling thermometers that would enable us to better estimate affect towards most of the minor parties. However, Table 24 provides some very general estimates of the distribution of voters. In Table 24, we break down the voters for each of the large five parties into three categories, those that voted for the party whom they ranked the highest on the feeling thermometers, those that ranked the party tied for highest, and those that ranked the party lower than another of the five parties. We then divided each of these categories into columns noting which candidate for Prime Minister the voter expected would win the election.

The most striking finding from this table is the large number of presumably “straightforward” voters, who expect that their camp’s leader will win the election. However, beyond the large percentage of One Israel voters who thought Barak would win or Likud voters who thought Netanyahu would win, there are some interesting insights that can be surmised from these statistics. It is instructive to observe how many voters voted for Meretz even though they expected Netanyahu to win. Many of these voters (about 13% of Meretz voters) would probably be considered sincere supporters of these parties because Meretz would have little influence in a Netanyahu-led government. Only one “irrational” respondent in the sample intended to vote for Meretz rather than a party they liked better in face of a Netanyahu victory, and only two more intended to vote for Meretz rather than a party they liked the same.


Hardly any of the respondents intended to vote for the Center Party when the Center Party was not the respondent's first choice, despite its presence in the ideological center and expected role in any future government. This is an important reminder that this does not mean that all of the Center Party voters were "sincere" since the anticipation of its all-star list's role in any government may have made them more attractive. Future research into strategic considerations in parliamentary systems should investigate the extent to which a pivotal position contributes to the popularity of similarly situated parties in other systems.

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Figure 1



Source: Yedioth Aharanot - Surveys by Dr. Mina Tzemach

Figure 2




Figure 3





Figure 4



**Table 4 Who do you think will advance to the second round?**

| <u>Name:</u>                          | <u>Percent:</u> |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Outright Winner<br>(No Second Round): | 14.7% (145)     |
| Netanyahu<br>and Barak:               | 70.6% (698)     |
| and Mordecai:                         | 7.8% (77)       |
| Barak and Mordecai:                   | 5.1% (50)       |
| Other Predictions                     | 1.9% (19)       |
| <u>Total:</u>                         | 100% (989)      |

Survey: Arian and Shamir

**If Respondent Picked a Candidate to Win Outright, Who Was It?**

Answers deduced from victory predictions

| <u>Name:</u>  | <u>Percent:</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|
| Netanyahu     | 37.2% (54)      |
| Barak         | 42.8% (62)      |
| Mordecai      | 11.7% (17)      |
| Other         | 8.3% (12)       |
| <u>Total:</u> | 100% (145)      |

Survey: Arian and Shamir

Table 9

Second Knesset vote (if possible)?

| Vote Intention          | Likud & Religious Right |              | Shas         | Russians     | Center       | Shinui       | One Israel, Other or Arabs and None |              | Total |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|-------|
|                         |                         |              |              |              |              |              | Left                                |              |       |
| <b>Right-other</b>      | <b>40.5%</b>            | <b>33.3%</b> | 2.4%         | 4.8%         | 4.8%         | 2.4%         | 2.4%                                | 9.5%         |       |
|                         | 17                      | 14           | 1            | 2            | 2            | 1            | 1                                   | 4            | 42    |
| <b>Likud</b>            | <b>26.2%</b>            | <b>22.1%</b> | 8.2%         | 0.8%         | 10.7%        | 7.4%         | 4.9%                                | <b>19.7%</b> |       |
|                         | 32                      | 27           | 10           | 1            | 13           | 9            | 6                                   | 24           | 122   |
| <b>Religious</b>        | <b>45.9%</b>            | <b>27.0%</b> | <b>13.5%</b> | 2.7%         | 0.0%         | 2.7%         | 5.4%                                | 2.7%         |       |
|                         | 17                      | 10           | 5            | 1            | 0            | 1            | 2                                   | 1            | 37    |
| <b>Shas</b>             | <b>38.7%</b>            | <b>37.3%</b> |              | 1.3%         | <b>17.3%</b> | 0.0%         | 2.7%                                | 1.3%         |       |
|                         | 29                      | 28           |              | 1            | 13           | 0            | 2                                   | 1            | 75    |
| <b>Russians</b>         | <b>29.2%</b>            | 2.1%         | 2.1%         | <b>41.7%</b> | 2.1%         | 2.1%         | <b>18.8%</b>                        | 2.1%         |       |
|                         | 14                      | 1            | 1            | 20           | 1            | 1            | 9                                   | 1            | 48    |
| <b>Center</b>           | <b>17.6%</b>            | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | 1.5%         |              | <b>13.2%</b> | <b>44.1%</b>                        | <b>23.5%</b> |       |
|                         | 12                      | 0            | 0            | 1            |              | 9            | 30                                  | 16           | 68    |
| <b>Shinui</b>           | <b>18.4%</b>            | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | 2.6%         | <b>13.2%</b> |              | <b>50.0%</b>                        | <b>15.8%</b> |       |
|                         | 7                       | 0            | 0            | 1            | 5            |              | 19                                  | 6            | 38    |
| <b>One Israel</b>       | 1.8%                    | 0.9%         | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | <b>21.3%</b> | <b>22.7%</b> | <b>44.4%</b>                        | 8.9%         |       |
|                         | 4                       | 2            | 0            | 0            | 48           | 51           | 100                                 | 20           | 225   |
| <b>Meretz</b>           | 0.0%                    | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | 5.4%         | <b>14.0%</b> | <b>71.0%</b>                        | 9.7%         |       |
|                         | 0                       | 0            | 0            | 0            | 5            | 13           | 66                                  | 9            | 93    |
| <b>Left-other, Arab</b> | 11.1%                   | 11.1%        | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | <b>55.6%</b> | 0.0%         | 11.1%                               | 11.1%        |       |
|                         | 1                       | 1            | 0            | 0            | 5            | 0            | 1                                   | 1            | 9     |
| <b>Other/No Vote</b>    | 7.7%                    | 0.0%         | 0.0%         | 7.7%         | 0.0%         | 7.7%         | <b>30.8%</b>                        | <b>46.2%</b> |       |
|                         | 2                       | 0            | 0            | 2            | 0            | 2            | 8                                   | 12           | 26    |
| <b>Total</b>            | 135                     | 83           | 18           | 29           | 92           | 87           | 244                                 | 95           | 783   |

Source: Diskin

**Table 10 Party R rated highest on the feeling thermometer by Knesset Vote**

| High F.T./ Knesset Vote | One Israel  | Likud       | Meretz     | Center     | Russians   | Religious  | Shas       | Left Parties | Right Parties | Arab Parties | Other / Not Voting | Un-decided |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|------------|
| Likud                   | 1.6% (5)    | 75.1% (205) | 0.0% (0)   | 3.0% (2)   | 36.0% (9)  | 47.6% (20) | 23.5% (8)  | 7.9% (3)     | 50.0% (17)    | 0.0% (0)     | 26.5% (9)          | 21.2% (24) |
| One Israel              | 60.8% (188) | 4.0% (11)   | 7.6% (4)   | 0.0% (0)   | 40.0% (10) | 4.8% (2)   | 0.0% (0)   | 23.7% (9)    | 0.0% (0)      | 44.4% (4)    | 14.7% (5)          | 13.3% (15) |
| Center                  | 6.8% (21)   | 2.2% (6)    | 7.5% (4)   | 77.3% (51) | 4.0% (1)   | 4.8% (2)   | 5.9% (2)   | 10.5% (4)    | 5.9% (2)      | 22.2% (2)    | 5.9% (2)           | 8.0% (9)   |
| Meretz                  | 7.1% (22)   | 1.1% (3)    | 60.4% (32) | 0.0% (0)   | 4.0% (1)   | 0.0% (0)   | 0.0% (0)   | 21.1% (8)    | 2.9% (1)      | 33.3% (3)    | 5.9% (2)           | 10.6% (12) |
| Shas/ Deri              | 2.3% (7)    | 3.7% (10)   | 0.0% (0)   | 1.51% (1)  | 4.0% (1)   | 11.9% (5)  | 44.1% (15) | 7.9% (3)     | 11.8% (4)     | 0.0% (0)     | 2.9% (1)           | 3.5% (4)   |
| Ties                    | 21.4% (66)  | 13.9% (38)  | 24.5% (13) | 18.2% (12) | 12.0% (3)  | 31.0% (13) | 26.5% (9)  | 29.0% (11)   | 29.4% (10)    | 0.0% (0)     | 44.1% (15)         | 43.4% (49) |
| Totals                  | 309         | 273         | 53         | 66         | 25         | 42         | 34         | 38           | 34            | 9            | 34                 | 113        |

Survey: Arian and Shamir

**Table 11a Pre-Election Intended Party Vote by Feeling Thermometer Ranking**

| Pre-Election<br>Vote Intention | Feeling Thermometers |              |                | Total |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|----------------|-------|
|                                | % Ranked Highest     | % Ranked Tie | % Ranked Lower |       |
| One Israel                     | 60.8%<br>188         | 21.4%<br>66  | 17.8%<br>55    | 309   |
| Likud                          | 75.1%<br>205         | 13.9%<br>38  | 11.0%<br>30    | 273   |
| Center                         | 77.3%<br>51          | 18.2%<br>12  | 4.6%<br>3      | 66    |
| Meretz                         | 60.4%<br>32          | 24.5%<br>13  | 15.1%<br>8     | 53    |
| Shas/Deri                      | 44.1%<br>15          | 26.5%<br>9   | 29.4%<br>10    | 34    |
| Total                          | 66.8%<br>491         | 18.8%<br>138 | 14.4%<br>106   | 735   |

Source: Arian and Shamir

**Table 11b - Post-Election Recalled Party Vote by Feeling Thermometer Ranking**

| Post-Election<br>Vote Recall | Feeling Thermometers |              |                | Total |
|------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|----------------|-------|
|                              | % Ranked Highest     | % Ranked Tie | % Ranked Lower |       |
| One Israel                   | 62.4%<br>68          | 13.8%<br>15  | 23.9%<br>26    | 109   |
| Likud                        | 56.6%<br>43          | 21.1%<br>16  | 22.4%<br>17    | 76    |
| Center                       | 47.4%<br>9           | 5.3%<br>1    | 47.4%<br>9     | 19    |
| Meretz                       | 24.4%<br>10          | 46.3%<br>19  | 29.3%<br>12    | 41    |
| Shas/Deri                    | 11.4%<br>5           | 25.0%<br>11  | 63.6%<br>28    | 44    |
| Total                        | 46.7%<br>135         | 21.5%<br>62  | 36.0%<br>104   | 289   |

Source: Arian and Shamir

**Table 12 Knesset Election Results**

| Knesset Party        | Arian and Shamir |               | Diskin       | Official Election Results - % | Seats |
|----------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------------------|-------|
|                      | Pre-Election     | Post-Election | Pre-Election |                               |       |
| One Israel           | 29.3%            | 21.7%         | 25.7%        | 20.2%                         | 26    |
| Likud                | 23.8             | 14.8          | 14.0         | 14.1                          | 19    |
| Meretz               | 5.7              | 8.4           | 9.4          | 7.6                           | 10    |
| Center               | 5.9              | 3.8           | 7.7          | 5                             | 6     |
| Russians             | 2.3              | 3.1           | 5.9          | 7.7                           | 10    |
| Religious            | 3.5              | 5.0           | 5.0          | 7.9                           | 10    |
| Shas                 | 2.8              | 9.2           | 9.6          | 13                            | 17    |
| Shinui               | 2.6              | 8.1           | 4.3          | 5                             | 6     |
| Left Other           | 0.7              | 2.1           | 1.9          | 1.9                           | 2     |
| Right Other          | 2.8              | 4.2           | 4.6          | 3                             | 4     |
| Arab & Communists    | 7.0              | 9.2           | 7.7          | 7.9                           | 10    |
| Other/No vote/Refuse | 3.6              | 10.5          | 4.1          | 6.2                           | 0     |
| Undecided            | 10.0             |               |              |                               |       |
| Total                | N = 1208         | N = 522       | N = 945      | 3,309,416                     | 120   |

Actual Results Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0epu0>

**Table 13 Predicted Largest Party in the Knesset and Number of Seats the Largest Party is Expected to win.**

| <i>Largest Party</i> | <i>Mean Expectation</i> | <i>Std. Dev.</i> | <i>Frequency</i> |
|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Likud                | 32.3                    | 8.7              | 195              |
| Center               | 34.9                    | 9.7              | 8                |
| One Israel           | 32.5                    | 6.1              | 618              |
| Other                | 23.9                    | 16.8             | 15               |
| <b>Total</b>         | <b>32.3</b>             | <b>7.2</b>       | <b>836</b>       |

**Table 14 Expected Number of Knesset Seats Won by Party R Intends to Vote For.**

| <i>Party</i>   | <i>Mean Expectation</i> | <i>Std. Dev.</i> | <i>Frequency</i> |
|----------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Left           | 19.7                    | 15.9             | 9                |
| Meretz         | 11.4                    | 9.1              | 90               |
| One Israel     | 32.8                    | 7.4              | 217              |
| Shinui         | 5.9                     | 8.5              | 41               |
| Center         | 16.1                    | 8.9              | 68               |
| Russians       | 5.9                     | 2.0              | 50               |
| Shas           | 13.1                    | 8.1              | 78               |
| Religious      | 6.0                     | 2.4              | 44               |
| Likud          | 28.8                    | 9.1              | 124              |
| Right          | 8.2                     | 4.2              | 39               |
| Other/ No Vote | 9.7                     | 16.0             | 23               |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>19.6</b>             | <b>13.5</b>      | <b>783</b>       |

Source: Diskin

**Table 15 Did R intend to vote for a major party?**

Probit analysis of whether R intended to vote for a major party for Knesset, given expectations of Knesset election outcome, past voting history and select demographic and attitudinal controls.

|  | Coef. | Std. Err. |
|--|-------|-----------|
| <b>Constant</b>  | -0.60 | 0.31      |
| <b>Size of Largest Knesset Party</b>                         | -0.03 | 0.01      |
| <b>Expected Number of Seats</b>                              | 0.06  | 0.01      |
| <b><u>Controls</u></b>                                       |       |           |
| <b>Voted for Major Party in 1996</b>                         | 0.81  | 0.14      |
| <b>Haredi</b>  | -0.20 | 0.34      |
| <b>Russian</b>   | -1.13 | 0.52      |
| <b>Bad Personal Financial Situation</b>                      | -0.05 | 0.20      |
| <b>Main reason for vote: Non-security issue</b>              | -0.88 | 0.31      |
| <b>Main reason for vote: Party represents people like me</b> | -0.18 | 0.17      |
| <b>Self-placement at extremes on security issues</b>         | -1.10 | 0.28      |

**Chi2= 251.83**

**Pseudo R2= 0. 3779**

**First Differences with all control variables = 0**

Seats of Largest Knesset Party

| R's Party<br># Seats | 20     | 25     | 32     | 40     | 60     |
|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 0                    | 11.95% | 9.30%  | 6.36%  | 3.94%  | 0.97%  |
| 3                    | 16.16% | 12.86% | 9.08%  | 5.85%  | 1.59%  |
| 13                   | 36.08% | 30.80% | 24.06% | 17.45% | 6.47%  |
| 24                   | 63.24% | 57.66% | 49.61% | 40.45% | 20.56% |
| 60                   | 99.55% | 99.32% | 98.82% | 97.89% | 92.67% |

**First Differences with Voted for Major Party Control = 1**

Seats of Largest Knesset Party

| R's Party<br># Seats | 20     | 25     | 32     | 40     | 60     |
|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 0                    | 35.74% | 30.48% | 23.78% | 17.22% | 6.36%  |
| 3                    | 43.01% | 37.41% | 30.01% | 22.48% | 9.08%  |
| 13                   | 67.56% | 62.19% | 54.28% | 45.04% | 24.05% |
| 24                   | 88.75% | 85.73% | 80.65% | 73.67% | 52.12% |
| 60                   | 99.97% | 99.95% | 99.89% | 99.78% | 98.82% |

**Table 16**

### Did R Intend to Vote for Favored Candidate?

Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intending to Vote for the Favorite Candidate Given "Folded" Probability of the First- and Second- Ranked Candidates Winning the Election

|                    | Coef. | Std. Err. | Z     |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| <i>"Folded" P1</i> | 3.57  | 0.29      | 12.49 |
| <i>"Folded" P2</i> | -1.36 | 0.28      | -4.92 |
| <i>Constant</i>    | -0.33 | 0.11      | -2.96 |

N= 880

Chi2= 167.39      Pseudo R2 =0.156

Predicted Differences  
Over select values of P

|                    | <u>"Folded" P1</u> |             |            |
|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------|
| <u>"Folded" P2</u> | <u>Min</u>         | <u>0.33</u> | <u>Max</u> |
| <i>Min</i>         | 37.0%              | 80.4%       | 92.7%      |
| <i>Mean</i>        | 27.4%              | 72.3%       | 88.2%      |
| <i>0.33</i>        | 21.6%              | 65.7%       | 84.1%      |
| <i>Max</i>         | 15.6%              | 57.0%       | 78.0%      |

Survey: Diskin

**Table 17**

### Did R Intend to Vote for Favored Candidate?

Probit Estimates of the "Folded" Probability of Expecting to Vote for the Favorite Candidate, Given Ordinal Preferences and Differing Assessments of Candidate Viability

|                 | Coef. | Std. Err. | Z    |
|-----------------|-------|-----------|------|
| <i>Constant</i> | 0.26  | 0.05      | 5.07 |
| <i>p12</i>      | 2.13  | 0.22      | 9.64 |
| <i>p13</i>      | 0.86  | 0.20      | 4.34 |

N=880

Chi2= 185.21      Pseudo R2= 0.173

First Differences

|             | <u>P12</u>   |              |              |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>P13</u>  | <u>Min</u>   | <u>Zero</u>  | <u>Max</u>   |
| <i>Min</i>  | <b>10.9%</b> | <b>43.5%</b> | 81.6%        |
| <i>Zero</i> | <b>21.1%</b> | <b>60.4%</b> | <b>90.8%</b> |
| <i>Max</i>  | 35.4%        | <b>75.6%</b> | 96.1%        |

Survey: Diskin

**Table 18**

**Probit Estimates of the Probability of Expecting to Vote for the First- or Second-highest-ranked Candidate, Given Normalized, Multiplicative Utility and Viability Measures**

|                        | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P> z  |
|------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|
| <i>PB<sub>12</sub></i> | 0.78  | 0.45      | 1.71  | 0.087 |
| <i>PB<sub>13</sub></i> | 2.57  | 0.35      | 7.40  | 0.000 |
| <i>PB<sub>23</sub></i> | -2.38 | 0.42      | -5.66 | 0.000 |
| <i>Constant</i>        | 0.27  | 0.05      | 5.12  | 0.000 |

Chi2= 151.4  
Pseudo R2= 0.142

N= 880

Differences:

| <b>PB23 Min</b>               |       |        |       |        |       |
|-------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
|                               | Min   | -StDev | Mean  | +StDev | Max   |
| <i>PB<sub>12</sub></i>        |       |        |       |        |       |
| <u><i>PB<sub>13</sub></i></u> |       |        |       |        |       |
| <i>Min</i>                    | 41.6% | 54.6%  | 59.3% | 63.8%  | 71.4% |
| <i>Mean-StDev</i>             | 71.2% | 81.3%  | 84.4% | 87.0%  | 91.0% |
| <i>Mean</i>                   | 88.3% | 93.6%  | 94.9% | 96.1%  | 97.5% |
| <i>Mean+StDev</i>             | 96.6% | 98.4%  | 98.8% | 99.2%  | 99.5% |
| <i>Max</i>                    | 99.1% | 99.6%  | 99.8% | 99.8%  | 99.9% |

| <b>PB23 Mean-StDev</b>        |       |        |       |        |       |
|-------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
|                               | Min   | -StDev | Mean  | +StDev | Max   |
| <i>PB<sub>12</sub></i>        |       |        |       |        |       |
| <u><i>PB<sub>13</sub></i></u> |       |        |       |        |       |
| <i>Min</i>                    | 21.6% | 32.4%  | 36.7% | 41.3%  | 49.6% |
| <i>Mean-StDev</i>             | 49.5% | 62.4%  | 66.8% | 71.0%  | 77.8% |
| <i>Mean</i>                   | 73.1% | 82.8%  | 85.7% | 88.2%  | 91.8% |
| <i>Mean+StDev</i>             | 89.4% | 94.2%  | 95.5% | 96.5%  | 97.9% |
| <i>Max</i>                    | 96.3% | 98.3%  | 98.7% | 99.1%  | 99.5% |

| <b>PB23 Mean</b>              |       |        |       |        |       |
|-------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
|                               | Min   | -StDev | Mean  | +StDev | Max   |
| <i>PB<sub>12</sub></i>        |       |        |       |        |       |
| <u><i>PB<sub>13</sub></i></u> |       |        |       |        |       |
| <i>Min</i>                    | 10.6% | 18.0%  | 21.2% | 24.8%  | 31.9% |
| <i>Mean-StDev</i>             | 31.8% | 44.3%  | 49.0% | 53.8%  | 62.0% |
| <i>Mean</i>                   | 56.2% | 68.7%  | 72.7% | 76.5%  | 82.5% |
| <i>Mean+StDev</i>             | 78.4% | 86.8%  | 89.2% | 91.2%  | 94.1% |
| <i>Max</i>                    | 90.8% | 95.1%  | 96.2% | 97.1%  | 98.2% |

| <b>PB23 Mean+StDev</b>        |       |        |       |        |       |
|-------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
|                               | Min   | -StDev | Mean  | +StDev | Max   |
| <i>PB<sub>12</sub></i>        |       |        |       |        |       |
| <u><i>PB<sub>13</sub></i></u> |       |        |       |        |       |
| <i>Min</i>                    | 4.4%  | 8.4%   | 10.4% | 12.7%  | 17.6% |
| <i>Mean-StDev</i>             | 17.5% | 27.3%  | 31.4% | 35.7%  | 43.8% |
| <i>Mean</i>                   | 38.1% | 51.1%  | 55.8% | 60.4%  | 68.3% |
| <i>Mean+StDev</i>             | 62.8% | 74.4%  | 78.1% | 81.4%  | 86.5% |
| <i>Max</i>                    | 80.7% | 88.4%  | 90.6% | 92.4%  | 95.0% |

| <b>PB23 Max</b>               |       |        |       |        |       |
|-------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
|                               | Min   | -StDev | Mean  | +StDev | Max   |
| <i>PB<sub>12</sub></i>        |       |        |       |        |       |
| <u><i>PB<sub>13</sub></i></u> |       |        |       |        |       |
| <i>Min</i>                    | 0.5%  | 1.2%   | 1.6%  | 2.1%   | 3.5%  |
| <i>Mean-StDev</i>             | 3.4%  | 6.8%   | 8.5%  | 10.5%  | 14.8% |
| <i>Mean</i>                   | 11.7% | 19.4%  | 22.9% | 26.6%  | 34.0% |
| <i>Mean+StDev</i>             | 28.7% | 40.8%  | 45.5% | 50.2%  | 58.5% |
| <i>Max</i>                    | 49.1% | 62.1%  | 66.5% | 70.7%  | 77.5% |

**Table 19**

**Did R Intend to Vote for Favored Party?**  
 Probit Estimates of the “Folded” Probability of  
 Expecting to Vote for the Favorite Party, Given Ordinal  
 Preferences and Differing Assessments of Party Viability

|                                       | Coef. | Std. Err. | Z      |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-----------|--------|
| <b>Constant</b>                       | -0.32 | 0.04      | -8.32  |
| <b>p12</b>                            | -1.05 | 0.37      | -2.84  |
| <b>p13</b>                            | 1.62  | 0.43      | 3.76   |
|                                       |       |           | N=1143 |
| <b>Chi2= 14.65   Pseudo R2= 0.010</b> |       |           |        |

Survey: Diskin

**Table 20**

| <b>What Party Did R Intend to Vote For?</b> |                            |                           |                            |                      |            |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|
| Voter Types                                 | Highest<br>Ranked<br>Party | Party Tied<br>for Highest | Another<br>Ranked<br>Party | Unranked<br>Party    | Total      |
| Sophisticated                               | 39.3%<br>22                | 21.4%<br>12               | 16.1%<br>9                 | 23.2%<br>13          | 56         |
| Sincere                                     | 57.3%<br>43                | 17.3%<br>13               | 5.3%<br>4                  | 20.0%<br>15          | 75         |
| Straight                                    | 60.9%<br>324               | 15.2%<br>81               | 9.0%<br>48                 | 14.8%<br>79          | 532        |
| Irrational                                  | 22.7%<br>5                 | 4.5%<br>1                 | 59.1%<br>13                | 13.6%<br>3           | 22         |
| <b>Total</b>                                | <b>57.5%<br/>394</b>       | <b>15.6%<br/>107</b>      | <b>10.8%<br/>74</b>        | <b>16.1%<br/>110</b> | <b>685</b> |

**Table 21a**

| <b>What Party Did R Intend to Vote For?</b> |                      |                        |                      |                |       |
|---|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------|
| <b>Intended PM Vote</b>                     | Highest Ranked Party | Party Tied for Highest | Another Ranked Party | Unranked Party | Total |
| Netanyahu                                   | 57.2%<br>166         | 12.1%<br>35            | 10.0%<br>29          | 20.7%<br>60    | 290   |
| Barak                                       | 58.6%<br>197         | 18.2%<br>61            | 11.6%<br>39          | 11.6%<br>39    | 336   |
| Mordecai                                    | 52.5%<br>31          | 18.6%<br>11            | 10.2%<br>6           | 18.6%<br>11    | 59    |
| Total                                       | 57.5%<br>394         | 15.6%<br>107           | 10.8%<br>74          | 16.1%<br>110   | 685   |

**Table 21b**

| <b>What Party Did R Vote For?</b> |                      |                        |                      |                |       |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------|
| <b>Intended PM Vote</b>           | Highest Ranked Party | Party Tied for Highest | Another Ranked Party | Unranked Party | Total |
| Netanyahu                         | 26.4%<br>33          | 12.8%<br>16            | 24.0%<br>30          | 36.8%<br>46    | 125   |
| Barak                             | 40.1%<br>67          | 13.2%<br>22            | 21.0%<br>35          | 25.7%<br>43    | 167   |
| Mordecai                          | 23.8%<br>5           | 14.3%<br>3             | 19.0%<br>4           | 42.9%<br>9     | 21    |
| Total                             | 33.5%<br>105         | 13.1%<br>41            | 22.0%<br>69          | 31.3%<br>98    | 313   |

**Table 22**

| <b>Did R cast a vote for a “straight – ticket”?</b>  |                          |           |       |
|--|--------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Logit analysis of whether R intended to vote for a major party for Knesset, given interaction of expectations of outcome election of both Knesset and Prime Minister, past voting history and select demographic and attitudinal controls. |                          |           |       |
|  | Coef.                    | Std. Err. | z     |
| <b>Constant</b>  | -3.06                    | 1.10      | -2.78 |
| <b>Size of Largest Knesset Party</b>   | 0.04                     | 0.03      | 1.30  |
| <b>Expected Number of Seats</b>  | 0.01                     | 0.02      | 0.31  |
| <b>Candidate for PM has best chance of winning</b>   | 3.53                     | 1.32      | 2.67  |
| <b>Interaction: Largest Knesset Party &amp; PM has best chance of winning</b>  | -0.18                    | 0.04      | -4.10 |
| <b>Interaction: Expected seats &amp; PM has best chance of winning</b>   | 0.16                     | 0.03      | 5.57  |
| <i>Controls</i>  |                          |           |       |
| <b>Vote for Major Party in 1996</b>  | 1.24                     | 0.28      | 4.43  |
| <b>Haredi</b>  | 0.11                     | 0.65      | 0.17  |
| <b>Russian</b>   | -2.00                    | 1.10      | -1.82 |
| <b>Bad Personal Financial Situation</b>  | -0.13                    | 0.40      | -0.32 |
| <b>Main reason for vote: Non-security issue</b>  | -2.17                    | 0.71      | -3.04 |
| <b>Main reason for vote: Party represents people like me</b>   | -0.18                    | 0.33      | -0.53 |
| <b>Self-placement at extremes on security issues</b>   | -2.58                    | 0.72      | -3.60 |
|  |                          |           | N=528 |
| <b>Chi2= 245.94</b>  | <b>Pseudo R2= 0.4013</b> |           |       |

**Table 23 Did R intend to vote for a “Straight-Ticket”?**

Multinomial logit analysis of whether R intended to vote for a “Straight-Ticket.” Comparison group is a split ticket vote. Vote for a straight ticket depends on the chance of winning Barak and Netanyahu, expectations of the Knesset election, past history of voting and select demographic and attitudinal controls

|   | Coef.  | Std. Err. | z     |
|---|--------|-----------|-------|
| <b><i>Likud-Netanyahu</i></b>                                   |        |           |       |
| Size of Largest Knesset Party                                   | -0.14  | 0.03      | -5.19 |
| Expected Number of Seats  | 0.17   | 0.02      | 7.94  |
| Chance of Winning: Difference between Barak & Netanyahu         | -0.02  | 0.01      | -2.74 |
| Voted for Major Party in 1996                                   | 1.04   | 0.38      | 2.76  |
| Haredi  | 1.08   | 0.75      | 1.44  |
| Russian   | -0.54  | 1.14      | -0.47 |
| Bad Personal Financial Situation                                | -1.54  | 0.81      | -1.92 |
| Main reason for vote: Non-security issue                        | -1.98  | 0.87      | -2.28 |
| Main reason for vote: Party represents people like me           | 0.26   | 0.43      | 0.60  |
| Self-placement at extremes on security issues                   | -2.49  | 0.90      | -2.75 |
| Constant  | -1.00  | 0.72      | -1.38 |
| <b><i>One Israel-Barak</i></b>                                  |        |           |       |
| Size of Largest Knesset Party                                   | -0.19  | 0.04      | -4.33 |
| Expected Number of Seats  | 0.25   | 0.04      | 6.25  |
| Chance of Winning: Difference between Barak & Netanyahu         | -0.01  | 0.01      | -0.43 |
| Voted for Major Party in 1996                                   | 1.64   | 0.65      | 2.53  |
| Haredi  | -37.57 | *         | 0.00  |
| Russian   | -39.45 | *         | 0.00  |
| Bad Personal Financial Situation                                | 0.72   | 0.71      | 1.02  |
| Main reason for vote: Non-security issue                        | -1.67  | 1.24      | -1.35 |
| Main reason for vote: Party represents people like me           | 1.16   | 0.61      | 1.91  |
| Self-placement at extremes on security issues                   | -1.22  | 1.21      | -1.01 |
| Constant  | -3.21  | 1.12      | -2.88 |
| <b><i>Center-Mordecai</i></b>                                   |        |           |       |
| Size of Largest Knesset Party                                   | 0.02   | 0.02      | 0.95  |
| Expected Number of Seats  | 0.02   | 0.02      | 1.28  |
| Chance of Winning: Difference between Barak & Netanyahu         | 0.01   | 0.01      | 0.92  |
| Voted for Major Party in 1996                                   | 1.14   | 0.35      | 3.28  |
| Haredi  | -39.01 | *         | 0.00  |
| Russian   | -39.61 | *         | 0.00  |
| Bad Personal Financial Situation                                | 0.23   | 0.47      | 0.48  |
| Main reason for vote: Non-security issue                        | -1.60  | 1.06      | -1.51 |
| Main reason for vote: Party represents people like me           | -0.50  | 0.43      | -1.16 |
| Self-placement at Self-placement at extremes on security issues | -40.04 | *         | 0.00  |
| Constant  | -3.13  | 0.82      | -3.81 |

**Table 24 Intended Party Vote by Party Feeling Thermometer Ranking and Expected PM Winner**

| Feeling Thermometer Ranking of Party |                    | Highest   |        |          | Tied for Highest |        |          | Other     |        |          |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------|----------|------------------|--------|----------|-----------|--------|----------|
|                                      | Expected PM Winner | Netanyahu | Barak  | Mordecai | Netanyahu        | Barak  | Mordecai | Netanyahu | Barak  | Mordecai |
| Intended Party Vote                  |                    |           |        |          |                  |        |          |           |        |          |
| Labor                                |                    | 10%       | 90%    | 0%       | 15.79%           | 80.26% | 3.95%    | 11.54%    | 84.62% | 3.85%    |
|                                      |                    | 19        | 171    | 0        | 12               | 61     | 3        | 9         | 66     | 3        |
| Likud                                |                    | 96.59%    | 2.44%  | 0.98%    | 97.44%           | 0%     | 2.56%    | 92.31%    | 2.56%  | 5.13%    |
|                                      |                    | 198       | 5      | 2        | 38               | 0      | 1        | 36        | 1      | 2        |
| Center                               |                    | 30.77%    | 28.85% | 40.38%   | 14.29%           | 57.14% | 28.57%   | 60%       | 0%     | 40%      |
|                                      |                    | 16        | 15     | 21       | 2                | 8      | 4        | 3         | 0      | 2        |
| Meretz                               |                    | 13.16%    | 84.21% | 2.63%    | 13.33%           | 80%    | 6.67%    | 7.14%     | 85.71% | 7.14%    |
|                                      |                    | 5         | 32     | 1        | 2                | 12     | 1        | 1         | 12     | 1        |
| Shas                                 |                    | 85.71%    | 14.29% | 0%       | 88.89%           | 11.11% | 0%       | 80%       | 20%    | 0%       |
|                                      |                    | 12        | 2      | 0        | 8                | 1      | 0        | 8         | 2      | 0        |

Source: Arian and Shamir