Biologists and psychologists working in the Darwinian tradition have long speculated about the adaptive functions of human emotions.  Guilt, for example, appears to have evolved to promote cooperation.  Romantic Jealousy appears to serve a mate-guarding function. Anger is thought to play a role in enforcing commitments.  However, these hypotheses are often challenged on the grounds that such emotions are largely influenced by culture. How could a trait be both culturally determined and a biological adaptation at the same time?  Recent developments in evolutionary theory shed new light on this question. Gene/culture co-evolutionary models have been used to explain the evolution complex human skills, like tool making and hunting.  In my own research, I adapt this model to the evolution of the emotions.  The basic idea is that humans inherit a system of norms and social traditions that 'scaffold' the development of affective dispositions.  Different cultures inherit different scaffolding systems, which allows for local adaptation to particular socio-ecological conditions. 

   This theoretical framework has the potential to unify two research traditions, the social constructivist and neo-Darwinian accounts of emotion, that have historically been at odds.  However, the application of a dual inheritance model to human emotions is not as straightforward as it might seem.  In a recent publication (forthcoming in Philosophy of Science PSA Proceedings) I outline several respects in which emotional development differs from skill acquisition, and the implications of these differences for an evolutionary model. 
 

2.  How do ecological models explain, and what is their significance for conservation biology? 

     Over the past 20 years the field of conservation biology has come to rely less on ecological theory and more on 'quick and dirty' heuristics for designing conservation reserves.  In a forthcoming article I investigate the rationale behind this move.  My central claim is that ecological theory has been cast aside without adequate justification, and that the heuristics adopted in its place are appealing only because they are easily implemented, not because they are likely promote the long term preservation of biodiversity. 

   I am also interested in the predictive and explanatory roles that mathematical models play in ecology.  Ecological models tend to be extremely simple idealisations of the  the messy real-word systems that they aim to describe.  Ecological models are also extremely difficult to test empirically, given the scale and complexity of their target systems.  What are the explanatory or predictive limitations of these simple models?  Should ecologists avoid using simple models in favor of highly complicated, systsem-specific individual based models?  Or, are there ecological questions that simple models are particularly well suited to answering? 
 

3.  Making progress in the innateness debate using experimental philosophy. 

    There has been considerable controversy in recent years over what it means to identify some mental process or behaviour as innate.  Philosophers have traditionally approached this question using conceptual analysis, asking whether a single account of innateness (defined, for example, in terms of genetic information, species-typicality, or as an unlearned disposition) conforms with most lay and scientific uses of this term.  Working in collaboration Dr Paul Griffiths at the Sydney University and Edouard Machery at the University of Pittsburgh, I approach this debate empirically.  The theoretical basis for our approach assumes that concepts change to suite and reflect the explanatory objectives of the populations who apply them.  Our prediction is that different groups of scientists and lay persons (e.g. behavioural ecologists, neuro-ethologists, comparative psychologists, the folk) will employ different conceptions of innateness each suited to their respective explanatory aims.  To test this hypothesis we have designed a questionnaire that has been administered to undergraduate students at the University of Pittsburgh.  As per our predictions, we found that three factors (species typicality, developmental fixity, and functionality)  independently influence subjects' judgment as to whether some trait is  innate.  The next step is to probe different scientific communities for their conceptions of innateness and compare them to the folk conception.