From Science to Policy

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Theoretical Background Research Application

Theoretical Background

There exists in the conservation community a dedication to the pursuit of scientific argument in their search for solutions. In the policy arena, this scientific-argument is a much-traded commodity. As a commodity, and being incomplete and often uncertain, scientific argument travels in the public realm through a process of engagement. Oftentimes in the process, scientific-argument looses its mantle of objectivity to an impression of bias (Kinchy & Kleinman 2003). The rise of courtroom epistemology in the popular media has only heightened the reality of scientific uncertainty and the impression of underlying bias.

Several disciplines attempt to codify the interactions between science and society. Science studies is an interdisciplinary research area that seeks to situate scientific expertise in a broad social, historical, and philosophical context (Latour, 2000). It is concerned with the history of scientific disciplines and the interrelationships between science and society. The sociology of science involves the study of science as a social activity, dealing with the social conditions and effects of science, and with the social structures and processes of scientific activity (Ben-David and Sullivan, 1975). The sociology of scientific knowledge (Collins, 1983; Bloor, 1991; Shapin, 1995), examines how scientific controversies are resolved by social factors, conventions and actors.

Concepts from the decision sciences and psychology, particularly the notion of framing effects, are reflected in my research. A frame in social theory consists of a schema of interpretation that individuals rely on to understand and respond to an event (Nelson et al, 1997). The term framing refers to an inevitable process of selective influence over an individual's perception of the meanings attributed to words or phrases. Framing defines the packaging of an element of rhetoric in such a way as to encourage certain interpretations and to discourage others (Levin et al, 1998). Both emphasis and equivalence frames exist, the first to manipulate the dimensions used to assess a choice, the second to manipulate an agent’s risk assessment (Nelson and Oxley, 1999; Druckman, 2001a/b). Priming in turn works to make these frames more immediately accessible to agents by repeating them enough to tap into, or even to establish them as heuristics. Heuristics are the rules of thumb, educated guesses, intuitive judgments or simply common sense that people possess that are open to manipulation (Blumer, 1956). Because of bounded rationality and rational ignorance (Bromberger, 1988; Caplan, 2001), people free ride on the public discourse and limit their own individual search and evaluation of information. Thus can attitudes be constructed and demolished based on emphases in the public discourse.

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Research Application

Together, these schools of thought add context to an application of heresthetics in constructing conservation policy. Heresthetics is the study of political strategy that focuses on how the machinations of constructing policy relies on paring down the field of all possible policy alternatives to those that are feasible and then to those that are considered through a process of interpretation, stable heuristics, dimensionality and rhetoric (Riker, 1984; Weimer, 1992). If attitudes (A) are formed according to the following model (Nelson et al, 1997)

A = ∑ vw

where v is an agent’s belief content and w her belief importance, and an extra element is added to capture the important role of priming (x1), we can arrive at a logistic expression for policy-making (P). This equation can be used to illustrate the importance for conservationists of not just adding material input to policies (which can change belief content, v1), but also of engaging in priming (x1) and framing (which in this case encapsulates using emphasis frames, z1 and equivalence framing, y1).

P = ∑ {v1[∑(z1-y1))]x1 + v2[∑(z2-y2))]x2 +…+ vn[∑(zn-yn))]xn}

As well as identifying the mechanics of how belief importance influences policy, I also use my results to postulate how belief importance plays a role in how policy changes, as shown in Figure 3. After all, understanding what happens in policy-making requires both a rich tapestry of data and a theoretical framework in which to assess assumptions and discern patters (Mayer, 1998). This dimensions-emphasis frames model (hereafter, DEF model) outlines the policy space that is inhabited by promulgated policies based on whether frames and dimensions are static or dynamic. It also suggests that as dynamic frames become static, conflict moves from being less about issues to being more about existential survival, becoming hardened in the process. This model suggests that emphasis frames can be used to solidify a winning policy, or undermine one when a consensual dimension exists. Conversely, when no consensual dimensions exist, and instead different frames are edited against dissonant dimensions, losing policy entrepreneurs can change frames and move from a stalemate and hardened conflict to a policy space with potential for winners and losers. In all cases, social and policy entrepreneurs (LPE are losing policy entrepreneurs, WPE winning ones) can move from static to dynamic frames and from consensual to dissonant dimensions, and back again, by priming and the application of winning equivalence frames.

Figure 3. The DEF model: Modeling how frames and dimensions influence policy outcomes.

The DEF model accords with the theory of punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Jones et al., 1998; and Jones and Baumgartner, 2004) and with at least the first part of Down’s issue-attention cycle (1972). As my research progresses, I will use its results to test the robustness of the DEF model against the cases under study.

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